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P R E F A C E 
Egypt is an outstanding example of a country whose poli-
tical destiny and economic development has been more vitally 
affected by her physical geography and strategic position rather 
than anything else. Being situated at the cross-roads of Asia, 
Africa and Europe, she has irresistably attracted great adventure-
rs and empire-builders who sought to extend their influence and 
authority over the largest possible area of the world. During 
the last 2,500 years, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the 
Arabs, the'^urks, and the last of all, a succession of Western 
Europeans were drauwn to this verdent delta of the Kile for the 
simple reason that it was the symbol of world-power-status. Napo-
leon acknowledged this fact when he called Egypt "the most impor-
tant country of the world." The opening of the Suez Canal in 
1869 further enhanced the strategic importance of Egypt, as it 
substantially reduced the time and expense of rough sea-going 
via the Cape, by connecting the Mediterranean with the Red Sea. 
Great Britain, had initially opposed the undertaking of 
this project as unfeasible and politically inadivisible. But 
later on it felt it necessary to get hold of the management and 
control of the canal with a view to neutralising the French influ-
to ence in Egypt, and in order /strengthen her own position in Asia 
/ 
and Africa. A series of timely accidents, however, led to the 
acquisition by Britain both of a major bloc of the canal stock 
and the actual defense of the canal site. In 1882, Britain*s 
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army forcibly occupied Sgypt after suppressing colonel orabi's 
nationalist agitation against foreign interference in Egypt's 
domestic matters. Since then, Egypt's political life has been 
dominated mainly by the problem of her relations with Britain. 
The various political parties and groups have been more seriously 
concerned with this most important issue than with any other 
matter. The most prominent of them, the Wafd, has been parti-
cularly engaged in dealing with and trying to redefine their 
country's relations with Britain. They have repeatedly insisted 
that their complete independence was the pre-condition for her 
socio-economic regeneration, that successful experiments in cons-
titutional processes could be undertaken only in the absence of 
external and un-called for interference in their domestic affairs. 
1 have dealt with many other sectors of society and 
pressure-groaps which also directed their zeal and energy to 
oppose or adjust their position with the British dcoainance. The 
Communists and the orthodox Ikhwans, though diametrically opposed 
to each other in their ideological approach and philosophical 
cannotation, have made common cause against the British. 
The king who occupied the central position in the triangular 
tussle for power and supremacy has always distracted Britain's 
interference in the making and unmaking of governments. 
These features of Egyptian politics became more prominent 
during the post-second world war period. In the new pattern of 
international politics in which the USA, and the U.S.S.R.emerged 
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the strongest powers, Great Britain immensely desired to stay on 
in Kgypt, The Egyptians, on the other hand, desired nothing 
more than the attainment of her coii5)lete independence. Their 
demand for the revision of the 1936 Treaty was accentuated to a 
large extent due to the Palestine debacle. 
During the decade from 1945 to 1954, Egyptnationalism 
became more vigorous and assertive, occasionally resorting to 
violence and sabotage. The orgy of unprecedented violence, 
looting, arson, killing and chaos thatcharacJberiSBd the Egyptian 
political scene during 1950-52 was an expression of ttieir anti-
British feelings and their utter disappointment to settle accounts 
with the British at the conference table. 
The revolutionary regime of Neguib and Nasser also soon 
discovered that stability and popularity of the new order as well 
as successful implementation of various reform plans were largely 
dependent on an early settlement with Britain. The question of 
the Sudan and the Suez Canal evacuation were therefore, taken 
immediately by the new elite. 
They succeeded in resolving their disputes with Britain 
in an amicable manner mainly due to the diplomatic astuteness, 
the 
straight forwardness and realism of the leaders o:^Revolutionary 
Command Council. They recognized the principle of self-deter-
mination for the Sudanese. This greatly facilitated the conclu-
sion of the most important and epoch-making agreement of the Suez 
Canal zone in October 1954. 
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An effort has been made to highlight, analyse and justify 
Egypt's struggle to emancipate herself from the feters of colo-
nialism. It has been maintained that it was wholly and primarily 
an expression of genuine nationalist sentiments,and not an atte-
mpt to divert the attention of the masses from the poor state of 
their national economy and administration, as some western scho-
lars have sought to establish. Their explanation of Egypt's 
unrest and coaos is characterised by a prejudicial approach and 
is not borne out by facts. It amounts to intellectual dishonesty 
as it is intended to thwart a judicious analysis and is invariably 
based on deliberately distorted facts. IThe British hegemony over 
the Egyptian politics operated as a cons tent limitation over her 
full sovereign status and vitiated her efforts in the economic 
sphere. 
Since it has been my purpose to examine and emphasise the 
Egyptian point of view in respect of their relations with imper-
ialist Britain, the .title of the present study h^s been accordingly 
/ 
worded as 'Egypt's relations with Great Britain. This appears 
somewhat mcommon and unconventional in the sense that most stu-
dies in this subject have been styled in the reverse order, obvi-
ously seeking to defend the British stand vis-a-vis the Egyptian 
cause of evacuation and freedom. 
I have tried to make an extensive study of the Egyptian J 
source-material that could be made available to me in the libera-
ries of Cairo, Damascus and Beruit. Bie archives of the Arab 
League Head Quarters at Cairo, were particularly helpful in this 
V 
regard. More often, however, I had to depend on official sources 
because press-censorship and ban on party publications has been 
too frequently and too rigidly applied by successive governments 
in Cairo during this period. 
Throughout this study I have used the term 'Middle East' 
instead of the currently popular and more appropriate term of 
•West Asia.' Uniformity of expression is the main reason. The 
Various documents, debates, conversations and resolutions have 
invariably used the term 'Middle East.' Even the Egyptians and 
other Arabs have used this same term in their expressions of 
thoughts regarding the problems of the area. MDreover, the term 
'West Asia' came in common use only during and after the Suez-
episode of 1956, while the period of my work is confined to the 
conclusion of the 1964 Suez Canal Evacuation Agreement. 
In the concluding chapter I have tried to summaries the 
whole issue of relations between the two nations with my observa-
tions and comments. The more suitable title for this chapter would 
be 'resume'. 
The appendices attached, here, have been selected from the 
point of view of their frequent reference in the text of the thesis. 
While going through tho relevant chapters, one might need to look 
for a more comprehensive reference of the brief citation. r 
Finally, I deem it my most pleasant duty to gratefully 
acknowledge the invaluable help and scholarly guidance of my 
teacher and supervisor. Professor Dr.S.A.H. Haqqi, Head of the 
Department of Political Science, in completing this work. Without 
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his constant interest, inspiring .t comments, expert advice and 
continuous assistance this work would not have been presented 
in this form. I sincerely thank him for all his encouragement 
that has sustained me through difficult moments in the course 
of the preparation of this thesis. 
SHAH ABDUL QAYYDM 
Chapter I, 
INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OP EGYPT'S 
RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN PRIOR TO 1945-
A* packground of Britain* s occupation 
of pgypt.,^ R„..1882 
Egypt* s uniQu^ position of being situated at the cross 
roads of Asia, Africa and Europe, (1) the stories of her 
\ 
magnificence and splendour as also the fact of most convenient 
trade-routes lying across her lands, have always fascinated the 
great empire-builders and conquerors of the world* 
The Assyrians who were the first to anniMlate the Pharees 
in 671 B.C., and their successors, the Persians, the Greeks, the 
Romans, the Byzantians, the Arabs and the Turks, (2) were all 
irresistibly drawn to the Valley of the Nile for the single reason 
of her vital strategy and resources. They all knew that Egypt was 
the "pivot of world-power-status". The European Powers of the 
modem era also recognized that the possession of Egypt was a 
1. Egypt occupies the north-eastern corner of the African 
Continent with an extension across the Gulf of Suez into the 
Sinai region which is usually, but not always regarded as 
lying in Asia. The area of Egypt's approximately 386,200 
sq. miles. Of this only 4 per cent is perman^tly settled 
while the remainder is desert and marsh. Egypt lies betwe^ 
lat. 22"and 32°N; and the greatest distance from north to 
south is about 674 miles and from east to west 770 miles 
giving the country a roughly square shape, with the Mediterra-
nean and the Red Sea forming respectively the northern and 
eastern boundaries. Egypt has political frontiers on the east 
with Israel (which she has recognized so far), on the south 
with the Republic of Sudan, and on the west with the United 
Kingdom of Libya. See The Middle East 1958 (Europe Publica-
tions, London, W.C.l), p.93. 
2. See, Encyclopaedia Britannica. vol.8, 1967, pp•66-73. 
-2-
great advantage in any contest for supremacy in the world. 
It is thus rightly said that; 
••• those who took roots blossomed forth as world 
powers while those who failed to imbed their roots 
in the-reot-fl in the verdent delta of the Hile, were 
destined to perish. (3) 
Napoleon* p 
Napoleon who aspired to extend the hegemony of France far 
and wide into the East and the West, also admitted that "Egypt 
was the most important country" in his plan of action because of 
her strategic importance. (4) He had fully realized that the 
conquest of England very much depended on the conquest- of Egypt 
because she was then the keystone of British ascendancy in the 
Indian Ocean. (5) His expedition to Egypt was therefore evidently 
motivated by his desire to obtain mastery over the Mediterranean 
in order "to cripple Britain communications with India", and thus 
to strike a blow at the English trade and politics in the entire 
East. (6) He succeeded in occupying Egypt because the Egyptians 
who were already sick and tired of misrule, corruption and 
cruelty of the Mamelukes, did not offer any resistance to him. 
On the contrary they well-received him hoping that the revolution-
ary banner of'liberty. Equality and Fraternity* raised in France 
3. Emile Lingyll, Egypt's Role in World Affairs (Washington, 
1957), p. 1. 
4. Emile Ludwig, Napoleon, trans. Eden and Paul (N.Y., 1956), 
pp. 10-11. 
6. A.J. Harriot, The Eastern Question - A Study of European 
Diplomacy (London, 1917), p. 8. 
6. J.H. Christopher, Bonapart in Egypt (London, 1962), pp. 4, 15. 
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would also fly over Egypt and hence restore their national 
dignity. (7) 
Russia and Britain, however, became seriously alarmed by 
the ascendancy of France over Egypt as it was bound to alter the 
existing balance of power in her favour. (8) They warned the 
people of Egypt and the Porte that the real motive of the French 
General was to make Egypt a permanent military base in order to 
expand his country's political influence and power in the 
Orient. (9) 
The Egyptians saw this danger within a short while of 
their association with the French rule of their country. They 
disliked Napoleon's economic reforms and administrative 'innova-
tions' . They were also seriously annoyed to discover that his 
'love of Islam' was merely a pretention for political purposes. 
Hence, they readily agreed to make a coranon cause with the Powers 
and'the Porte to get rid of the French occupation of Egypt. (10) 
The defeat and departure of the French army from Egypt in 
1799 was followed by a period of anarchy and administrative 
instability from which emerged Mohammed Ali - ' the founder of 
7. See P.G. Elgood, The Transit of Egypt (London, 1962), pp.33-37; 
also Jean and Simmare Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (London, 
1958), pp. 39-55. 
8. The British Minister at Istambul had warned Lord Granville 
that "the possession of Egypt by any independent power would 
be a fatal circumstance to the interests of his country". 
Quoted in John Marlowe, Anglo»Egyptian Relations 1800-1953 
(London, 1956), p. 15. 
9. See M. Rifat Bey, The Awakening of Modem Egypt (London, 1947), 
pp. 1-5, 10-15. 
10. Anthony M. Galatoli, Egypt In Mid-passage (Cairo, 1950), 
pp. 3-10. See also, Elgood, op.cit., pp. 40-45; also,^ 
D.A. Cmeron, Egypt In The Nineteenth Century (London, 1898), 
pp. 63-65. 
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modern Egypt' whose last descendant was Faruk. (ll) 
Mohammed All did many things to raise Egypt's social and 
political status. In 1841 he secured from the Sultan an 
autonomous status for Egypt, (12) and thus initiated the process 
of Egypt's transformation from the position of a canton of Islam 
to that of a national state. But he could never become popular 
because of his autocratic methods and personal whims- (13) 
His successors were his true replica - self-centred and 
devoted to their own aggrandizement at the cost of the people 
and dignity of the nation. They all failed to associate them-
selves with the land and the people they ruled over. Instead, 
they always cherished and relied on the friendship and protection 
of European friends and Missions in Egypt, and thus, virtually 
made Egypt a pai«na of power-politics. 
Among his successors. Said and Ismail were mainly 
responsible for Egypt's political subjugation and suffering 
during the past several decades. In 1856 Said Pasha obliged his 
engineer-friend, Perdenand de Lesseps of France, by granting him 
permission to construct the Suez Canal on terms which proved to 
be most harmful and burdensome for Egypt. (14) 
11. For a detailed'description of Mohammed Ali's rise in Egypt, 
his work and personality, see, Hehrey Dodwell, The Founder 
of Modem Egypt - a study of Mohammed Ali Pasha of Egypt 
(London, 1930). See also Abd ar-Rehman ar Raffl, Tarikh al 
Harakat al Qaumiva wa Tatawevar Nizam al Hukuma Fi Misre^ 
vol. VII (Cairo, 1944), pp. 311-13. 
12. Valentine Chirol, The Egyptian Problem (London, 1920), 
pp. 10-15. See also T.E. Holand, The European Concert In 
Eastern Question (London, 1885), pp. 110-14. 
13. Kaday Safran. Egypt in Search of Political Community (London, 1961), pp. 3O-S5TSee alsoy Encyclopaedia Britannica, op.cit. 
pp. 74-77. 
14. For text of the Suez Canal Concession Act, see Select 
Studies Committee, The Suez Canal - facts and documents (Cairo, 1956). ^ 
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Great Britain had strongly opposed the project and had 
refused to participate in its implementation, considering it 
unfeasible and politically inadvisable. Nevertheless, after the 
Canal was completed and was formally opened in 1869 for navigation, 
Britain became greatly interested in its political aspects. She 
realized that previously it was possible to neutralize Egypt by 
keeping all the Powers away, but now France was very much there 
and her influence could be countered only by adding equal 
influence of another po-wer* Moreover, the new water-channel had 
largely reduced the time and expense of shipping to and from 
India - then Britain* s most important colonial outpost as compared 
to the arduous and tire-some journey via the Cape of Good 
Hope. (15) Therefore, it now became a cardinal principle of 
British diplomacy to acquire maLximum control over this most 
strategic waterway and the country which owns it. (16) 
Ismail Pasha provided the British with opportunity and the 
excuse to intervene in Egypt's domestic matters and, eventually 
to forcibly occupy her in 1882. (17) He borrowed huge sums on 
16. Ibid. 
16. see, H.C. Deb, vol. 327, cols. 99-100. See also, E|W.P. 
Newman, Great Britain in Egypt (London, 1928), pp. 7-9. 
George Young, whose book Egypt has been wide-acclaimed as 
a fairly objective treatment of the Egyptian question, wrote 
that it was the Canal that "changed for the worse the 
relations between the British Empire and Egypt by shifting 
the main objective of British policy from Constantinople to 
Cairo. Thereafter, it would have been difficult for Egypt ••• 
to prevent the British Empire from guarding so vital and 
vulnerable a line of communication by garrisoning at least 
the Irthimes." See, George Young, Egypt ( )» P* 
17. See W.S. Blunt, Secret History of British Occupation of 
Egypt (London, 1895)• 
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exhorbitant rate of interest - 12 to 15 per cent (18) from the 
European moneylenders, apparently for the realization of his 
misconception of modernization of Egypt. His spent-thrift fiabits 
and luxurious trips of European capitals, further indebted his 
country. Being unable to repay the debts from his meagre local 
Resources, he unwisely sold out his country's shares of the Suez 
Canal, Maritime Company at a Hhrow-away' price to Britain. (19) 
Selling away his shares was a confession of his bankruptcy 
and admission of his inability to manage his country's economic 
affairs. The British and the French who had vast financial 
interest in stabilizing Egypt's economy, first imposed a 'Joint 
Control' to look after all financial matters of Egypt, and finally 
when Ismail resisted this interference, they persxiaded the Sultan 
to depose him, and appoint his son Tewfik Pasha in his place. (20) 
B. Orabi's Nationalist Campaign and 
Britain's occup&tion of Egypt 
Thus, in 1882 Egypt was already under the authority of 
the 'Joint Control' of Britain and France. The new Khedive, 
being installed in office with the blessings of the two Powers 
could not, indeed he did not wish to, become independent of their 
influence. He was ^ ust a figure head, acting upon the advises 
18. John Marlowe, Angle-Egyptian fielatioQs 1800-1956 (London, 
1965), pp. 91, 93. 
19., H.C; Deb.^  vol. 327, cols. 99-100. See also Tom Little, 
Modem Egypt (London, 1967), pp. 39-45; also, Elgood, op.cit., 
p. 58. 
20. Lord Cromer, Modem Egypt^ vol. I (London, 1907), pp. 57-61. 
See also Wood Jarvis, PaahlL to Faruk (London, 1956), 
chapter 18; see also, A.T. Wilson, The Suez Canal (London, 
1939), pp. 48-58. 
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and according to the xirishes of the British and the French j^ents 
who did not wish to encourage the native's participation in 
their country's affairs. (21) 
The people of Egypt were awfully sick and tired of the 
incompetence of their rulers and the growing alien interference 
in their internal matters* They resented the discriminatory 
policy of the administration and suppressive methods adopted by 
the 'Dual Control', and were preparing to agitate against injustice 
and malpractices prevalent in the entire administrative set up. 
Colonel Ahmed Orabi, a son of the soil, finally led them to 
protest against the 'hold' of the outsiders over the Palace and 
the public affairs, and put an end to the rule of self-interested 
aristocrats. His objectives were purely nationalist. He fought 
for "^s country's freedom and to preserve the rights of his 
fellow-countrymen. The British were alarmed by the rise of a 
nationalist upsurge and wished to nip it in the bud. They 
forcibly suppressed the popular uprising and purposely called it 
a 'rebellion' to Justify their naked aggression and capture of 
political authority of the world's most important country. 
From that moment Great Britain exercised her exclusive 
authority and influence over all matters connected with Egyptian 
affairs until the Revolution took place in July 1952. During 
the crucial period of the two Great Wars, Great Britain did not 
allow Egypt to slip out of her hold, despite continuing nationalist 
21. Jamal Mohammed Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian 
Nationalism (London, 1960), pp. 22-25. See also M. Mustafa 
Ala, Egypt between two Revolutions (Cairo), pp. 15-43. 
-8-
agitation. Egypt was too important a link in her communications 
with Asia and Africa to let it go free or go against her own 
economic and strategic interests. By virtue of their strong 
political position, backed by their standing army and naval units, 
they imposed their preferences in making and unmaking of govern-
ments in Egypt to suit their requirements and war time 
The Establishment of Protectorate 
At the outbreak of the Great ¥ar in September 1914, 
Egypt's political status underwent a sudden and significant 
change. His Majesty's Government's formal declaration of war on 
Germany on 4 August had placed Egypt in a peculiar politico-
legal anamoly. legally, Egypt owed allegiance to the suzerain -
the Sultan of Turkey - who was intending to join the side of 
Britain's enemy. (22) 
While practically she was already under the occupation of 
Britain. In the event of Turkey's siding with Germany, all his 
subjects, including the Egyptians, were to be considered at war 
with Britain and all of their hostile acts were to find a legal 
justification. To avoid the creation of such an awkward and 
difficult situation, Britain declared Egypt to be a 'Protectorate' 
free from the suzerainty of the Turkish Sultan. (23) 
Britain's action was, nevertheless, unilateral and illegal 
in character and consequences, but she justified it on the 
22. War between Great Britain and Turkey was declared on 
6 November 1914. See limes* 7 November 1914. 
23. British and Foreign State Papers, 1915. vol. 109, pp.435-39. 
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ground of Egypt's peculiar position in their strategy of the 
war. Under the given circiimstances, the least embarrassing 
course for them was to declare Egypt a * protected' territory-
The alternatives being annexation or full independence were neither 
desirable nor expedient from their viewpoint. Annexation not only 
would have prompted suspicion among the neutral nations as -well 
as the allies, but also aroused serious resentment and disorder 
throughout Egypt, while full autonomy would Iiave added to Britain's 
strain and anxiety to maintain her vital interests. A protectorate 
therefore, appeared to them to be the only practicable solution 
to meet the requirements of the situation. In the words of 
Elizabeth Monroe, the protectorate was to be "less humiliating 
to Egyptians, more platable to allies, and making no difference 
to the British military grip on the country." (24) 
The Egyptians felt humiliated and were annoyed by the 
establishment of the protectorate and more so by the war-time 
regulations. The highhandedness of the British military rule 
destroyed whatever chance there had been of an understanding 
between the British and the Egyptian national movement. 
During the war period, the Egyptians however remained 
neutral. When the Sultan of Turkey sent around a call for 'Jihad' 
the Egyptians did not respond to it. This was not solely because 
their towns and cities were turned into armed camps in which the 
people were compelled to be 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' 
but also because they hated the Turks. They were too sick and 
tired of the Turkish domination of their country to wish her a 
24. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East 
1914-1960 (London, 1963), pp. 25-26. 
-10-
military victory. In Turkey* s defeat they saw their national 
emancipation and freedom from the Khedive* s repressive tutelage. 
There was also the prospect, upon Turkey's collapse, of the Muslim 
and Arab leadership devolving upon Egypt. Precisely, it was not 
solely the dislike of Turkey but certain calculations as well 
that determined the Egyptian*s and other Arab*s attitude towards 
the Ottoman Empire at the time when her dismemberment seemed 
imminent. The news of Turkey's attack on the Suez Canal on 
2 February 1915, and the atrocities of Jemal Pasha in Syria 
further compelled them to outrightly break with the Sultan of 
Turkey, hitherto their suzerain and their Caliph. By attacking on 
Egypt, Turkey sank into the estimation of nationalist groups. (25) 
C. Egypt's Mationalist Struggle and the 
Award of Partial Independence in 1922 
After the war, the Egyptians naturally expected a relaxation 
in British control and to receive independence as a reward for 
their contribution and sacrifices, without which Sir Archibald 
Murray, Commander of the Allied Forces in the Suez Canal Area could 
not have repulsed the Germans. (26) 
But to their utter dismay, the Egyptians were to find 
that President Wilson* s announcements that the Allies were fighting 
25. Elgood, op.cit., p. 221. See also Header Bullard, Britain 
and the Middle East (London, 1951), p. 57. 
26. There were 21,000 Egyptians working idth the Canal Transport 
Service in 1917. Of them 220 were killed, 1,400 wounded and 
4,000 died in hospital. In all, there were 135,000 Egyptians 
taking part in the Syrian campaign aloneV Besides that, 
there were 30,000 men of Egyptian army serving under British 
command in the Sudan. 8,500 serving in the Labour Corps in 
Mesopotamia and 10,000 men in Prance. See Little, op.cit., 
p. 70. 
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the war *to preserve the liberties of small nations' (27) and 
the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918, (28) were to be 
applied to all nations but Egypt. The British showed no regard 
for Egyptian national sentiments. Soon after the end of the War, 
they further intensified their hold over business of the State. 
The number of British officials increased from 300 in 1898 to 
1,700 which was obviously an xmbearable burden on Egypt's limited 
resources. (29) In place of a relatively smaller body of well-
disciplined troops of the pre-War period, there was now a large 
number of British and imperial troops who were quite insensitive 
to the political importance of their good or bad behaviour. It 
was thus clear from almost every act of Britain in Egypt that they 
had no intention of leaving Egypt to the Egyptians. 
The presence of such a large number of officials and troops 
were bound to create obstacles for Egypt in the exercise of her 
sovereign rights. Their large-scale spending caused inflation in 
the economy of the country. Forced recruitment of peasants for 
the 'Egyptian Labour Corps' and the seizure of her cattle and 
crops to feed their troops, badly affected the agriculture which 
resulted in the acute shortage of food supplies. (30) Above all, 
the post-War unemployment and moral degeneration of the European 
soldiers inflamed the people's indignation against the 
imperialists. 
27. British Parliamentary Papers Cmd. 5974, p. 49. 
28. The World's Great Events (Colliers, New York), vol.7, p. 47. 
29. Beader Bullard, op.cit., p. 118. 
30. George lenssowski. The Middle Bast in World Affairs (New 
York, 1966), pp. 394-96. 
-12-
This was the political climate in which Egypt, insensed 
with a feeling of injustice, decided that she should take her 
place, not merely as an independent nation, but also as the 
leading Muslim and Arab state. In Saad Zaghlul pasha, a lawyer 
of Fellahiro origin, % Egyptian nationalism found a successful 
and energetic champion* Soon after the armistice agreement was 
signed between the two sides of the Great Powers, he sought 
permission to go to London to present their demands before His 
Majesty*s Government. 
Great Britain*s refusal to permit Zaghlul and his associa-
tes, was followed by an outbreak of violence which seriously 
threatened the life and property of the British subjects in Egypt. 
It seemed that Egypt's legitinate grievances could only be 
ventilated by means of agitation. In this moment of crisis, when 
the ruthlessness of administrative machinery had failed to prevent 
disorder and lawlessness, the Acting High Commissioner, Sir 
Cheetham committed a serious political mistake by arresting the 
nationalist leaders and deporting them to Malta. Certainly, Sir 
Cheetham had underrated Zaghlul*s mass popularity and completely 
misunderstood the Egyptian's mood and their desire for freedom, 
if he had imagined that a display of firmness was all that was 
necessary to restore order in the country. 
Though the new High Commissioner of Egypt, lord Allenby, 
-v 
succeeded in suppressing the revolt by force, nevertheless seemed 
to have fully realized that in such circumstances Britain could 
not maintain her interests without giving Egypt some 
concessions. (31) The grov/ing influence of the middle class. 
31. Marlowe, op.cit., p. 236. 
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demands of the modernization programmes and increased need 
for civil servants, sway of new ideas of democracy and self-
determination, had allied even the 'moderates' in the nation-
wide protest. All this revealed the gravity of the situation 
and the strength of the movement for liberation. Lord Allenby 
also seemed to have learnt and accepted that the main clamour 
in Egypt was for independence rather than internal reforms* His 
immediate reaction was, therefore, to release the acknowledged 
leaders of nationalism from deportation and to permit them to go 
to Paris, where the interests of Egypt were sacrificed at the 
alter of the Great Power politics. Zaghlul failed to receive 
recognition of Egypt's participation in the war, and thereby to 
secure its reward. Great Britain had already convinced the 
world dignitaries that Egypt's constitutional inhibitions were 
not yet sufficiently developed, and that they would grow up in 
the shadow of the protectorsite. 
The Egyptians were seriously disappointed and disgusted 
at the turn of events. They unanimously boycotted Lord Millner's 
Mission that arrived in Egypt towards the end of November 1920 
to study Egyptian conditions and recommends .on fchat basis a 
working arrangement under the British Protectorate. In his 
report to the Foreign Secretary of State, lord Millner, who had 
been deeply impressed by the thoroughness of the nationalist 
determination, recommended to abandon the protectorate and to 
redefine Britain's relations with Egypt on the basis of a bilateral 
treaty. (32) On 28 February 1922, His Majesty's Government in 
32. Report of the Special Mission to Egypt. Cmd. 1131 (1921), 
pp. 19-21. See also Lord Allenby's Note to Lord Curzon, 
dated 12 January 1922, Cmd. 1722, p. 20. 
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UK admitted that a policy of forcible repression of nationalist 
forces in Egypt could not continue indefinitely, when it made a 
unilateral declaration of partial independence; 
Whereas His Majesty's Grovemraent, in accordance with 
their declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognize 
Egypt as an independent sovereign state; and whereas 
the relations between His Majesty's Government and 
Egypt are of vital importance to the British Etapire; 
the following principles are hereby declared; 
1* The British Protectorate over Egypt is"termina-
ted and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign 
state* 
2. As soon as the Government of His Highness shall 
pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all 
inliabitants of Egypt, Martial Law, as proclaimed on 
2 Nov^aber 1914, shall be withdrawn* 
3. The following matters are absolutely reserved 
to the directions of His Majesty's Government until 
such time as it may be possible by free discussion 
and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude 
agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's 
Government of Egypt; 
a) The security of the communications of the 
- British Empire in Egypt. 
b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign 
. aggression or interference, direct or indirect. 
c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt 
. and the protection of minorities. 
d) The Sudan. 
On the conclusion of such agreements the status 
quo in these matters shall remain in tact. (33) 
r 
This declaration of independence would have been generally 
welcomed in Egypt but for the reservations which constituted a 
serious limitation on her sovereignty. The protection of 
minorities was merely a pretext for interference in anything and 
33. British and Foreign State Papers (London, 1922), pp. 84-86 
also Cmd. 1592. 
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everything relating to internal affairs. Her right of diplomatic 
representation was also nullified by the necessity to consult 
the British High Commissioner that is to say, in fact, to submit 
to his direct control in the conduct of foreign affairs. The 
document also did not propose for Egypt* s membership in the 
Leagixenof Nations. Lord Lloyd, who later as High Commissioner 
based his entire policy on the text of declaration, pointed out 
that it had given Egypt *a qualified independence, an independence 
i^ich was subject to certain definite reservations*, and that 
these reservations *were an absolutely vital part of that 
declaration. (34) The Egyptian-'nationalists refused to accept 
the limitations on their sovereign independence involved in the 
reserved points. Zaghlul Pasha expressed his disappointment but 
later persuaded himself and his followers to accept it as a 
useful forward step towards the attainment of complete independence. 
And, therefore, soon after assuming office of the Prime Minister 
Zaghlul raised the issue of the presence of the British troops 
being incompatible with Egyptian independence and the Sudan being 
an integral part of Egypt. He had hoped that the new British 
Prime Minister, Mr. Bamsay MacDonald, who had oft«i sympathised 
with the Egyptian cause and had openly criticised Lloyil George* s 
Government for its repressive policies in Egypt, (36) would be 
more considerate towards Egypt*s aspirations. In September, he 
went to London to discuss his country* s outstanding problems 
34. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cronver (London, 1933). 
35. Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), vol. 160, 1922, 
pp. 87-93. See also Lord Lloyd, op.cit., pp. 85-^8. 
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with the new Labour Government. (36) But the reality turned 
out to be quite different. Mr. MacDonald did not agree with 
his demands regarding the Sudan. He plainly told the Egyptian 
Premier that no arrangement could be contemplated that would 
Jeopardise the administration and development of the Sudan. (37) 
It was mainly on the question of the Sudan that their 
negotiations broke dov/n® On his returning horns, anti-British 
activities broke out in all the major cities of the country. 
Even in the Sudan the agitation became widespread. Fuel was 
added to the fire by yet another folly committed by the British 
administration in the Sudan. They announced to divert more of 
the Nile water for irrigation of the British-owned cotton fields 
in Gazira, which was obviously damaging for the Egyptians. (38) 
This unilateral action infuriated the Egyptians and was 
an immediate provocation which culminated in the murder of Sir 
Lee Stack on 19 November 1924. (39) He was simultaneously the 
36. The Times. September 1924. 
37. Even before Zaghlul had reached London, MacDonald had 
to Lord Allenby thatJ "Until X have some indication that his 
(Zaghlul* s) aspirations do not conflict too hopelessly with 
our irreducible requirements regarding the Sudan and the 
defence of the Canal in particular, I would be unwilling to 
ask him to undertake negotiations in London." See Foreign 
Office pespatcht Mr. MacDonald to Viscount Allenby, 3 April 
1924 in Lloyd, op.cit., p. 85. Similarly, on 24 June 1924, 
Lord Paramour had emphatically stated before the House of 
Lords that the Government was not going to abandon the Sudan 
in any sense whatever. See House of Lords Debates,. 5th 
Series, vol. 57, col. 986. 
38. J.C. See also. Reader Bullard, op.cit., p. 186. 
Dn IQ N'nv<atnh<»'»«- Ho t^TSta onino •P'nnrn •hho trait t 39. O 19 o ember, he was go g from t e w r office to his 
house in Cairo when he received a volley of shots from seven 
men dressed as students who were lined up on the side wall. 
He died the following day. See Egyptian Gazette^ 20 November 
1924. 
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Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army and the Governor-General 
of the Sudan. 
The reaction of the British High Commissioner on the 
incident was unduly severe and vindictive. He demanded the 
Egyptian Government to apologise for the crime, 4^quire 
the utmost energy* and punish the culprits 'without respect of 
persons*; pay an indemnity of £500.000 and suspend all political 
dgnonstrations; immediately withdraw all Egyptian forces from the 
Sudan (within 24 hours); notify to the competent Department 
that Great Britain reserves the right to 'increase the area for 
irrigation at Gazira from 300^000 feddams (acres) to an unlimited 
figure'. (40) (Italics mine) 
The tone and nature of these demands and the accompanying 
waring tliat "failing immediate compliance with the demands, His 
Majesty's Government will at once take appropriate action to safe-
guard their interests in Egypt and the Sudan", (41) however, 
shox^ ed that Allenby merely intended to use the incident, as a 
means of discrediting Zaghlul and his Wafdist Government in the 
eyes of his people, and a pretext to establish Britain's position 
in the Sudan on permanent basis by forcing the Egyptian officers 
and troops out of that territory. (42) 
40. Abd El Monein Omar, The Sudan Question based on British 
Documents (Cairo, 1952), pp. 83-85"^  Also The Times (London)^ 
24 November 1924. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Mohammad Neguib, Egypt's Destiny (London, 1956), p. 63. 
See also J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy-in the Near and the Middle 
East, vol. II, p. 128; also, Information Paper No. 19« op.cit., 
p. 13. 
-18-
This was a clear violation of Egypt*s sovereignty and 
an uncalled-for interference in her domestic affairs. Zaghlul 
resigned in protest on 24 November 1924. (43) King Fuad, who 
was jealous of Vfafd's popularity and held its prominent leaders, 
and thus became an absolute dictator and ruled with great 
assertion of personal authority. The British High Commissioner 
preferred to shpport him in his bid to suppress the Wafdists. (44) 
He exercised his constitutional authority liberally in 
making and unmaking of ministers. This state of uncertainty and 
ministerial instability, demagogy and chaos continued until 
Fuad«s death in April 1936. 
The Wafd found its chance to reassert its influence on 
Egypt's politics vis-a-vis Britain's domination, only after the 
King died in April 1936* The growing 'menace' of Mussolini in 
the sm'rounding areas, Tripolitan and Abyssinia, also enhanced 
Wafd's bargaining position regarding modifications in the 'Pour 
Reserved Points'. 
D. Egypt's Struggle for Full Freedom and the 
conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 
1936 - Brief Analysis of its main provisions 
ajid their Implications 
Nahas Pasha, who had again become Prime Minister in May 
1936, (45) however, soon realized that in the event of a major war. 
43. The Times. 26 November 1924. 
44. F.M.V. Wavell, Allenby - Soldier and Statesman (iondon, 1946), 
pp. 338-39. 
46. In the General Elections held on 2 May 1936 the Wafdt swept 
the polls by securing 99 out of 132 seats in the Senate and 
186 of 232 in the Chambers. It is to be noted here that on 
12 December 1935 Fuad had restored the original 1923 
Constitution as a result of which his prerogative to appoint 
(contd. on next page) 
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rival powers would fight for the possession of Egypt mainly 
because of its most important strategic location and transit 
routes connecting Asia, Africa and Europe. She could not have, 
therefore, remained neutral or disinterested in this struggle. 
The defiance of the League of Nations by Italy had already shaken 
her confidence in international security, in general and her own 
in particular. Being situated so near to the victim of the 
Italian invasion, Abyssinia, Egypt would, in no time, be the next 
to fall. Fear of Italy therefore seemed to have 'temporarily 
damped the ardour of the Wafd and other Egyptian nationalists to 
rid themselves too quickly of the British'. (46) 
In August 1936, Nahas paid a visit to London and opened 
negotiations with His Majesty's Government, (47) and finally 
signed a treaty with the British Government. (48) Under tiiis 
treaty the Egyptian leaders agreed to collaborate in the Allied-
War efforts against the Axis in recognition of Egypt's complete 
independence. The principal objective of the arrangement, valid 
for twenty years (Art. 16), was expected to establish a basis for 
45. (contd. from back page) 
three-fifth Senators was dropped. See Walter H. Mallory, ed.^  
Political handbook of World Parliaments^ Parties and Press 
(New York, 1938), p. 6. 
46. Richard Hilton, The Thirteenth Power (London, 1958), p. 83. 
47. His team consisted of representatives of all Egyptian 
political parties, a total of thirteen. This multitude of 
signatories was an unusual but necessary precaution. In this 
way all the parties shared the responsibility and it was 
difficult for any one of them to evade the agreement later. 
See Anthony Eden, Memoirs - Full Circle (London, 1959), p. 224-
48. For full text of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, s ^ 
Parliamentary Papers 1937. Treaty Series No. 6, Cmd. 5360. 
-20-
more cordial and permanent relations between the two countries, 
by formally terminating the 'Protectorate* (Art. l). The treaty 
also provided for the removal of British forces from Cairo and 
Alexandria to the Canal Zone, and limited their number to 10,000 
troops and 400 pilots. (49) Britain also agreed to permit 
unrestricted immigration of the Egyptians into The Sudan and 
promised to help Egypt in securing membership of the League of 
Nations (Art. 3) as well as in the abolition of the capitulations 
(Art. 13). The approved draft of the agreement also contained 
a very significant provision - Article 16 which savs that the high 
contracting parties^ could *any time after the expiration of a 
period of ten years" ^  enter into negotiations for its revision. 
Implications of the Treaty 
The Treaty was an important landmark in the history of 
Anglo-Egyptian relations. The Egyptians generally welcomed it as 
a step forward towards complete independence. (50) Being primarily 
r 
a treaty of mutual defence and alliance, it also appeared to solve, 
for the time being, the problem of Egypt* s sovereignty and 
independence by terminating the 'occupation* which had long been 
abhorrent to the Egyptians. 
Nahas Pasha was widely hailed as its chief architect. 
But, in fact, Britain's predominant position was not fundamentally 
changed. A closer examination of its provisions would show that 
/ 
Britain actually gave up nothing with the exception of certain 
responsibilities pertaining to Egypt's internal administration and 
49. See Annex to Article 8 in the Appendix. 
50. Mustafa Ata, op.cit., p. 81. 
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protection of foreign and minority interests (Art. 12). She 
fully retained her position regarding 'imperial communications', 
'the Sudan', and 'the defence of Egypt' as provided in the 
unilateral declaration of 1922. Besides, it was exclusively for 
the British Military Mission to advise the Egyptian Army in all 
military matters. Above all, the alliance was perpetual because 
it could never be broken or repudiated unilaterally. (51) Any 
demand for a revised treaty which did not contain provision for 
ultimate British military control was in itself a breach of the 
Treaty. The nationalist movement demanding full independence, 
therefore, could be considered not only an act hostile to British 
interests but also unconstitutional, because the King had bound 
himself, by ratifying the treaty, to regard British vital interests 
as also being be4ftg vital interests of his own country. (62) The 
abortion of capitulat^ too could not be regarded as convincing 
evidence of Britain's sincerity or good intentions. By compelling 
other Powers to relinquish their 'capitulatory privileges', 
Britain only eliminated European opposition to her position and 
activities in Egypt. The provision that the British Ambassador in 
Cairo would always be given precedence over all the other members 
of the diplomatic corps, clearly manifested the desire of Britain 
to maintain its position in Egypt. Finally, the Sudan problem 
which had been the principal stumbling block in all previous 
negotiations was not satisfactorily settled. The Governor-General 
of the Sudan, essentially a British agent, still exercised the 
61. Anthony Eden, op.cit., p. 226. 
S2. See Michael lonides, Divide and Rule (London, 1960), 
pp. 27-28. 
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' supreme military and civil command* as originally provided 
bv the 3B99 Convention* C53) Restrictions on the size of British 
forces also were not only unbinding to the Sudan* but not applica-
ble to Egypt also 'in the event of vrar% menace of war or apprehen-
ded emergency' (Art. para 2^. Financially too, the treaty was 
a burden on Egypt's limited resources, ^^was requir^ (Annex 
to Art^ 8, par^ S and 4) to 'make available th© land aad 
construct the accommodation> water supplies, amenities and 
convalescent camps', ^ r the British Forces at her own expense. 
Furthermore, to meet the needs of the increased garrison in the 
Canal Zone, Egypt was to provide facilities for rapid entrainment 
of personnel, guns, vehicles and stores, for which she had to 
construct and maintain several roads, bridges and railways. 
The Wafd Party's achievement in concluding this treaty 
and its later success in securing the abolition of Capitulations 
at the MontreaiK Conference in 1937, and Egypt's admission to the 
League_gf Nations in the same year, (54) vastly increased its 
popularity with the masses. It was therefore naturally expected 
that the Wafd would remain in power for quite some time. But a 
series of unpleasant events in Egypt's national politics, rivalries 
and splits in the ranks of the ruling party, and clashes with the 
young King, seriously undermined its position and prospects. 
The Wafd also entered into conflict with the young and 
"popular" King as soon as the latter came of age on 29 July 1937, 
9 
and evinced a keen interest in the affairs of the State. Nahas 
53. Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Questiop (London, 1951), Appendix A, 
p. 158. 
Survey of International Affairs 1937^  vol. I, pp. 581-606. 
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Pasha seemed seriously alarmed by the start of the King Faruk, 
and felt it necessary to renew his attempt to diminish the 
»royal prerogative*.- His efforts in this regard, however, only 
further annoyed the King and consequently widened the gulf between 
them. Following in the footsteps of his father,Faruk refused to 
grant the requisite 'royal assent' to any such measure by invoking 
his authority on the basis of the 1923 constitution which was then 
in existence. They becaiae more antagonistic to each other when a 
'Green Shirt*, a member of the Misr al-Fatah, a small extremist 
I 
body, generally believed to be patronised by the Palace, made an 
unsuccessful attempt on Nahas Pasha's life. Pro-Nahas demonstra-
tions by students and the »Blue Shirts' only delayed the King's 
action until 30th of December 1937, when he dismissed Nahas from 
the Prime Ministership. The ground of the dismissal was described 
by the King that he no longer enjoyed public support; that his 
cabinet's method of work undermined the spirit of the constitution, 
and that he 'failed to protect public liberties'. (55) 
E* Britain sought Egypt's Collaboration 
in the War 
At the outbreak of the war in September 1939, and specially 
at the advent of a pro-Axis Government in France which rendered 
the African theatre of war vulnerable, Egypt once again became a 
ma^or base for the Allied troops. Britain became more concerned 
about Egypt's internal affairs after their setback in Libya and 
5i5» Philip Graves, "The story of the Egyptian Crisis", 
Nineteenth Centuiy^ March 1938. See also Tom Little, 
(London, 1968), pp. 156-57. 
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the Italian air-raids on her borders in June 1940. C56) VJith 
f. r 
successful German blitzkrings in Europe and the decision of the 
Albanians to seal their destiny with Italy by offering the Cro\m 
of Albania to Victor Qnmanual III, King of Italy and Emperor of 
Ethiopia, (57) it became absolutely imperative for Britain to 
secure Egypt* s "administrative cooperation" in resisting the Axis 
advances in the Mediterraneans Their anxiety was fully appreciated 
by the Government of Ali Mahir who promptly assured to carry out 
V - ' "" 
the obligations of the 1936 Treaty. He repeated the assurance of 
his country's collaboration with the Allies when he said; 
Egypt and its people are loyal and sincere friends 
of Britain, and will do everything in our power to 
help her. We shall oppose with all our might any 
attempt at domination by brute. ... We struggled for 
years to obtain our independence, and to preserve this 
independence we are ready to make any sacrifice. (58) 
^ r 
Under the terras of Article 7, para 2, of the Treaty, a 
state of seige was proclaimed in Egypt, the Prime Minister became 
the Military Governor of Egypt, solely responsible for the 
maint«iance of security, her communications, ports and aerodromes 
were placed at the disposal of Great Britain; severed her 
diplomatic relations with,Germany, arrested its nationals and 
seized their property. (59) Yet her international position remained 
56• Charles Issawi, Egypt; An Economic and Social Analysis 
(Iondon, Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1947), pp.~68-69. 
57. Documents on International Affairs 1939-46^ vol. I (RIIA, 
london, 1951), p. 135. 
The Times. 8 September 1939. 
59. Uew York Times^ 5 September 1939. 
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anamolous. Despite the fact that Egypt had most sincerely 
fulfilled the obligations of 1936 Alliance, she had not yet 
officially declared war on Germany* *The only practical difference, 
however, between the existing state of affairs and the state of 
war was that the Egyptian armed forces were not committed to 
active hostilities against Germany.' (60) 
Ali Mahir seems to have based his attitude on the situation 
of the war in Europe as well as in the Bast which had then 
brightened the prospects of Axis victory. (61) His hesitation in 
coiranitting his people to Britain, therefore, was not unjustifiable. 
His anxiety to renew contacts with the Axis Powers (62) too does 
not seem to have been unwise or impolitic in such circumstances. 
The intelligentsia of the country, impressed as it had been by 
the Axis propaganda abroad^their respect for the principles of 
Islam and the promise of independence from colonial yoke, (63) r 
favoured a non-committal attitude. It was argued that Egypt's 
declaration of war "would not provide any important accretion of 
strength to the Allies". On the other hand, if the Allies emerge 
victorious in this conflagration, Egypt would, no doubt, have many 
60w Marlowe, op.cit., p. 313. 
61. Heyworth-Dunne, Beligious and Political Trends in Modem 
Egypt (Washington, 1960), p. 86. 
r 
62. Survey of International Affairs 1939-46 (BIIA, london, 1951), 
vol. I, p. 135. 
63. Seth Arsenian, "War Time Propaganda in the Middle East", 
The Middle East Jourr^ al^  vol. II, October 1948, pp. 419-23. 
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advantages and 'share in the spoils of the victoiy, but in case 
they collapse, Egypt will be * exposed to the vengeance of the 
Axis*. (64) Such a risk could only be avoided by not making a 
formal declaration of war against the Axis Powers, who would then 
admit that Egypt being under actual British control with large 
contingents of Suropean armies, could not have done otherwise. (65) 
But the very fact that Britain still possessed the power 
to maintain its rights and to assert its views in Egypt's internal 
affairs, however, did not permit any Government to go against its 
wishes. At this stage of the war Britain needed Egypt's full and 
active cooperation to meet the growing strength of the enemy in 
North Africa. The prospects of Germany's 'summer offensive' 
against Russia, required speedy and uninterrupted flow of men and 
material to the Egyptian military base. Any reluctance to openly 
intervene in Egypt's domestic policies was now overcome by what 
was regarded by them as ' overwhelming necessity of war*. (66) 
On 3 February the British Ambassador is understood 
to have requested of the King that, in accordance with 
the constitutional practice, a government should be 
formed which commanded a majority in the country and 
would therefore be able to control the internal situa-
tion: only, a government h^ded by NahaS Pasha, as leader 
of the the opinion of His Excellency, could 
be sure to commanding such a majority. 
64. Marlowe, op.cit.. pp« 313-14. See also Egyptian Gazettey 16 September 1940. 
65. All Mahir who was impressed by the recent Axis victories in 
the Par East and the western Desert and propaganda sought to 
avoid any conflict with them. He maintained his country's 
rgle^of^non-belligerency ev^ af^r the actual linmsion of 
Egyptian territory by the Italians who, by uctoDer is^ aO had 
aldvanc^ 70 miles inside Egyptian 'territory. See Henry 
Maitland "Wilson, Eight Years Overseas 1939-47 (London, 1950), 
p. 45. See also The Dally Telegraph. 17 June 1940. 
66. George Kirk, The Middle East in the War 1939-46 (BIIA, 1952), 
pp. 209-210. 
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King Faruk who had already made up his mind to bring in a 
government less committed to support the British efforts, did not 
like the British Ambassador suggesting to appoint a person he did 
not like, to the position of the Prime Minister. He, however, 
replied that «he would consult the leaders of all parties, including 
Nahas, with a view to the formation of a coalition government'-
British sources believed that the King intended to recall Ali Mahir, 
which they could not have tolerated at a time when »the strategic 
outlook was far from good'. Hence they decided to take no chances, 
and the very next day the British Ambassador clearly warned that 
unless I hear by 6 p»m> that Na^s Pasha has been 
His Ma3¥sty~ICIngI^ruk must 
p^ec^ jtfiTe consequer^s. C67) 
On the King's rejection of the ultimatum, HE Sir Miles 
Lampson, called on him at 9 p.m. and 'insisted upon the absolute 
necessity of his sending for Nahas, as representing the majority of 
the country'• In this epoch-making meeting with the Egyptian King, 
he was accompanied by the GOC British troops in Egypt and an 
armoured escort. He was bent upon securing the maximum collaboration 
of the Egyptian Government in carrying out the terms of the 1936 
Treaty of Alliance, and he thought Nahas would not disappoint. 
Surrounded thus by British guns, tanks and troops, Faruk conceded 
the British demand. (68) 
67. Ibid. 
68. A Cairo newspaper, close to the King, gave the following 
account of what happenee on that day. 
"... at 9 p.m. on 4 February 1942, the Britishers 
pe3?petrated a treacherous violation of Egyptian sovereignty. 
Tanks with guns trained, surrounded Asdin Palace and 
thousands of troops, fully armed, patrolled the neighbour-
(contd. on next page) 
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The British Ambassador*s insistence upon Nahas Pasha's 
appointment seem^ to have been based first on his understanding 
that Nahas was more amenable to the British cause while in office, 
and more critical even harmful, wh«a outside the office. (69) 
Secondly, after the expulsion of the Italians from Egypt in 
Dec^nber 1841, Nahas Pasha himself was convinced of the \d.sdom of 
siding vdth the Allies. He had calculated that in the event of 
an Axis victory the "Wafd would have no political future. Its 
basic stand of democratic government and rights of the conanon man 
quite incompatible with the political philosophy of the Axis Powers. 
Above all, Nahas being himself the principal architect of the 
1936 Treaty could be trusted to fulfil its obligations in the 
most sincere and suitable manner. (70) Finally, the Wafd in a 
situation in which the King had been * completely written off* 
owing to his pro-Axis sympathies', the constitutional Liberals 
68. (contd. from back page) 
hood. One tank forced the Palace-gate and was followed by 
the British Ambassador who had the GOG, British troops, with 
him in his car. 
"The bodyguard was overpowered and eight fully armed 
officers accompanied the Ambassador to the King's study and 
remained a guard. The palace telephone links were cut and 
broadcasting House was surrounded by British troops. The 
King ordered that there should be no resistance to avoid 
useless bloodshed. When the Ambassador demanded the appoint-
ment of Nahas Pasha (leader of the Wafd) as Prime Minister, 
His Majesty turned to his suite and remarked that while he 
could have rejected the ultimatum and turned the country into 
a battlefield, he wished to spare the lives of his subjects 
and to let history judge his actions." 
See John Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars.^  pp. 32-33. 
69. George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (iondon, 1948), 
p. 226. 
70. See Chicago Daily News> 6 February 1942. 
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were weak and indecisive about the stand in the war, the 
Saadists did not command much influence over the nation's 
political forces and were too weak to withstand the intrigues of 
the Palace clique, had become almost indispensable for the British 
Government. It alone was straightforward in its anti-Palace and 
anti-Axis attitude. 
Great Britain's intervention to place Kahas Pasha at the 
helm of affairs to ensure for themselves security and cooperation 
during the military crisis, bitterly annoyed the Palace and all 
the anti-Wafd elements. They openly accused him of having compro-
mised Egypt's integrity and the nation's interest. Ahmed Mahir 
publicly charged the Wafd leader of having accepted the office 
"supported by bayonets". 
To undo the effects of such damaging propaganda, Nahas 
made it public that "he had agreed to form Government on the basis 
that neither the Anglo-Sgyptian Treaty nor Egypt's situation as a 
sovereign independent country permits her ally to interfere in 
the internal affairs of the country and parti<?ularly in the 
formation and dismissal of ministers". (71) He also declared that 
he intended to carry out his job with the assistance of a freely 
elected parliament in which the Wafd had only 12 seats as a result 
of the 1938 elections, in his opinion, was not a 'free elected' 
Parliament. He actually got it dissolved on the 7th of February 
and ordered for immediate elections. 
71» This is the main portion of the letter which Nahas pasha 
wrote to the British Ambassador, upon taking office of the 
Prime Minister in which he explained to the addressee that 
his acceptance of Premiership at this Critical juncture would 
not oblige him to give up his country's main interests. 
Text of the letter in Survey of International Affairs 1939-46 
(1951), p. 210. 
-30-
As a result of the elections, held in March 1942, the Wafd 
returned with mdisputed majority. (72) Thus armed with a 
massive vote of confidence in his leadership, Nahas earnestly 
pursued his policy of wholeheartedly backing the Allies in every 
way. He took immediate action against Ali Mahir and other pro-
Axis elements. (73) During the critical days of June and July 1942 
when the British Army was forced by Rommel's advance, to fall back 
from Tabruk to El-Alaraain, the Wafd Government stood firm with 
Great Britain. The British Ambassador paid generous tribute to 
hold statesmanship and firmness in dealing with 'the enemies of 
democracy and liberty'. 
Acknowledging the British Ambassador's appreciation of 
his work, Nahas sent the following reply: 
72. In the elections, the Wafd secured 223 seats in the Chamber 
and 81 in the Senate. The election results, under the 
circumstances, could hardly be regarded as proof or evidence 
of the Wafd's popularity with the masses. Their victory at 
the polls has no relevance to the popular inclination towards 
the Axis. The Wafd*s success was due to several reasons; 
Firstly, there was no contest in 110 out of 264 electoral 
constituencies. Secondly, freedom of speech and expression of 
and on behalf of the candidates was limited during the election 
campaign. They were not allowed to make any reference to the 
'recent events leading to the change of government, to the 
King or to the British'. Political commentators find that 
thus Nahas had shrewdly disabled the opposition to arouse 
public sentiments by saying that the Wafd was hoisted.into 
power on British bayonets. Another factor responsible for the 
Wafd's success in this election was that the Saadists and the 
liberal Constitutionalists did not officially participate in 
the contest. The voters were thus left with no choice. 
73. In a bid to preserve order and public morale in the uncertain 
situation of the war, Nahas Pasha confined Ali Mahir to his 
country house, interned the fifth columnists and closed the 
Royal Autombbile Club which was a meeting place of pro-Axis 
elements. 
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I had to act with a view to the preservation of 
the interests of the Egyptian people, to secure 
their rights and guard them from all injury and to 
inspire confidence amongst them. It gives me 
pleasure to say that the Egyptians gave proof of 
their courage and firm conviction. Each of them is 
conscious of the duty of supporting our friend and 
ally, England, in the hour of its need. The Egyptian 
Government and people offered, as I too offered, 
with the greatest willingness every possible assistance 
which did not conflict with the interests of the 
country, and I am proud to say that every Egyptian did 
at that moment his duty to his country and to Egypt's 
ally. (74) 
^ The Egyptian Prime Minister mentioned about Egypt's 
contribution in the Allied war efforts only to ask in return for 
British support for Egypt's interests in the post-war settlemmt. 
At that time His Majesty's Government seem so much indebted to 
the Egyptian assistance at 'al-Alamain' that they authorised the 
Ambassador to assure Kahas Pasha that the British Government would 
use its good offices to secure Egypt the right of representation, 
on a footing of equality, at all peace negotiations wMch would 
directly affect her interests, and that 'Britain would take no 
part in discussions directly affecting Egypt's interests without 
having prior consultations with the Egyptian Government. (75) 
/ 
P* Egypt and the Making of the Arab League 
Britain's Interest in Arab Unity 
Earlier in 1939, Britain had, however, admitted the 
advisability of harnessing the Arabs* aspirations for independence 
and unity, in their favour. They seemed fully convinced that 
Rashid Ali al-Gilam's uprising, which they had been able to quell 
74. Al-Mafd al-Misri (Cairo), 6 August 1942, 
75. The Daily Telegraph. 20 November 1942. 
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only by force (May 1941) and the hostility of the Grand Mufti 
of Jerusalem Ha^i Amln-al-Hussaini, were in fact the expression 
of Pan-Arab sense of frustration with regard to the settlement 
of the Palestine question and the future of the levant States. (76) 
The German promises to favour the Arabs in their struggle for 
independence seemed to have played quite an important part in the 
drift to extremism. (77) It was, therefore, not unnatural to 
visualize the consequ«ices of ignoring the Arabs* discontent. 
Their first step therefore was to issue a White Paper in 1939 which 
almost nullified the Balfour Declaration of 1917. (78) It was an 
attaint to appease the Arab sentiments. (79) Another impelling 
76. In 1939. Mustafa Hahas Pasha, in a letter to the President 
of al-Itehad al-Arabi, a Pan-Arab club in Cairo, ^pressed his 
party* s grave concern for the Arabs of Palestine. He wrote, 
"The government takes great interest in the affairs of the 
sister Arab nations, and is always ready to defend their 
interests and rights. It also views with great interest the 
question of Arab unity." Quoted by G. Anwar, "The Egyptian 
Attitude towards Pan-Arabism", The Middle East Journal II 
(Summer, 1957), p. 258. 
77. Survey, op.cit., p. 334. 
78. Cmd. 5479, p. 22. 
79. As a result of the Arab rebellion in Palestine, the British 
Government issued an important statement of Policy in 1939, 
declaring that neither their undertakings to the Jews nor 
the national interests of Britain warranted that they should 
continue to develop the national Jewish home beyond the point 
already reached. It said; (l) "... theJTewish National Home 
a^envi saged in the Balfour—declaratiorf and^iTprevious 
s't.atements_of British policy had been established"; (2) "That 
to"dev^opTiFiraiher against Arabs^'^shes would be,a^violation 
of Britain* s undertakings to the Arabs, and that such a policy 
could only be carried out by the use of unjustificable force"; 
(3) "That therefore after,the admission of a final quota of 
7Sj000jaore Jewlsh^ JUpmigjgants over a period of five years, 
JewTsfi^Md^jcS^n^shoi^^ (4) "that . . during this period of'Tive'lreai's, a restrictionshould be placed on the acquisition 
(contd. on next page) 
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consideration in determining Great Britain* s policy towards 
the Arabs was the emergence of several Arab states as independent 
entities which made it necessary for Britain to try to keep them 
knit together as an integrated whole by a common bond of unity* 
A united Arab world, in the opinion of Britain* s foreign policy 
experts, could be expected to adopt a coherent if not uniform 
attitude towards Britain. Anthony Eden, Churchill's Foreign 
Secretary, finding it imperative to "line-up the Arab backing in 
a region so vital to their imperial defence", assured the Arabs 
of his Government's assistance in bringing them closer to each 
other. He once saids 
» 
... the Arab world has made great strides since the 
settlecent reached at the end of the last war and 
many Arab thinkers desire, for the Arab peoples, a 
greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In 
reaching out towards this unity, they hope for our 
support. No such appeal from our friends should go 
unheard. It seems to me both natural and right that 
the cultural and economic ties, too should be 
strengthened. His Majesty's Government, for their 
part, will give full support to any such scheme that 
commands gffl:ieral approval. C80) 
Egypt's position in the Arab League 
Egypt, hitherto, more enthusiastically engaged in her own 
struggle for ' full independence and unity of the Nile*, now found 
79. (contd. from back page) 
of further land in Palestine by the Jews"; C5) "that at the 
end of five years, self-governing institutions should be set 
up in the country." Text of the Statement in Parliamentary 
Patters 1939. Cmd. 6019, pp. 1-12. 
80. White Paper, Misc. No.2 (1941) Cmd. 6289. See also H.C. Deby 
6 May 1941, cols. 737-38. See also Anthony Eden, Freedom 
Order - Selected Speeches 1939-46 (Boston, 1948), p. 105. 
For a similar declaration of support made by Anthony Eden in 
the House of Commons on 24 February 1943, see H.C. Deb.* 
vol. 387, col. 139. 
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a nex^r vista to play a vital role in the realization of the 
common Arab aspirations. Her geographic position and her status 
as the centre of Islamic learning and culture justifiably-
encouraged her to assume the leadership. Mustafa an-Nahas 
claimed: 
flE- I 
The bonds which bind us to the Arabs and Eastern 
peoples are many beyond numbering and disturbing. 
They hay^ increased in firmness and strength by 
their common attitude towards the war, in that all 
of them took for the victory of democracy and await 
the dawn of the day in which the rights of the young 
peoples to determine their own future shall be upper-
most. Cto that day these Arabs and neighbouring 
Eastern states will present, with Egypt in the fore-
front, a powerful and cohesive bloc, capable of 
fulfilling its international responsibilities and 
its moral duties and of talcing its fitting place 
among the free peoples. (8|.) 
It was thus in keeping this attitude that Egypt 
virtually stole the initiative from Iraq, (82) in organizing 
AJ-'^ isri? November 1942. 
82. It is generally believed that the firs^pr^^sal^qr the 
creation""W~arTOion of ^ :raB~Bt""^ es came from Iraq's Premier 
Muri Pag5a7 al-Said7~In^Qcember In M s plan he 
suggested unlfication^ ,^ ^ izria? Palestine ^ d Trans-
3;0r^^int0_a^ GreajierSyr^ an^tne latter's merger with I^q 
as the^ "~Tlrsg[steiOn thet'ormation of a League of_Arab ^ tages. 
But this plan met witiTTTttle favour because of dynastic 
rivalries between the Eashimites, the Saidies and the 
Egyptians. The area covered by his plan constituted a natural 
geographical and economical, if not an ethnic unit, its 
political integration, would undoubtedly have strengthened 
Iraq's position vis-a-vis Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Whether 
unitary or federal in character, the proposed 'Greater Syria' 
was to be dominated by Baghdad. The young republics of Syria 
and Lebanon also did not approve of it. They wished to 
preserve their newly acquired independent status. The 
Xebanese Premier, Riyad as such clearly stated on 6 January 
1944, that 'Syria and Lebanon, being independent countries 
would endeavour to cooperate with other Arab States on condition 
that their independence should not be infringed. According to 
Majid Khadduri, "Towards an Arab Union", American Political 
Review (February 1946, XI, p. 95), the President of Syria, 
t' 
(contd. on next page) 
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meetings and conferences of Arab leaders and representatives 
of heads of the state to discuss the ways and means of furthering 
the cause of Arab unity, prosperity and strength. Finally a 
general Arab Conference was held on 26 September in Alexandria 
under the chairmanship of Nahas Pasha as Egypt's Prime Minister 
which produced the historic Alexandria Protocol on 7 October 1944 
under which a League of Arab States was to be created. (83) But 
J. r 
this Charter of Arab unity could not become an 'Act* so as to be 
binding upon all its signatories until 22 March 1945* 
The delay in the creation of the Arab League on the basis 
of the Protocol could be attributed mainly to the political events 
that occured in Egypt as a result of Nahas Pasha's dismissal from 
the prime Ministership and also because certain modifications in 
the Alexandria Protocol were being suggested by the new Egyl>tian 
delegation to safeguard the sovereignty of its member states. 
For instance, wh^rea^ the Protocoj^had envisaged a_progressively 
increasing surrender of sovereignty, the Pact in its final shape 
l^d emphasis on i.;^^tention. 
Another clause of the Protocol which stated that 'in no 
case will a state be permitted to pursue a foreign policy which 
would be detrimental to the policy of the League or to any of its 
member states, was dropped from the Pact. The Egyptian delegation 
82. (contd. from back page) 
Shukri al Quwv/atly endorsed the view that their independence 
would be retained in all circumstances. He said; "Syria 
will refuse to have raised in her sky any flag higher than 
her own, save that of an Arab Union." 
83. Text of the protocol in, Arab Information Centre, Basic 
Documents of "the League of Arab States (N.Y., 1956)7 PP» 6-8. 
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also succeeded in incorporating into the Pact a clause binding 
•each member state not to interfere in the system of government 
of the others*• The Pact also stressed the importance of Palestine 
and pledged support in general terms for the Palestine ^ rabs; 
*without the inclusion of Palestine, public opinion in the Arab 
world would not have regarded the League as complete'. (84) The 
r 
Alexandria Protocol also made it explicit that the Arab leadex'S 
believed that the prospects of future peace and stability in the 
Arab world largely depended upon satisfactory solution of the 
Palestine problem. (85) 
Though the formation of the League of the Arab States 
recognized Egypt's important position vis-a-vis other Arab 
States, (86) the feuds in her internal politics, particularly the 
tussle between the Palace and the Wafd continued uninterrupted. 
The King could never reconcile himself to the humiliation he had 
to undergo in appointing under British pressure Nahas as Egypt's 
Prime Minister against his utter dislike of him and his party. 
0 
Towards the end of April 1944 Faruk made a serious attempt to 
dismiss Nahas Pasha, but again the British Ambassador openly 
intervened against the King who might have thought that, after the 
84. Cecil A. Hourani, "The Arab League in Perspective", The 
Middle East Journal^ April 1947, vol. I, p. 132. 
85. Text of the Protocol in The Arab World (Arab Information 
Center, New York, April 1959), pp. 16-16. 
86. Article 10 of the Pact between the seven Arab States which 
participated in the making of the League of Arab States, 
provided that the permanent seat of the League is established 
in Cairo. The first Secretary-General of the League, 
appointed under Article 2 by a majority of two-third, was also 
an Egyptian, Abdul Rehman Azzam Pasha. 
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defeat of the Axis forces in Egypt and Tunisia, the British 
won't be so very keen to see Nahas continue as Egypt's Premier. 
But the British still needed Egypt's support and sympathy because 
the strategic bases of Lower Egypt still remained vital to them 
for the wider prosecution of the war. (87) They were particularly 
more seriously concerned about public security in Egypt, which 
the Wafd under Nahas's leadership had thus far successfully main-
tained. The British Ambassador, therefore, declared: 
... this was no time for a change of personnel in 
the United Nations front, and informed the King that 
if he did not recind the dismissal they x^ rould take 
the strongest measures. (88) 
As he also Imd the consent of the Foreign Office to again 
resort to military action, if this were necessary to deter the 
King from his proposed action, Fandc put off the matter for some 
more opportune hour. And, he did not have to wait too long. The 
opportunity for him to dismiss Nahas and fttmish his reputation 
arose in the wake of serious dissensions inside the Wafd itself. 
As soon as the preparatory conference for a League of Arab 
States, being held at Alexandria under Nahas Pasha's chairmanship, 
was over, the King sent him a carefully worded letter of dismissal 
on the 8th of October. His recent tours of the provinces of his 
kingdom had shown to him that the Wafd was still well-rooted and 
that Nahas was dearly loved by the people. (89) He therefore so 
87. Information Paper No.lQ^ op.cit., p» 76. See also Wilson, 
Eight Years Overseas i ), pp. 158-59. 
88. Wilson, op.cit., pp. 214-15. 
89. P.J. Vatikoitis, The Modem History of Egypt (London, 1969), 
p. 363. 
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diefted his letter as to impress upon the people that his action 
against Hahas Pasha was in fact motivated by his desire to safe-
guard constitutional rights of his people and to see them happy 
and prosperous; 
As I am anxious to see my country governed by a 
democratic Ministry working for the fatherland and 
enforcing the laws of the constitution in the spirit 
as well as in the letter, giving equality to all 
Egyptians in rights and duties and bringing to the 
masses food and clothing, I have decided to dismiss 
you from office. (90) 
r 
By this time the whole Allied position in the war had 
greatly changed. 'The actual danger from the Axis on Egypt had 
long receded; the war was now being fought on the West-European 
continent with the Axis forces clearly in retreat*. Britain 
seemed no longer interested in the continuance of Wafd Government 
in Cairo. Moreover, now Egypt's other political groups, the 
Saadists, the liberals and even the newly founded 'Kutla' were 
equally convinced of the benefits of siding with the Allies. (91) 
There was, therefore, no particular reason for the British Foreign 
Office to insist on the retention of Kalias Pasha in office. The 
King had thus chosen the right time to take his revenge. 
•Conveniently the British Ambassador happened not to be in Cairo 
on that day'. 
On Nahas's dismissal, a coalition government was set up 
under the leadership of Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha. New elections were 
held in January 1946, but no single party could secure absolute 
90. Text of King Faruk's letter of dismissal in The Times^ 
9 October 1944. See also Rashid al-Barawi, op.cit., p. 147. 
91. John Marlowe, op.cit., p. 333. 
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majority to form government. The Saadists having received a 
majority of 125 against 74 of Liberals, 29 Kutla, 7 National 
Party and 29 Independents, (92) its leader Ahmed Maher was again 
asked to head a coalition government. The Wafd had boycotted the 
elections alleging that the Government was using its power under 
the state of emergency for obtaining falsified results. (93) 
As the British had expected, the new coalition Ministry 
of Dr. Maher, soon after taking the oath of office, declared his 
desire for sincere cooperation v;ith Britain and expressed the 
opinion that "it was due to friendship, rather than the legal 
requirements of the Treaty, that Egypt had faithfully discharged 
her obligations and pooled all of her resources with Britain; 
she would continue to do so until the war with Japan had been 
brought to an end"® Surely, like his predecessor, he too was 
92. See, Political Handbook of the World Parliaments^ Parties 
and Press (1945), p. 54. 
93. The Times* Cairo Correspondent's comment (1 August 1947) 
that 1945 election was 'at least as fair as any elections 
that have taken place in Egypt', was considered ' unfair to 
the Wafd', by Professor H.A.R. Gibb. See his article 
"Anglo-Egyptian Relations, a Revaluation", International 
Affairs. October 1951, p. 449. Mafd's refusal to participate 
in the 1945 elections was indeed 'a vital decision based on 
mg-ture understanding "and good sense of judgement. In ^ 
environment iVwMch~tHeKing and the Government both were 
determined to keep the Wafd out of power and its own former 
members, now the dissidents, were doing everything to damage 
the reputation of the Wafd and tarnish the image of its 
leaders, by a malicious propaganda campaign, the Wafd would 
not have been able to swing the poiis as before. Thus by 
not joining the elections in 1945- the Wafd leaders saved 
the party from running into the disrepute of having lost 
the elections, which could have been cited as a proof of 
its unpopularity with the masses. 
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anxious to secure a position for his country in the post-war 
Assembly of Nations. But a formal declaration of War against 
the Central Powers was an essential prerequisite for participation 
in the projected United Nations Conference at San-Francisco to 
be held on 25 April. (94) He had made up his mind to make a 
r 
declaration to this effect. There was nothing now that Egypt 
was likely to lose by acquiring the status of a belligerent 
nation, on the other hand, Egypt had all the prospects of becoming 
a * founder-member' of the world organization by making a formal 
statement of partnership with the Allies. He secured the consent 
of the Chamber of Deputies, meeting in Camera 25 February 1945, 
but when he was going to obtain a similar approval of the S®iate 
he was shot dead by a young lawyer who belonged to the extremist 
Misr al-Fatah Party. (95) 
His successor, Mohammad Fahmi En Nokrashi Pajfta, however, 
adhered to the same policy. On 28 February, with the King's 
94. As early as 17 October 1944, the British Prime Minister had 
stated before the House of Commons that 'the only countries 
which can be represented as of right at a peace conference 
are those which have participated in the war as belligerents' 
H.C. Debates^ 5th Series, vol. 403, col. 2195. 
- __ ,, successor< 
Npkrashi,Lb^ieveHn^Syi:lie 'Muslim Brotherhood' h ^ a hand 
in jthe_ orime^ He had immediately rounded up the founder-head 
o'f the Ikhwan, Hassan el Banna and other known members of the 
•extremist organization of the religious fanatics', but 
later released them for want of proper evidence. But he 
could never give up the idea that the 'Brotherhood' was 
incolved in his colleague's murder. See Tom little, op.cit., 
p. 164. 
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assent, he declared a «defensive war* against Gemany and 
Japan, (96) which certainly enhanced his comtry^s prestige and 
status in the comity of nations as a foijnder-inember of the 
United Nations. (97) 
96. The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), 27 February 1946; also 
Al Ahram of the same date and day. It should, however, be 
noted that under Article 46 of the 1923 constitution while 
the declaration of a 'defensive \ia.r* was a prerogative of 
the King, an «offensive war' could not be declared without 
the consent of Parliament. See Helan M. Davis, Constitutions, 
Electoral Laws^ 3?reaties of States in the Hear and the Middle 
gasl (Durham, M.C., 1953), p. 79, 
97. Ibid. 

Chapter II 
EGYPT'S DEMAND FOB THE REVISION OF THE 1936 TREATY-' 
THE SIDKI-BBVIN DRAFT AGREBSENT 
For Great Britain the World War II ended in 1945 in a 
blaze of glory» Her victorious armies were physically present 
throughout the Arab world, apparently in peaceful and friendly 
occupation* Her fleets and air forces, with those of the United 
States, controlled the Mediterranean. (1) For Egypt, the 
presence of these foreign troops was soon to come to an end-
Having won the war they were to retreat to their respective 
countries. The post-war era held hopes of greater cooperation 
with the nations of Europe and the United States. The Egyptians 
in Cairo were no less jubilant than the Britons in London to see 
the termination of the war. The United Nations was a great hope 
and a great promise to uphold the freedom and dignity of all 
nations. They hoped to revise and recast their relations with 
Great Britain on the basis of mutual respect and friendly 
cooperation. 
It was on this basis that the Egyptians had hoped to remove 
the restrictions on national sovereignty and independence imposed 
by the 1936 Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain. They had 
faithfully served the British during their most critical moment 
in the war at al-Alamain, and had helped to gain their full 
freedom by formally becoming a belligerent nation on 1st March 
1945 which cost Egypt the life of its Premier, Dr. Ahmed Mahir. 
1. John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs 1908-1958 (London, 
1959), p. 400. 
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But the British had completely misunderstood the relative calm 
that existed during the years of active warfare as a result of 
rigorous press-censorship and Martial law as Egypt* s acceptance 
of the treaty stipulations and willingness to continue their 
relationship with her on the same basis. The Times of London, 
certainly undermined Egypt's nationalist sentiments and aroused 
its people's indignation by publishing an article on lOth of 
April of which the following passage intended to falsify their 
hopes of getting rid of Britain's domination and interference in 
their domestic matters: 
(The Middle Eas^ Supply Centre) should be enlarged 
to include representatives of i^ssia^ndlFrance, so 
lihat Tt can take itF~pSce~among~tHe other regional 
bodies which the United Nations may set up for 
economic planning* In the.political, field the-case 
for the creation of regional commission representing 
the same four Powers is equally clear[~Tor Brit&ih, 
however grealf her responsibilities may remain, cannot 
sustain alone the burden of safeguarding international 
security and solving by herself their problems in which 
other powers are equally interested* Among these are 
the task of reconciling the strategic safeguards 
necessary to international order with the independence 
and self-respect of the Middle East countries; the 
provision of leadership and assistance in building up 
the strength and unity of the region until it is capable 
of discharging its own responsibilities for world 
security; the resolution of traditional rivalries among 
the Western Powers into that cooperation for the advance-
ment of the Middle East which circumstances now demand* 
To this Egypt's most respected political philosopher, 
Professor Tahe Hussain, replied that 'the Arab States would not 
be prepared to discard the tutelage of one state in order to accept 
that of four* They not only wished to be free of any kind of 
sub.iection* but aspired to play their own part in collective 
security and to share in the protection of strategic centres* 
They rejected the idea of economic control, but were desirous of 
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economic cooperation ijith Europe and the United States* The 
British, as also other Europeans and the Americans* were making 
a great mistake if thev thought they could employ this outmoded 
type of language to the Arabs* • (2) (Italics Mine) 
Similarly, the Wafd, the Ikhi^ an, the student organisations 
all condemned such disappointing suggestion being made in the 
British press. For the last ten years they had looked upon the 
presence of foreign forces in Cairo and Alexandria as derogatory 
to their sovereign status. The apprehension of its being further 
intensified was, therefore, highly infuriating. The withdrawal 
of press-censorship and the laws regarding arbitrary arrests, 
imprisonment and ban on public meetings, provided both material 
and opportunity for their political vehemence. (3) There was 
widespread resentment against the British. 
The Wafd, in the prevailing inflammable atmosphere, 
however, found its chance to try to regain popular support by 
organizing impressive demonstrations against the British, demanding 
immediate revision of the 1936 Treaty which, they said, had 
completely lost its value and purpose after the war-exigencies had 
ended. An eminent Arab historian wrote: 
In 1936, an Egypt free from British connections would 
have been weaker and more exposed to the danger and 
less considered by the world than she was; by now (1946), 
only an Egypt free from British connections could . 
actualize the potentialities of her position. (4) 
2* Al-Balagh (Cairo), 12 April 1945, in Survey of International 
Affairs 1939-46 (BIIA, London, 1961), vol. I, p. 267. 
3. Thomas Russel, Egyptian Service 1902-46 (London, 1949), pp. 214-16. 
4. Albert Hourani, "The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement: Some Causes 
and Implications", The Middle East Journal, vol. 9, 1956, 
p. 248. 
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The Egyptians were also highly irritated and annoyed to 
see that the British authorities in the Sudan were encouraging 
separatist tendencies, while they had been, throughout the last 
quarter of the century, insisting upon the unity of the Sudan 
with Egypt. In November 1943 the King and the Parliament had 
unanimously called for the complete evacuation of British troops 
immediately after the war and the Union of the Sudan with Egypt. (5) 
Even earlier than that Nahas Pasha, leader of the Wafd Opposition, 
had addressed a memorandum to Great Britain on 1 April 1940 in 
which he had^for a promise that after the war all foreign troops 
should be withdrawn from Egypt, negotiations should be opened on 
the subject of the Sudan, and finally Egypt should be represented 
at the Peace Conference. (6) But contrary to their hopes, ,an 
Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan was established on 16 May 
1944. The Governor-General of the Sudan had described the Council 
as 'the first concrete expression of a Sudanese nation'. C7) The 
Egyptian press and parties complained that the step had been tak^ 
without consultation vdth the Egyptian Government, that they should 
have been invited to send a representative to the opening ceremony, 
and that the Vice-President of the Council should have been an 
Egyptian. {8) On 26 August 1944, on the eve of the anniversary 
of the Treaty of 1936, Nahas had declared that he considered 
5. K. Awad, "Egypt, Great Britain and the Sudan", The Middle 
East Journal. July 1947. 
6. Text of the Memorandum in Orient Mode m o y May 1940, pp»228-31 
See Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), 2 April 1940. 
The Times, 17 May 1944j also Egyptian Gazette. 17 May 1944. 
8. al-.W^ fd al-Misrj.T 17 May 1944. 
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' Egypt and the Sudaa as one nation* • He had also pointed out 
that the Treaty had referred only to the 'welliare* of the Sudanese 
as the * primary aim» of the Condominium (Art. 2/1), but had not 
spoken of their right to self-government. (9) The popular 
Arabic daily al-Ahram complained that the Egyptian Government, 
legally a partner in the administration of the Sudan had remained 
unassertive while the British «demonstrated their real authority 
by creating the Advisory Council'. (10) 
The Egyptians now had serious doubts about Great Britain's 
intentions regarding evacuation of Egypt and the unity of the Nile 
Valley. The idea of »regional arrangements' being mooted by Great 
Britain and others at the San Francisco Conference, was seen by 
many in Egypt as an attempt to deny Egypt full freedom to manage 
its internal matters and external relations according to her own 
national^and understanding of international complexities. The 
Egyptian delegation therefore strongly argued that the basis of 
such 'arrangements' should be 'geographic propinquity' and 
'common interest'. (11) Speaking on his budget proposals on 
9 May, MakramEbied who, after his release from internment, was 
included in the Mahir Cabinet as Finance Minister, made it 
9. The Egyptian Gazette, 21 September 1944. 
10. al-Ahramf 10 September 1944. 
11. Documents of the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization (San Francisco, 1945)^ vol. III^ p. 451; vol. XI, 
p. 57. Similarly, an Egyptian delegate to the United Nations 
General Assembly in 19S1 argued that regional arrangements 
under the Charter 'presupposed a certain propinquity not only 
of a geographical character but also of language, religion and 
customs'. See The Times^ 23 November 1951, quoted in Survey, 
op.cit., p. 82. 
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absolutely clear that anticipating total withdrawal of British 
forces from Egypt, no provision was made for the building of the 
barracks for them as required by the obligations of the 1936 
Treaty. (12) 
The change of Government in London which placed Clement 
Attlee in power, gave the Egyptians new hopes about the fulfilment 
of their national aspirations. The Government and the Opposition 
both shared the view that the Labour Government would be more 
amenable than the outgoing Government of Sir Winston Churchill.(13) 
The Wafdist leader who was pretty anxious * to establish himself 
and the V?afd as champion of Egyptian independence' immediately 
presented to the British iUnbassador a Memorandum which 
recapitulated the demands set out in his earlier note to him in 
April 1940. (14) Later, • on-Aggust 6, Egypt's Prime Minister, 
Kokrashi Pasha, endorsed the most essential points of the 
12. !Ehe Egyptian Gazette. 10 July 1945. 
13. Hew York Times^  3 August 1945. 
14. The Memorandum contained the following demands: 
(1) ... that the British Government should promise 
withdrawal of the foreign forces from Egyptian 
-soil after the termination of hostilities; 
(2) that Egypt would have the right to participate in 
the peace deliberations; 
(3) tiiat Britain would enter into negotiations with 
Egypt to recognize ultimately the Etypgian suzerainty 
over the Sudan; 
(4) that the Martial Law would be abolished; 
(5) that the restrictions on the export of the cotton 
would be lifted. 
See 2.M. Qureshi, Liberal Nationalism in Egypt (Delhi, 
1967), pp. 137-38. 
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MemoranduBi as representing the demands of the entire Egyptian 
people. In his speech in the Senate, he said: 
Egypt again has given proof of her faithfulness 
and has steadfastly adhered to her Allies during 
the war. Kie United Nations greatly appreciated 
Egypt's help to the cause of democracy and the far-
reaching effects that this help had on the victory 
of the Allies. No better ^ ustiilcation and no 
firmer ground could be found for the rmoval of the 
restrictions imposed on the country's independence 
and for the withdrawal of foreign troops. As for 
the unity of the Nile Valley, which includes both 
Egypt and the Sudan, the principles of this new 
era which have spread all over the world are suffi-
cient guarantee of its achievement. This unity 
reflects the heartfelt desire of all people of the 
Nile Valley. (15) 
Similarly, King Faruk who was now 'wholeheartedly committed 
to the aim of getting rid of the last vestiges of British 
tutelage', which had twice interfered in his conflict with Nahas 
Pasha between 1942 and 1944, reiterated the nationalist demand 
for evacuation and unity of the Sudan and Egypt. In his Speech 
from the Throne on 12 November, Paruk said; 
Egypt is more resolved and united th^ ever to see an 
end of all restrictions to independence by the with-
drawal of all foreign troops, and to reaffirm the 
unity of the Nile Valley. My Government is in contact 
on this subject with the British Government, and is 
actively pursuing this task so as to achieve the best 
results. Relations between the Egyptian and British 
Governments are excellent, and both are sincerely 
determined to cooperate and to develop them on the 
basis of equality. (16) 
To follow up his* demands for negotiations to revise the 
1936 Treaty, Nokrashi Pasha sent a formal Note to His Majesty's 
Government on 20 December, saying that 
15. The Egyptian Gazette. 7 August 1946. 
16. Ibid., 13 November 1946. 
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The Treaty was accepted by Egypt only under the 
pressure of necessity and 'as a testimony to the 
loyalty and sincere desire for collaboration which 
inspire her towards her ally' • The victory of the 
Allies had, however, rendered several of its 
provisions superfluous and without justification. 
After recalling Egypt's services rendered to Britain 
during the war, the Note continued; 'The presence of 
foreign troops on our soil in peace time is wounding 
to national dignity, and can only be interpreted by 
Egyptian public opinion as ±e the tangible sign of 
a mistrust which the British Government muefe eegard 
as unjustified. It would be better for both countries 
that their relations should be founded on mutual 
understanding and confidence. Egypt, conscious of the 
needs imposed on her by the defence of her territory 
and of the responsibilities which her participation in 
the United Nations Organization entails for her, will 
shrink from no sacrifice in order to place her military 
potential on a state to enable her to repel aggression 
pending the arrival of reinforcements of her allies 
and of the UN. The Egyptian Government expresses 
their confidence that these views will be shared by 
their ally, and that the British Government will take 
steps to fix an early date for an Egyptian delegation 
to proceed to London to negotiate Vith them the 
revision of the Treaty. ... It goes without saying 
that the negotiations will include the question of the 
Sudan and will be inspired by the interest and 
aspirations of the Sudanese. (17) 
The Egyptians in general were greatly disappointed to 
learn that the British Government did not take a serious view of 
the Egyptian insistence for the revision of the Treaty; they were 
already too much preoccupied with the major post-war problems. 
The Soviet-sponsored Communist uprising in the Iranian province of 
Azerbaijan and Eussia's direct pressure on Turkey to revise the 
Montrieux Convention in her favour, were indirectly mentioned as 
compelling reasons to postpone consideration of the question of 
relations with Egypt. (18) Replying to a query from the Opposition 
17. 
18. Ibid. 
Text of the Egyptian Note in The Timesy 31 January 1946; 
see also Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), 30 Januaiy 1946. 
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in the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Bevin had said; 
"H*M« Government will, at the proper time, approach the question 
(of the revision of the 1936 Treaty)." (19) His suggestion to 
look into the possibility of preliminary talks with the British 
Ambassador was, therefore, purposely vague and non-committal. 
The Wafdists described the Labour Government's policy of 
' sleeping over' the Egyptian requests as an expression of 
unwillingness to leave Egypt to the Egyptians. They organized 
large-scale demonstrations in which students and labour organiza-
tions took leading part. 
Opposition to the British presence, however, became more 
violent and challenging with the emergence of Communists, and 
Muslim Brotherhood as organized and popularly supported 
groups. (20) Both, being primarily anti-British by definition, 
further incited mass-demonstrations against western imperialism. 
Deterioration in the general condition of the people; the post-
war economic crisis; the emergence of a well-organized working 
class (21) as a result of rapid industrialization during the war; 
and the frustration of the educated unemployed, (22) further 
19* H.C. Deb.y vol. 423, cols. 701-790. See also vol. 432, 
cols. 616-20. 
20. Rashid El-Barawy, "Egypt and the Sudan", India Quarterlyy 
1951, pp. 360-61. 
21. Rashid El-Barawy, The Military COUP in Egypt (Cairo, 1952), 
pp. 126-48. 
22. At the end of the war nearly 200,000 Egyptians were dismissed 
from their services in the British Army. See, W.J. Handley, 
"The labour Movement in Egypt", Middle East Journal. July 
1949, p. 240. Jean and Simmare lacottture, estimated the 
number of unemployed over 300,000. In their opinion the 
(contd. on next page) 
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str©ngthened the national opposition to Britain. 
The leftist elements in the Wafd as also the Ikhwan which 
had nothing in common but the hatred of the British had now 
become more »activist* and «radical' in their approach and 
programmes and both were to play a major role in all the future 
strikes and demonstrations for the attainment of national 
liberation, i.e. complete evacuation of all British and other 
foreign forces and the establishment of parity in the socio-
economic standards of their people. The Marxist and Conaaunist 
party agitators, though legally disallowed, had infiltrated 
several trade unions and student-organizations, such as the 
'Universities Alumni Association*. The Wafdists, in order to make 
their policy and programme more appealing to the masses, coupled 
their resistance to 'alien rule anc|/or influence* to the struggle 
for political and economic freedom frcan the native ruling 
classes. The 'Ikhwan* which had now become a fully developed 
organization with a political manifesto, 'introduced vast social 
and welfare schemes into their activities: insurance for workers, 
health care, and others. It was undoubtedly aspiring for political 
leadership mainly by fomenting nationalist agitation and appealing 
to religious sentiments of the masses'. C23) 
22. (contd. from back page) 
withdrawal of ban on imports after the war ended, hit hard 
Egypt* s new industrial venture and commercial undertakings. 
Many local concems closed down because they could not 
successfully compete with their foreign counterparts. Many 
Egyptians therefore became jobless. See p. 100. 
23. Tom Little, op.cit., pp. 164-66. 
-100-
Thus in January 1946, practically every party and group 
in Egypt (24) was raising its voice for the abrogation of the 
1936 Treaty. 'Inflammatory editorials in their Press organs 
calling the people to combat and sacrifice f&nned agitations. 
They publicized Britain's unwillingness to negotiate the end of 
their bases in the country* • On 30 January when Hokrashi Pasha's 
exchange of correspondence with the Foreign Office was published 
in the local dailies, the reaction generally was one of great 
resentment. The younger clientele of these groups: 'the students 
and workers' organizations' (26) were once again in the forefront, 
demonstrating against their government's 'slackness' in dealing 
with the British on the question of Treaty revision. They 
particularly objectee to the 'lenient tone of the initial Note' 
to Britain. (26) 
These students organizations first sent a petition to the 
King "urging him to accelerate the Government's efforts in resolv-
ing the question of Anglo-Egyptian relations'. Then, on 9 February, 
the day of the reopening of the Fuad I University, massive 
demonstrations against the British and against the Government were 
organized in Cairo and Alexandria, the demonstrators shouting 
24. For example there were the 'Workers Committee for National 
Liberation', 'The National Committee of Students and Workers', 
' The Federation (Congress) of Egyptian Trade Unions', ' The 
Centre of Scientific Research', etc., etc. The 1/^ afd, the 
Saadists, the Kutla, the Ikhwan, and the Liberals were among 
the leading political groups with their own distinct 
programmes, organization and party publications. 
25. Handley, op.cit., pp. 283-85. 
26. Yatikiotis, op.cit., p. 361. 
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*Ko negotiation without evacuation*, soon culminated 
in 'The Abbas Brigade Incident' in which 9 persons were officially 
reported killed and 84 injured after the demonstrators clashed 
with the Police. (27) This resulted finally in the fall of the 
Nokrashi Government on the 15th. The British Ambassador, Lord 
Killeran, at this critical juncture tried to persuade King Faruk 
to accept the resignation without delay as, in his opinion, 
Nokrashi had not been able to maintain order and 'proper environ-
ment* for negotiating the revision of the 1936 Treaty. (28) On 
16 June thousands of demonstrators again gathered outside the 
Royal Palace shouting anti-British slogans such as: "To hell with 
Britainl", "Evacuation or Blood". 
Sidki-Bevin Talks - Conclusion of 
Draft Treaty 
The change of Government, however, did not serve the 
British purpose. The new Prime Minister Ismail_Sidki Pasha> known 
as the 'strong man* of Egyptian politics, contrary to expectations. 
27. The demonstration started from the University grounds in 
Giza and marched towards Asdin Palace. When they reached 
the Abbas Bridge over which they had to cross the Nile to 
the city, their route was blocked by a strong police force. 
They clashed with the police in which some were killed and 
many injured. 
28. Great Britain's intervention to obtain or retain an Egyptian 
Government amenable to British policy was referred to by 
Nokrashi Pasha himself in his speech in the Security Council. 
The British delegate's statement that the matter was an oral 
communication between the Ambassador and the King shows that 
Nokrashi's complaint was not without grounds. See UN 
Security Council, Official Records^ 11, 13 August 1947, 
p. 1866. 
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* adopted a permissive policy towards political demonstrations'. 
C29) lAilike the British Ambassador, Ismail Pasha could not fail 
to realize that the recent 'all-party agitation' was mainly 
directed against the presence of the British and other Allied 
forces in their country. And as soon as the restrictions on 
demonstrations imposed by Nokrashi Pasha were withdrawn, the 
National Committee of workers and students gave a call for a 
'General Strike' for holding meetings and demonstrations on 
Thursday, 21 February 1946, and call it as the 'Evacuation Day'. 
The demonstration, however, turned into a serious rioting involv-
ing 15 deaths and injuries to 120 persons. (30) Again on 4 March, 
the same organizations commemorated the 'Evacuation Martyrs' Day', 
to pay homage to their sacrifices for the sake of liberating 
their country. A section of the mob becaiae violent and in its 
anger set fire to a British Military Police Post and stoned to 
death two of its occupajhts. The day ended with a toll of 28 lives, 
leaving 340 injured. (31) 
The British Charge d'Affaires Mr. R.J. Bowker, (32) 
29. Vatikiotis, op.cit., p. 362. Ismail Sidki Pasha who was 
asked by the King on 17 February to form a new Government 
was a member of the Egyptian delegation which negotiated the 
1936 Treaty and, therefore, fully understood the purposes and 
motives implications of the Treaty. Under the circumstances 
he was a very suitable choice to initiate its revision. 
Buring a brief period of his Premiership in 1933 he had shown 
that he was a gifted administrator. 
30. The Egyptian Gazette. 22 February 1946. 
31 • Al»Ahram. 6 March 1946. See also Survey of International 
Affairs - The Middle East 1945-50 (RI IA), p. 218. 
32. lord Killeam, the British Ambassador, was appointed on 
18 February as Govemmwlkdviser in South East Asia, hence 
all diplomatic functions being discharged, until the arrival 
(contd. on next page) 
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strongly protested at »the Egyptian Government's failure to 
take timely and sufficient measures to prevent the riots'. This 
was indeed an attempt on the part of the British diplomat to 
suppress the fact that the rioting was caused by insensible and 
arrogant attitude of the British Army. Prime Minister Sidki 
strongly denied the British allegations. He told the Egyptian 
Senate and the world information media that 
••• the disorders were due to the fact that 4 British 
Army lorries attempt to cut their way through a crowd 
of demonstrators, who, he declared, until then behaved 
peaceably; he expressed astonishment at the British 
Protests, asserting that 'the EgyJjtian Government is 
entirely satisfied that it has done its duty in main-
taining peace and giving the nation the liberty to 
raise its voice in demanding its national rights. (33) 
Such was the political climate of his country and the 
state of relationship with Great Britain, when Ismail Sidki Pasha 
decided to hold 'exploratory negotiations* with Great Britain. 
Since it was a highly delicate matter, he wished to deal with it 
in collaboration with other national leaders. He invited almost 
all the leading personalities in Egypt's political life to join 
in his endeavour. The composition of the 'national delegation', 
however, proved to be a difficult task. The Wafdists demanded a 
majority representation with Nahas Pasha as leader of the delega-
tion. This was an impossible demand. How could Nahas Pasha or 
any other person, however important or popular, be considered to 
32. (contd. from back page) 
of new Ambassador, by the Charge d'Affaires. The charge 
was repeated in the House of Lords by lord Adison (Dominions 
Secretary) on 26 February. See, H.X. Deb.y 5th Series, 
vol. 139,-col. 873. 
33. Al-Ahrain and The Egyptian Gazette^ 26 February 1946. 
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lead a delegation with the head of the Government, the Prime 
Minister, holding a secondary positionl The Wafd had thus nearly 
killed the initiative taken by Sidki, but for his firmness. He 
excluded them outright and formed a delegation otherwise represent 
tative of all political parties and leading personalities. (34) 
All of them believed in the necessity and advisability 
of reaching an understanding with Great Britain without further 
delay. (35) 
Great Britain took more than three weeks to announce names 
of its delegation to be led in the final stages by the Foreign 
Secretary. (36) The earlier part of the discussion, according to 
34. The Egyptian delegation finally formed on 8 March 1946 
consisted of the following; 1. Ismail Sidki Pasha, Prime 
Minister and leader of the delegation. ^ ^"MohaSmad Sharif 
Sabry, 3. Alj^Mahir, 4. Husain .H^^l, 5. Mohammad Fahmi el 
IfokrasMJ^^ha, 6^ . M^ram Ebeid, "7. Hafiz Afifi, 8. Ahmed 
Iiutfi Syed, 9. Abdul Fatah Yahiya, 10. Hussain Sirri, 
11. Aly al Shamsy, 12. Ibrahim Abdul Hadi. 
35. El Barawy, op.cit., p. 151. 
3g, It may be noted here that Britain* s failure to announce 
promptly the composition of its delegation had aroused 
suspicion in Egypt*s political circles.' Sidki was embarrassed 
by the British Government*s inaction; more so when finally on 
30 March the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Campbell answered 
his inquiries stating that he himself was to head a delegation 
consisting of senior military experts and Embassy officials. 
The Wafdist Press and the extremists violently resented 
Britain's intransigence. Sidki, although immediately suppre-
ssed their activities by arresting some Wafdists and the 
terrorists of the Misr al-Fatah, and putting a ban on their 
newspapers, but he himself felt it atrongly. He informed Sir 
Ronald that members of the Egyptian delegation were among the 
most distinguished figures in Egyptian political life and 
expected to negotiate with the British personalities of the 
same order. The people in Egjrpt, he added, believed and 
would not forget that the policy adopted during the last decade 
and especially during the war - a policy which did not leave 
a good impression - was planned and executed by the very 
Bnbassy officials whom you now wish to have as your political 
assistants. See Ismail Sidki, Mudhakarati (Cairo, Dar al-Hilal, 
1960, trans. Emile Marmarstein), pp. 61-62*, 
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the Foreign Office communication was however to be conducted 
on his behalf, by the Secretary for Air, Lord Stansgate* (37) 
The British delegation arrived in Cairo on 15 April, (38) 
but the beginning of negotiations was however further delayed 
because of Egypt* s demand that they »should be preceded by a prior 
announcement that all British forces would be withdratfli from 
Egypt' - (38) The British delegation which had come to Egypt to 
search for an agreeable basis for maintaining the British troops 
there, was taken aback by such a firm and categorical stand of its 
counter negotiators. Sidki*s simple and plain statement; *You 
can have no agreement with Egypt - except on the basis of 
evacuation', was not therefore a 'pre-condition'. On the contrary, 
it was the British delegation which had flown to Cairo with a 
pre=deterffilned objective which was diametrically opposed to what 
the Egyptians were seeking - the evacuation of their country, 
lord Stansgate's top military advisers tried to apprise Sidki Pasha 
and his colleagues of the serious threat to the security of the 
37. The appointment of lord Stansgate was publicly welcomed by 
the Egyptian Prime Minister with the remark that 'as Mr. 
Wedgewood Benn defended the Egyptian cause in and out of 
British Parliament just after the first World War, when few 
other Britons spoke favourably on behalf of my country. Thus 
Wedgewood Benn's name is always remembered as a ray of hope 
in Egypt'. See Information Paper Mo.ig^ op.cit., p. 87, 
QUOTED Pi?OM: The Times^ 22 April 1946. Lord Stansgate was to 
be assisted .by Sir Kinhan Comwallis, British Ambassador to 
Iraq 1941-46, and now head of the Middle East Secretariat 
of the Foreign Office, and the three Coimnanders-in-Chief in 
the Middle East, and the British Ambassador in Cairo. 
38. ^l-Ahramy The Egyptian Gazettej 16 April 1946. 
39. The Annual Register 1946. p. 294. See also Survey (1946-50), 
op.cit., p. 120. 
-100-
vrhole Middle East inherent in the Soviet cold-war pressure on 
Iran, Turkey and Greece. Explaining Egypt's importance as a 
military base, they urged the Egyptians to think of the defence 
of the region as a whole, not of the narrow interest of the Kile 
Valley, and that Egypt* s own resources were inadequate to with-
stand the Communists' onslaught. The vlsi&n of the Egyptian 
delegation, representing all shades of political opinions, however, 
'tended to be restricted to the narrow confines of their Nile 
Valley and a desire to put an end to the British occupation' • 
Moreover, the uneasy atmosphere of the cities and towns filled 
with student demonstrations, bomb explosions and risk of 
assassination would not permit any divergence from their basic 
demand. • (40) 
Attlee seemed to have understood the situation well enough 
when he decided to assure the Egyptians that the British forces 
would be withdrawn from their territory and thus to break the 
deadlock in negotiating an alliance. He made the following state-
ment on 7 May in the House of Commons which was hotly debated by 
the opposition; 
It is the considered policy of H.M. Government in the 
United Kingdom to consolidate their alliance with Egypt 
as one between two equal nations having interests in 
common. In pursuance of this policy negotiations have 
been begun in an atmosphere of condiality and goodwill. 
The Government of the United Kingdom have proposed to 
withdraw all British naval, military, and air forces 
40. iord Stansgate afterwards asserted that 'had we been able on 
our arrival to announce that in future British troops would 
only be in Egypt by Egyptian consent, we could have had a 
treaty in a month'. See "The Egyptian Point of View", The 
listener^ 25 January 1951. p. 127. But surprisingly, he did 
not do anything, even at this stage, about the Sudan question 
which was Just as important to all the Egyptians. 
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from Egyptian territory and to settle in negotiations 
the stages and date of the completion of this with-
drawal and arrangements to be made by the Egyptian 
Government to make possible mutual assistance in time 
of war or imminent threat of war in accordance with 
the alliance. (41) 
Defending his step against severe criticism by the 
Opposition, (42) Attlee, in fact, only admitted the reality of 
the jftnglo-Egyptian relations when he stated that without "a clear 
declaration to clear up doubts as to our position" the negotiations 
H.C. Deby 5tgi Series, vol. 422, cols. 781-2. 
42. Churchill characterised Attlee's statement as *very grave* 
one of the most fomentous I have heard in this House. Anthony 
Eden, speaking/a motion of adjournment of the House, pointed 
out that the chief object of the 1936 Treaty was to safeguard 
the defence of the Suez Canal - so essential an artery of 
their Imperial life, and asked whether the Government had 
any plan for securing that end. Some Government supporters 
argued that the Canal could be well defended from bases not 
on Egyptian territory. The Opposition, however, stressed the 
impermanence and inadequacy of Cyprus, Palestine and Cyra-
naica as alternative bases. Churchill and Eden also warned 
of the danger relying solely on a British right to reoccupy 
installations in a time of possible future international 
emergency: 'The Great Power with which we shall be in dispute 
would, of course, say to the Egyptian Government - 'We should 
regard any movement into the Canal Zone of British forces as 
an unfriendly act*. Can any one suppose that the Egyptian 
Government confronted with this situation and not desiring 
anyhow to have British troops as Air Force in the Canal Zone, 
will not refuse permission to reenter? Eden, unsatisfied 
by the explanation of the Government, strongly felt that 
'fundamental principles' of the 1936 Treaty, 'have been thrown 
over without any substitute being provided in the interests 
of this country, of Egypt and of the Empire'. ChurcMll 
'placed it on record that His Majesty's Government have not 
consulted in any way any other people in this country, and 
therefore entire responsibility for the course that they are 
pursuing must rest with them'. For complete account of the 
debate on Treaty Negotiations, in the House of Commons, see 
UK, parliamentary Debates^ House of Commons^ 6th Series, 
vol. 423, 24 May 1946, cols. 701-790. For Churchill's speech 
in the Debate, see cols. 772-79; for Eden's remarks see 
vol. 422, cols. 849-64. 
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could not possibly succeed, and that they could not hope any 
alliance to continue or be fulfilled unless the Egyptians 
received at the outset an assurance that no foreign troops would 
be retained on Egyptian soil against their wishes. (43) 
Bie basic difference of approach of the two parties was 
revealed in the course of debates in the Parliament on this vital 
question. The Conservatives viewed the whole situation from the 
point of view of Great Britain's interests alone, and they 
believed the withdrawal of British troops would seriously 
jeopardise their control of the Suez Canal. They did not favour 
any move from any quqrter which, in their opinion, would weaken 
their hold over the Canal and Egypt's foreign relations. They 
remembered what Lord Iiloyd, Britain's High Commissioner in Egypt 
during 1926-29, had advised them: " ... the only place from 
which the Suez Canal can be economically and adequately defended 
is from Cairo." (44) Winston Churchill and itothony Eden, 
therefore, thought of nothing but their country's position in 
the post-war balance of power. (46) 
The Xabour Party under Attlee's leadership, however, saw 
the situation from a different angle. They were equally concerned 
about the communications of the British Commonwealth and Empire 
and with the security of the Canal. But they thought that the 
objective could be achieved best only if Great Britain had an 
alliance with Egypt on the basis of respect for her sovereign 
43. E.G. Deb.y 6th Series, vol. 422, cols. 854-858. 
H.X. Deb., vol. 75, cols. 1137-38. 
45. H.C. Deb.y vol. 423, cols. 701-790. 
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rights and national sentiments. Attlee reminded the Opposition 
that * without the cooperation and goodwill of the Egyptians 
Britain's interests could not be protected and promoted for 
long. No 'treaty* or 'alliance' with Egypt could survive a 
serious calamity, against which it has been advised, unless it 
has been willingly accepted and endorsed by the people. He 
said: 
We had said we were going to leave Egypt long ago, 
but we had not gone. Those things remained in the 
minds of the Egyptian people, and the presence of 
foreign troops in their capital offended national 
sentiments. It was true that troops from Britain, 
India, and the Dominions rendered a great service 
to Egypt in saving her from the aggression of 
Mussolini and Hitler it did not, however, alter 
the fact that the continued presence of troops in 
Cairo offended nationalist opinion. In order that 
the alliance should continue with the same mutual 
confidence and success as in the past, th^ complete 
freedom and independence of Egypt was essential® (46) 
Bevin further confirmed his chief's statement by frankly 
admitting that if they had not put forward such a proposal, 
»disorders in the streets would have it dragged out of us' . He 
reminded the opposition that in the new pattern of international 
behaviour, set-up by the UN, all countries, great and small had 
acquired a new status, (47) and are assuired of their security 
without sacrificing their dignity or political independence. (4B) 
46. H.C. Deb., vol. 422, cols. 864-858. 
47. Ibid., vol. 423, col. 782. 
48. United Nations Charter, Article 2, i para 1, recognises the principle of sovereign equality of all of its members. 
Para IV makes it obligatory for its members to ' refrain in 
their International relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity and political 
independence of any state'. 
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But he also pointed out that Britain's withdrawal from Egypt 
should not create a vacuum; 
If the Egyptian Government try to force a situation 
in which there is a vacuum - meaning that we have 
gone and that there is nothing there for security 
instead, regional defence or other organization -
to that we can never agree. But I have offered ••• 
a new basis of approach, in which I believe, perhaps 
partnership is the wrong term, but it is a Joint 
effort for mutual defence not only in the interests 
of Great Britain and her Commonwealth, but in the 
interests ultimately of the contribution to wliat I 
hope will yet become a United Nations defence for 
the security of the world. (49) 
Egypt's Response to British Offer 
Egypt* s Prime Minister, Ismail Sidki Pasha, welcomed (SO) 
the statements of the Labour leaders, and began negotiations in 
Cairo on 9 May on the lines suggested by Attlee and his Foreign 
Secretary, i.e. an alliance in place of the Treaty, for mutual 
defence on the basis of sovereign equality. (51) But the 
49. H.C. Deb.t vol. 423, col. 788. 
50. "Egypt and Britain are beginning negotiations in an atmos-
phere of friendship to settle the stages and the date of 
completion (of evacuation), and measures that the Egyptian 
Government will have to take to ensure mutual assistance in 
time of war or the threat of war. Kie Egyptian negotiators 
will be very careful to see that this cooperation is kept 
within the limits of the San Francisco Charter and within 
the interests of Egypt. 
A new chapter is opening in the Anglo-Egyptian 
relations, in spite of the fact that in both countries 
there exist people who doubt very much the outcome of the 
new phase. ... I personally believe that this complete 
evacuation and an alliance id.th Britain within the San 
Francisco Charter are great blessings to Egypt." 
The Egyptian Gazette, 10 May 1946; see also Clare 
Hollingworth, The Arabs ^ d the 1/fest (London, 1952), pp.53-54. 
51• Al-Ahramy The Egyptian Gazette^ 10 May 1946. 
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negotiations between the two delegations could not, however, 
proceed smoothly because of the exclusion of The Su(^ from the 
scope of the negotiations- The British had obviously intended 
to split the nationalist demands by insisting on taking up each 
issue separately. The whole of Egyptian press that had been 
watching the developments closely with hope and interest commen-
ted rather unfavourably on the British offer. The Wafdists, in 
particular, severely criticised the Government for having agreed 
to discuss the principle of an Anglo-Sgyptian alliance as such 
without first obtaining the consent of the nation. (52) Others 
expressed sucpicion of the conditions that Britain must have 
facilities in Egypt in case of war or threat of war. (53) 
The 'tactical coalition' of the Wafd, the extreme 
nationalists and the Communists continued its campaign against 
the proposed alliance, and against the Prime Minister who was 
favouring it. The 'Ikhwans', on the other extreme, insisting on 
not having anything to do, whatever, with the British, were 
suggesting for immediate and total severence of relations with 
her, and called for launching 'Jihad' - holy war, to obtain full 
52. For vivid description of the Wafdists' opposition to the 
British offer and to Ismail Sidki's acceptance of it, see 
Ismail Sidki Pasha's Autobiography, Mudhakarati (Cairo, 
Dar ul Hilal, 1950}. 
53. Commenting on the British offer of 21 May, Nokrashi Pasha 
informed the Security Council that it was a "draft of the 
treaty of alliance, together with a military treaty which 
incorporated in substance the burdensome ajnd objectionable 
conditions imposed in the 1936 Treaty". See, UN Security 
Council, Official Records. 5 August 1947, 2nd year, No. 70, 
p. 1747. 
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freedom. All of them added fuel to the fire of mounting social 
uwrest by organizing and encouraging * stay in strikes* in busi-
ness and factories to protest and to prevent reteenchment of 
employees regardless of fluctuations in the rate of supply. The 
state telegraph workers, government engineers and teachers, 
organized by the Communist-in spired Workers* Congress, sympathised 
with the strikers. (64) 
Sidki, however, did not yield to the threat of a general 
strike in the country. He decided to face the situation by being 
bold and firm in his policies. (55) On 9 July, his Government 
approved a Bill which imposed heavy penalties for strikes by 
state employees; authorised the Government to arrest all such 
persons who were found fomenting trouble in any manner. (56) 
Many Wafdists and Couununifets were arrested, several educational 
and cultural organizations which were suspected of having 
connections with the Marxist and other radical groups were closed 
down; many publications were banned, al-Wafd al-Misri< and the 
Sawt al-umma (The Voice of the Nation) were among the most popular 
ones. But all these measures did not help much to ease the 
situation. Some of his colleagues in the delegation also differed 
from him on the fundamental question of joint defence. (67) 
64. See, "The Egyptian Point of View", The listener. 25 January 
1951. 
55. See, Mudhakarati. op.cit. 
56. Al-Ahram. 10 July 1946. 
57» Although Great Britain had already conceded the principle 
of total evacuation in peace-time, there still were two 
points which seriously marred the chances of a successful 
agreement. Britain insisted on having an alliance which 
(contd. on next page) 
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Makraia Abied publicly announced his determination to abide by 
the original demands. (68) Serious difficulties arose on the 
question of including a Special Protocol on The Sudan in the 
draft treaty to retain the 1899 Condominium. (69) Both Sidki 
Pasha and King Paruk in effect had acquiesced to the British 
insistence that there should be no change in the arrangements 
affecting The Sudan without prior consultation of the Sudanese 
themselves. Makram Abied and others objected to the dangerous 
separatist move and criticised the Government for having "thrown 
over board the Egyptian demand of the Unity of the Nile Valley". 
Thus being opposed from within the delegation itself, Sidki Pasha 
practically achieved nothing and towards the end of September, 
resigned from Premiership. (60) 
67. (contd. from back page) 
would entitle here the use of Egypt as a war-time base as 
soon as war appeared imminent in any part of the Middle East. 
Egypt, on the other hand, wished the return of the British 
forces only in case of an aggression against Egypt or one of 
her immediate neighbours. See, "Anglo-Egyptian Belations", 
Bound Table. March 1961, p. 116. See also Vatikiotis, op.cit., 
pp. 362-3. 
68. In a press interview reported in A,l-Ahram of Cairo of 17 July 
1946, Makraum Ebied, leader of the 'Kutla* party, attacked 
the proposed Joint Defence Board as 'certainly some sort of 
marked protectorate ... particularly an Anglo-Egyptian Control 
Board or rather a joint Ministry of National Defence*. On 
Makram* s refusal of Britain's mid-August offer, The Times of 
30 September 1946 commented that the intransigent section of 
the Egyptian delegation led by the leader of the Kutla Party 
not only refused the British offer, but 'consistently 
exploited their official knowledge of the negotiations to 
publicize confidential discussions and secret documents in 
an endeavour to prove that they are more patriotic than their 
colleagues". 
69. See Information Paper No.19, op.cit., p. 92. 
See also Appendix No. 
60. Sidki Pasha resigned on 28 September. 
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At this stage of uncertainty in Egypt*s relations with 
Great Britain and grave risk to public security, the King chose 
a rather uncommitted and uncontroversial person, his own uncle, 
Sharif Sabry, to succeed Si<Mci Pasha, hoping that he would be 
able to form an all-party cabinet which would also be able to 
resume negotiations with Britain and make a fresh attempt to 
obtain more concessions from the latter* But as the Wafdists 
were now determined not to modify their claim for the immediate 
proclamation of Egyptian sovereignty over The Sudan, and also 
their stand on the question of a defence alliance with the 
UK, (61) he could not succeed in his bid (62) and, therefore, 
the King decided to bring back Sidki to deal firmly with the 
local problems of law and order and to continue his negotiations 
with the British Governments 
61. Prior to the resumption of office by Sidki Pasha, the 
Wafdist party issued a strongly worded manifesto abandoning 
hope in the negotiations, denouncing both the proposed 
military alliance with Britain and the Joint Defence 
Committee, insisting on the "Unity of the Nile Valley under 
the Crown" demanding the submission of Egypt* s case to the 
United Nations, and calling^n the nation to be|in a 
struggle for «Complete . See Al-Misri, 14 November 
1946; also see Egyptian Gazette. 2 October 1946. 
62. On 1 October, Sharif Pasha informed the King that he was 
unable to form an all-Party Government as His Majesty had 
desired. In a press statement, Ste. Sabry declared that his 
attempts had failed because of difficulties raised by the 
liberals and the Saadists on the one side and the Wafdists 
on the other, the latter demanding an immediate dissolution 
of Parliament, fresh elections, and leadership of and a 
majority in the treaty delegation, whilst the former insisted 
that the present regime must stay. See, Egyptian Gazette. 
2 October 1946. 
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His reappointment, however, assured him of Fari:d{:*s 
unreserved support and sympathy in his endeavours regarding the 
revision of the 1936 Treaty, and gave him the confidence to 
proceed without any significant change or modification in his 
policies. Soon after resuming his position, Sidki announced 
that he would go to iondon to "explain personally to Bevin the 
national ideals inspiring his government's policy and to assure 
himself that the British Foreign Secretary is fully informed of 
the reasons for the Egyptian attitude". (63) 
The opposition violently attacked the government for its 
unilateral decision to bypass and ignore the * Treaty delegation' 
and contact authorities of the British Government directly. The 
Wafd, the Kutla and others feared that, left to himself, Sidki 
Pasha would accept an alliance with the British without securing 
basic national objectives. Makram Ebied said that any treaty 
accepted or assurance extended by Sidki Pasha on behalf of the 
nation would not be binding on Egypt. (64) Following their 
verbal protests, anti-government and anti-British dononstrations 
broke out in Cairo on 15 October. The organizers, mainly the 
students and the workers also called for a general strike the 
next day, when the Prime Minister was due to leave for London; 
63. Al-Ahramy The Egyptian Gazette. 2, 3 October 1946. 
64. Replying to the opposition attacks, Prime Minister Sidki 
Pasha declared that his visit to London would not affect 
the treaty delegation because its purpose would not be to 
negotiate but to enlighten the British authority on the 
full facts. See Egyptian Gazette^ 8 October 1946. 
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10 people were injured and a large number arrested in clashes 
with the Police. (65) 
In London, Sidki and his Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Abdul 
Ifeidi, met the British Foreign Secretary several times and after 
prolong discussions \'fith him, signed a new draft treaty, of 
which the most important points were: 
1- That all British forces would be withdrawn from 
Cairo, Alexandria and the Delta by 31 March 1947, 
and that the final evacuation of Egyptian territory 
would be completed by 1 September 1M9. 
2. That in the event of Egypt being attacked or the 
UK being involved in a war as a result of attack 
against countries adjacent to Egypt, both Govern-
ments, in close cooperation and after consultation, 
would take such action as might be recognised 
necessary until the Security Council had taken the 
necessary measures for the restoration of peace. 
To secure this, mutual cooperation and coordination 
of mutual defence, a Joint Board of Defence would be 
set up to advise both Governments on the measures to 
be taken for mutual defence when so required. 
3. The joint policy for The Sudan to be followed by 
both governments 'within the framework of the unity 
between the Sudan and Egypt under the Common Crown 
of Egypt will have for its essential objective to 
assure the well-being of the Sudanese, the develop-
ment of their interests and their active preparation 
for self-government and consequently the exercise of 
the right to choose the future status of the Sudan'; 
and that until these objects should be attained 
provisions of the Condominium convention of 1899 
would remain in force. (66$) 
r 
It was on the basis of his understanding of this last 
paragraph that Sidki Pasha on his arrival in Cairo informed the 
people that Britain had agreed to accept the 'Unity of Egypt 
65. A,l-Ahram. 15, IB, 17 October 1946. See also Egyptian 
Gazette of the same dates. 
66. Cmd. 7179. See Appendix No. 
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with Sudan under the Egyptian Crown'. (67) But this statement 
was promptly contradicted by the British Prime Minister. He 
explained to the House of Commons that "No change in the existii:^ ^ 
status and administration of the Sudan is contemplated"* Referring 
to the Sudan Protocol he reiterate^ that the Sudanese would 
themselves have the right to decide their own future* (68) 
The British interpretation of this provision clearly 
implied the possibility of the Sudan's separation from Egypt. It 
was a victory for the ' IMm Party' headed by Abdel Reliman El 
Mehdi who stood for a separate independent status for the Sudan. 
On the following day (29 October), however, official sources in 
Egypt released a paraphrase of the controversial 'Sudan 
Protocol' (69) which reasserted the Egyptian claim. The King's 
speech delivered at the opening of the new session of the 
Parliament also stated that "Egypt regarded the Sudan as a brother 
state, and one of Egypt's aim would be to develop their interests 
and prepare them for self-government as soon as possible." (70) 
67. Egyptian Gazette. Al-Ahram. 27 October 1946; see also 
Observery 27 October 1946. 
68. H.C. Deb., vol. 428, cols. 295-6. 
69. Jon Kunche characterized the Sudan Protocol as '^ ost 
wonderous jumble of nonsense and contradictions that we^ -^ftJt 
graced a diplomatic instrument". Commenting on contradictory 
and ambiguous phraseology of the document, he writes: "It 
seems incredible that intelligent men could have drafted 
this protocol, and that leading statesmen of Bevin's and 
Sidki's calibre could have discussed and approved it." 
Seven Fallen Pillars (london, 1960), pp. 71-72. 
70. The Egyptian Gazette* 15 November 1946. 
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These contradictory statements, however, led to much discussion 
and political excitement and to demonstrations in Egypt and the 
Sudan. The 'Independent Front* and the pro-Egyptian 'National 
Front' held rallies in the Sudan to protest and to defend 
respectively the Egyptian thesis of dynastic union. (71) 
In Egypt the situation of law and order became extremely 
serious when it was disclosed that Sidki Fasha had signed the 
draft treaty in spite of opposition from 7 out of eleven members 
of the Egyptian delegation. The ailing Premier's position 
became most embarrassing when in response to El Mahdi's visit to 
London, Bevin sent a 'letter of interpretation' to be affixed 
to the Treaty, in which Sidki was asked to agree that the draft 
protocol amounts to an affirmation of the existing status of 
the Sudan'. (72) Next day the Governor-General of the Sudan 
also stated that: 
His Majesty's Government are determined that nothing 
shall be permitted to deflect the Sudan Government 
whose powers and constitution remain unaltered by the 
recent conversations, from their task of preparing 
the Sudanese for self-government. (73) 
This finally ended the negotiations and the following day, 
9 December, Sidki Pasha resigned, on strong medical advice. (74) 
r 
His disappearance from the scene, however, did not change 
much the pattern of politics in Egypt. His successor, Mahmoud 
Fahmy En Nokrashy Pasha, formed a coalition cabinet of the 
71. Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Question (London, 1951), pp.118, 134. 
72. See Kokrashi Pasha's speech in the UN Security Council, 
dated 11 August 1947, Official Records. 2nd Year, No. 73, 
p. 1871. 
73• The Egyptian Gazette. 10 December 1946; Daily Telegraph. 
9 December 1946; also The Times,, 10 December 1946. 
74. Al-Ahram^ 10 December 1946. 
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Saadists and Liberals, (76) and informed the Parliament of 
f 
his determination to protect his country*s vital interests. In 
his first address before the Chamber of Deputies on 16 December, 
he said; 
••• the whole nation "impatiently awaited the breaking 
of the last feather on its independence and dignity", 
and first among its objectives the government had 
placed those claims "which were graven on the heart 
of every Egyptian, egacuation and the unity of the 
Nil© Valley". 
"In affirming the permanent unitv of Egypt and 
the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown" /^he maintained_y 
"we simply expressed the unanimous will and wishes of 
the inhabitants of this valley. .•• When I state 
that Sudan under the Egyptian Crown is a permanent 
unity, I liope that the whole world will understand 
that I ajn expressing the opinion of all Egyptians and 
all Sudanese. ... There is therefore no ground to 
suspect that we wish to colonize the Sudan, as the 
desire to dominate cannot exist between brothers"® (76) 
r 
Nokrashi Besumes Negotiations -
UH Help Sought 
Nokrashi Pasha resumed negotiations from the very point 
at which they were abruptly suspended due to Sidki Pasha»s 
Political Handbook of World Parliaments. Parties and 
Pressy 1947. ' 
76. In a further debate in the Chamber on 31 December in which 
Makram Ebied bitterly criticised the statement of the 
Governor-General of the Sudan, Sir Hubert Huddleston made 
by him on 9 December last, the Prime Minister declared; 
"The Sudan to us is a life line. The permanent 
unity of Egypt and the Sudan is the desire of the 
people of the Nile Valley. I do not blame you for 
your annoyance with the Sudan's Governor-General*s 
statement vdiich advocates separation, and I have 
demanded that the British Government submit to me 
immediately their policy towards the Sudan and 
whether they support separation or not." 
See The Egyptian Gazette^ f 17 December 1946, also 1 January 
1947; also The Times^  24 January 1947. 
-100-
resignation. He met the British iUnbassador, Sir Ronald p 
Gambell, on 30 December and again on 4-5 January but both failed 
"to reach anything in the nature of an agreed interpretation" 
of the Sudan protocol* The British Ambassador insisted on the 
recognition of the Sudan's right of self-determination to attain 
full self-government. He stood firm by the policy of his home 
government that the Sudanese must have the right to choose complete 
independence or Complete union with Egypt. The Egyptian Prime 
Minister, on the other hand, insisted on the recognition of 
autonomous status of the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown. "No 
ifgyptiai^  or Sudanese will ever accept a division of the Nile 
Valley. I refute the charge that we want to colonise the Sudan 
and that we are imperialistic. What we want is unity under the 
Egyptiag Cmwn. We shall educate the Sudanese imtil they have 
self-rule, but they must always remain under the Crown." (77) 
(Italics mine) 
Consequently, the talks could not proceed further and were 
officially declared broken on 26 January. Nokrashi Pasha also 
announced that having failed to bring round the British Government 
to the Egyptian viewpoint, he feels constrained to seek the help 
of the United Nations by asking the Security Council to annul the 
1936 Treaty. 
The Egyptian Parliament endorsed his decision on 27 
January by a vote of 175 to 115. (78) Sidki's and Nahas Pasha's 
opposition to the idea of appealing to the Security Council, and 
77. Al'Ahramy 17 December 1946; The Times^ 24 January 1947. 
78. The Middle East Journal, vol. I, April 1947, p. 194. 
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the reported offer of mediation by the Governments of Syriaa 
and Lebanon, (79) however, did not deter him from doing so on 
8 July 1947• He seems to have obviously been forced to take 
this action by the British attitude of complete intransigence 
over the matter of the »Unity of the Nile Valley*, which finally 
killed the Egyptian hope of reaching an understanding. (80) 
NOKRASHI'S NOTl TO THE SBCURITX COUNCIX 
In his note to the President of the Security Council, 
Nokrashi pleaded thati 
... the presence of the British troops on Egyptian 
territories against the unanimous will of its people, 
that their presence in time of peace constituted an 
offence to Egypt*s dignity, an interference in her 
nomal development, as well as an infringement of the 
fundamental principles of sovereign equality, and, 
therefore, contrary to the letter and spirit of the 
UN Charter. 
He further stated that 
in the Sudan, the British were instigating and 
encouraging an artificial separatist movement, 
•notwithstanding that the Unity (of the Nile Valley) 
79. Survey of International Affairs - The Middle East 1945-50^ 
^ The British Government for their part were fully ready 
to-let the case be discussed by the UN, but they also 
welcomed the Syrian and Lebanese offer to mediate between 
Egypt and Britain to avoid the proposed Egyptian appeal to 
the UN where the Soviet Union was surely to advocate the 
Egyptian cause in a bid to either win them to her side or 
at least to neutralize them in the increasing rift between 
the East and the West. 
80. On 16 May 1947, Bevin had declared in the House of Commons 
that there would be »no attempt to appease Egyptian Govern-
ment at the expense of the Sudanese people ... whether they 
take this to the Security Council or elsewhere, we cannot 
go any further ^ t h m ^ the offer we have made." See: 
H.C. Deb.« 6th Series, vol. 437, col. 1963. 
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is urged by the common interest and aspirations of 
its peoples'. Such a situation, in his opinion, 
constitute^ a "danger to international peace and 
security" which could only be avoided by 'total and 
immediate evacuation of British troops from Egypt 
including the Sudan, and the termination of the 
existing regime in the Sudan' • (81) 
Demanding the termination of the 1936 Treaty, Nokrashi 
Pasha forcefully asserted: 
... an alliance of this kind is but another form of 
subordination. It makes a relationship^jiich is 
both unbalanced and undignified. It gives Egypt to 
British economy; it subjects Egypt to the vagaries 
of British diplomacy; and it imprisons Egypt within 
the orbit of British imperial power. (82) 
With regard to the question of self-determination for 
the Sudan, Nokrashi spoke at length to establish that Egypt and 
the Sudan were one and the same country, geographically, ethni-
cally, culturally and politically. He defined Mohammed Ali's 
action in the Sudan in 1820 as an effort to consolidate Egypt's 
various parts and unify its governmental institutions. He 
accused Britain of having divided them artificially for their 
selfish interests. (83) By raising the question of ultimate 
self-determination the British, in his view, simply intended to 
prolong their domination of the Sudan. The question of self-
determination, he stated, did not arise at all. The Egyptians 
and the Sudanese were one and the' same people and should like to 
settle their mutual relationship without any interference from 
the British. He concluded his arguments by assuring of hisa 
81. UN Security Council Official Records^  17 July 1947, No.59, 
pp. 1343-45. 
82. Ibid., p. 1756. 
83. Ibid., pp. 1757-65. 
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government*s most sincere desire to accord the Sudan "self-
rule within the frameworic of 'unity under the Crovm of Egypt'." 
(84) (Italics mine) 
The British representative Sir Alexander Cadogan questioned 
the jurisdiction of the Security Council to discuss the issue. 
Replying to Nokrashi Pasha's statements, he observed that the 
1936 Treaty v&s still valid and that there was no evidence of 
a threat to the international peace and security. He summed up 
his remarks by saying that 
his Government (Britain) has met 'in the most 
sympathetic manner' the Egyptian request for a 
revision of the Treaty and had offered to with-
draw the British forces from Egypt on reasonable 
conditions; the^ Bevin-Sidki,^ Agreement had failed 
to come into force, 'for only one reason namely 
that Egypt was not prepared to^  accord in the 
future to the Sudanese people the right of self-
determination which it had claimed for Arabs" ' 
elsewhere. (85) (Emphasis mine) 
Sir Cadogan also cited instances and statements of 
Egyptian leading public men, (86) in favour of his argument that 
84. Ibid., 193rd Meeting, 22 August 1947, p. 9. 
86. Ibid., 176th Meeting, 5 August 1947, No.70, pp. 1767-84; 
see also No.75, p. 1986. 
86. He quoted: 
The then Egyptian Prime Minister while introducing the 
Treaty to the Chamber of Deputies: 
"Goodwill and sincere intentions have largely helped 
in the reaching of this agreement, which realizes 
the nation's hopes, safeguards the interests of 
Great Britain and strengthens our relations, on a 
free and honourable basis of friendship, equality 
and alliance." 
He also cited the Foreign Minister saying: 
"This Treaty constitutes without any doubt a clear 
ratification of Egypt's international situation 
(contd. on next page) 
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the treaty of 1936 was freely negotiated and accepted by the 
Egyptian people and their parliament, and hence did not constitute 
violation of the General Assembly Resolution of 14 December 
1946 (87) or any other principle of the UN Charter as alleged 
by the Egyptian representative. 
Contesting the British representative's argument on this 
point, Nokrashi said: 
that Egypt was not a free agent in entering into the 
treaty of 1936. Not only was it under a military 
occupation, but it was also given to understand ... 
that its failure to accept the conditions laid down 
by the UK would mean a restoration of the Protectorate 
br something worse. In a most charge and ominous 
atmosphere, Egypt yielded to this pressure. It sought 
escape from the UK reservations of 1922. 
86. (contd. from back page) 
from both the legal and practical point of view. The 
Treaty makes Egypt's independence real, and enables 
it to advance with firmness and wisdom towards its 
glorious future." 
Mohammad Mahmud Pasha, a former Prime Minister said; 
the countries have, in fact, a common interest 
in safeguarding the peace of the world, in their 
reciprocal defence against all aggression, and in 
strengthening the relations which bind them together." 
Ismail Sidki Pasha, also Egypt's Premier from 1930-33, said: 
"Both personally and as the representative of one 
of the political parties, I approve of this treaty, 
in the negotiation and signature of ^ ^^ hich I have had 
the honour to participate." 
See UN Security Council Official Records^ 6 August 1947, 
176th Meeting, 2 year, No.70, pp. 1780-81. 
87. The General Assembly Resolution of 14 December 1946 recommended 
all members to undertake "the withdrawal without delay of 
their armed forces stationed in the territories of Members 
without their consent freely and publicly expressed in 
treaties or agreement consistent with the Charter and not 
contradicting International Agreements". (See Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly during second part of its 
first session, No. 41 ^ TlJ A 
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Concluding that the Treaty was negotiated and signed under 
some duress, he also quoted Egypt's prominent men in public 
affairs. Referring to Mohammad Mahmud Pasha's statement, a part 
of which was narrated by Sir Cadogan, Nokrashi quoted the rest 
to support his argument: 
The military obligations are in contradiction with 
the independence of Egypt, and were it not for our 
special circumstances, and vxere it not for certain 
advantages of the Treaty and for the international 
circumstances at present prevailing, that force us 
to take into consideration these hard facts and 
present us from concentrating on our hopes and 
aspirations, it would have never come to mind to 
accept this treaty. 
Nokrashi also quoted Ahmad Mahar Pasha, then President 
of the Chamber of Deputies saying: 
We are compelled to accept these conditions in 
view of the inescapable circumstances prevailing. 
The Egyptian leader also stated how the President of the Senate, 
Hussein Heikal Pasha had reacted to the conclusion of the Treaty: 
In case you wish to change the situation of which 
we are wearied ... with the hope that any change 
may bring blessings, then accept this treaty on 
condition that it should be revised at the earliest 
opportunity in such a manner as to remove anything 
that affects the independence of Egypt. (88) 
The Egyptian Premier reiterated that 'the Treaty was not 
consistent with the UN Charter' : "It is not an agreement between 
equals. It does not live up to the requirements of sovereign 
equality. It is based on sovereign inequality". "This was 
recognized by Mr. Bevin", he said, "when on 16 May 1946 he declared 
in the House of Commons that the recent negotiations had been 
directed towards placing the relations between Britain and Egypt 
88. UN Security Council Official Records. 2nd year, 179th 
Meeting, 11 August 1947, No.73, pp. 1866-7. 
-100-
on a basis different from that on which they are heretofore 
and which would have been more modem than before, in that the 
relations between the two coiintries would have been as between 
/ 
equals and not on the basis of cooperation." (89) 
Thus in an atmosphere of mutual recrimination and 
accusations, the Council failed to arrive at a decision and 
shelved the issue- It could, however, be ascertained from the 
speeches in the Council that majority of the members of the Council 
supported Britain on the question of self-determination for the 
Sudan. Some of them suggested that Britain and Egypt should 
resume direct negotiations in consultation with the Sudanese. (90) 
Nokrashi outrightly rejected this proposal saying: 
The Egyptian Government would work out the future 
of the Sudan in consultation, not with the British, 
not with the Sudanese while they are hampered by 
the British occupations but with the Sudanese 
acting of their own ffee will. The United Kingdom 
have no place in the matter and we shall not discuss 
it with that country. 
89. Ibid., p, 1868. 
90. On 20 August, the Brazilian delegate submitted a draft 
resolution recommending the two parties 'to resume direct 
negotiations and, should such negotiations fail, to seek a 
solution of the dispute by other peaceful means of their 
own choice'. The Chinese (Nationalist) delegate proposed 
to add to tts preamble a paragraph noting that Britain had 
already partially withdrawn her troops from Egypt and was 
ready to negotiate on the completion of the evacuation; 
and he added: *I cannot see how this Council can be a party 
to any arrangement which would deprive the Sudanese people 
of this right of self-determination which is the foundation 
of the Charter of the United Nations'. The US, French and 
Belgian delegates supported the Brazilian proposal. 
The French delegate compared Nokrashi's repudiation 
of the 1936 Treaty with the repudiations practised by the 
Nazis before the war: 'Every Hitlerite aggression vras 
preceded by a declaration announcing that the Treaty signed 
a few years or a fev^  months before ... was now useless, an 
anachronism, and contrary to the trend of historic develop-
ment '« 
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In this state of indecision the Council finally shelved 
the issue which reflected its unwillingness to consider the 
problem as constituting a serious threat to world peace. 
When Nokrashi Pasha returned home, desperate and dis-
appointed, he found the country inflicted with manifold troubles. 
There was political uneasiness and annoyance over his defeat in 
the United Nations. His opponents criticised him on the groimd 
that his performance in the Security Council was not forthright 
and vigorous, especially on the Sudan question. The Wafdists 
severely criticised the Government for its 'half-hearted' 
presentation of the Egyptian case in the Security Council by 
relying mainly on the 'moral' aspect of the question. (91) 
Others criticised the Prime Minister for not clearly distinguishing 
between Egypt's 'acceptance of the principle of a treaty with 
Great Britain and their objections to certain provisions of the 
existing treaty, and thus giving an impression that 'Egypt was 
trying to repudiate an obligation rather than seeking a remedy 
for a grievance' • (92) 
91. The leader of the Wafd Party, Mustafa al Nahas, in a letter 
to the Prime Minister, dated 23 September 1947, wiote that; 
"Though you declared in a speech before the Senate that both 
the treaty of 1936 and the Agreement of 1899 were no longer 
operative, you did not mention about it in your discourse in 
the Security Council." Not having insisted on this fact, he 
thought, was mainly responsible for weakening the Egyptian 
argument. See Mohajumed Moustafa Ata. tran. M.yehia, Egypt 
Between Two Revolutions (Cairo, 1952;, p. 85. See also, 
Rashid El-Barawi, The Military Coup in Egypt (Cairo, 1952), 
p. 155. 
92. John Marlowe, op.cit., p. 347. 
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Some others in their grief and anger over the inconclu-
sive debate in the United Nations, indulged in disruptive 
activities and mischief against the foreigners and the diplomatic 
missions of those countries which had opposed the Egyptian 
claims in the Council. (93) They seemed to have lost all faith 
in the integrity and impartiality of the world body. (94) 
93. The Brazilian Legation in Cairo, for instance, received a 
letter from 'The Egyptian Terrorist Society' demanding 
immediate payment of £5 million as reparation for Brazil's 
impertinence in moving her resolution in the Security Coiwcil 
(20 August 1947) and on the night of 28th, 29th August two 
bombs were exploded outside the Legation, but without doing 
any damage. The Chinese and Belgian residents also received 
similar threatening letters. The American Consulate at Port 
Said was stoned and an attempt was made to burn the British 
Consulate. The angry students in Alexandria clashed with 
the police. More than 1,000 employees of the Egyptian amy 
workship marched to Prime Minister's office to protest 
against Britain and USA, hailing at the same time the Soviet 
Union, Poland and Syria for their favourable stand in the 
Security Council. See The Middle East Journals vol. II, 
January 1948, pp. 62-63. 
The Polish representative had expressed the view that 
the Council could not be bound by the legal aspect of the 
question solely: a treaty which had 'outlived its purpose 
and exhausted its objectives' stood in the way of 'the justi-
fied national aspirations' and sovereignty of a member state. 
Poland would support Egypt's demand for the 'immediate, 
complete and unconditional' withdrawal of British troops from 
Egypt and the Sudan, but could suggest no solution at the 
present moment for the problem of the 'development of self-
government and free political institutions' which should be 
the United Nation's primary objective in the Sudan'. The 
Russian delegate expressed identical views. In his speech on 
28 August, Mr. Gromyko, criticised the Brazilian resolution as 
unreal, impracticable and unhelpful. "A fundamental drawback 
of the Brazilian resolution"^ he said, "is that its adoption 
would mean that the Security Council steps aside of its own 
free will and washes its hands of the question. If the Council 
limits itself to calling for renewed negotiations and does 
not state its own opinion on the question it would mean the 
Council avoids its obligations." 
94. G.M. Dib, The Arab Bloc and the United Nations (Amsterdam, 
1952), pp. 70-6. 
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All this criticism against Nokrashi Pasha and his govern-
ment, however, was not proper and unbiased. The Wafdists took 
this stand in order to make a bid to recover their reduced 
prestige and to regain political power. In fact, it appeared 
that they wished to see no other individual or party to champion 
the cause of Egypt's national struggle. For Nokrashi's failure 
at the UN, the Vlafdists were no less responsible. They unwisely 
stretched their personal and political rivalries beyond the 
borders of their own country by sending a cable to the President 
of the Security Council claiming that Nokrashi's delegation did 
not represent the Egyptian nation and, therefore, was not entitled 
to argue the country's case before the international body. (95) 
The cable unquestionably undermined Nokrashi's position 
as Egypt's spokesman. Nevertheless, Nokrashi Pasha argued his 
country's case most sincerely and zealously and spared no effort 
to secure international sympathy for his claims. For this 
purpose, if he chose the 'moral respect' of the question, it was 
not improper or unwise. He knew that on legal grounds Egypt's 
case would be weaker. Notwithstanding the circumstances, the 
Treaty, in the eyes of law, was freely negotiated and signed by 
accredited representatives, later approved by the legal competent 
authority, the King and the Parliament, for the duration of 
twenty years. The United Nations in such circumstances could not 
do anything but to uphold the sanctity of the treaty on the basis 
95. Abd al-Rehman al Rafii, Fi Agab al-Thaurat al-Misrivvia 
(Cairo, 1951), vol. Ill, p. 233. See also Vatikiotis, op.cit., 
p. 364; also El-Barawy, op.cit., p. 166. 
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o f 'Pacta Sunt Servanda'• (96) 
On the question of the Sudan also, the leader of the 
Egyptian delegation was absolutely firm and clear. In his speeches 
in the Security Council, he repeatedly and vigorously asserted 
that Egypt and the Sudan were a single people and would mutually 
decide their future relationship, in any case under the Crown of 
Sgypt. (97) It is unfair to say txiat on hearing tiie views of 
other members of the Security Council on the question of self-
determination, Nokrashi became shaky in his standpoint and his 
later speeches lack earlier spark and firmness. (98) Neither any 
portion of his speeches gave any indication, as alleged, of 
Egypt's imperialistic designs in the southern part of the Nile 
Valley. (99) He only insisted on the maintenance of the unity of 
Egypt and the Sudan, self-government of the Sudanese and the 
restoration to Egypt of her rights in the administration of the 
Sudan in order to further the preparation of the Sudanese for 
self-government. The unity of Egypt and the Sudan, he emphasised, 
was the will of both the Egyptians and the Sudanese alike. (100) 
He had rejected the Australian suggestion to consult the Sudanese 
96* This generally accepted principle of International law means 
that 'treaties must be observed during the period for which 
they were made' . 
9^. See, Security Council Debates, op.cit., pp. 1753-65. 
9g. Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Question (London, 1951). 
99. Bashid al-Barawy, op.cit., p. 140. 
100. see Documents Section, Middle East Journal, vol. I, 
July 1947, p. 320. 
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in so far as their future was affected not because he had 
imperialistic designs in view, but for the fact that the Sudanese 
were obsessed by the presence of the British. 
The decision to refer the question of their relations with 
Great Britain to the Security Council, hov?ever, was not well-
timed. It was not adequately realized that the interests of 
smaller nations were generally subordinated to the interests of 
Greater Pov/ers. In the recent post-war Power-alliances based 
mostly on ideological considerations, Great Britain v/as not likely 
to be left alone and isolated to face an embarrassing situation. 
The whole of Western Europe and the United States were already 
convinced of the British contention that Egypt, the Suez Canal 
and the rest of the Middle East were vital links in their new 
defence strategy. They would not have willingly let slip the 
Suez out of the British hands without being definite of her right 
to return to the area as and when a need arises to do so. There-
fore, what happened in the Security Council v/as a foregone 
conclusion. The Americans were also not likely to oppose Britain's 
position in the Suez Canal because their position in the Panama 
was not much different. (lOl) Even the Soviet Union was not 
expected to take a clear and whole-hearted stand on Egypt's side. 
During a private meeting between Stalin and Bevin reportedly held 
on 24 March 1947, on the eve of the Moscow Conference, Bevin had 
been able to obtain an assurance from Stalin that Russia would 
101. Harold 1. Hoskins, "The Guardianship of the Suez Canal", 
The Middle East Journal. April 1950, p. 150. 
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remain neutral in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. (102) 
France vms not friendly with Egypt at that time due to 
latter's stand against France over Tunisia. (103) Thus it 
should have been obvious that Egypt without the support of a 
ma^or power would not be able to cut much ice with the Security 
Council. 
The opposition to Nokrasiii'e Government became more 
vehement in demanding its resignation because he had failed to 
solve the country's serious financial and economic difficulties. 
Egypt accumulated a sum of nearly 4 million sterling pounds in 
london during the war. Britain blocked this money, and after 
great persuasion had released barely over a quarter of the total 
balance which did not help Egypt in stabilising her economy and 
foreign trade. 
102. Soviet News. 15 May 1947. See also Mew York Times^ 8 May 
1947. The Soviet Ambassador's speech in the Security 
Council on 28 August which was acclaimed in Cairo as 
supporting the Egyptian case, was however non-committal 
and vague. His delegation abstained from voting on the 
Brazilian resolution. This abstention from negative voting 
could be regarded as a definite expression of her neutrality 
in the matter. 
103. France had recently strained her relations with Egypt 
because the latter had sent an auxiliary cruiser to Tunisia 
without French authorization with grain to relieve a famine, 
and had also given a sanctuary to the Moroccan revolutionary 
Abdel Karim who had escaped to the Egyptian soil from the 
ship which was taking him to France. -See, Information 
Paper No.l9y op.cit., p. 106. See also Ann William, Britain 
and France in the Middle East and North Africa (New York, 
1968), p. 70. 
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The outbreak of cholera epidemic in September and the 
number of resulting deaths reaching to thousands, (104) gave the 
opposition another point to denounce the government. They 
accused the Government of failing to prevent the spread of 
epidemic throughout the country and becoming a national disaster. 
Some alleged that the epidemic started from the British camps. (105) 
The infection became so serious and widespread that the whole of 
the state machinery virtually became standstill and the Government 
had to declare Egypt a cholera-stricken country which practically 
cut off Egypt from the rest of the world for the duration of 
the epidemic and reduced further her commerce and tourist 
industry. 
104. See The Middle East Journal, vol. II, January 1948, p.63. 
105. See The Times^ 5 November 1947. 
Though it is doubtful that the epidemic started from 
the British military base, but the very fact that the 
Egyptians implicated the origin of the disease to the 
British camps shows their disgust with the British. It was 
more a psychological point that they regarded the presence 
of the British forces as the source of every kind of evil, 
polluting their minds, their liberty and their health and 
hygiene. 

Chapter III 
THE PALESTINE WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON EGYPT« S 
NATIONAL POLITICS 
A. Bylta^ r^ ' s PQferenc^ of the Palestine 
Question to the United Nations 
Hardly had the Egyptian Government been able to breathe 
a sigh of relief after it had successfully combated and suppressed 
the epidemic within three months of its outbreak, a politically 
more dangerous crisis of perennial consequences came up* 
On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly of the United 
Nations passed the •Partition of Palestine Resolution', (l) The 
Early in April 1947 Great Britain, being absolutely unable 
to maintain lav and order in Palestine, where the Zionists 
and the Palestine Arabs were engaged in fierce battle to 
establish their nationalist claims, ultimately referred the 
case to the Uhited Nations to find a solution of the problem. 
The latter body appointed a Special Committee to study and 
suggest a satisfactory solution* 
The findings of this Committee were, however, not 
unanimous. There was a •Majority Plan* which proposed 
partition of Palestine into an Arab State and a Jewish State 
with economic iinion, while Jerusalem was placed under the 
UN administration as an international city* The *Minority 
Plan*, on the other hand, suggested a single state with a 
federal structure* 
The General Assembly was required to adopt either with 
a two-third majority in favour* During the discussion on the 
report, manorlty of speakers favoured the so-called 'minority 
Plan*, but'when vote was taken* after 24 hours* adjournment, 
the decisive two-thirds majority was surprisingly found 
supporting the partition of Palestine* 
This shift in voting behaviour of the delegates was 
decidedly due to the •American official and unofficial 
pressure* and, in certain cases, compulsion upon the smaller 
member nations dependent on US aid* Lux^berg* Liberia, 
Haiti, the Philippines and Greece who had earlier opposed the 
Partition of Palestine, now either favoured or abstained from 
voting against it* For a detailed account of the subject 
(contd* on next page) 
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firitish delegate had. abstained from voting on the resolution 
because partition of the Arab homeland was totally reflected by 
Egypt and other Arab countries, and therefore also gave no 
assurance to implement it« (2) The Arabs believed that Palestine 
belonged to the natives - Arabs of Palestine • and only they 
were entitled to determine their future after the end of the 
Mandate* None else had any right or justification to promise 
or partition away any part of their territory to an alien group 
of people whose claims to the territory were based on doubtful 
renote historical connections* The British had already under* 
mined the l^cts of Arab position in Palestine (3) when they 
promised in 1914 to establish a Jewish home in Palestine* The 
infamous Balfour Declaration was a masterpiece of ambiguity* It 
1* (contd* from back page) 
see Alfred Lilienthal, ^ t Price Israel (Chicago, 1963), 
?p* 60-4; see also Sumner Welles, We Meed Not Fail (Boston, 948), p* 63* For a debate on the question of voting on 
the partition of Palestine Resolution in the UK Assembly, 
see, US Congressional Becords^ 18 December 1947, p* 1176* 
Text of the Palestine Plan of Partition 1947 in UN Resolution 
No* 181 (11) of 29th November 1947* See, J*C* Hurewitz, 
Diplomacy In The ilear And Middle East «» A Documentary Record 
1914"S6 CLondon^ 19S61^ pp* 281-95* 
2* AloAhraypy Al Akhbar ul Yaiim* 29, 30 November 1947* 
The Times. 30 November 1947* See also, Bashid El-Barawy, 
Military Coup In Egypt » An Analytic Study (Cairo, 1962), 
pp* 167-68* 
3* In 1917 the total population of Palestine numbered 700,000; 
644,000 were Arabs and the remaining 66^000 were Jews* In 
1948* the population of Palestine was 2,li57^0 out^of wMch 
1.380,000 were Arabs and 700,000* In other words, when the 
State of larael was established on the termination of the 
British Mandate the Arabs^-were-still-a-two-third-majority., 
in spite of thirty l^ ears of Jewish immigration under the 
auspices of the British authority. 
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contained contradictory pledges (4) to both the Arabs and the 
Jews because they needed the support of both the communities in 
world war I. 
At the end of the War in 1919 the Palestinians had right-
fully expected to become free and to be proclaimed a sovereign 
nation like the other former provinces of the defeated Ottoman 
Etapire- But they were betrayed. The British declared them to 
be unfit to manage their own aff&irsy and hence assumed the 
responsibility to prepare them for self-rule under the new 
device of the 'Mandate System*• 
During the entire period of the Mandate, the Arabs struggled 
to preserve the dominant Arab character of their fatherland and 
realize the national aspirations. The 1939 White Paper wasj in 
a way, a recognition of their legitimate struggle because it 
sought to restrict the Immigration of Jews into Palestine and 
banned selling or purchasing of land belonging to the Arabs to non-
4, On 2 November 1917, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Arthur 
Ballbur sent the following message to Edment de Roths Childs: 
"His BSaJesty's Government view with favour the establishment 
in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will 
use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this 
object it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done 
which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights or 
political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." 
The phraseology of this statement obviously intended to 
please the Zionists without annoying the Arabs. The former 
understood it a p^mise towards the establishment of a Jewish 
State in Palestine, while to the Arabs the words 'national 
home* for the Jews in Palestine could not mean the establish-
ment of a Jewish political order in Palestine as it would 
certainly 'prejudice the civil and religious rights' of the 
Arabs. 
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Arabs* (5) This, however) did not help much the Arab cause 
* 
because during and after the Second World War, the Zionists had 
found another Great Power to patronise the promote their claims 
about Palestine. The Government and the people of the United 
States of America became genuinely interested in the problem of 
the Jewish settlement. President Truman was particularly 
interested in the Jewish Vote he needed to win the forthcoming 
elections, but the people were generally interested on humanita-
rian grounds, to find a sanctuary for the persecuted Jews of 
Europe, the victims of Germany's man-slaughter. The Zionist 
organizations started illegally pouring them into Palestine 
despite serious restrictions on immigration. (6) This new influx 
of Jews caused the Arabs a serious concern. They feared that 
unrestricted flow of Jewish immigrants, wave after wave, would 
5. In the :(,§39 White Paper the British Government declared 
that neitfier"^ tfielr~undertakings to the Jews nor the national 
interests of Britain warranted that they should continue to 
develop the national Jewish home beyond the point already 
reached. The Government, therefore, decided: (l) "That the 
Jewi^^ National Home as envisaged in the Balfour Declaration 
and in previous statements of British Policy had been 
established." (2) "That to develop it further against Arab 
wishes would be,a.violation of Britain's undertakings to the 
Arabs, and that such a policy could only be carried out by 
the use of unjustifiable force". (3) "That, therefore, after 
the admission of a final quota of 75,000 more Jewish immi-
grants should stop." C4) "That during this period of five 
years, a restriction should be placed on the acquisition of 
further land in Palestine by the Jews". (5) "That at the end 
of five years, self-governing institutions should be set up 
in the country. See British Parliamentary Papers 1939« 
Cmd. 6019, pp. 1-12. 
>. John Bagot Glubb. Britain and the Arabs 1908-1958 (London, 
1969), pp. 279-81. 
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soon outnumber them, alter their social position and undermine 
their political claims. They protested against the Government 
and fought the Zionists in the streets of the towns and cities 
of Palestine. The latter had by now organized several para-
military organizations, the 'Irgun' and the *Hagana' and now a 
large number of trained young men to kill and terrorise the Arab 
population. The Arabs resisted with whatever little means they 
had. Law and order had been completely paralysed, and there was 
no security of life and property. The whole of Palestine was 
plagued with killing, looting and dynamiting buildings and 
houses. (7) The Ar^s were already d^spe^^^y looking for safer 
places. Vill^es and towns w^e being forcibly evicted to make 
room for the newc^^s. A new problem of Arab refugees was being 
created by trying to solve the problem of Jewi^ refugees. (8) 
The British felt themselves quite disabled to enforce law and 
restore order. The Zionist teirorism was not spajjjjg the English-
men and officers. Two young sergeants in British uniform were 
hanged as a reprisal; a British Minister of state, Iiord Moyne, 
was assassinated in Cairo by a fanatical Jewish youth, next the 
7. Sami Badawi, Palestine in the United Nations (Cairo, 1966), 
pp. 41-64. 
8. The Arab civil population of Palestine began increasingly to 
disperse under the pressure of Jewish terrorist attacks. The 
climax was on 9 April, the jZi^ij^ of_Irgun Dai Leumi, the 
larger of the two terrorist organizations ^ raided thiAiab 
village of_Deir Yasin near Jerusalem and Massa some_8aD_^ Arab 
meej women and"^ cfilldrenT who were done to _desth with every 
b^b^Hty. By the end of October nearly 650^OOCLEalestinian 
Arabs i^d become refugees. See, Sami Badawi, op.cit., pp.14-64. 
See, also Annual Register 1948^ p. 308• 
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King David Hotel which housed several British offices, was 
blown up causing grievous loss of life. (9) 
It was in this frustrating state of disorder and lawless-
ness and want of security to their own people in His Majesty's 
service, that the British felt utterly helpless. The Attlee 
Government was, under the circumstances, rather unwilling to 
carry on the •Whitemen's burden*. Their inability to find a 
solution of the Palestine problem which could be acceptable to 
both, the Arabs and the Jews; the new growing American pressure 
in favour of the Jews; (10) her own war-exhaustion coupled with 
9. For a detailed account of the activities of the Jewish 
terrorists see, Arthur Koestler, Promise and Fulfilment 
(London, 1949). See also Angelina Mlu, Interaction of 
Politioal. Military and Sconogiic Factors in Israel (Palestine 
Be search Centrey Beirut); also, Abu-Qazalehy Bassam, Terrorist 
Boots of the Herut Party of Israel (PBC, Beirut); see John 
Connelly The Most Imt)ortant Country (I/>ndon, 1967), pp. 7-8. 
10. In early 1945 President Truman urged Attlee that 100,000 
Jews be admitted into Palestine. Expressing his inability 
to comply with the request of the American President explain-
ing it will be highly resented by the Arabs and there will 
be serious administrative problems for the mandatory authority. 
Instead, however, he invited the United States to participate 
in a Joint inquiry into the conditions in Palestine and 
problems related to it. The US accepted to share the responsi-
bility of finding and implementing a solution acceptable to 
both the communities. 
A Joint Committee of Inquiry was established which 
after several months of investigations, called, for the_is,8uanoe 
of 100,000 certificates for admisgj^n intT^lestine of Jews 
who have been the victims of Nazi and ffeiscist persecution". 
Of all the other reGommendations this was the most 
satislfe-ctory from the point of view of the American President, 
who immediately started demanding its implementation. Britain, 
however, had her own limitations of considerations of national 
economic and defence interests to weigh before agreeing with 
th^unrealistic recoromendatjffts. On the final assessment of 
their own vital interests and pledges to the Arabs, they 
(contd. on next page) 
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serious financial crisis and mounting criticism from the 
opposition, finally impelled the Labour Government to ask the 
UN to find a solution and own the responsibility for doing so. 
B. partition of Palestine Plan 
The solution which the UN had found in November 1947, 
however, was the one the British had long shirked. Their own 
Commissions (11) in the past had suggested paj^ition as a solution, 
but they had rejected it on the ground that it contradicte^the 
original Brfjtis^p^^ to guard the interests of both the 
communities, and said that Britain would take no action that was 
not agrreable to both the Jews and Arabs. (12) 
10s (contd. from back page) 
rejected the findings of the Committee on practical grounds. 
The Higher Committee and the league of Arab States, with 
its headquarters at Cairo, had already warned "the Committee 
report doomed Palestine to be a land of bloodshed and misery." 
See International Events (Chatham House), May 1946, p. 286. 
The US President, under the influence, of his Zionist 
advisers of the Wite Hoi^. ^^^^ 
Zionist cause~in Palestine bylTl means and methods. 
11. The Peel Commission appointed in 1930 recommended partition 
of Palestine which being unacceptable to both was undone by 
the findings of the Woodhead Commission in 1938 that Partition 
was absolutely unsatisfactory and unworkable solution*. 
12. On 18 February 1947, the British Foreign Secretary had 
announced in the House of Commons that His Majesty's Govern-
ment had found that "the Mandate ha8„p,roved_jtgL3^ ^ 
in practice, that the obligat'ions.,undeTtaken_to_the two 
comm5firjlie.sJha4^  shown to be irreconcilable." See, 
Parliamentary Pap"ers7~CmdV~7DS8. 
After the question of Palestine was referred to the 
UN, the British representative said at a meeting of the UN 
General Assembly on 16 May 1947, "We have tried for years to 
solve the problem of Palestine. Having failed so far, we 
(contd. on next page) 
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Yet, even before the UN General Assembly had finally 
decided on the report of the Special Cocmittee on Palestine, the 
British Government announced that they intended to give up the 
Mandate and withdraw their administration and all their forces 
as rapidly as possible. And eventually on 15 May 1948 th^y 
formally terminated their Mandated authority without making any 
arrangement for the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority* 
The same ^ y_I>avid Ben^^riqn^proclaimed the establishment_4)f 
the Jewish State of Isr^l as decreed by the General Assembly on 
29 November 1947» (13) President Truman immediately recognized 
her as a new member of the family of nations, assuring thereby 
security of her existence. (14) 
12. Ccontd. from back page) 
now bring it to the UN in the hope that it can succeed where 
we have not. All we say is that we should not_Jmye the__sole 
responsibility l^ or enforcing a solj^ ipn_j!;hi^  is_^t_accepted 
by both .partlfes_and which we cannot reconciJ^_with our 
conscience". OfficIaT~flec^ds of tTie""?'!!^  SpecldTSesslon 
oT^the General Assemblyy April-November 1947, vol. Ill, pp. 
183-4. See also H.C. Deb.y 11-12 December 1947, cols. 1402-S. 
Upon this statement, Sami H^dawi, a prominent Arab 
scholar, commented as followsJ "To have taken the British 
Government thirty years to find out that the Mandate for 
Palestine was 'unworkable*, afterjhaving created a problem in 
1917_ where none _exi ated3efo?^. and_aft^r„floodi^ ry 
with_Jewish immigrants_unj_il__tfey3e<»mest^ to 
i^ rest the c'ountry "from its original~lltRaljr£ants; and then to 
wash'its hands at th'is~late fi^rs and declare its idrikillingness 
to enforce a solution, "not acceptable to both parties" under 
the pretext of conscience, does not speak weIl„oiLei±her the 
British conscience or intelligence. Sami Hadawi, Bitter 
aaF^j^gsFTIIew^ 
13. Text of the Proclamation in John Kinche, Seven Fallen Pillars 
(New York, 1963), pp. 227-8. 
the United States in World Affairs 1948-49. p. 385; also 
The New York Times^ 30 November 1947. 
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Israel a more solid position than was provided 
for by the partition, and to create a running sore 
in the heart of the Near East* British diplomacy 
had deliberately chosen to set the Egyptian bull 
against the Israeli 'muleta', (19) 
While all of these factors might have contributed in 
making Egypt's decision to join the Arab war against Israel, it 
is not doubtful that the absence of any or even all of them would 
have averted the war. During the last thirty years the whole 
question of Palestine had been so developed that recourse to 
arms was inevitable. The Palestinians had become more conscious 
of their national rights and were determined to protect these 
rights including that of self-determination. The Jews under the 
spell of Zionism, on the other hand, were seeking a national 
existence implying their resurgence as an independent political 
community within the same historical area. 
The real issue was that the Jews wanted Palestine 
for themselves, although the country was already 
inhabited by Arabs. If the Jews were to achieve 
their ambitions, the Arabs would have to be either 
evicted or eliminated. In face of two such directly 
opposed objectives, neither side being prepared to 
consider any reduction of its demands, a reconcilia-
tion was unattainable. 
The very logic of the unprecedented situation made it 
imperative for the native Arabs to protest and agitate against 
injustice. It was the Arabs whose land was being subjected to 
alien rule, whose culture and history was being suppressed, whose 
national identity and character was being undermined and, in 
gaotf being replaced by another people, another culture which 
had nothing in common or even reconcilable with their own. The 
19. Lacouture, op.cit., p. 102. 
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3Lt> General tlacmlllan, the British GDC In Palestine and a host 
of other senior officials left Palestine the same fateful day of 
14 Mavy without delegating authority^ assets and responsibilities 
to anybody* They virtually abandoned the oountry to its fiat^ > 
(Italics mine) The fight between the_Arabs and the Zionists 
became more fierce to grab mor^of territory, buildings, sjtores 
and other assets. 'The remaining British forces stood by, inter-
vening less and less frequently and less and less effectively, 
and preparing solely for their evacuation'. *As they quitted 
police-posts, forts and strong-points there was usually a race 
between Jews and Arabs for their capture'. A senior British 
officer explained the policy by stating that 
I have no desire whatever to involve my troops in 
these clashes (between Arabs and Jews). All I want 
is to secure the routes and sectors that I need to 
complete the British evacuation of Palestine. (15) 
C* Egypt's Role in the Arabs' Mar 
Against Israel 1948-49 
Prior to the formation of the League of Arab States Egypt 
neither had a particular desire of bothering about the affairs 
of other Arab countries nor she practically had any prospect of 
15. Quoted in Walid Khalidi, "The Fall of Haifti", The Middle 
East Foruia (Beirut), December 1959, p* 26. 
In March--19-4a, Bevi^had told, the House of Commons 
th^ th.e aim of the Labour Government was to be rid of an 
incubus that was queering their"~relatTons witTrimj?QrJb^t 
allXe^ g; He~saiiaT~"I do want to~emphasize t5at~we want to 
geTHnto a position^ tQ_enable us to ge^^ut of Palestine. 
That is the fundamen£alpoint oFsriti^ Policy". H^C. Deb.^ 
23 March 1948, vol. 448, cols. 2817-18. 
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having independent contacts with any or feifeher of them, ^ er 
foreign relations were controlled and guided by the British 
authority in Cairo in consultation with the Foreign Office in 
London* Some might have indeed felt strongly about the injustices 
being done to their fellow-Arab brothers in Palestine but they 
were helpless to do anything for them. They had their own 
problems of a continuing struggle for full freedom and national 
dignity. But now through her established position of leadership 
in the organization of the Arab States, she could deliberate with 
and Influence other Arab leaders and the course of events in the 
common Arab affairs. It was under Egypt's influence and insis-
tence that the Arab League had taken over the conduct of the 
Arab cause in Palestine. 'The headquarters of the Arab League 
being in Cairo, and Abdul Rehman Pasha Azzam, an Egyptian, being 
the permanent Secretary-General, the actions of tl^ League at 
this time were very nearly those of Egypt*. (16) 
Besides, there was now also present in Cairo the Grand t' ' 
Mufti of Jerusalem, Ha^ Amin al-Husaini, (17) who equated Zionism 
with Western imperialism, and urged the Egyptians and all other 
Arabs to resist the implementation of the UK Resolution of 
November 1947. He explained to his listeners that "the United 
States was helping to create Israel ... not because of apy 
16. J.B. Glubb, Britain and the Arabs (ILondon, 1969), p. 287. 
17. The Grand Mufti had taken refuge in Germany during the war 
because the British were looking for him to put him behind 
the bars for his antl-Allied activities. He held the Germans 
in many ways. After their defeat he returned to Egypt and 
organized movements in support of the Jewish cause in 
Palestine. 
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ioterest la .thfi.homeless Jews but-in prder to get an Impfirig-llss 
tic foothold in the Middle East". The Brotherhood gave the call 
of »Jihad* and asked the Government to fight to protect and 
preserve the Islamic l&ith in Palestine. And thus they were 
able to transform the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine and 
particularly the support which the Western Powers gave the 
Partition Resolution at the UN into an Arab-Islamic Holy War 
against foreign domination and all those whom they disliked or 
distrusted. They worked diligently to excite their fellow-
countrymen against the Jews of Palestine, against Great Britain 
that had created the troubles in Palestine in 1917 where none 
existed, against the United States which was trying to replace 
the British position in the Middle East by establishing her own 
economic and political hold, against the home-government that 
had failed at the UN, was undisguisedly inimical to the Ikhwans, 
and was feeling -slfiy of facing the Zionists in battle. 
The K^^g supported the idea of military intervention not 
entirely because BajiHusainl*s influence and persuasion but also 
because the declaration of war was likely to restore his shattered 
prestige, (18) and give him more authority to suppress his 
enemies and enable him to win new supporters and admirers. There 
were also some private individuals, traders and industrialists 
who l».d certain well calculated economic and commercial interests 
in pushing Egypt into a war with Israel. Some of them were to 
18• In February 1948 Faruk was .leered at in public for the 
fjnrstndnae. All sorts of stojgies were being circulated 
atwiQiis personal life; his love of vine« women and gambling 
had made~M!D quite unpopular. See IjacouTure, op.cit., 
p. 101* 
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make real fortunes out of numerous military purchases. There 
were people who had good connections inside the palace and 
could convince the King that by declaring war against Israel, 
he had everything to gain, nothing to lose. 
The Government headed by Hbkrashi Pasha was already 
weakened by its failure at at the UN and was being openly 
criticized and condemned by the Opposition. The Brotherhood was 
blunt and outspoken in its criticism of the Government and the 
Prime Minister in particular. In these circumstances, the 
Palestine crisis presented a situation to divert the attention 
of the embittered masses and silence opposition by imposing 
Martial Law in the country. 
There is,_l^wever, another view which suggests that the 
British sit.uation of tussle_in Palestine 
^y leaving Palestine abroip^ ly. They were now seriously worried 
about retaining their possession of the Suess Canal, and so needed 
an issue of this sort to distract Egypt from the Suez problon* • 
Nothing is so monotous or irritating as the constant 
search, in the Middle East affairs, for the *hand of 
Britain'. But in this case everything falls into 
place with remarkable ease. ... It was theJBritish 
Government which, from 1917 Balfour Deolaration_down 
to thejiasty evacuation in May 1948, ensured the birth 
of Israel_in spite of pro-Arab sympatHIes~in the Foreign 
CTffice. It is'the same d^ veriMnent ^ i^Icfirin~lS43 
entrusted Nahas Pasha's Cabinet with founding the Arab 
league, in spite of suggestions put foirward earlier 
by the very devoted and intelligent Nuri Sa'id. 
Finally, it was the same government which fixed the h 
hour and day of the intervention, pressing on with the 
iiracuation so urgently that neither the Arabs who 
favoured compromise - such as Abdullah of Jordan -
nor the British experts «iioh as General Spears who 
favoured the Arabs, were listened to while they 
advised caution and stressed the risks of the under-
taking. Everything happened as though in order to 
distract Egypt from the Suez problem, to give 
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Zionists too were aware of the inherent irreconcilability of 
their claims and contentions with the existing majority of 
Arabs. As such no amount of persuasion and promise of better 
economic future whicdi would be the result of Jewish enterprise, 
skill and experience, would appeal to them. No self-respecting 
nation could accept economic benefits at the cost of its 
national dignity and identity. 
Even at that late stage the Arabs were prepared to accept 
the Jews already in Palestine, (20) on the condition that 
further immigration stopped and that independence and a democratic 
constitution, guaranteeing political equality and decisions by 
majority, be accepted. This was obviously_^d totally unaccept-
able to the Zionists who had taken a pledge at^^ltimo^^_JJSA, 
in jj42 to create a Jewish St^e. »Jewishness« was in fact the 
romance and the sole Justification of their demand for a state 
in Palestine. 
The Arab rebellion of 1936 had convinced them that the 
ultimate issue would be decided by force. They had foreseen the 
British evacuation of Palestine and the struggle with the Arabs, 
and therefore had already started 'studying methods to be adopted 
for the physical eviction of the Arabs from Palestine. (21) 
•During the last war, a Jewish brigade had been formed and had 
20. In mid-May 1948 the total population of Palestine was 
2,065,000 of which 1,415,000 were Arabs and 65|,000 were 
Jews. See, UN Document A/364^ vol. I, Ch. IV, p. 54. 
See also, Israel Government, Yearbook 1950 (Tel Aviv), pxxSSS 
p. 339. 
21. J.B. Glubb, Britain and the Arabs 1908-1958 (Xondon, 1959), 
pp. 282-3. 
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been trained by the British. It went into Europe and fought 
in the final stages of the Italian campaign. It had therefore 
obviously been trained to a level of efficiency comparable to 
that of European armies. In addition, when it was thought 
that the Germans might occupy Palestine, other Jews had been 
trained by the British in guerrila tactics. Many thousands of 
Jews who had served as officers or soldiers in different armies 
- • ^ ^ — -
during^  ^he Second World War had arrived in Palestine by 1948. 
With this material the Jews had built up the Hagana, into 
reasonable troops. In addition great quantities of arms had 
been smuggled into the country or stolen from the British Army, 
and large secret arsenals of weapons were located underground 
in the Jewish colonies. (22) In the words of lacouture: 
Fierce exchanges between the Mufti of Jerusalem 
and heads of different Arab Governments; terrorism 
on the part of Irgun; rivalry between Egypt and 
Iraq; the conclusions of the Anglo-American Committee 
in favour of another 100,000 Jews being allowed to 
immigrate into Palestine; the Secretary-General of 
the UNO's undisguised sympathy for Zionism; the last-
minute change in the demarcation of frontiers to the 
detriment of the Arabs - everything seemed to 
encourage the Arabs in the direction of violence, 
especially as events were being directed by cleverer 
men than themselves. (23) 
Egypt being a founder-member of the Arab League md being 
its leader was honour bound to defend the cause of Palestine. 
The partition of Palestine was a staggering blow to her prestige 
and therefore^a challenge to undo what the Zionists and their 
new patrons - the Americans - had aciiieved. And so, on 16 May 
22. Ibid., p. 287. See also John Connell, op.cit., p* 9. 
23. Lacouture, op.cit., pp« 101-2* 
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she sent her regular armies into Palestine to forestall the 
establishment of an Isi^ aeli State* Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and 
Jordan also rushed volunteers to Palestine to reinforce their 
brother in their struggle against the partition. It seemed that 
they had temporarily sunken their mutual differences, rivalries 
and fears, (24) to the extent of agreeing on a ;3oint armed 
intervention against the Zionists. 
24. The members of the L^gue differed widely in culture and 
out"lo6kir~lEach of th^ >iTshed to enlarge its territory, 
power and position. Each of them was Je^ -lous and 
suspicious of the other. E^hJ3f_them_desired_and^^de 
ef^irts to use tl^ slogan of greater,Arab lyiity tOLits__own 
advantagJjb^jp^pgs^gJb^ achieve thisJby'conquering 
it's^ j^ gTiSoui^  and annexing th^ to itself, fhis mentality 
served to keep them all in a constant state of fear and 
anxiety. 
AS a result of this approach to the ideal of unity, 
Lebanon lived in a fear of annexation by Syria, while the 
latter was apprehensive of attack by Iraq. The increasing 
fame of the Arab Legion, the army of Jordan gave Syria 
further cause for apprehension. Amir Abdullah, after the 
withdrawal of France from Syria, seriously toyed with the 
idea of using force, but was strongly dissuaded by Britain. 
After Syria became an independent republic, Abdullah sought 
Syrlo-Transjordan unity with himself ruler of botht S^ia, 
onTEhe other hand, wanted ¥filFunlty on the condition 
that the President of Syria became the head of the enlarged 
state. 
The Arabian Peninsula was still divided by dynastic 
hostility between the Sherifian and Saud families. Syrian 
fears of Iraq and Trans-Jordan resulted in a drawing 
together of Syria and Saudi Arabia. 
Ibn Saud had serious apprehensions about Egypt's 
motives in creating a League of Arab States, which later 
were dispelled by a meeting with King Paruk of Egypt. 
WJhile Egfflt was in favour of complete AralLJunity, she 
desired~it~unaeinier suzerainty. She ther^ore did not 
wish any other Arab governments to combine, lest, in doing 
so, they produce a new country equal in power to Egypt. 
Particularly was she afraid of a union of the Fertile 
OfescenfT^at is« Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. If 
these four countries were to unite, they would produce a 
new State as influential as Egypt. The latter, therefore, 
endeavoured to keep them apart by creating mistrust between 
Syria and Iraq. 
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In this battle, Egypt as was expected, played an 
Important role. For her the existence of an enemy state right 
across her borders was too big a danger to her security and a 
threat to her economy and political institutions. At first 
things went well for the Arabs. The Egyptian army adganced 
easily into the parts of Palestine awarded to the Arabs by the 
partition plan: (25) the South-West Negeb, the coastal plain 
through Gaza to BSagdal and beyond. But then by a combination of 
terrorism (as at Deir Yasin, where 250 Arab villagers were 
murdered), of military dash and skilful utilisation of truces, 
Jews had consolidated their grip on a far Jlarger area of the •s ~~ "" ~ ^ ~ ~ 
country ttmjbiiey had been awarded. 
At this state of serious reverses, Britain tried to 
restrain further Jewish advances as they were obliged to defend 
Egypt under the 1936 Treaty obligations. (26) But the Egyptians 
preferred to negotiate an armistice with Israel (27) rather than 
invoke the support of the British garrison in the Canal Zone 
under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and thereby perpetuate its 
continuity which was an abnoxious symbol of the incompleteness of 
their independence. 
25. The United States in World Affairs 1948-49 (Council of 
Foreign Relations, W.Y., 1949), p. 387. 
26. See, The Middle East Journal^ vol. 4, 1950, No. 2, 
pp. 143-54. 
27. Egypt signed an individual Armistice with Israel at Rhodes, 
on 24 February 1949. Text of the Armistice in UK Security 
Council Official Recordsy Sp. Supp., No, 3. 
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The conclusion of an Armistice with Israel, instead of 
a * Peace Treaty* shows that Egypt did not accept these setbacks 
as her defeat. She only needed some time to prepare herself for 
a final struggle to liquidate Israel. (28) The Armistice enabled 
her to maintain a state of technical belligerency against Israel, 
to invoke economic boycott and blockade of passage through her 
territories and waters; to refuse recognition and to withhold the 
right of refusing exchange of legation with the enemy state. 
D* Causes of the grabs' Defeat 
The Egyptians and other Arabs had plunged into the war 
mainly on the strength of emotional fervour and sentiments. Their 
preparations werg_ffetr from being adequate, numerically also the 
proportion of trained personnel was not imposing. Against a total 
of 65,OCX) better equipped^ and__eathusiastic Zionists who fully 
they were fighting for, the Arabs had been 
abl^ to muster only 21,500 ill-armed, ill-trained and unwillii^ 
and ignorant soldiers. {29) Comparatively, most prepared for war 
28. Article 5 of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice signed on 
24 February 1949, stated that the line demarcated in 
Articles 6-7 was "delineated in pursuance of the purpose 
and intent of the Security Council resolution of Nov. 4 
and Nov. 16, 1948" was "not to be construed in any sense 
as a political or territorial boundary", and was delineated 
"without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of 
either party to the armistice as regards the ultimate 
settlement of the Palestine question." The basic purpose 
of the demarcation line was "to delimit the line beyond which 
the armed forces of the respective parties shall not name." 
29. Nasser's biographer, Robert St. John gave the following 
account of how Nasser felt disgusted and disappointed when 
he incidently picked a soldier of his own battalion, during 
one of the cease-fires, just to find out whether his men 
understood what the war was all about, and found that he 
(contd. on next page) 
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was the Arab Legion of King Abdullah of Jordan, but even his 
army consisted of only four infantry battalion and one recently 
formed battery of field artillery, together with an improvised 
•home-guard' that was seriously under-equipped in many important 
respects. It had received from Britain six Twenty-five Pound 
guns a few months before, but its gunners had had only three 
months training and the Zionists for their part had manufactured 
large numbers of mortars and were skilftil in their usej the 
legion's fifty British armoured cars, though obsolete by British 
standards in 1941, were superior in quality but were greatly 
outnumbered by the eight hundred home-made araoured cars of the 
Zionists. (30) 
The root cause of the Arabs' defeat, hov/ever, was the 
absence of adequate cooperative planning of the campaign by Arab 
States which in turn had been due to insufficient mutual trust 
and confidence. Secondly, whereas the Jews were struggling for 
29. (contd. from back page) 
had just no idea. The soldier even did not know -itfiether 
he was in the battlefield or in the training right. Follow-
ing few dialogues were exchanged between Major Nasser and 
his soldier; 
Major Nasser: 'What are we doing here?' 
The soldier; 'We are on manoeuvres. Sir.' 
Major; 'Manoeuvres? where?' 
Soldier; 'At El-Rebeki Sir'. 
Nasser looked at the soldier, a Fellah from Upper Egypt 
incredulously. El-Reheki was on the road running from Cairo 
across the desert to Suez, hundreds of miles away. It was 
where the Egyptian Army used to hold its annual manoeuvres. 
See, The Boss (London, 1960), p. 65; also, Richard Hilton, 
Thirteenth Powey (London, 1958), p. 106. 
30. Survey of International Affairs 1945-50 (RIIA, 1954), 
p. 270. 
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their very existencei many_-of the-Arab^troops had 'little 
stomach*, for the war> Moreover, whereas the Jews conducted the 
war with a coordinated organization, a unified and total conscrip-
tion, the Arabs betrayed disunity, diversity of plans, improviza-
tion, and, above all, slackness and lack of seriousness about 
winning the war. Musa-Alawi, a fairly well-known Arab writer, 
remarks that "in fece of their enemvy the Arabs were not a state 
bi^ t pelit^y stateg, gyoups, not; a nat^ ioQ, each fearing and watching 
the other and intriguing against it» What concerned them most 
and guided their policy was not to win the war and save Palestine 
from their enemy, but what would happen after the struggle^ who 
would be dominant in Palestine or would annex it to them-
selves. " (31) 
Th^ attitude owed not a little to their illusions about 
their capability to easily uproot the new political entity* 'Abd 
ur Eehman 'Azzam, the Egyptian Secretary-General of the Arab 
league, thought that 'the strategic and technical position of the 
Arab Forces was particularly favourable ••• so that they would 
have no great difficulty in bringing about a military decision to 
their advantage in a very short time'. (32) The Egyptian Prime 
Minister also seemed to have no doubt about the defeat of Israel. 
While asking the Senate's approval for the invasion of Palestine, 
the Egyptian Premier hoped that 'the war would last no more than 
two weeks before the Zionists were defeated.' (33) 
31. Musa Alami, "Lessons of Palestine", The Middle East Journal, 
October 1949, p. 381. 
32. Fblk Bemadotte, To Jerusalem (I/indon, 1951), p» 34. 
33. John Kimche, op.cit., p. 199. 
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The Arabs thus being over-confident were mainly concerned 
about making the most fop themselves out of the episode* That 
King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan Intended to "annex to his l^£dom 
as much of Palestine as he could occupy" was not a secret* He 
was even prepared to make some compromise with the Zionists 
over the division of Palestine territory. (34) President Nasser 
also ^id once that the Arabs were defeated because they were 
"several armies"* "Bad the Army been one, Palestine would have 
been saved." (36) 
Other important factors were shortage of war material 
and stoppage of supplies of arms by UK in accordance with the 
UN request, (36) while Israel ,had been reinforcements in arms 
and volunteers from abroad, (37) mainly from Czechoslovakia. (38) 
34. Marlowe, op.cit., p* 327. 
Adjudged as traitor to Pan-Arabism he was done to death 
on the 20th July 1951 reportedly by a Cairo fenatic in the 
al-Aksa Mosque in Jerusalem. The Jordanian Court which 
sat in judgement on the crime found that a nephew and 
intimate counsellor of the Grand Mufti, al Hussaini. was 
one of the principal instigators and sentenced him to death. 
Sir Pierre Handot, This Changing Pattern of the Middle East 
1919-1958 (london, 1961), p* 133. 
r 35. President Nasser's Speeches (Director of Infoiraation, Cairo, 
1958), p. 72. 
36. H.C.Deb.. 6th Series, vol. 461, cols. 187-8. See also 
UN Security Council Official Records^ 3rd year, No. 76, 
pp. 6-9; also Document S/801. 
37. George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (London, 
1965), p* 223. 
38* Marlowe, op.cit*, pp* 360, 353* See also J.B. Glubb, 
op.cit*, p* 289. 
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E* Impact of the War on Egypt* s National Affairs » 
Bid to Resolve Disputes with Britain 
The Government of Egypt which was much more deeply 
committed over Palestine for reasons of her geographic proximity 
and political realities, and which unlike Jordan had not gained 
anything from the Palestine campaign (39) with which to appease 
public opinion, found itself faced with a dangerous domestic 
situation- The already discontented middle class found in this 
defeat an evidence of Government's weakness, corruption and 
misjudgement. 
Their humillajbing defeat in Palestine had a profound and 
Immediate effect on Egypt's public life. Prime Minister Nokrashi 
Pasha's efforts to conceal from public the disastrous course of 
the war had failed. They came to know about the inefficiency, 
corruption and cowardice in high places, which caused their 
showdown. (40) The shocking stories of misappropriation of war 
39. Judea, Samaria and Hebron which included the old city of 
Jerusalem and other Important towns like Nablus, Jericho, 
Lydda and Hebson, were held from 1949 onwards by the Arab 
Legion until they were captured by the Israelis in 1967 
campaign. See map. For detailed account of the war, loss 
and gains on both sides from 15 May 1948 to March 1949 when 
the final armistice was concluded. See Survey^ op.cit., 
pp. 270-94. 
40. Nasser made an entry in his diary as to why the Ninth 
Egyptian Battalion was defeated: "The Commander of the 
battalion was on leave. The next in command was hit by a 
splinter and died immediately. The third in command took 
a car and fled with it, stopping only when he reached 
Ismailia on the Canal. The fourth in command left the 
battalion to go to General Headquarters." See Robert St. 
John, The Boss (Iiondon, 1960), p. 73. See also Peter 
Mansfield, Nasser (liOndon, 1969), p. 42. 
About corruption and bungling in the supplies of arms, 
medicines and general stores, ofndal investigations 
revealed that a good number of people connected with the 
(contd. on next page) 
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funds, of stealing of military stores and the neglect of the 
wounded (41) disgusted them with the Government and the King, 
who, in their opinion, intended to use the war to eliminate 
opposition and 'rule with an iron hand'. (42) 
Frustration, humiliation and anger caused the outbreak 
of violence and destruction. Many ardent spirits desired to 
overthrow the entire political set-up that proved to be so 
incompetent to upkeep the nation's prestige and safeguard its 
territorial and ethnical integrity. 
The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan ul Muslemin) who enjoyed 
great popularity and prestige with the general masses for her 
enthusiasm and record of personal service in the fight against 
Israel, was most active in the anti-Government and anti-West 
campaign. 
40. (contd. from back page) 
Pglace were involved, prince Abbas Halim, a cousin to the 
Klng^was alsoraccused of pocketing nearly half a million 
dollars of secret government funds given to him to cover 
his expenses on a trip abroad to obtain arms. Another person 
confident of the King who was reported to have collected 
several million dollars in bribes from munitous men who had 
been supplying Egypt with expensive, albeit defective, arras; 
that exploded on the face of the soldier. See, R.S. John, 
op.cit., p. 98. 
41. Writing about the seige of Faluja, Nasser described the 
scene of war and the plight of his soldiers thus: 'Air raids 
were launched on our positions, forcefully and numerously. 
OUT own air force disappeared comp 1 etely«^_JW^never saw any 
o^^ur Planers. EnSagr-artillery begajTfhrowing fire our 
fieadsT^never keeping quiet for a moment. VJhat bothered 
most was the number of casualties in our forces. The 
existence of the wounded in our midst was a tax on our 
nerves." 
4 2 . Tom Little, op.cit., pp. 1 7 7 - 7 8 . See also Mansfield, 
op.cit., pp. 42-3. 
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The lamentations of the Moslem Brotherhood were 
tinged with a sense of triumph, for some of its 
phalaiixes had been sent to the front as volunteers 
and had so distinguished themselves by their fight-
ing spirit tliat in this period, darkened by ineffi-
ciency, treachery and defeat, they shone like a 
beacon light of Pan-Arab patriotism. Thousands of 
people flocked to join the movement, until it was 
able to boost by 2,000,000 members. (43) 
The news of the conclusion of the first Armistice at the 
end of_a_month^ fi^^ was strange and upsetting for m^ny p^ple 
in Cairo. From the very first day of the outbreak of fighting, 
the Egyptians were being told through official announcements and 
press-release that their armies were marching ahead successfully 
and that very soon they will wipe out the enemy; victory was sure 
and they should prepare to welcome their brave soldiers when they 
return home *after obliterating the State of Israel'. (44) 
During the previous month's fighting, the press in 
Egypt and other Arab countries had created a world of 
fantasy by daily reporting an unbroken succession of 
victories. As a result, the public, especially in 
Egypt, were surprised and annoyed at the conclusion of 
the armistice, when everyday the press (and the radio) 
was describing more and more glorious success. The 
Politicians were criticised for agreeing to the truce, 
and accordingly decided to terminate it, regardless of 
whether such a course would, or would not, lead to 
ultimate victory. (45) 
43. Tom Little, op.cit., p. 103. See also Christina Phelps 
Barris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt (london, 1954), 
pp. 177-94. 
44. Nasser's biographer, Robert St. John whose authenticity and 
accuracy of information has been confirmed by President Nasser 
himself and scores of other Egyptian officials, scholars and 
prominent journalists, tells us that Nasser was exasperated 
that the people were being told lies about the state of war. 
He records how Nasser felt when he heard that King Faruk had 
ordered the construction of a new boulevard between Cairo and 
Helipolis down which the victory parade would pass on the day 
the Egyptian Army returned home. This was misleading the 
people. The soldiers were nowhere near victory. The Boss, 
pp. 70, 73-74. 
45. J.B. Glubb, Britain and the Arabs (Iiondon, 1969), p.
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Though the second round of the fighting had begun, it 
was no longer possible for the Government to persuade its people 
to have hope about its outcome and about its own competence to 
handle the problems of war and improve administration at home« 
Despite emergency regulation being in force, the opposition 
organized protest rallies, shouting slogans against the Government 
and against the West. During June and July a series of riots 
and attacks on foreigners and Jews occurred in Cairo and 
Alexandria. There was considerable loss of life and property. 
In one case on 20 June several Englishmen and Jews were killed 
when some houses were blown up. Among buildings and property 
destroyed by explosions were the premises of the two British and 
French newspapers on 12 November. The authorities had long known 
that the Moslem Brotherhood was playing a leading iBirt in this, 
— 
and on 20 November, when they discovered a large store of arms 
and explosives together with literature belonging to that body, 
they had in their hands ample evidence to prove its complicity. 
Matters were brought to a head by the death of the police 
Commandant in serious riots in Cairo on 4 December, (46) and the 
Prime Minister, who now had proof of the Brotherhood's responsi-
46. Selim Zaki Pasha, Commandant of the Cairo City Police, was 
killed on 4 December 1948 when police were despatched to the 
King Puad University to quell violent demonstrations by 
medical students, said to have been fomented by the Moslem 
Brotherhood. The students had been on strike for several 
days in protest against the refusal of the Governor-General 
of the Sudan to admit a party of Egyptian Lawyers into the 
Sudan, and following the expulsion of some of the students* 
leaders by the University authorities, professors' rooms had 
been wrecked, laboratories destroyed, and anti-Government 
demonstrations staged. The police called in to restore 
order, were met with granades, one of which killed Zaki Pasha. 
Al-AhramV 6 December 1948. 
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bill ty for the outrage, dissolved it by proclamation on 
8 December and ordered the confiscation of all its property. 
He justified this in a statement declaring that it had been 
training youths for terrorist activitiest extorting money by 
violence or threats^ and inciting irresppnsj.ble elements of tl^ e 
population to create disturbances. Its definite avowed aimy 
as shown by the evidence in his handsy was the overthrow of the 
Government. (47) 
Following his order of dissolution Nokrashi Pasha sealed 
its offices, arrested its prominent members and supporters and 
banned students' participation in political demonstrations. (48) 
The Ikhwans already had an account to settle with the 
Prime Minister who publicly accused them of responsibility for 
his predecessor's murder and had been their •staunchest enemy' 
since then. Now these repressive measures were, in their view, 
too much to go unanswered. Their answer came twenty d&.ys after 
the dissolution of their organization was announced. One of 
their student members, disguised as a police officer, shot and 
killed him as he was going up to his office in thfe Ministry of 
Interior. (49) 
47. Annual Register 1948^ p. 299. See also Vatikiotis, op.cit., 
p. 366; also Information Paper No.l9f op.cit., p. 117. 
48. ^isAhramj 15 December 1949; Egyptian Gazette^ 16 December 1949. 
49. The Middle East Journal, vol. 3, April 1949, No.2. p. 183. 
See also Maurice Barari, Government and Politics in the 
Middle East (New Jersey, 1962), p. 66. 
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His successor, Ibrahim Abdul Hadi, also belonging to 
the Saadist Party, however, did not allow the extremists and 
other trouble-makers to influence or to determine Egypt's 
domestic and foreign policy issues. He had assumed the office 
of the Prime Minister at a very critical moment in his country's 
political history* On the Palestinian front, his armies had 
suffered serious losses and the conclusion of a cease-fire for 
an unspecified period was imminent; in the Sudan the demand 
for self-government and an end of the Condominium was becoming 
violent and widespread; on the issue of the Treaty revision, 
though he was firm on evacuation, but he also realized the 
difficulties in securing it immediately because of the new 
international power-alliance; the suggestions to raise Egypt's 
status in the Suez Canal managing board, were reasonably 
attractive, but they needed personal boldness and the King's 
support. 
In all these matters, Premier Hadi took some of the most 
determined steps. He first paid attention to the question of law 
and order without which stability of administration was not 
guaranteed. Continuation of ban on extremist groups and extension 
of the Martial law were approved by the Parliament on 3 May. (50) 
1' 
This enabled him to deal firmly with all persons and parties 
involved in subversive activities. The Brotherhood, for example, 
ostensibly founded in 1930 for the propagation of religious and 
60. The Egyptian parliament, in view of the public order and 
security conditions in the country, approved on 16 May 1949 
the government's request for the extension of Martial law 
for another year. Ar-Ahram. 4 May 1949; The Sgyptiah 
Gazette, 4, 6 May 1949. 
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social ideals, had become an organization whose real aim was 
the seizure of political power by removing the unpopular King 
and the existing so-called western-oriented secular leadership. 
They desired to establii^ an orthodox order based on the 
^ . • ^ ^ - ^ ^ — - -— — ^ — — 
teacMngs of Islam in their original sense* C5l) 
The Communists collaborated with them only to exploit 
the state of chaos and uneasiness to their advantage. Neither 
of the two extremist parties, however, suited the Egyptian temper 
and political climate. Their most immediate need was a stable 
and honest government, not the search for an ideological basis. 
61. T;^ e real jDowerof the BrotherhQOjdJldeo logy Lay in.JJs 
cfltlcIimoT'Egjnpfl^ society. Western imluincewas 
attackea^ The corruption in Parliamentary life and the 
palace was ridiculed® The society called for a new sense 
of unity based on Islamic principles and designed to rid 
the country of Western rule and influence. There was 
considered social content in the programme of the Brother-
hood, for they favoured cooperative organizations, the 
founding of local industries, the better division of wealth, 
and education for the mass of population. 
Their programme, on the whole, was a mixture of 
reactionary and progressive elements. Their ultimate goal 
was the creation of an Islamic order dominated by the 
religious law, pured of its inQ)ured Elements. Hasan al-
Banna, the founder, regarded class antagonism as a sign of 
the breakdown of Islamic unity. He favoured the abolition 
of usury, nationalization of natural resources, expulsion of 
foreign capital, and promotion of harmonious labour -
management relations within an Islamic framework. On other 
important issues of modernity, such as the status of women, 
the use of Arabic in schools in place of European languages, 
and the teaching of Western sciences, the Moslem Brotherhood 
tended to be more conservative than others. 
See, Hi sham B. Sharabi, Government and Politics in the 
Middle East (London, 1964), p. Ill; also Peter 0. Collins 
and Robert 1. Tignor, Egypt and the Sudan (New Jersey, 1967), 
p. 101. See also, Franz Rozenthal, "The Moslem Brotherhood-
in Egypt", Moslem Worlds vol. XXXVII, 1947, pp. 278-91. 
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Ibrahim Abdul Hadi's action against both the extreme leftists 
and the extreme rightists was the necessity of the time. He 
tightened the policy of suppression and swooped the Ikhwans and 
the Communists behind the bars. (52) There iS| however, no 
conclusive evidence that his stringent and repressive policy 
included the murder of the Ikhwan's chief, Sheik Hasan al-Banna 
(53) on 13 February 1949. Nevertheless it appeared to be a 
state murder through the machination of the counter-terrorist 
movement 
^organized by the Palace. (54) 
52. Al-Ahram. 21 March 1949. 
63. Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Moslem Brotherhood, was a 
devout Muslim who had been educated in Muslim schools and 
then at Dar-al-Ulum, the teachers' training school, it>r 
Arabic and Islamic subjects only. In^a certain sense he 
was the spokesman of those like'him who_had llttl9_o^ r no 
spegiall21dJWrnstenTiSraini^ but who~wer^ eager to _r_ecapture 
their plag_e_ of prestige in a changing. Egyptian society. 
He~disliked Western influence in Egypt. I^was sp^ially 
appalled at the degree of Westernization of Cairo and the 
decline of Islamic values among its educated citizens. 
Urban centres like Cairo and Alexandria, where Western 
influence was so strong, were always special objects of 
attack by the Moslem Brothers. 
At Ismailia, where he worked as a teacher he felt the 
full force of Europe*s position in Egypt. Being a Canal 
city, there was a large number of British soldiers and 
officers, their money and pleasure-seeking habits had largely 
spoiled the life of that city and which affected al-Bana's 
mind and thoughts. 
54. Tom little, op.cit., p. 178. See also St. John, op.cit., 
p. 89. 
It is quite understandable that the King who was so 
anxious to get rid of his enemies, had patronized the 
activities of such an organization of professional bad 
characters. 
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Thus, by resorting to repressive methods, Badi, though 
temporarily successful in restoring tranquillity in the country, 
he could not completely suppress the opposition. They acquired 
new names and adopted new methods of opposing the Government. 
Financial difficulties, initially caused by the Palestine war 
expenditure and borrowing from abroad, led to deficit budgeting-
His proposals for new taxes were opposed by the landed 
aristocracy (66) which dominated the two houses of the Parliament. 
Spiralling up of prices of essential commodities like wheat and 
paraffin added to the dissatisfaction of the people with the 
Government• 
The King was also now becoming apprehensive of his Prime 
Minister's intention to look into the matters of the Palace and 
the people closely connected with the King. (56) 
The Wafd, which had during this intervening period 
consolidated its strength, organization and contacts with the 
people, now felt particularly confident of its prospects of winning 
the polls. The ban on Brotherhood and the Communists further 
55. Prior to the land reforms undertaken by the revolutionary 
government of Abdel Nasser (Egypt had not become a republic 
till then), there was a wealthy .landowning class, privileged, 
underjdkaxj^,J^^naWng the two Houses of Parliament^ was^ 
with their professional "and official associates and hangers-
on , Qwned-nearly_all_the_wealth^nd ex.ercised nearly all_Jhe 
influence and patronage in the country. There was a small 
clSTss of industrialists and financiers, mostly of foreign 
extraction, wealthy but less influential politically and 
socially than the landowners. See, Marlowe, op.cit., p.354. 
56. Mohammed Naguib, Egypt's Destiny (london, 1955), p. 15; also 
Basheed el-Barawy, The Military Coup in Egypt (Cairo, 1952), 
pp. 161-3. 
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bettered her chances of success. Wahas Pasha, therefore, 
demanded that a new government should be formed to lead the 
country to solve its major national and inteua&tional matters, 
a government that enjoyed people*s support and commanded wider 
respect. (57) 
In the army, a certain group of young officers, all 
between late twenties and early thirties, who called themselves 
Free Officers, also entertained serious doubts about the fair 
management of public affairs and particularly the conduct of war 
by the politicians, wished to a change in their country's political 
life and destiny. But they were working and aspiring to play a 
political role in the transformation of their co^mtry, secretly. 
The Prime Minister had some doubts about certain officers' under-
ground activities but he could not extort any information even 
from a direct and personal interrogation of the key person of the 
Free Officers' Organization, Major Abdel Hasser. (68) 
57. The Middle East Journal, vol. 3, April 1949, No.2, p. 185. 
See also Tom Little, op.cit., p. 104. 
58. In May 1949, the Prime Minister sent for Major Nasser for 
questioning as he suspected some relationship between the 
Moslem Brotherhood and the clandestine movement in the army. 
Nasser's biographer, Robert St. John Cp.91) describes the 
scene of interview as follows: 
The Chief of Secret Police who sat beside the Prime 
Minister; 
"We have information that you have formed a secret 
society". 
Nasser shook his head: "We know that you are training 
your members for amed rebellion." 
"Haw can possibly be true", Nasser asked. "I went to 
Palestine more than a year ago. I have been back for only 
a few weeks." 
Ccontd. on next page) 
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After this historic interview, the Free Officers became 
more cautious and more secretive, but they continued their 
campaign against corruption and highhandednees in the administra-
tion of civil and military affairs by publishing and circulating 
pamphlets secretly. (69) 
Ruling with a fim hand nonetheless enabled Prime Minister 
Hadi to restore the authority of the Government. Suppression 
of the Brotherhood and the loung Egypt Society considerably 
ended disorders in the country for a good many months "a fact 
which justified the view that they were behind most of the 
troubles in the post-war period." ( 
58. (contd. from back page) 
"Do you know Mahmoud Labbib?" 
Nasser hesitated. I^bbib was an officer of the Brotherhood 
who had charge of initiating Free Officers desiring to take 
the Brotherhood vows. 
"Yes". 
"How do you know him?" 
"We worked together organizing the Arabs of Palestine". 
"Who introduced you to him?" 
Kasser hesitated again. It was Sadar or Raouf. But 
rather than mention the names of any Free Officers, he said, 
"Captain Anwar el Seyani". 
"His address?" 
"You will have to ask Allah. He died during the war." 
The Prime Minister lost his tamper while Gamal remained 
calmly smiling. "You are mking a fun of me. I could hand 
you over to the Police. Do you understand what I mean by 
Police?" 
"Yes, I know, I know very well." 
But the Prime Minister had no proof whatever. 
See, "Gamal Abdul Nasser", Al-Musawwar (Biographical edition, 
Cairo, 1958), p. 71. 
59. El-Barawy, op.cit., pp. 207-210. 
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He had undertaken no social reforms, but he had 
restored conditions in which the introduction of 
social reforms became possible. His methods had 
not been in accordance with the recognized methods 
of democracy, but he made the practice of democracy 
possible for his successors. (60) 
EGYPT*S ENHANCED POSITION IN THE 
?UEZ CAN^L BOAI^ 
In the calm won by repression, and before his exi^t from 
the turbulent scene of national politics, Ibrahim Abdul Hadi 
Pasha had successfully concluded in March an agreement with the 
Suez Canal Company making Egypt a "privileged partner". The new 
agreement which brought some benefits to Egypt in fact represented 
a compromise between the provisions of Egyptian law regarding 
the Egyptian share in the management of the Company and its 
distributed profits and the views of the Board. Following were 
its main pro visions J 
1. The Egyptian Government will receive 7 per cent of 
the annual gross profits of the Company, with a 
guaranteed minimum of £E 360,000 annually. 
2. Egypt is granted 5 additional seats on the Board 
of Directors bringing her total to seven. (Total 
members being 32). 
3. Foreign employees will be replaced by Egyptians 
according to the proportion prescribed by the 
Egyptian Law. 
4. Foreign pilots will be gradually replaced by 
Egyptian nationals who have graduated from the 
Egyptian Naval School. 
5. The Company will appoint 60 Egyptian experts and 
civil servants; will establish a proportion of 4 
Egyptians to 1 foreigner on its technical staff and 
of 9 Egyptians to 1 foreigner as regards its 
administrative personnel; and engage 20 more 
Egyptian pilots. There will be no dismissal or 
hinderance to promotion of present personnel. 
60. Marlowe, op.cit., pp. 366-7. 
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6. All vessels displacing under 300 tonnes will be 
exempted from Canal dues (benefiting essential 
local Egyptian traffic in small vessels). 
7» Large-scale construction schemes will be undertaken 
by the Company, £E 4,600,000 being earmarked for 
this purpose. A 6-mile Canal will be constructed 
parallel to the main canal, a workers' centre will 
be built. 
8. A municipality will be established at Ismallia by 
the Egyptian Government, will take over the Abbasiya 
Canal, supplying drinkable water to the town. 
9. The Conmany will waive repayment of a loan of 
£E 100.000 granted to the Port Said Municipality 
for city development. (61) 
The terms of the agreement were not only of considerable 
immediate advantage to Egypt, but that also greatly helped 
President Gamal Abdul Nasser in making his bold and epochmaking 
decision to completely take over the Canal in July 1966. If the 
number of Egyptian technicians, pilots and administrative 
personnel had not been what it was provided under the 7 March 1949 
Agreement, Nasser in all probability, would not have thought of 
taking such a challenging step and risk his own political career 
and the continuance of the revolutionary regime. In the interven-
ing period of nearly seven years the Egyptians had become quite 
sufficient to handle the canal affairs satisfactorily. 
The British Government accepted Egypt's enhanced position 
in the Sue25 Canal Company mainly for two reasons. Firstly, 
because "the terms of the agreement in no vay pre.iudiced the 
interests of His Ma.1esty*s Government either as the largest share-
61. The Agreement with the Suez Canal Company was ratified by 
King Faruk of Egypt on 19 August 1949 following its passage 
by the Egyptian Parliament. See the Egyptian Gazette. -
20 August 1949. 
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holder in the Company or as the largest user of the Canal«" 
(62) Secondly, the British Government hoped that by encouraging 
the Egyptians in their aspirations would help create a better, 
somewhat more congenial atmosphere for negotiations on more 
significant and urgent issue of Egypt's participation in a 
Western sponsored defence alliance to replace the existing 
Treaty. Earlier, the Cairo correspondent of The Times had 
reported that Egypt was in a mood to respond to Britain's 
gestures of goodwill and amity towards her. In his 25th January 
despatch he said. 
The Egyptians desire for settlement of i^glo-Bgyptian 
differences is now growingly apparent. The Palestine 
futility is restoring the innate sanity of the 
Egyptian people where Britain is concerned. ... The 
extremists have been listened to in the past, and 
Egypt has paid heavily in men and money. A revulsion 
is starting, and the wind is setting fair for settle-
ment. The remaining obstacles are what they have 
long been. ... 
Egypt's willingness to improve her relations with Britain 
was further reciprocated by the UKI Government by signing with 
her a financial agreement on 31 March. It provided for an 
immediate release of £12 million from Egypt's pre-July 1947 
sterling balances and for further releases, up to £18 million, 
as might be necessary to maintain the total of Egypt's balances 
on Wo. 1 account at £45 million. Britain was also to provide 
Egypt with £6 million in dollars, and it was agreed that the 
level of UK exports to Egypt might be £47 million in value or 
even higher. 
H.C. Deb.y 14 March 1949, vol. 462, cols. 151-2. 
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Affcer almost two weeks Egypt signed another agreement 
with Great Britain of which certain provisions were of great 
political significance in later developments of relations 
between the^untries. On 17 April the Governments of Egypt 
and the United Kingdom agreed upon Egypt's participation in the 
construction of a dam and hydro-electric Power station at Oswan 
Falls in Uganda, the outflow of the river Nile from liake Victoria 
as part of a twenty-five schemes for the regulation of the 
Irfhite Nile. The project in which Egypt's initial contribution -
an investment indeed, was to be £E million, was of great 
importance for the future development and prosperity of Egypt, 
the Sudan and Uganda as a whole. (63) 
ithe British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin felt happy 
to inform the House of Gonanons that the Sudan would be a partner 
in the implementation of the project. Speaking on this aspect 
of the agreement, Bevin said; 
I am happy to inform that the Egyptian Government 
have announced that they would welcome the partici-
pation of the Sudan in these projects for the control 
of the Hill which are now under consideration. The 
participation of the Sudan in these projects will 
be the subject of technical discussions between 
Egypt and the Sudan, the results of which will be 
embodied in agreements to be con(?luded in connection 
with these projects. (64) 
Members of HM Government and the Opposition welcomed the 
statement as it suggested implied recognition of the Sudan's 
o\m identity. (65) 
63. Al-Ahram^ 11, 12 February 1949, also 20 April 1949. 
H.C. Deb.|, vol. 405, vol. 405, cols. 617-21. See also 
Al-Ahramy 20 May 1949. 
65. Ibid. 
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It was in this atmosphere of accommodation and better 
understanding, exhibited by Ibrahim Hadi*s Government that 
Britain»s Chief of Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir 
William Slim, and Sir William Strang, Permanent Under-Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, separately visited Cairo to explore the 
chances of bringing Egypt into the network of military arrange-
ments ostensibly for the containment of Communist advances into 
the Orient. (66) They, however, found despite Egypt's present 
Government's friendly gestures, it was not advisable to deal 
with an unpopular government with little chances of success in 
the forthcoming general elections in January 1950* 
As a result of his too rigid legalistic mannerism, his 
strict rather harsh administrative methods, his forcible 
suppression of opposition, his policies of reforms and additional 
taxation and his determination to cleanse the Palace of corruption 
and the moral corruptors, made him the most unwanted man in 
every quarter of Egyptian society. His was not obviously the 
government which could speak for the country as a whole in any 
negotiations with Great Britain. Nevertheless, both Egypt and 
Great Britain were anxious to find a satisfactory formula fop. 
their continuing relations. Only a government in Egypt which 
could speak for all the ma;Jor parties could probably enter 
confidently into long-term treaty commitments. (67) But 'such a 
66. The Egyptian Gazette^ 19 March 1949. 
67. Cm^. 8419, p. 3. Soo Appondi3e-ifcr> 
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Govemment had not existed since King Paruk sunmarily ousted 
the Wiafdists - almost certainly the strongest political group 
in the country in October 1944.' (68) 
68. Harold Hoskin, "The Guardianship of the Suez Canal", 
The Middle East Journaly vol. 4, April 1950, no. 2, p. 151. 

Chapter IV 
EGYPT* S BID TO SETTJLB ITS DISPUTES WITH BRITAIN 
THROUGH PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS JUNE 1950 
THROUGH OCTOBER 1951 
A- THE mFD RETURNS TO PO^ l^R 
Under such circumstances of uncertainty and uneasiness 
prevailing throughout the country, Paruk, like Ismail Pasha, 
shrewdly made a virtue of the necessity by favouring the demand 
of a constitutional and representative Government. He knew very 
well that at the polls the Wafd* s victory was a certainty 
*because of its countrywide organization* and mass popularity. 
Why not, therefore, make an ally of the Wafd well in advance? 
An alliance with the Wafd would not only help him rebuild his 
reputation as an adherent of the Constitution and a supporter of 
the nationalist claims, but would also put an end to internal 
political strife. He feared that continuation of the existing 
chaotic conditions and ministerial instability might lead to a 
coup d'etat as the one that occurred in Syria under.-Colonel Zaim 
or like the one recently attempted in Lebanon. Cl) 
At this moment there was secret contact between the 
Palace clique and the Wafd by which the idea was 
elaborated that if the party abandoned its enmity for 
the King, the two could come together and govern the 
country, the King with his prerogatives supporting 
the popular force of the Wafd. (2) 
1. "Developments of the Quarter", The Middle East Journal^ 
vol. 3, October 1949, No.4, p. 442. 
2. "The Egyptian Imbroglio", Round Table, larch 1952, p. 118. 
See also, Tom Little, Modern Egypt (London, 1967), p. 104. 
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The Wafd, already sick of violence and terrorism in the 
country and also anxious to come back into the limelight, did 
not fail to respond to the King* s offer of reconciliation. (3) 
It agreed to join a coalition Government provided Ibrahim Abdul 
Hadi Pasha was replaced by a neutral Prime Minister. Accordingly, 
on 26 July, the King obtained resignation from Ibrahim Pasha 
and appointed in his place Hussain Sirry (4) to form a new 
government including members from all major political parties. (S) 
r 
Sirry Pasha* s main task was to restore normalcy and 
prepare for General Elections. He released most of the political 
prisoners and promised to abolish Martial law. He also announced 
that the national elections would be held early next year-
Polling took place on 3 January and resulted in the 
return of 228 Wafdists, 28 Saadists, 26 Liberal Constitutionalists, 
30 Independents, 6 Watani or old Nationalists, and one Socialist. 
3. It is interesting to note that the Wafd, smelling an imminent 
return to power, publicised the party's abhorence of violence, 
and its opposition to Conmiuniem, its undying loyalty to the 
Crown, and its firm attachment to Islam. See Vatikiotis, 
op.cit., p. 484, footnote 14. 
4. Hussain Sirry Pasha, the new Prime Minister, was a non-party 
man who had held the post from Fall 1941 to February 1942, 
when the Germans were threatening Egypt from Al-Alamain. 
Known for friendly feelings towards foreigners in general, 
he also had the respect of the political parties because of 
his independent position. See Al-Ahram^ 26 July 1949. 
6* Al-Ahramy 27 July 1949; The Egyptian Gazette. 27, 28 July 1949. 
See also, Vatikiotis, op.cit., p. 484, footnote 14. 
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Several Independents later aligned themselves with the 
Wafd. (6) Thus assured of overwhelming support of the House 
and also the King's blessings, Nahas Pasha formed his Government 
on 12 January. (7) 
6. Survey of Internatlanal Affairs 1951 (HIIA, 1S64), p»261j 
also Annual Hegister 1950^  p» 2947 
The Wafd success in the election was not wholly due to 
its well-knit electoral organization in the provinces and 
its vast financial resources, but also because of the 
support of the Brotherhood and the Communists who wanted 
to avenge the Saadists for their severe treatment of them 
from 1946 to 1949. Political neutrality of the Government 
under which the elections were held also contributed to 
the spectacular victory of the Wafd. 
Rasheed al-Barawy, who wrote a very authentic account 
of Egypt*s July Revolution, gave the following reasons for 
the Mafd*s sweeping the polls: 
1* The Sirry Government gave some support to the 
Wafd. 
2» The Moslem Brotherhood members mostly gave their 
votes to the Wafd. 
3. Vested interests also helped the Wafd because they 
resented certain laws issued by the Saadist 
Government. 
4. The enquiries made by Mohamed Aly Rateb, Minister 
of Supply in the Sirry Cabinet, into certain 
irregularities alleged to have been perpetrated by 
some Saadist Ministers. 
5. The belief that Britain welcomed the advent of a 
Wafdist Government. 
6* The state of insecurity and concern which prevailed 
in foreign economic circles as a result of unrest 
in the country. 
7. The fact that the police and provincial administration 
officials favoured the Wafdist candidates in most 
constituencies as a retaliatory measure against the 
Saadists. 
Ccontd. on next page) 
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B« HEGOTIATIONS WITH BRITAIN RESUMED 
The return of the Wafd Party with a clear majority in 
the Parliament was welcomed by the British Government, its 
Embassy and the British community in Cairo. They recalled that 
between 1936 and 1942-4, the Wafd, of all the parties, had been 
most cooperatively inclined towards Britain. Now, with its 
enhanced power and prestige, it would be able to act independently 
and confidently to resume treaty negotiations. They hoped that 
Nahas Pasha would 'realistically* appreciate the new complex of 
the post-war international politics and Great Britain's predica-
ment. They felt optimistic about the Wafd's response to their 
proposal regarding the defence of the Middle East. In their 
optimism and expectations^they under-estimated, rather ignored 
that the Wafd leaders during the pre-election period had repeatedly 
avowed their intent of insisting on the complete evacuation of 
Egyptian soil by British forces and of uniting Egypt and the Sudan. 
They presumed that such assertions might have been made to counter 
opposition charges of their (Wafdists) being ready to sell out to 
Britain. Later events, however, proved that the British leaders 
had not taken account of the consistency and the seriousness of 
Egypt*s nationalist demands. During the past fifteen years the 
7. (contd. from back page) 
It must, however, be noted that less than two-third of 
the qualified voters exercised the right of franchise; out 
of 4,106,182 only 2,969,741 went to the polls. Moreover, the 
Wafd did not receive a majority of the total votes cast; 
1,136,642 as against 1,724,098 polled by the opposition. 
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Egyptians had acquired more education, more political aware-
ness of their national rights, and had become more disgusted 
with the limitations upon their freedom. In 1960, they were 
more than ever, insistent to settle their disputes with the 
British on the question of the Suez and the Sudan* They would 
not have allowed any leader or government to compromise on 
Egypt*B national honour and aspirations. 
Niahas Pasha, contrary to British expectations, was not 
blind to the facts of his own country's political history, and 
also the existing conditions in which his party was put in 
office. He was sincere and determined to free his country from 
the obligations and limitations of the 1936 Treaty, which he had 
himself negotiated and signed under the pressure of the then 
existing circumstances. He was anxious to do may with the 
stigma of being a pro-British in the 1940s. 
In the 'Speech from the Throne' at the opening of 
Parliament his Government promised to do everything possible to 
hasten the evacuation of both parts of 'Our Valley, Egypt and the 
Sudan'. The King said: 
... the nation had unanimously proclaimed the 
necessity for the liberation of our Valley, Egypt 
and the Sudan, from all fetters on its liberty and 
independence, and that the Government would make 
resolute and effective efforts to speed up the 
evacuation of both parts of the Nile Valley and 
protect its unity under the Egyptian Crown. (8) 
8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Records of ConversationSy 
Note And Papers Exchanged Between The Royal Egyptian 
Government And The United Kingdom CCairO| 1951)^ p. 3. 
See also The Egyptian Gazette^ 17 January 1950; Al-Ahram. 
17 January 1960. 
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Conversations with Britain on these issues were in fact 
informally initiated at the end of January, when Bevin broke 
journey at Cairo on his way back from the Colombo Conference. (9) 
Formal negotiations, however, could not begin before June when 
Field Marshal Slim arrived in Cairo with his advisors. (10) In 
his very first meeting with the Egyptian Prime Minister and 
other members of the Government, Marshal Slim emphasised that 
the relations, political and military, between Egypt and Great 
Britain should be viewed as part of the larger question of the 
regional security of the Middle Bast in which Egypt, because 
of vital strategic location, and the Suez Canal, occupied key 
position. 
This was obviously a bad start. It became clear from 
the very start of the negotiations that there would be little 
room for a compromise. There was in fact no meeting ground 
between the political approach of Egypt and the sole military 
consideration of its counterpart. The latter asked Egypt to 
appreciate the danger of aggression from the Russian side and, 
therefore, became a partner in their effort to defend themselves 
against such an ev«atuality. 
In fact this was exactly the same line of argument against 
which Al»Ahram had already warned: 
The British strategists have come out again with 
their old theories of the importance of the Mddle 
East in any armed conflict with Russia, and they 
demand Britain should hold tight to its position in 
9* Al-Ahram^ 28 , 29 January 1960. 
10. The Egyptian Gazette. Al»Ahram. 4, 5 and 6 June 1960. 
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the Middle Bast. They also plead with the new 
rulers of Egypt to think likewise and take a more 
realistic view of the whole situation* 
It is paramount to saying that the strategists 
have been interfering with the Treaty talks ever since 
1930 and their views have never changed. They claim 
they are only concerned with the military side and 
have nothing to do with politics or the national 
aspirations of nations. Their thoughts are only 
centred on how to win a new war, forgetting that a 
friendly nation is a stronger bastion than a 
strategic position. ... Britain during the war found 
out that a friendly and faithful nation which joins 
the British Camp is more valuable than a strategic 
position surrounded by a hostile people, (ll) 
The British delegate tried to dispel, what some people 
would like to call »misgivings' about the British intentions. 
He told the Egyptian Prftae Minister that the proposed alliance 
did not suggest Britain's military occupation. It merely sought 
cooperation in peace-time with the British garrison in the Suez 
Canal zone in Joint preparation for defence *on a footing of 
equality*. (12) He urged the Egyptian leaders to see the merit 
of the 'offer* in the perspective of the existing tensions in 
world politics. He stressed that 'the Soviet Union expected war 
with the West (the Capitalist States) and that in the event of 
war Egypt would be one of the Russian objectives, since he who 
holds Egypt holds the Middle East', (13) its routes, waterways, 
strategic highlands and its fabulous riches. The Marshal warned 
that Russia seriously intended to get into Africa, and Egypt's 
neutrality would be violated the moment the war begins. Egypt, 
11. Quoted in The Egyptian Gazette. 12 January 1950. 
12. Conversation^^ op.cit., p. 12. 
13. Ibid., p. 11. 
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he added, had * neither men nor the experience' to defend 
herself against the avalanche of Soviet air attack 
*The danger (of Russian invasion) is a real one*. 
*If war comes, one of the Soviet interests is tiiis 
country: Egypt. Egypt, in the Middle East, is like 
France and Belgium in Eurppe. If there is war in 
Europe, Belgium and Prance would be in it. Anyway, 
Egypt will be in war right from the beginning' • 
•You say that by having British troops in Egypt, 
you attract the Russians to come and drive them out. 
What they want is Egypt. You are the country with 
wealth and resources. Anybody who wants to hold the 
Middle East, must hold Egypt. You have ports and 
everything, and will be the centre of target for 
Russia. Egypt cannot hold that by being neutral. 
Field Marshal Slim further pointed out; 
'Only two countries can remain neutral; either one 
so great and powerful, and Egypt is not; or one 
that is small but possesses something useful for 
both sides, like Sweden, and Egypt is not. 
You cannot remain neutral. If you want to 
defend yourself, you must be ready for defence. 
The only way is to have an Ally. Obviously, that 
Ally is Britain. (14) 
C. THE PROPOSED ALLIANCE SUGGESTS CONTINUATIOM 
OF OCGUPATIOH OF EGYPT 
The Egyptian leaders, however, did not accept the British 
point of view and the arguments based on it. Replying to Marshal 
Slim, Prime Minister Nahas Pasha said that the Egyptian people 
were angy and resent.ful and would be absolutely unwilling to 
1 
accept new conditions, which aimed at maintaining foreign troops 
in Egypt under any name or in any form. "I can never be convinced, 
nor convince the people that the maintenance of a foreign aimy 
14. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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in peace time means anything else but a sort of occupation 
and incomplete sovereignty"* 
The Prime Minister also reminded the Field Marshal how 
his Government and the people had cooperated with the Allied 
cause in the two World Wars: 
The people were behind me, serving you and putting 
all their services at your disposal; they will help 
you with their hearts and souls as they did in the 
first World War. They gave you their crops and put 
their railways, means of communications and other 
services at your disposal, hoping for the fulfilment 
of the promises of evacuation and complete indepen-
dence. But none was fulfilled. (16) 
Nahas Pasha then said rather bluntly: 
• •• why should we stand on your side, get ourselves 
killed, destroy our lands and lose our resources, 
if we Qo not know for sure that this third time our 
demands are satisfied. (16) 
Commenting upon Marshal Slim* s remark that Egypt would be the 
object of the Soviet attack, he said: 
I like you to know that no power on earth can 
convince Egyptian people that Egypt will be meant 
for itself for attacks or aggression. What will 
cause this attack is the presence in our land of 
foreign troops which will be the target for Russian 
aggression. The presence of these troops will be 
the excuse which the Russians will make to attack 
Egypt. (17) 
16. Conversations, op.cit., p» 13» 
16. Ibid. Makram Ebied's organ, al-Kutla also disapproved the 
Eritish offer of an alliance for joint defence in the same 
manner. It wrote: "If we are courted as allies, we must first 
be shown wherein Egypt's interest in such an alliance lies -
unless it is a question of involving her in a war in which 
Britain would be a combatant and Egypt would have no concern. 
We have already experienced that sort of alliance in the 
last war. We were ruined and starved to feed the Allied 
armies. We are still suffering many setbacks on account of 
that ally. Lord preserve us from such alliances". See, 
Information Paper No.19. op.cit., p. 121. 
Conversationist op.cit., p. 13. 
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The Egyptian Government's attitude on the question of 
continued presence of the British troops was based, as the Prime 
Minister argued, on their previous experience. If the existence 
of a threat of war justified the maintenance of British troops 
in the Canal Zone, the occupation would last for ever, because 
the danger could never disappear. 
This danger came in the past from Germany, then 
from Germany, Italy and Japan in the last war; it 
is said to come from Russia. In fact, it is a 
vicious circle. It will be always possible to say 
there exists a danger of war from one of the big 
powers. Therefore, Egyptians cannot accept the 
occupation of their country because of such an 
argument. (18) 
Moreover, the people of Egypt regarded British occupation 
as a standing fact while the danger of Russian invasion was 
merely a metter of threat, and that too only from the Western 
point of view. It was not really easy or even desirable for any 
government in Egypt to convince the people that the continuation 
of the British occupation was necessary to repel that supposed 
danger. Nonetheless, the Government was prepared to discuss any 
plan of military cooperation provided evacuation of Egypt was 
preceded. With the British soldiers stationed within the country, 
the Egyptians could never believe that the proposed new alliance 
was different from the existing one. Many times in the past 
Britain had promised to evacuate Egypt. (Foreign Secretary Bevin 
had agreed with Sidki Pasha on complete withdrawal of British 
forces by September 1949.) But they continued to be stationed 
there on some excuse or other. This had weakened the Egyptians* 
14. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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faith and confidence in their promises, that the British 
troops would leave their country. (19) 
The Egyptian leader summed up his view point by adding 
that once the British withdrew from Egypt his Government and the 
people would be most willing to "work together hand in hand and 
V 
with all our hearts and souls." Further, in his'^ effort to 
persuade the British negotiators to understand Egypt* s mind, 
Nahas Pasha pointed out to them that "the support and loyalty 
of the Bgyptian people" would be "much more useful to Britain in 
war time than to maintain this limited number of her troops in 
the Canal Zone". "With the advance in military strategy and 
weapons, the stationing of this limited number of troops in the 
Canal Zone has become futile from the military point of 
view". (20) (Italics mine) 
Furthermore, answering the analogy which the British 
military expert had drawn between Egypt and his country regarding 
the presence of foreign troops a ^ England, (21) the Egyptian 
19. Ibid., pp. 19, 21. 
20. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
21. During his conversations with Prime Minister Nahas Pasha 
in their first meeting held on Monday, 6th June 1960, Field 
Marshal Slim had suggested that the presence of the forces 
of one nation in the territory of another ally was demanded 
by the vastness of any major war in the future. In his view 
no nation, big or small, could stand alone against the 
Soviet »monster*. "We have to be united and march together 
politically, militarily and economically. This is not easy 
because we all have to give up some of our cherished rights 
and traditions. Each one of us has to accept the other 
one's troops and installations in his own territory, and to 
put his troops under another command. We, the British, 
accepted the presence of the American troops in England, and 
American bases in London. We accepted that our troops in 
Germany be under French Command...." See, Conversations, 
op.cit., p* 11. 
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spokesman said: 
(1) There can be no question that the presence of 
these fores does not, in any way, prejudice British 
sovereignty, in view of the fact that the two 
States are equal. 
(2) The situation in Britain is temporary and occasioned 
by an emergency, but in Egypt it is considered a 
continuation of 60 years of occupation* 
(3) Should Britain ask the American forces to leave, 
they will, no doubt, leave immediately. This is 
not the case with regard to the British forces in 
Egypt. 
(4) There is also difference in the way the British 
and the Egyptians view the presence of foreign troops 
in their country. 
The Prime Minister then firmly reiterated that his Govern-
ment 'would not accept the stationing of British troops on her 
soil either in time of peace or Imminent threat of war or an 
apprehended international emergency'• He also suggested that 
the problem of the Middle East defence could be satisfactorily 
dealt with only by strengthening the military potential and 
preparedness of the Egyptian forces by supplying them necessary 
weapons and equipment. Thus 'strengthened, Egypt would not only 
be able to defend herself against armed aggression from any 
quarter, but would also be willing to cooperate with Britain in 
her overall plan to defend the Middle East. In such an eventuality 
British troops would be welcomed and be granted all facilities 
jbhat wo-uld.^ be negBEBaary for the conduct of war. (22) (Italics 
mine) 
14. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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The British representative, on the contrary, insisted 
that Egypt should view the problem from the 'defence angle, 
instead of that of occupation'. With a tone of finality, Sir 
William Slim repeated that Egypt could not be defended without 
British troops. "The danger", in his view, "against Efeypt is 
twofold: By way of air and by way of land." For the proper 
defence of Egypt the (two) forces should be integrated in peace-
time". We have to be integrated before the attack starts. The 
first air-attack should be met with cooperation between us." 
If we suddenly bring British help, it would be too late, it 
should be there and ready before the start. (23) 
It is clear from the above citations of references from 
the conversations between the representatives of the two 
countries that there was a fundamental difference in their way 
of approaching the problem of revising their mutual relations. 
There was logic and consistency in the arguments advanced by 
the Egyptian side. They rightly insisted that in order to be 
able to negotiate freely on matters of their mutual interest, 
including defence of Egypt, they should first get rid of 
limitations on her sovereignty. Equality of national status was 
to be a pre-condition to become equal partner in the proposed 
alliance with Great Britain. 
They were insistent on complete and immediate evacuation 
of British forces, but at the same time they were not denying 
or refusing to cooperate with them in a defence arrangement 
with them. Evacuation, if then agreed by the British, would 
14. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
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undoubtedly have given the Wafd government "an excellent 
argument" to bring the people round the idea of favourably 
considering proposals for ^ oint defence with Britain or any 
member of the Western camp. A free Egypt would not have had the 
obsession of accepting an 'arrangement* against its will. With-
evacuation, the psychological effect of the new alliance would 
have been generally detrimental to the position and prestige of 
the Government. (24) They were naturally and justifiably more 
concerned about the realisation of their national aspirations, 
while their counterpart seemed only interested in preserving the 
Western military position in this part of the world. 
Ifeirshal Slim was unable to appreciate the political 
advantages of evacuation that Egypt was assuring him, after its 
completion. Being essentially a military expert, he could not 
value the wholehearted support and sympathy of a willing people 
as compared to a limited advantage of technical nature which he 
expected to drive from the presence of 'limited foreign troops' 
in a land where they are hated by the natives. In his arguments 
he showed no concern for the feelings of the Egyptian people. He 
told Nahas Pasha: 
If the British troops withdraw from Egypt, it will 
have a disastrous effect on the cold-war against 
Russia. Arab countries, Turkey, Iran and the 
dominions will be horrified. Our Allies in America 
will think we have deserted them. (25) 
24. Egypt's Foreign Minister Mohammed Salah Bddin Bey told 
the British Ambassador on 10 August 19S0: "I would like it 
to be understood that the Wafd derives its influence over 
the people from their faith in that it safeguards the 
country's rights as planned in 1919, the first and foremost 
of which being the question of immediate evacuation." 
See, ibid., p. 49. 
25. Ibid., 15. 
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At a later stage of these conversations between the 
Gtovernments of Egypt and the United Kingdom, the British 
Ambassador His Excellency Sir Ralph Stevenson made two contro-
versial points in his opening statement on 14 August 1950. 
Ansv/ering an earlier Question of Sgi'pt's Foreign Minister as to 
why the presence of foreign troops in Egypt in peace time was 
necessary while alliances with other countries were concluded 
without that requirement, he said that the reason was "the 
geographic position of Egypt and her possession of the Suez Canal 
which is a vital communications* link, in which all maritime 
nations are interested." "It" is impossible for us to risk that 
link being cut»" H© then drew an analogy with Panama Canal and 
said that the United States was solely responsible by treaty 
rights, for the defence of the Canal, and on that basis justified 
Britain's insistence on assuming the defence of the Suez Canal. 
For the Egyptians there was nothing new in these arguments^ 
They had heard it many a times before. The British had used the 
same argument to justify their occupation of Egypt in 1882, and 
since then in all negotiations about its termination. The 
presence of British forces on Egypt's soil nevertheless had 
always prejudiced her sovereignty, and, therefore, she had every 
right to resent this violation and protect against it. To an 
Egyptian the independence of his country was much dearer than the 
inq)ortanoe the British attached to the Suez Canal. Moreover, 
the experience of the last war had shown that the Suez Canal was 
not militarily and even commercially inevitable. This was 
evidenced by the fact that the most of the shipping to the Far 
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East via the Cape of Good Hope. And, in any future war, there 
was the possibility of the Canal being completely put out of 
order for a long time. It was obvious, therefore, that Egypt 
herself was the real object and the Suez Canal only. 
Moreover, the British iijnbassador's argument suggested 
that the domination of some states over the others, whether they 
like it or not could be Justified merely because the interests 
of one country happened to affect the other. This meant that 
every big state could insist to have defensive bases on the 
territory of smaller states that happen to be on her communication 
route. Egypt, a member of the United Nations, could never agree 
to such a position. This was violating the principle of 
sovereign equality enunciated in the Cterter. If such a stand-
point is allowed to prevail, there would be chaos in international 
relations. 
Salah Eddin Bey rejected Sir Stevenson*s plea of defence 
against Communist aggression on the groiand that the presence of 
foreign troops in Egypt would defeat its own purpose by creating 
a psychological environment that is more favourable to Conanunist 
propaganda. In his own words: 
... the greatest weapons exploited by Communist 
propaganda in Egypt and in all countries occupied 
by foreign forces is this some occupation and the 
economic and social effects resulting from it. This 
propaganda finds a fertile soil in the minds of 
nationalists so much so that it is feared that they 
might generally confuse nationalism with Communist 
propaganda. Experience in Egypt has shown that all 
pamphlets of Communist propaganda which were seized 
mostly make use of this weapon. In fact it almost 
makes use of it to the exclusion of other ideological 
weapons. (26) 
26. Ibid., p. 60. 
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D. THE SUDAN - A CRUCIAL POINT 
EGYPT* S CONTENTION 
To this state of confusion, misiinderstanding and 
insistence that characterised the present negotiations between 
the Governments of Egypt and Great Britain was added the question 
of the Sudan. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, in his statanent 
of 26 August, demanded that Britain should immediately recognize 
the rights of Egypt in the Sudan. He argued that the unity of 
Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown was 3ust another 
legitimate aspiration of the people of the whole of the Nile 
Valley. 
In a more elaborate treatment of the Sudan problem as an 
important item of relations between Egypt and the UK, the 
Egyptian Foreign Minister asserted that together with the Sudan, 
Egypt formed one single country under one single Crown, the 
Egyptian Crown. This unity, he said, was natural and was suppor-
ted by history since remote and ancient times. The Nile linked 
them together. They were not separated by any physical boundaries^ 
In addition, the people of Egypt with their •compatriots*, the 
Sudanese, were bound together by ties of common origin, language, 
religion and customs, etc. 'Britain had nothing to do with the 
Sudan before the occupation of Egypt*. After the occupation, she 
•forced the Egyptian Govewiment to withdraw from the Sudan, then 
she forced her to reconquer it jointly with British, and then 
she forced her to conclude the 1899 Agreement which provided for 
a joint administration of the Sudan, without British occupation 
of Egypt, none of this would have taken place and Britain would 
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not have been in the Sudan today'• It implied therefore that 
Britain neither had any valid claims nor any responsibility in 
regard to the Sudan. Moreover, she herself admitted, more than 
once, that she was acting there in the name and on behalf of 
Egypt, and not for herself or on behalf of the Sudanese. (27) 
Egypt thus based her contention not only on her natural rights 
but also on her legal position. 
The Foreign Minister of Egsrpt then complained that the 
British administrative personnel been trying to antagonise 
the Sudanese by various subterfuges and manoeuvres against their 
Egyptian compatriots preparatory to separating the Sudan from 
Egypt and to isolate the Southern from the Korthem areas of 
the Sudan as a prelude to separating the South from the North 
with the ultimate intention of colonising the whole of the Sudan, 
South and North alike. Salah Edden Pasha also referred to the 
incident of 1924 when Great Britain took advantage of the 
assassination of the Sirdar and put Egypt bag and baggage out of 
the Sudan and went further with their aggression as to threaten 
interference with Egypt's Nile Waters. Commenting upon the 
question of self-determination for the Sudan, he said; 
Now that national consciousness has awakened in 
Egypt and the Sudan, the British adopted a new 
tactics to meet the new circumstances. They 
repeatedly declare their concern for the welfare 
of the Sudanese and demand that they should be 
consulted and be given self-government leading 
eventually to self-determination. 
It can be seen, therefore, that when Egypt in 
the early days of occupation could not question their 
27* Ibid., p* 142. 
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actions, they made use of Egypt's name and acting 
on her behalf to dominate the Sudan* When we 
demanded the independence of Egypt and the Sudan, 
the pretext of acting in the name of Egypt became 
of no use to them. They had to turn to another 
pretext which was this time that they speak in the 
name of the Sudanese and defend their interests* 
It is obvious that the two pretexts are contradictory 
for indeed there is a great difference between 
administering the Sudan in the name of the Egyptians 
and demanding from the Egyptians in the name of 
the Sudanese that the Sudan should ultimately have 
the right of self-determination. i28) 
Thus from the Egypt's point of view, the problem of the 
Sudan was a matter between the two Arab brothers of the Nile 
Valley and the British had no historical, legal or moral right 
to interfere between them. They believed that Britain never 
had Egypt's interest at heart when they acknowledged that they 
administered the Sudan in Egypt's name and on her behalf, nor 
did they have the interest of the Sudan at heart when they 
claimed that they were endeavouring to give it aelf"government 
and self-determination* But it was a pretext to continue their 
single-handed administration of the Sudan for as long as possible 
under cover 6f the will of the Sudanese. (Italics mine) 
The Foreign Minister clearly warned that the question of 
evacuation and the unity of the Nile Valley were absolutely 
linked together* They cannot be dealt with separately* Evacuation 
of Egypt would not be complete without evacuation of the Sudan 
at the same time. 
If Britain dislike Egypt linking the question of 
evacuation with that of the Sudan, Egypt on her part 
cannot deviate from linking these two questions 
together* In fact she has always done so and both 
questions were dealt with in all the negotiations 
27* Ibid., p* 142. 
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which took place between Egypt and Britain. Indeed, 
certain negotiations, such as those of Zaghlul-
MacDonald and Nahas-Henderson, failed on account of 
the Sudan. In the negotiations which paved the way 
for the 1939 Treaty, the two questions were dealt 
with together and provisions concerning both were 
included in that Treaty. It is no innovation, 
therefore, that we should insist today on linking 
together the two questions. 
THE BRITISH STAND 
Though the British spokesmen did not dispute that they 
should withdrawnfrom the Sudan as they were already contemplating 
to withdraw from Egypt. There were, however, two major points 
on which they differed with Egypt. Firstly, whom should the 
authority be handed over - the Sudanese or the Egyptian Crown. 
They did not accept Egypt's claim that Egypt and the Sudan were 
one and the same people and that they had the same destiny. 
They believed and insisted that the Sudanese, like the Egyptians, 
or any people for that matter, have the right to be first free 
and then to choose on their own free will their future status. 
The British Ambassador said that »the legitimate owners of the 
Sudan' were the people who lived there - the people of the Sudan. 
But they were not yet politically mature enough to look after 
their country's business successfully. (29) It might take a 
decade or more to prepare them for self-government and to decide 
about their relations with Egypt. 
29. Ibid., pp. 71-2. In August 1950, there were only 120 
political officers in the administration of the Sudan. 
AS to standard of education there were only 3$ of the 
Sudanese literate. See British Ambassador's statement of 
26 August, Ibid., p. 73* 
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Sir Ralph Stevenson refuted the charge of the Foreign 
Minister that Britain had her ovna vested interests in the Sudan, 
najnelyi holding it indefinitely. He said; 
Britain Iias no economic or strategic interests in 
the Sudan and she does not care either way whether 
Egypt and the Sudan be one country or not* (30) 
Nonetheless, Sir Stevaason felt that Great Britain could 
not absolve herself of her responsibility towards the peoples of 
the Sudan. We cannot leave them in a state of chaos and 
unpreparedness; "We cannot divest ourselves of our responsibility 
in this case whatever the legal, historical or even moral 
considerations may be". 
Bevin further made it clear that His Majesty's Government 
did not accept the Egyptian premise that Egypt*s defence and the 
Sudan question were inseparable. He suggested that of the two 
questions immediately feeing both Egypt and Britain, the Sudan 
was less pressing than the question of defence. (.31) 
E- BRITAIN' S MEW PROPOSALS FOR THE 
SOLUTION 
After prolonged exchange of ideas. Great Britain, taking 
note of the Egyptian position in regard to the two basic issues 
of their mutual relations, presented certain proposals for the 
considelation of the Egyptian Government. (32) The British 
30. Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
31. See 'Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Foreign Office, 
London, on 4th, 7th, 9th and 15th December 1960, in 
Conversations, op.cit., pp. 77-83, 84-104. 
32. For text of the British Proposals, see Ibid., pp. 108-110. 
Also Cmd. 8419, pp. 24-5. 
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proposals were as follows: 
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are 
prepared to resiane negotiations fop the revision 
of 1936 Treaty of Alliance in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 16 of that Treaty. 
His Majesty's Government in the U.K# are aware 
of the Egyptian Government's great difficulties in 
the matter. They cannot however in view of their 
commitments to their allies in the North Atlantic 
and in the Middle East, accept the responsibility 
of making any arrangements which prejudice their -
ability to contribute to a successful defence of 
this region against an aggressor. Such a defence 
will only be possible if in the future the Egypt 
base continues to function in such a manner as to 
be immediately available in war and if the air 
defence of Egypt is assured. 
In these circumstances His Majesty's Government 
in the U.K. proposes that the 1936 Treaty of Alliance 
be revised so as to provide for the following: 
a) Th^pijased witodrawal of British troops from 
Egypt begihning within one year of the conclusion of 
an agreement on Eevision of the Treaty and ending in 
1956. (It should be noted that rate of withdrawal of 
the combatant troops and of General Headquarters 
depends largely on the rate at which accommodation can 
be provided Ibr them elsewhere). 
b) The processive civilization of the base which 
it is suggested should be completed by 1956, essential 
British civilian personnel being introduced as military 
personnel are withdrawn. The base thereafter to be 
entrusted to the Egyptian Armed Forces for security 
purposes but to be operated in accordance with British 
military policy under the overall administrative control 
of an Anglo-Egyptian Control Board. (Hli/f Government in 
the U.K. would be prepared to pay rent for base 
installations and sites). 
c) The creation of a long-term Anglo-Egyptian 
coordinated air defence system in which these should be 
both Egyptian and British components. 
d) The Provision at an early date of arms and 
equipment on training scale for the Egyptian forces and 
thereafter the provision of whatever further arms and 
equipment may be necessary in equal priority with 
other nations with whom Great Britain has working 
defence agreements (HM Government in U.K. would also be 
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prepared to render any assistance required by the 
Egyptian Government in the training of Egyptian 
forces.) 
e) In the event of war, imminent menace of war 
or apprehended international emergency, Egypt would 
agree to the return of British forces for the period 
of emergency and would grant to them and to the 
forces of Britain's allies all necessary facilities 
arid assistance including the use of Egyptian ports, • 
aerodromes and means of communications* 
Kis Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
cannot accept the validity of the view that the 
question of The Sudan is inseparable from that of 
the defence. Nevertheless HM Government would be 
prepared to discuss the question of The Sudan if 
the Egyptian Government that this would be useful. 
It is the main aim of HM Government to enable 
the Sudanese to attain self-government at the 
earliest practicable opportunity and it would be 
impossible for them to accept any understanding 
with Egypt which interferes with this objective. 
In any event HM Government suggest that discussion 
of The Sudan should be deferred until at least a 
preliminary exchange of views of defence has been 
completed. 
P' EGYPT'S 0I3UJCTEB'4>ROPOSALS 
The Egyptian Government foimd the British proposals 
utterly disappointing as they were not consistent with its claims 
and contentions. They regretted that what they had been trying 
to explain to the Government of the United Kingdom over the past 
10 months was not fully appreciated by those who prepared the 
British proposals. And so the Egyptian Government felt compelled 
to reject them "in toto". (33) 
The British proposals, from Egypt»s point of view, were 
particularly disappointing in regard to the following points: 
33. Conversatiorist op.cit., pp. 111-12. 
-147-
!• The ciate at which evacuation of British troops 
was to begin and the time set down for completing 
that evacuation. 
2. The rate of withdrawal of the combatant troops 
and General Headquarters being made dependent on 
the rate at which accommodation can be provided 
for them elsewhere. 
3. The time taken in handing over the base to the 
Egyptian Armed Forces and the stipulation that 
the base be operated in accordance with British 
military policy under the overall administrative 
control of an Anglo-Egyptian Control Board. 
4. The creation of a long-term Anglo-Egyptian 
coordinated defence system. 
5. The exceedingly slow rate suggested for providing 
the Egyptian forces with necessary arras and equip-
ment. 
6. The return of British Forces to Egypt in the event 
of imminence menace of war or apprehended interna-
tional emergency. 
7. Separating the question of evacuation from that 
of the unity of Egypt and The Sudan under the 
Egyptian Cro\m. 
8. Offering "the earliest practicable opportunity" 
as a pretext for putting off the time at which the 
Sudanese may en^oy self-government. 
9. Finally the suggestion that HM Government would not 
consider any suggestion or position which is not 
agreeable to Britain's other allies, was particularly 
offending to Egypt's national honour and dignity. 
In its counter-proposals the Egyptian Government firmly 
reiterated once again its position as a basis of resuming 
negotiations for settlement of outstanding problems between 
them. Egypt's counter-proposals (34) were as follows; 
34. For Text of Egyptian Government's Proposals, see 
Conversations, op.cit., pp. 112-3; also Cmd. 8419, 
pp. 25-6. 
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!• The evacuation of British troops* Egypt to begin 
immediately upon concluding the agreement and the 
necessity of completing this evacuation by land, 
sea and air within a period not exceeding one year. 
2. The base to be handed over to the Egyptian Armed 
Forces immediately upon the completion of evacuation 
in accordance with the preceding paragraph. 
3* Special priority for the provision of necessary 
arms and equipment to be given to the Egyptian Army 
at the earliest opportunity considering that Egypt 
is situated in a sensitive strategic area. 
4. The Unity of Egypt and The Sudan under the Egyptian 
Crown and self-government for the Sudanese within 
two years in the framework of this unity. 
6. British Forces and British Officials to be withdrawn 
from The Sudan and the present regime in The Sudan 
to be terminated immediately upon the expiry of those 
two years. 
6. The conclusion of an agreement between the two 
parties whereby British forces may return to those 
places to which in the agreed opinion of the two 
Governments, it is necessary that they should return 
for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Egypt 
in the event of an armed aggression upon her or ii^  
in the event of UK*s being involved in was as the 
result of an armed aggression on the Arab countries 
ad.1acent to Egypt. CEmpliasis minel 
7. In the event of their returning in Egypt in accord-
ance with the preceding paragraph, British troops 
will begin to withdraw from Egyptian territory 
immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. This 
withdrawal to be completed by land, sea and air 
within a period not exceeding three months. 
8. The Treaty of Alliance signed in London on 26th August, 
1936y together with the Agreed Minutes^ notes and 
Conventions^ also the two Agreements of 1899 regarding 
The Sudan to be abrogated immediately upon the entry 
into force of the new agreement. 
G. BRITAIN'S OBJECTION AMD AlDE-MOIfiES 
These proposals, in turn, were found unsatisfactory 
and incompatible with Britain's interests, strategy and 
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international commitments. The British Ambassador objected 
that one year for completing evacuation was physically impossible. 
Similarly, the evacuation of all British officials from The 
Sudan in two years was, in his opinion, utterly impracticable. 
"The Sudan cannot get on without the British officials." (36) 
Similarly, referring to paragraph 6 of the Egyptian 
proposals, the British spokesman objected that it severely 
delimited the scope of their defensive strategy, as the last 
part of this paragraph referred to Arab countries adjacent to 
Egypt which only meant Transjordan and thus obviously excluded 
an attack on Turkey or an attack on the Middle East through 
Turkey or Iraq. 
The last paragraph of the proposals clearly warned the 
British Government that in case of unreasonable delay on her part 
to answer these proposals, the Government of Egypt would be at 
liberty to abrogate the 1936 Treaty and to put an end to the 
1899 Agreement. (36) The British Ambassador in Cairo protested 
35. For British Ambassador's objections to the Egyptian Proposals 
of April 24th, 1951, see. Conversations., op.cit., pp.113-14. 
36. The Speech from the Throne dated 16 November 1950 had 
referred to the denunciation of the Treaty with Britain in 
following words; "The_Gqyei!imenJ^considers^ 
Treaty ji^ l o s t , i t j j b a ^ tian 
relation^, „and_it3eems^ it inevitable that it shoulllbe 
ajjrogated. It is also necessary that future relations 
should be founded upon new principles ... immediate and 
complete evacuation and the unification of the Wile Valley 
under the Egyptian Crown. My Government further proclaims 
that it will not deviate from its insistence on these 
v^ principles. ... My Government is therefore proceeding withoit 
hesitation or undue delay with the task of realizing these 
national objectives, sparing no effort to achieve". See, 
Annual Register 1950. p. 296. 
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against what he tewned as an ultimatum by the Egyptian 
Delegation. Later on 8 June he handed to the Egyptian Foreign 
Mnister an Official Coniraunioation in which HM Government had 
noted 'with disappointment that whereas their own proposals 
represented a very considerable modification of the position 
laid down by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the Egyptian 
proposals do not appear to differ in essence from the claims 
put forward by the Egyptian Ciovernment some eighteen months 
ago'. (37) 
On the question of The Sudan, the British Aide-Memoire 
made it once again explicit that it was distinct from the urgent 
issue of the Middle East Defence. In the Annex to this statement 
of Principle, they however stated that they were prepared to 
discuss The Sudan issue on the basis that the Sudanese has a 
right to ' full self-government and thereafter choose freely fbr 
themselves their form of government and the relationship with 
Egypt'. (38) The British Ambassador further added that during 
the past five or six years had largely developed a national 
consciousness and a national movement, represented by the Umma 
(Nationalist) party. Therefore, he asserted, the Sudanese must 
be treated as a national community. "No alteration can take 
place without having consultation with them and they must have 
the right of self-determination. 
37. Text in Cmd. 8419, pp. 27'«. See Appendix No. 
38. Ibid. 
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H« EGYPT* S OBJECTION AND AIDE-MEMOIRES 
The British steind was obviously not likely to bring the 
two Governments any nearer. Seen from Egypt*s angle Britain's 
insistence on the Sudan's right of self-determination was aimed 
at creating a wedge between the children of the Nile Valley. 
"The question is a question of unity of Egypt with the Sudan* 
When you have a united country, the question of self-determina-
tion does not at all arise." (39) 
The Egyptian Government objected as 'unwarrantable' 
the comparison which the British note had drawn between the 
British and the Egyptian attitude: 'for, whereas the Royal 
Egyptian Government claim inviolable national rights which 
cannot be bartered away*, the British Government were pursuing 
•exaggerated interests, and when rights and interests are at 
variance, rights should be made to prevail'• (40) 
In its Aide-Memoire of 6 July, the Government of Egypt 
declared that they could not continue merely talking and repeat-
ing their position indefinitely. 'Hitherto these talks have 
lasted over a year without a glimpse of hope towards reaching 
the desired agreement. ... It is obvious that HM Government in 
the UK lose nothing by this procrastination but it has become 
extremely difficult for the Royal Egyptian Government and 
Egyptian public opinion to contemplate any further prolongation 
of this (unsettled) state of affairs'. 
39. Foreign Minister Salah Eddin's comment upon the British 
Ambassador's statement which he made at the time of 
presenting the Aide-Memoire. See ibid., p. 118. 
40. Ibid., p. 120. 
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The Egyptian Aide-Metaolre firmly and finally reasserted 
that they regarded the question of evacuation and the unity of 
Egypt and The Sudan as one indivisible whole and therefore it 
was inevitable that both the issues 'be simultaneously settled 
and covered by any agreement to be concluded between the two 
parties'. Egypt could not agree to anything that failed to 
provide for this natural and historical unity. The dependence 
of the Egyptians and the Sudanese on the waters of the Nile 
(which the British »Note» had acknowledged and emphasized on 
that basis, the need to have friendliest relations between them) 
was not the only link that bound them together from * time 
immemorial*• 
There is the community of race, language, religion, 
culture, customs and interests as well as the 
geographical unity, the economic unity, etc., etc. 
In the presence of all these strong and inseverable 
ties it is gross injustice for the British Aide-
temoire and its Annex to speak of two countries and 
two peoples instead of speaking of one country and 
one people indivisible, inseparable. 
The Egyptian Government finally put forth the under-
mentioned principles on the basis of which they were prepared to 
make their last attempt to settle the conti^ oversy with Great 
Britain, after which they were determined to take independent 
action: 
a) The unity of Egypt and The Sudan under the 
Egyptian Crown. 
b) Self-Government for the Sudanese within the frame-
work of this unity in two years. 
c) British forces and British officials to be with-
drawn from The Sudan and the present regime in 
The Sudan to be terminated immediately upon the 
expiry of these two years. 
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d) In the event of the principles outlined in (a), 
' (b) and (c) being accepted, the Bjyal Egyptian 
Goverranent-agree to setting up a tripartite 
Commission in oi^ der to help attain the goal in 
(b) 
After receiving the Egyptian Government's Aide-Memoire« 
Ambassador Ralph Stevenson made an iirq)ortant statement which 
made it clear that the British Government was not ready to 
concede Egypt's demand for complete evacuation. The Ambassador 
said: 
TheiEgyptian ^vernment must realise that they are 
faced with two alternatives: (1) to cooperate in a 
valid and effective scheme Qf, defence which might 
prevent Egypt being invaded at all, (2) having two 
invasions, one from the North-East to occupy the 
country and the other from the West by the Western 
Powers to expel the aggressor. That is an absolute 
certainty® ... (41) 
This showed that the British Government was not at all 
prepared to change or modify its stand vis-a-vis the Egyptian 
aspirations. Salah Eddin was Justified when he complained that 
the above remarks of the British Ambassador were 'couched in the 
language of vfar^  force^  invasion while as Members of the UMD w.q 
should talk the language of peace, security, recognition of 
rights and .lustice and respect of the sovereignty of nations and 
the integrity of their territories'• (Italics mine) 
He also clearly pointed out that his Government were 
obliged to make a full statement before the parliament on the 
talks. As representatives of the nation they had a right to know 
before the present session was prorogued whether or not the talks 
had reached a successful conclusion. He, therefore, demanded 
41. Cmd. 8419, pp. 30-31; Conversations* op.cit., pp. 122-23. 
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that HM Government send a reply to Egypt's counter-proposals 
concerning evacuation without further postponement. To this 
the British iUnbassador answered that HO Government were trying 
to find 'some conanon approach', but they were 'much preoccupied 
at present with other problems'. (42) 
On a closer examination of the British attitude, one 
finds that they refused to see the urgency for the settlement 
of the controversy that was being so insistently demanded by the 
Egyptians. Sir Stevenson's plea of his Government's preoccupation 
with other issues so obviously suggested that they did not 
consider Egypt's problems important enough to attend to them 
despite lapse of several months. To the Egyptians this statement 
was most humiliating and also challenging to take independent 
action. Moreover, it vaa quite evident that the promised 'new 
approach' would involve Egypt with the NATO powers, (43) which 
r 
they seriously despised and disapproved, hence they could not 
see anything hopefUl in this information. Foreign Minister Salah 
42. Ibid., p. 123. 
43. This was quite manifest from the speeches of Britain's 
prominent leaders during the election campaign. Sir Winston 
Churchill emphasised the gravity of international situation 
and stated that it was necessary to rearm in order to 
parley with Communist Hussia, and that there must be no 
running away from the challenge in Persia or Egypt'. 
Similarly, from the Labour Party's platform, Morrison 
repeated what he had been saying as Britain's Foreign 
Secretary: "In Egypt we have to protect our life line and 
keep our promises to the Sudanese; the question of the 
Suez can be settled by the Middle East Defence Pact". 
See Newspapers reporting of election-broadcasts of prominent 
political personalities of Britain. The Times. 5. 7 and 8 
February 1960, also of 17, 18 and 19 February I960. 
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Eddin replied: 
I am aware that the British Government are pre-
occupied to a great extent with the problems con-
fronting them in Iran but the troubles of the 
British Government are endless ••• and if we delay 
the settlement, of questions penflfiing between us on 
account of the troubles confronting Britain in other 
parts of the world, we shall never finish. 
He then asserted: 
The Egyptian question is no less important in itself 
and in so far as it is concerned with the cause of 
universal peace than any other international problem* 
Indeed it may be of greater importance than many of 
these problems. This, at least, is how we view it 
and indeed to us it is a question of life or death. 
The two months which have elapsed since we 
handed to you our counter-proposals are sufficient, 
in fact more than sufficient to get a reply from 
you to these counter»proposals whatever your other 
preoccupations might be. ... The Egyptian Government 
cannot possibly go on with these talks for another 
long period. ... Should the talks fail and are 
consequently broken off ... the Egyptians would lose 
every confidence in the possibility of coming to an 
understanding with you through negotiations. (44) 
I. DEADLOCK IN TALKS - BRITAIN'S 
RESPONSIBILITY 
The climax, however, reached when Herbert Morrison, 
Great Britain's Foreign Secretary, accused Egypt of 'uncoraprointsi-
ing insistence on demands which bear no relation to present-day 
realities'. Speaking in a Middle East debate in the House of 
Commons on 30 July, Morrison said that the problem of the 
presence of British troops is not now a purely Anglo-Egyptian 
problem. We are a Power bearing responsibilities in the Middle 
East on behalf of the rest of the Commonwealth and the "Western 
allies as a whole. ... The destinies and civilization of our 
44. Cmd. 8419, pp. 31-32, 
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two coimtries are bound up together and it is unrealistic 
for Egypt to pretend that she can avoid danger by refusing to 
allow us to share in the defensive organization of the area« 
Moreover, she can no more stand alone in the defence of her 
territory than we can in the defence of our country. ... 
»In conanon with our North Atlantic Commonwealth Allies, 
our people have assumed a great burden in time of peace in order 
to make the world safe for those countries with whom we share 
a common heritage and civilization. ... We want to plan our 
relationship on an entirely new basis. If Egypt re.iects that 
invitation we cannot allow that to pre.iudice the fulfilment of 
our international responsibilities'. (45) (Italics mine) 
On the question of the Sudan also, Morrison blamed the 
Egyptian Government of 'certain prejudices which prevent her from 
approaching in a realistic frame of mind'. Their insistence on 
the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown, in his 
view, was unrealistic. If the Egyptians had agreed to the British 
view-point and thus surrendered their claims regarding the Sudan, 
the Egyptians, in Morrison's a*udgement, would have been the most 
cooperative, sober, reasonable, realistic and what not. 
The British Foreign Secretary also chose the occasion to 
condemn Egypt's embargo on the passage of shipping to Israel (46) 
45. H.C. Deb,.« 5th Series, vol. 491, cols. 973-75. 
See also. The Times. 31 July 1951. 
46. Under a decree of the Egyptian Government intended to 
prevent oil supplies from reaching Israel through the Suez 
Canal, which was brought into effect on 19 July 1950, 
masters of north-bound tankers passing through the Canal 
Ccontd. on next page) 
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as an act of »injustice and unreasonableness, and an act of 
defiance of the Security Council resolution on the free passage 
of shipping in the Suez Canal. (47) 
Such provocative statements and quite uncalled-for 
remarks made by British officials and other public-man helped 
Britain in no way but they did consolidate Egypt's suspicion 
46. (contd. from back page) 
were required to furnish guaranteed declaration regarding 
the destination of their cargoes including their final 
destination at the port of disembarkation, aad on arriving 
there to obtain a further declaration from custom officials, 
countersigned by the nearest Egyptian Consulate, certifying 
that their cargo was being discharged there and was 
intended fbr local consun^ jtion. 
Britain, France, USA, Norway and the Netherlands 
protested against these regulations as unlawfu.1-
Replying such protests, the Egyptian Under-Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, Abdel Rehraan Pakky Pasha, declared on 
23 March that Egypt would not stop to exercise her 
"absolute right in conformity with International law of 
searcliing vessels passing through "Egyptian territorial 
waters" as long as she still considered herself in_a-4tsLte 
of war with Israel. 
Similarly, Egypt* s representative in the Security 
Council defended his Government's action as lawful. He 
argued that under international law Egypt was fully justi-
fied in imposing the blockade. An armistice, he pointed 
out, was not a temporary peace, the condition of war 
remained, and belligerents retained "such rights as the 
right of blockade, the right of capture of neutral vessels 
atteii5)ting to break a blockade, and the right to seize 
contraband of war. The stoppage and inspection of ships 
bound for Israel was, he declared, necessary for Egypt's 
self-preservation in f^ ce of Israel's hostility. UN Security 
Council Official Records^ 26 July 1951. 
UN Documents S/2298/Rev.l, 16 August 1951. In his statement 
in the House of Commons on 21 March 1951, Morrison had said 
that "the continuance of restrictions on the free passage 
of shipping through the Suez Canal so long after the 
conclusion of the Armistice between Egypt and Israel 
contributed to the maintenance of a state of tension and 
unrest in the Near East." See H.C. Deb., 21 March 1951. 
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of her unwillingness to relinquish her control over Egypt 
and the Sudan. The Egyptian Foreign Minister felt it necessary 
to severely condemn Britain's policy of justifying their 
occupation on the ground that there existed some threat to 
world peace. Speaking before the Wafd dominated Chamber of 
Deputies, he declared that the ever present possibility that 
Great-Power rivalries might flare up into a worldwide 
conflagration was no justification for asking Egypt to 
.*• tolerate indefinitely an occupation violating 
our sovereignty and independence. ... British 
occupation of Egyptian territory is a standing 
reality, a stark violation of our independence^ a 
wound to our national dignity and a vestige of 
hateful British imperialism which must be effaced. 
As to the threat of war against which we are warned 
from time to time, it is no more than apossibility 
which, pray God, would never imterialise. Indeed 
it wi11 never materialise if sovereign equality 
between nations prevailed and if each major pox^ rer 
respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of smaller and weaker nations thus setting a good 
example of international conduct regardless of 
actions taken by others. (48) (Emphasis mine) 
He finally assured the Deputies and the people that their 
Government was fully conscious of the pledge it gave in the last 
•Speech from the Throne*. In his view, Morrison's recent state-
ment before the Commons, (49) had 'closed the door on current 
talks' between the two Governments. Egypt now could justify her 
taking independent action to abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 
before the next 'Speech from the Throne' • (50) 
48. Conversationst op.cit., pp. 140-41. 
H.C. Deb.^ 6th Series, vol. 491, cols. 973-6. For full 
text see Appendix No. 
50. Conversations, op.cit., p. 148. 
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The Egyptian Gtoverament was indeed ju-stified in 
concluding from Morrison's aforesaid statement that it was 
futile to continue the negotiations 'without a glin^se of hope'. 
The Government also could not have ignored that the spontaneous 
effect of his statement on the Egyptian Press and public 
opinion was extremely bad. (51) 
The statement as a whole constituted a definite negation 
to Egypt's national rights and was completely irreconciliable 
with the Egyptian viewpoint. They had been demanding immediate 
evacuation by land, sea and air of British forces from Egypt 
and the Sudan and the unity of both under the Egyptian Crown. 
Their Foreign Minister had told Bevin in 1950; 
Our foreign policy is very limited one, and can 
almost be resolved in these two questions of 
evacuation and that of Ifcity of Egypt and the Sudan 
under the Egyptian Crown. (52) 
The statement of the British Foreign Secretary, on the 
other hand, irrespective of the style and the manner in which it 
was formulated, insisted that evacuation was not advisable in 
view of the mounting tensions in the East-V/est relations, while 
Unity of the Sudan with Egypt was completely refused on the 
ground that it denied the Sudanese the right of self-determina-
tion. What in factj a politically conscious Egyptian ordinarily 
understood from the text of the statement in question and, 
therefore, resented, was as follows: 
51 • Al-Ahrapy 31 July, 1 August 1951. 
5fi. Conversations.^  op.cit., p» 148. 
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1. The continuation of the occupation of Egypt by 
British forces. 
2. Joint defence in Peace time. 
3. Justification of the above two points by a new 
British claim, namely, tlmt Britain bears 
responsibilities in the Middle East on behalf 
of the rest of the Commonwealth and the Western 
Allies as a whole. 
4. The denial of the Unity of Egypt and the Sudan. ... 
6. Separating the Egyptians and the Sudanese by 
various means and pretexts and using the Sudan 
- dual in name but British in fact - to achieve 
this end. (53) 
Egypt's expression of determination to rid herself of the 
limitations on her sovereignty and the agitational mood of its 
people apparently caused some stir in Government and political 
circles in Great Britain. Morrison hurriedly sent personal 
messages to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Egypt 
telling them that he was 'urgently considering a definite new 
approach to the solution of the defence question', and asked them 
to restrain from doing 'anything which might prejudice the possi-
bility of reaching a settlement satisfactory to both sides'. (54) 
But the same 'personal messages' to the Egyptian leaders 
also told them that he was 'leaving for a short holiday' and that 
he intended to take advantage of that to ponder over 'our common 
problems'. Obviously, His Majesty's Government in the United 
53. Press statement released by the Royal Egyptian Embassy in 
London, dated 20 August 1951. For full text see 
Conversations, op.cit., pp. 159-60. 
54. Text of Morrison's personal messages to the Egyptian leaders 
in Records of Conversationsy op.cit., pp. 155, 156. 
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Kingdom was treating the question of her relations with Egypt 
in the normal course of things. Egypt, on the contrary, was 
growing impatient. The people were counting days. The Govern-
ment knew that its survival very much depended on securing from 
Britain favourable terms for the revision of the Treaty, and 
the sooner it was done the better. It was mainly on this point 
that Government could hope to balance its inability to control 
rising prices and to stabilise the nation*s economy and foreign 
trade. Moreover, even these 'personal messages'. Ambassador's 
Press statements, and the Foreign Office's explanation, 
emphasised only the 'question of defence' and liad carefully 
avoided to mention anything regarding the Sudan. No Egyptian 
could fail to see that Great Britain was still unprepared to 
accept that the Sudan question was 'indivisible from the question 
of the British evacuation. The Egyptian Prime Minister in his 
reply to Morrison reiterated that his Government and the people 
of the Nile Valley were not prepared to consider the two issues 
separately. He also reminded him that the long-av;aited British 
proposals could be considered provided they arrived 'before the 
ending of the present parliamentary session, and were based on 
the realization of Egypt's national demands'. (56) 
A 
The promised 'new proposals* could not be delivered to 
the Egyptian Government before 13th October. But by then Egypt 
had decided to unilaterally denounce the Treaty. The Government 
55. Text of Nahas Pasha's reply dated 26 August 1951 in 
Documents on International Affairs 1951 (RIIA, Xondon, 
1954), P- 462. 
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and the people were growing tired of waiting to hear of some 
new British proposals to supersede the Treaty. They had waited 
for them for a number of years, and they could have probably 
waited for some time more, despite their characteristic 
impatience, if the British had shora some inclination to 
accommodate their viewpoint and to harness their nationalist 
objectives. On the contrary, all that the British Government 
had shown was an unsympathetic, rather hostile and rigid 
attitude towards the interests of Egypt and the Arab world in 
general. 
On the question of Egypt's right to blockade the Suez 
CaJial to ships carrying contrabimd material (66) to her enemy -
Israel, the British representative at the UN had actively 
supported Israel's contention against Egypt. Condemning Egypt's 
action. Sir Gladwyn Jebb said that freedom of international 
shipping and commerce was a matter of utmost interest to Britain 
and all maritime nations, and they must therefore view with 
grave concern any restrictions on the passage of vessels through 
the Suez Canal. For Britain the ban on the passage of oil 
tankers to the Haifa refinery, he pointed out, had involved 
56. Israel and her Western supporters had purposely publicised 
that Egypt's action amounted to blockading the Suez Canal 
and putting serious restrictions on the rights of shipping 
guaranteed under the 1888 multilateral Convention. In 
l^ct, as explained by Egypt's representative in the Security 
Council. Egypt merely intended to invoke her rights under 
International law to 'visit and search* only a few merchant-
men in connection with only a few war materials. See, 
Pauzi Bey's statement before the Security Council. SCOR^ 
553 Meeting, 16 August 1951, p. 19. 
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great inconvenience and considerable financial loss, apart 
from the effect of the refinery's virtual inactivity on almost 
the whole of Western Europe. He could not accept Egypt's 
claims concerning the Suez Canal convention and belligierent 
rights, and considered that the Council need not become 
"entangled in the mesh of these legal issues." "The Armistice 
in Palestine had not been meant merely to lead to a pause in 
the fighting, but to put an end to the hostilities and to guard 
against their renewal, and the Council had understood it to mean 
the ending of restrictions imposed by both sides." C67) 
Mohammad Fawzi Bey of Egypt defended his coiintry's 
action by declaring that she was still at war with Israel and 
thus her restrictions on shipping in the Suez Canal were within 
her legal rights. The draft resolution (68) sponsored by the 
British delegate which sought to remove those restrictions not 
only violated the principles of the laws of nations, it 'attempted 
to impose a political settlement on Egypt, which the Council 
was not empowered to do'. (69) 
57. SCOR. 552nd Meeting, 16 August 1951, pp. 1-4. 
58. UM Document S/2313. 
69. 'Any arbitrary resolution of the Council denying Egypt 
its belligerent rights would be an attempt by the Council 
to impose on Egypt a political settlement. The Council 
is not empowered to enforce political settlements'. Fawzi 
then cited the undermentioned from the speech of the US 
representative, Warren Austin at the 253rd meeting of the 
Council on 24 February 1945. 
"While we are discussing the problem of Palestine, 
it is of primary importance to the future of the UN 
that the precedent to be established by the action 
taken in this case should be in full accord with the 
(contd. on next page) 
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Co-sponsoring the draft resolution, the US representa-
tive had said that 'by removing the restrictions Egypt would 
make a positive contribution to the relief of tension in the 
Middle East. (60) To this the Egyptian representative replied 
that it was Great Britain whose policies were solely responsible 
for the present tension and uneasiness in the Middle 
East.' (61) 
This brief statement contained important and irrefutable 
facts of history of British policy in the Middle East. Its 
encouragement of political Zionism and its allowing the 
Zionists to unlawfully receive great amounts of arms aad great 
numbers of fighting personnel, including those from Cyprus and 
other parts under British control, (62) represented 'an over-
flowing contribution to the state of tension and turmoils' in 
the Middle East. As a result of this policy, the Jewish State 
of Israel came into being in Arab Palestine and from where 
thousands of Arab families vrere forcibly ousted to live in 
destitution and privation. 
69. (contd. from back page) 
terras of the Charter under which we operate. The 
interpretation of the terms of the Charter given in 
the Palestine issue will seriously affect the future 
actions of the UN in other cases. 
The Charter of the United Nations does not 
empower the Security Council to enforce political 
settlement." 
See, gCOR, 553rd Meeting, 16 August 1951, p. 23. 
SO* SCORy 552nd Meeting, op.cit., p# 9. 
61. Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
62. Ibid., 553rd Meeting, p. 17. 
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To the Arabs and the Egyptians in particular, the 
questions of Holy Places, the Arab refugees and disputes of 
territorial nature, remaining unsolved "no attempt at pacifica-
tion will yield enduring results." They considered the present 
Suez Canal question as 'but a reflection of the whole of 
Palestine question*• (63) 
Thus Britain's unreserved and enthusiastic support of 
Israel's claims to freedom of passage in the Suez Canal virtually 
ended all prospects of reaching a settlement with her. It had 
now become clear to every Egyptian that Britain really did not 
wish to retain Egypt's friendship. The 'hate imperialists' 
oaii5)aign started by the left-wing press and persons was already 
becoming widespread. It is worthwhile to mention here that the 
Government of Nahas Pasha, persisting in its resistance to the 
British proposals for Joint defence, had recently allowed the 
so-called 'progressive people' and their publications to carry 
on their campaign vigorously against any association with the 
Western Powers. 41-Katab was the official organ of the 
'Egyptian Committee of the Partisans of Peace', which was most 
vociferously writing against any alliance with the West. 
It is understandable that the Wafd leaders were anxious 
to secure the diplomatic support of the Soviet Union to counter-
balance the pressure of the West. The United States' had 
already indicated to the Egyptian Foreign Minister that if Egypt 
agreed to take part in the proposed defence organization, his 
Government was prepared to press Britain to adjust her position 
63. Ibid., p. 13. 
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to the Egyptian requirements. The price demanded by US envoy 
for his Government's support was too much and totally contra-
dictory to the fundamentals of Egypt's stand on the question* 
In the Security Council debates (64) also the American 
delegate had openly sided with the British delegation on the 
question of unrestricted shipping to and from Israel. He was 
a co-sponsor of the draft resolution calling upon Egypt to lift 
the ban against Israel. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, 
had timely intervened to secure a postponement of voting on 
the Western countries' resolution. The Egyptian Government 
gratefully appreciated the Soviet delegate's hinting at using 
veto if the said resolution was pressed for a vote. Foreign 
Minister Salah Eddin greeted the event as a 'turning point 
towards the path of right and justice and real stability in the 
Middle East'; the Government organ al-Balagh generously praised 
the Russian diplomacy and assured them that 'Egypt's gratitude 
would be multiplied should this support be continued (65) at 
r 
other Council sessions'. The Egyptian press generally described 
64. Ibid., 652nd Meeting, pp* 8-9. 
65. The Egyptians were utterly disappointed to find that the 
USSR was not sincere in its attitude towards Egypt. It did 
not suit their policy at that stage to completely identify 
themselves with the Arabs. Therefore, when the above-
mentioned draft resolution was put before the Council for 
vote on 1 September, the Soviet delegate quietly abstained. 
In a state of shock, the pro-Government Journal d'Egypte 
immediately wrote that whereas Russia had deceived Roosevelt 
and Churchill for three years, 'with us the devil's forces 
lasted only three days' - the paper headed its editorial 
The Devil is always a Devil'. See, Christian Science 
Monitor^ 8 September 1951. 
-167-
the USSR as * Egypt* s only friend» and »noble ally in the 
common struggle against imperialism*• (66) 
On the day of the anniversary of the British entry into 
Cairo (14 September 1882) the ^Partisans of Peaoe*, the Socialist 
Party of the Pallah and the Muslim Brotherhood (67) organized 
protest rallies throughout Cairo and Alexandria and demanded 
immediate action in regard to the *hated* Treaty with Britain. 
Their demands undoubtedly voiced the feelings of the nation as a 
whole. Al-Balagh was urging them to muster their confidence 
and take bold steps to realize national objectives. It cited 
the example of the people of Iran who successfully defied the 
British on the question of sharing benefits of their oil. « I t 
is only the wealc whom they oppress. Their prestige in the 
East is finished*. It was a call to the people of Egypt to fight 
for their rights. 'Rights are obtained not granted*, was the 
popular slogan. They drew inspiration from the Persian 
example. (68) 
The Government of Egypt under such circumstances could 
not wait any longer. V^ ith the inclusion of Turkey and Greece 
66. New York Times, 1 September 1951; Manchester Guardian* 
31 August 1961. 
67. Al-Ahram, 15 September 1951; Egyptian Gazette, 
16 September 1951. 
68. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East. 
1944-1956 (London, 1963), p. 172. See also, Ann Lambton, 
"The Impact of West on Persia", International Affairs^ 
January 1951. 
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Into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (mTO) (69) it had 
- I* 
become evident that the pressure on Egypt to join with the West 
in their plans for common defence of the Middle East would 
increase. In June a conference of British Commonwealth Defence 
Ministers had emphasised the importance of the defence of the 
Middle East as a part of the defence of Western Europe and the 
United States. (70) In the Western strategic thinking the three 
northern states of the Middle East were defined as "shield" 
which had to sustain the main thrust of Soviet Power and protect 
the weaker areas behind. To the South lay the Arab States and 
Israel, in a region endowed with rich petroleum deposits and 
traversed by multiple land, sea and air communications which made 
it a natural "bridge" between Europe, Asia and Africa® (71) It 
was therefore obviously vital for them that this aggregation of 
resources, strategic positions and communications routes was 
denied to the USSR and made readily available to the West. The 
control of the Suez Canal was necessary for the successful 
functioning of the protective barriers that the West was already 
building around the Soviet bloc. 
69. The Council of the NATO, consisting of Foreign Ministers 
of the 12 Atlantic Pact countries, met in Ottawa from 16-20 
September and unanimously agreed to admit Greece and Turkey 
to the NATO. The Council agreed that 'both Greece and 
Turkey, despite their official clarification as 'Hear Easterr 
States', were politically associated with the European, and 
not the Asian section of the non-Communist community. 
70. New York Times^ 27 June 1961. 
71. The United States in V/orld Affairs (New York, 1962), 
p. 263* 

Chapter V 
PRELUDE TO THE 1952 REVOLUTION 
A. EGYPT* 3 ABROGATION OF THE 1936 TREATS 
Hopelessly waiting for the British proposals, under 
such pressing circumstances, would not have helped Egypt in her 
struggle to eliminate Britain's political influence from Its 
territory. Moreover, the prospects of the Conservatives coming 
again into power had made the question of treaty revision all 
the more urgent. They could not hope the Tories to agree to 
wind up their military bases in Egypt and to redefine their 
mutual relations on the basis of sovereign-equality, trust and 
cooperation. The Colonial Office under the Conservatives would 
never agree to relinquish Britain's dominance over Egypt and 
the Sudan. The Egyptians remembered that it was only a couple 
of weeks ago that Churchill, v^o was certain to become the new 
Prime Minister after the general elections, had criticized 
labour Government's dealings with the Egyptian blockade of the 
Suez Canal as "unprecedented British submissiveness". Further, 
asserting that the British power and influence had declined 
throughout the Middle East, he had suggested that the situation 
could only be retrieved by the Joint cooperative action of the 
United States and the United Kingdom and, in the Mediterranean, 
by France and Turkey. In other words, he pi^ iposed the use of 
»big stick' against Egypt and other countries of the area, (l) 
!• H.C. Deb.^ 30 July 1951, vol. , col. 
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Fot Egypt it was the question of »now or never*• Post-
poning the issue of the Treaty revision any further would have 
oaused a serious setback to her national aspirations. As late 
as 6th of October, Morrison was still "hoping to be able to make 
a communication to the Egyptian Government after a few days". 
On this vague message the Wafdist al-Balajgh rightly remarked: 
No one waits for ffeirreaching proposals from a 
weak Cabinet on the eve of an election campaign 
in which it is doomed to defeat. Such a Cabinet 
cannot be expected to resolve the Egyptian question 
in so short and critical a time. ... There is no 
chance of the British proposals being made before 
the elections, unless this new proposal is worse 
than its predecessors. (2) 
Thus coi^elled by circumstances and their own strong 
nationalist fervour to get rid of the 'most uncherished and 
abnoxious» Treaty, the prime Minister of Egypt made the epoch-
making statement before the Chamber of Deputies on 8 October 1951. 
He declared that 'the due time for the arrival of the new 
proposals, referred to in ray reply to Mr. Morrison's personal 
message, is over. The conversations between the two Governments 
must cease because it is clear that they are futile*: 
Since the continued efforts fbr the realization 
of the country's demands by negotiation has proved 
a failure, it is time for the Government to fulfil 
its promise pronounced in the last speech from the 
Throne, and take the necessary step for the abroga-
tion of the 1936 Treaty and the two Conventions of 
19th January and 10th July, 1899, concerning the 
administration of The Sudan. 
fJi® thisl;purpose he-plebedofdUr dlp6ffe3a0cp<?estije^ d3*eciSfie 
Chamber for its approval. 
2. Quoted by Bourse Eg.vptienne« 5 October 1951. 
The first decree that abrogated the 1936 Treaty and 
the 1899 Condominium Agreement, was worded as follov^ s: 
law No,80, 1936, ratifying the Treaty of Friendship 
and Alliance between Egypt and Great Britain and 
which was signed in London on August 26, 1936, shall 
be rescinded. Thus, the provision of this Treaty 
and the agreement attached thereto concerning 
exemptions and privileges «iJoyed by the British 
Forces stationed in the Kingdom of Egypt, as well 
as the provisions of the Condominium Agreements of 
January 10 and July 10, 1899, regarding the adminis-
tration of The Sudan cease to be operative. (S) 
The second and third decrees abolished Articles 169 and 
160 of the Egyptian Constitution and substituted for Article 159 
the followinel 
The provisions of this constitution shall apply to 
all the Egyptian kingdom. Although Egypt and The 
Sudan are one nation, the regime of rule in The 
Sudan shall be defined by a Special Iiaw* 
. Article 160 was amended to read: "The King shall 
be titled King of Egypt and the Sudan." (4) 
The fourth decree provided that: 
"The Sudan shall have a special constitution to be 
drawn up by a Constituent Assembly representing the 
inhabitants of the Sudan, and to be enforced as 
soon as sanctioned and promulgated by the King." 
It was also laid down that the proposed new constitu-
tion would provide for "democratic parliamentary 
Government" through an elected Chamber or Chambers; 
that separate legislative, executive and judicial 
authorities would be established; that a Sudanese 
Cabinet would be directly responsible to the 
Sudanese Parliament; that Ministers would be appoin-
ted and dismissed by the King of Egypt; that all 
legislation would be approved by Parliament and 
sanctioned by the King; and that "foreign affairs 
and matters connected with defence, the army» and 
currency" would be a responsibility of the Egyptian 
Crown. (5) 
3* Text of the decree in Appendix No. 
4. Pull Text in Appendix No. 
6. Ibid. 
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Defending the Government's decision to denounce the 
Treaty and the Condominium, Nahas Pasha cited as many as 18 
instances where unequal partners have resorted to unilateral 
denunciation of international agreements. Among those mentioned 
in this connection quite a few were related to more recent 
history* For exaB5)le, on 16 March 1935. Germany abrogated that 
part of the Versailles Treaty affecting her. Again, in Ifeiroh 
1936, Germany abrogated the Locarno Treaty. Similarly in 
December 1938, the Japanese Government abrogated the Nine-Power 
Agreement signed in Washington in 1922. Likewise in June 1939, 
Germany abrogated the German-Polish Declaration of 1934. In 
the same month Germany abrogated the 1935 naval agreement with 
Great Britain. 
In all these and other such numerous cases, the other 
party always contested the validity of the unilateral action 
but the abrogation nevertheless was effected and in all instances 
was legally fruitful. The only difference in the present case 
was that Egypt did not have necessary fbrce to back her action. 
Therefore, Egypt based her defence on her 'natural rights, 
outstanding justice and lofty principles embodied in the United 
Nations Charter. (6) 
vH r 
He argued that the circumstances under which the Treaty 
was signed by Egypt had completely altered and hence there was 
no justification for continuing it. In fact, with the victory 
6. Nahas Pasha's Speech of 8 October. Text in The Record of 
Conversations, op.cit., pp. 168, 177. See also, Al-Ahram^ 
9 October 1951. 
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of the Allied i3&tions In the last war, not only the menace of 
the Axis pov/ers had disappeared but a new international 
organization was created to suppress every other menace to 
universal peace and security* 
Nahas Pasha argued that fiaithfUl obeservance of the 
Charter of the United Nations on the part of the member-nationsj 
would make all such defence arrangements superfluous and 
unnecessary* He said; 
The UN Charter, signed in San Francisco in June 
1945 ••• established a new basis for international 
relations, totally different from the basis of the 
1936 Treaty. It forbids war as means of settling 
international disputes and demands their settlement 
by peaceful means. It also prohibits aggression 
on the independence of member states and the 
integrity of their territory. It stipulates that 
all countries are entitled to decide their own 
destiny and provides for equal sovereignty between 
member states. It also provides that fehould there 
be any contradiction between the obligations of 
member states under the Charter and those of any 
other instrument, then the_Charter must 
supersede. (7) 
AS the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of August 1936 was concluded 
during the British occupation, Egypt did not have then complete 
that 
freedom of choice. Therefore a treaty/had been extracted from 
the Government of Egypt by compulsion and intimidation of the 
situation, (8) could no longer be considered valid after those 
7. Ibid., p. 168. See also UH Charter^ Article 2, para 3. 
8» Explaining the meaning of pressure due to the occupation 
of their country, Nahas Pasha said: "We do not mean by that 
Egypt had been compelled materially to conclude a treaty. 
What we want to point out is that we felt the moral pressure 
caused by occupation and its interference in the country*s 
affairs, which was prejudicial to its interests and the 
fact that the capitulations increased the stranglehold. 
Ccontd. on next page) 
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circuinstances had so drastically changed. 
Thus having affirmed that Egypt's action was justified I 
the Prime Minister emphasised that the abrogation of the 1936 
Treaty and the 1899 agreements meant the automatic reversion 
of the Sudan to its pre-1899 status, removal of all British 
rights in that territoryj and the re-establishment of the 
"Complete Unity of the Nile Valley". The proposed new 
constitutional arrangements for the Sudan were designed to 
replace the then existing syst«n. They were in accordance 
with Hhe natural unity which has joined Egypt and the Sudan 
from the earliest times." 
The Egyptian Prime Minister concluded his historic 
speech with the remark that "^ t was for Egypt that I signed 
the 1936__^eaty, and it is f^r^gypt that I^as^you to denounce 
U." C9) 
The draft-decrees and the Prime Minister's statement 
were received by the members of the Chamber with wild and 
prolonged cheers and were approved unanimously. Leaders of 
the opposition praised Nahas Pasha for his bold and timely 
step to free the Egyptian people from the limitations on their 
political freedom and national status. They pledged their full 
support for the Wafdist Government's action. (10) 
8. (contd. from back page) 
We wanted to get rid of all this. We wished to find an 
opening which at the same time was the first step towards 
unity and independence'. See I^ ahas&s Speech of 8 October, 
Becord of Conversations, op.cit., p. 177. 
9. Ibid., p. 179. 
10• Al-'Ahrajn. 9 October 1951; The Egyptian Gazette. 9, 10 
October 1961. See also, The Times^ 9 October 1951. 
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B. BRITAIN'S MEW PROPOSALS PROMPILY 
REJaCTED BY EGYPT 
Five days after the draft-decrees to unilaterally 
denounce the Treaty of Alliance and the Condominium Agreements 
had been introduced in the Egyptian Parliaments - the long-
awaited British Proposals were delivered to the Government of 
Egypt. They were promptly rejected on the ground that they 
underlined the same antiquated, imperialistic approach. They 
expressed not even the slightest intention of complying with 
Egypt* s requirements. On the question of the Sudan, Britain 
still insisted on the principle of self-determination for the 
Sudanese, while the Four-Power Proposal appeared to the Egyptians 
a plan to perpetuate rather intensify the presence of foreign 
troops in their country. The USA, Britain, France and Turkey 
had invited Egypt to join the proposed Middle East Command <ll) 
as a founder member. Britain had also indicated that they 
would waive the 1936 Treaty if Egypt accepted the offer. It was 
further clearly stated that the details of the organization of 
the Command and its relationship to the MTO would be worked out 
in consultation with all the powers concerned. Egypt's contribu-
tion in the proposed Command was to be; 
I. to furnish to the command such strategic defence 
and other facilities on her soil as are indispen-
sible for the organization in peace time; 
11. Text of the Four-Power Proposal in, Department of State 
"" ' ' "" - . - - — M?*^. See alsc 
1961, pp. 43-46i 
i cu r i' jpropo i .ye : 
Bulletin^ vol. 25, 22 October 1961, pp. 647* o, 
British Parliamentary Papers^ Cmd. 8419, 
-.176-
II* undertake to grant the forces of the Middle East 
Command all the necessary facilities and assis-
tance in the event of war, the imminent menace of 
war or apprehended international emergency 
including the use of Egyptian ports, airfields 
and means of communications; 
III* permit the establishment of the Allied Supreme 
Command's Headquarters in her territory. 
The Pour-Powers also suggested that. 
(a) the present British Base in Egypt would be 
formally handed over to Egypt on the understanding 
that it would simultaneously become an Allied 
Base within the Middle East Command with full 
Egyptian participation in the running of the base 
in peace and war; 
(b) that the strength of the Allied Forces would be 
. . determined between the participating nations, 
including Egypt; 
(c) an Air Defence Organization including both Egyptian 
and Allied Forces would be set up under the command 
of an officer with joint responsibility to the 
Egyptian Government and the Allied Command. 
A careful study of these proposals, however, shows that 
they were completely divorced from the existing political 
environment, generally characterised as 'nationalist revolt 
against the West'• The whole of new approach as it was manifest 
in the latest move of the British and her allies seemed extremely 
one-sided. One gets the idea that these proposals were made 
in a state of perfect tranquillity and friendship, that Egypt 
simply had no demands of her own to be taken account of and to 
be satisfied in any offer made to her. To the Gtovernment and 
the people of Egypt who were clamouring for full national 
independence and were determined to free their country from the 
presence of the unwanted alien forces, this 'new approach' was 
'ridiculous' and a mockery of their national objectives. They 
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felt that they were being bossed in their own country. To 
them Great Britain and her 'friends and partners* seemed to 
have assumed that they had the right to impose on them a 
defensive system favourable to themselves because of the 
apprehension of the area falling under the influence of the 
Conanunist Powers. 
The attitude of the British Government remained unchanged 
after the Conj^ erSatitfUs came to power as a result of general 
elections held on 26 October 1961, (12) Anthony Eden, the new 
Foreign Secretary, had earlier made it absolutely plain: '^ We 
could not meet the Egyptian demand and that it was no good the 
Egyptian Minister (Salah Eddin Pasha) expecting it." (13) 
Similarly, Winston Churchill had referred to the draft-
decrees of 8 October in his pre-election broadcast in a language 
which expressed his disapproval of them. He did not fail to 
throw a hint as to what he would do if returned to power; 
•••A great country like ours cannot escape from 
dangers of war and violence merely by running away 
from them. I warned you what happened would bring 
its consequences elsewhere - and I mentioned Egypt. 
Curiously enough, as I was preparing to address 
you here, the news came through that the Egyptian 
Prime Minister had denounced the 1936 Treaty, which 
affects the Sue2 Canal, and the Sudan Agreement. 
Another blow has fallen upon us even more grave and 
injurious than that which affected us at Abadan. 
It is a grievous misfortune for the whole of the 
western Allies in Europe, or in Atlantic Pact, when 
Britain falls flat on her face as if she were a booby. 
But this is not the real Britain, it is only the 
12. The Times J 26 October 1961; Manchester Guardian. 
26 October 1961. 
13. Anthony Eden, Meinoirs - Full Circle (London, 1969), p. 228. 
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grimace of an exhausted and divided Administration 
upon whose conduct the nation will soon be able to 
pronounce. C14) 
There was thus no scope or alternative left for a 
negotiated settlement. The Egyptian Parliament then finally 
endorsed the bills with overwhelming majority denouncing the 
1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the Sudan Condominium Agreanents 
of 1899. At the same time the Government announced that the 
Four-Power Proposals were also being rejected. The Egyptian 
reply to the Western offer was worded as follows: 
The Egyptian Government cannot consider these 
proposals, or any other proposals concerning the 
differences outstanding between the United Kingdom 
and Egypt while there are British forces of occupa-
pation in Egypt and the Sudan. These proposals 
hardly differ from the proposals already delivered 
on April 11 and June 8. and rejected by the Egyptian 
Government in their entirety and in detail. (15J 
The Egyptian Parliament promptly approved the Government 
decision and also unanimously agreed to amend their constitution 
in respect of Articles 159 and 160 so as to define the 
constitutional status of the Sudan and to change King Faruk's 
title to that of King of Egypt and the Sudan. 
C. BRITAIN*S REACTIONS TO THE ABBOG^TIOH 
OF THE 1936 TREATY 
Apparently, the Mafd Government had thus «fulfilled 
their pledge" and had "placed on record in the annals of the 
14. Winston Churchill's Broadcast dated 8 October 1951. See, 
The Tiiaes, 9 October 1961; Manchester Guardian^ 9 October 
1961. 
15. Al-Ahracif Al-Gamhuria, 16 October 1951; also The Times^ 
16 October 1951. 
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Nile Valley glorious deeds that will go dovm to posterity." (16) 
In the words of the Prime Minister of Egypt unanimous approval 
of these measures had shoim that the Egyptian nationalism was 
'stronger than events'. Overwhelmed by the sense of Joy, over 
his 'achievement', Nahas Pasha thanked the Parliament and said: 
You have taught those who boost of democracy an 
admirable lesson in respect of rights. You have 
taught them that people can lose their patience 
if they wait too long. You have taught them that 
rights are not granted or given - that they are 
won by struggle. You have taught them that 
aggressive material force cannot stand in the way 
of rights. You have given practical proof that 
Egypt, newly vested in democracy, knows more about 
it and venerates it more than those who claim that 
democracy has developed among them. ... Material 
force and political intrigue cannot prevent small 
nations from overthrowing imperialism, and I pray 
God that the country may be purged of every trace 
of foreign occupation and that the unity of the 
Nile Valley may be realized under King Faruk. (17) 
(Italics mine) 
These 'bold actions' on the part of Egypt, however, did 
not really shake off Britain's position vis-a-vis the Suez and 
the Sudan. By proclaiming Paruk 'the King of Egypt and the 
Sudan' (18) did not in fact unite the Nile Valley. Being 
unilateral in character and obviously against the vested 
interests of the other party, they remained devoid of any 
practical value. Great Britain had promptly announced that it 
16# Nahas Pasha's speech in the Egyptian Pkrliament on 
17 October 1951. See Al-Ahratof 18 October 1951. See 
also John C. Can5)bell, Defence of the Middle East (New 
York, 1958), pp. 43-45.-
17. Ibid. 
18. Article 2 of the Draft Law. See Appendix No. 
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had no intention of recognizing the Egyptian action. (19) 
Replying to the Egyptian note which formally communicated 
to them on 27 October what their Parliament had passed on the 
15th instant, the British Government declared that the 1936 
Treaty contained no provision for its unilateral denunciation, 
hence they regarded *the Treaty and the Condominium Agreements 
of 1899 as remaining in force and intend fully to maintain 
their rights under those instruments"* The reply also contained 
a warning that the Egyptian Government would be held responsible 
for any breach of the peace and any damage done to the life 
or property that might result from their * purported' abrogation 
of those instruments. 
The 'King's Speech' delivered on the opening of the 
new Parliament on 6 November, clearly defined Great Britain's 
official policy on the question of their relations with Egypt* 
It said: 
My Government regard the abrogation by the Egyptian 
Government of the Anglo-Sgyptian Treaty of Alliance 
of 1936 and the Sudan Condominium Agreements of 1899 
as illegal and without validity. They are resolved, 
in conjunction with the Governments of the United 
States, France and Turkey, to press forward with 
their proposals for joint defence armawents in the 
Middle East. In the meantime they will maintain 
their position in the Canal Zone under the terms of 
the 1936 Treaty and will safeguard the international 
highway, nothing can be allowed to interfere wito 
the rights of the Sudanese to decide for themselves 
the future status of their country. i20) (Emphasis 
mine} „ . . 
19. See Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison's election speech 
at Acton on 15 October, in The Timesy 16 October 1961. 
20. H.C. Deb.. 6 November 1951, vol. 493, col. 51'j also 
British and Foreign State Paper 1951^ vol. 158, pp.128-31* 
-.181-
Similar was the tone and content of the speech of 
Britain* s new Prime Minister Winston ChurcMll: 
In Egypt and the Sudan we are pursuing the policy 
adopted by the late Government* (21) ••• We are 
resolved to maintain our rightful position in the 
Canal Zone in spite of the illegal and one-sided 
Egyptian action over the 1936 Treaty. We shall do 
our utmost to safeguard the Canal as an international 
highiiray using, of course, no force than is 
necessary. (22) 
The United States, France and the European members of 
the British Commonwealth of Nations supported the stand of Great 
Britain. Official statements in Washington, fbr instance, ' 
upheld the validity of the Treaty and the Sudan Agreements. 
"The US Government", Secretary Acheson pointed out, "believes 
that proper respect for international obligations requires that 
they be altered by mutual agreement rather than by unilateral 
action of one of the parties." (23) 
21. Herbert Morrison made the following statement of policy 
in his election broadcast on 17 October 1951: 
We are perfectly rdadvto negotiate with Egypt. 
But Britain will not be dictated to. The Suez Canal 
is vital to us, to our sea-going trade, to the life 
of the Commonwealth, to the defence of the Middle 
East, to the safety of the whole free world. The 
Sudan is important for different reasons. We have 
given our pledge that the Sudanese people shall move 
forward to self-government under our guidance. We 
stand by that pledge. We cannot, and will not, 
betray the people of the Sudan, iltalics mine] 
We have got troops already in the Canal Zone. 
They will stay there until we can negotiate a new 
agreement for the defence of the whole Middle East. 
But we shall not sell the future freedom of the 
Sudanese for hjoy defence agreement whatsoever. 
See The Times^ 18 October 1951. 
22. H.C. Deb.« 6 November 1951, vol. 493, col. 79. 
23. Department of State Bulletin^ vol. 25, 22 October 1951, 
p. 647j 29 October 1951, pp. 686, 702-3. See also, 
AlnAh'ram. 18 October 1951 • 
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Such expression of firmness on the part of Great Britain 
and her allies to defend their position in Egypt and in the 
Sudan and the .subsequent reinforcement of the British troops 
in the Canal Zone by bringing paratroopers from Cyprus, 
created a highly embarrassing situation for the Egyptian 
Government. (24) The latter could neither possibly undo their 
action nor in fact they could substantiate it smoothly and 
rapidly in the face of British threat of using force to prevent 
them from going ahead. .The British troops as a matter of fact 
had already occupied the Suez and Ismailia towns and begun to 
move British women and children to the military zone. They 
also hastened to take control of the bridges over the Canal. 
All this they had done on the 16th of October, two days ahead 
of the Royal assent to the laws passed by the Egyptian Parlia-
ment on the 15th. 
Though anti-British demonstrations had begun in Cairo 
and Alexandria as soon as the decrees were announced in the 
Egyptian Parliament, they were not likely to assume the serious-
ness they acquired as a result of Britain's provAcation. The 
Egyptian Government would have been able to bring the situation 
under control under the emergency rules which had been clamped 
all over Egypt on the 17th, but for Britain's so-called 
24. Al-Ahram. 18 and 19 October 1961; The Times^ 18 October 
1961. According to John Connell, The Most Important 
Country (London, 1957), p« 31, the number of British troops 
in the Canal Zone rose from 10,000 permitted under the 
1936 Treaty, to 80,000 combat troops of high calibre. 
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'precautionary steps* - that is, reinforcement of their 
troops and the latter's capturing certain key points in 
important tovns in the Suez belt* (26) 
In reply to the British Note of October 16 and 19, 
the Egyptian Government claimed that the clashes 
in Ismailia and Port Said on those dates had been 
caused by the appearance of British military 
vehicles in the streets "challenging the senti-
ments of the people"; that British troops had 
fired "at random" on the public, killing and 
wounding innocent persons; and that "assaults and 
robberies" by British soldiers had been reported. 
Whilst admitting the possibility that British 
subjects had been robbed and molested, the 
Egyptian Note of 27 October pointed out that as 
no complaint had b^en made to the competent 
Egyptian authorities, it had been impossible to 
investigate and bring guilty persons to justice. 
Apart from the action, taken by the British "on the 
pretext of restoring order in the Canal Zone", 
there had been wider operations, such as the 
occupation of public buildings, railway installa-
tions, ports, bridges and strategic points, the 
seizure of means of transport and the detention of 
public officials, which could have "no other purpose 
than the invasion on a prepared plan on the whole 
Zone, its subjection to military law, and its 
separation from the rest of Egypt. In persuasion 
of this plan the British had attacked Egyptian ' 
army positions, although Egyptian army had done its 
utmost to avoid collusions, and were bringing daily 
reinforcements into Egypt by sea and air. The 
British action in the Canal Zone, the Note declared, 
constituted "an act of aggression in violent contra-
diction of the terms of the UH Charter ••• and a 
clear attack on Egypt's territorial integrity and 
sovereignty. (26) 
25. Al-Ahram, 19 October 1951. 
26. Foreign Minister Salah Eddin repeated these same charges 
before the United Nations General Assembly held in Paris 
on 16 November 1961. For the text of his speech see 
Record of Conversations, op.cit., pp. 183-4. 
For text of the Egyptian note of 27 October 1951, 
see Command Papers 8419^ pp. 46-7. See also the Times. 
19 and 29 October 1961. 
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Thus with the movements of the British troops, the 
BSxtremist-terrorist activities became widespread and more 
violent. And, once such activities began, there was no end 
to them. Vociferous students and youngmen, incited by the 
extremist organizations found in the subversive activities 
a way to esspress their suppressed resentment and pent up 
frustrations. 
The Government of Egypt had first sincerely tried to 
maintain law and order inside the country. They had had no 
intention of making a resort to devices of pressure. The 
Minister of Interior had even called the demonstrators as 
traitors. (27) The local police had no hesitation to open fire 
on the mobs of their own kith and kin demonstrating in Cairo 
and Alexandria. They even assisted British troops at Port 
Said. 
The Government of Egypt could not have allowed the 
people to take the law in their own hands and freely roam about 
in the streets and outskirts of the cities killing, looting 
and burning human beings and destroying their property. Such 
a state of lawless would have led to their ouster from authority. 
The King would have blamed them for failing to maintain law 
and order and removed them on that account from office, as he 
really did later on. The successor Government, probably a 
coalition or a non-party government headed by one of King's 
27 •> Al-Misre^ 6 Decenaber 1951; The Timesy 5 and 6 December 
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favourites would have yielded to the British pressure. The 
Wafd, therefore, had reasons to decide not to give in to the 
pressure of the extremists and radical nationalists for trying 
to forcibly push out the British occupation. 
After the incidents of 16 October, the British officers 
and men behaved most irrationally and indulged into all sorts 
of brutality and violence in order to terrorise the people and 
thus to demoralize them to further insist on their 
evacuation. (28) it. General Sir George Erskine, GOC, British 
troops in Egypt, sent the following message to the forces 
under his command: 
if the Egyptians tried to force the British 
from the Canal Zone "we shall resist most strongly; 
we are not going to be forced out or knocked out.... 
I have planned to meet the situation. You must be 
ready to protect yourself and to go to the help of 
your comrades if they are attacked. I have sent a 
message to the Governors of Jguez. Port-Said, and 
Shakia telling them that I do not regard abrogation 
of the Treaty as relieving them in any way of their 
duty to maintain law and order ... but I must tell 
you that they have already started attacking us in 
Ismailia, and with public excitement at its present 
level^ I must further warn you that hostile and 
criminal elements of the population may try to attack 
individuals and parties. I want you to do all you 
can. ... We are not looking for trouble, but we 
shall deal with it firmly if we meet it. 
You must trust me and Air Vice-Marshal Brown 
to watch over the security of the British forces 
and to take such measures as are required. We shall 
trust you to do your duty with courage and common 
sense*n I am confident that together we can handle 
the situation effectively. ... Our is quite 
clear. We stand on our rights under the treaty. <29) 
28. See 41-Ahram. 17 and 18 October 1961. 
29. The Times. 31 October 1951. 
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Pollowing this statement, the British forces captured 
*a.ll public utilities and key communication ports in the Canal 
Zone in public interest*. They also 'banned all Egyptian 
troops from entering the Canal Zone except those in transit to 
and from the Gaza area in southern Palestine, who would be 
allowed to pass through if 24 hours* notice was given. British 
troops were also posted on all roads leading into the Canal 
Zone* 
The same day, British troops occupied El Ferdan bridge 
after mercilessly killing its Egyptian guards and taking many 
prisoners. According to the War Office announcement in Ijondon, 
there was no casualty on their side. (30) 
This was too much of alien interference with matters 
essentially within Egypt's domestic jurisdiction. A part of 
their territory was practically severed from the jurisdiction 
of the local authority. The movement of citizens was seriously 
restricted in their own country. Their army was disallowed to 
enter the Canal Zone, and the Egyptian Government itself had 
to ask ft>r permission '24 hours in advance' for serving supplies 
via the Zone to its soldiers on the armistice-frontiers with 
Israel. Thus for the first time after the last war, the people 
of Egypt saw how the presence of British troops constituted 
a limitation on their national sovereignty and ri^tful legal 
authority. The British troops during those days were really 
behaving like the army of occupation. It was indeed for this 
day that the British had not provided the Egyptian army with 
30. Al-Misri^ 17 October 1961; The Times^ 19 October 1961. 
-.187-
military means and training. (31) After their reinforcements 
from Cyprus, the British troops in Egypt were masters of the 
situation. British armoured cars and military vehicles moving 
about in the streets in battle formation were too grave a 
provocation to the people and their Government to bear without 
strongly reacting to it. (32) 
!>• ADMIMISTRATIYE MEASUBES TAKEN AGAINST 
THE BRITISH 
Thus it was under * grave provocation* that the Govern-
ment of Egypt decided to face facts and adopt 'administrative 
measures' for the enforcement of its plans*. (33) 
Soon after the incident of 16 October, about one thousand 
auxiliary police were despatched to Ismailia to help maintain 
a state of peace in that province. The Government further 
encouraged a move for non-cooperation with the British forces 
in the Suez Canal Zone. The Minister of Social Affairs Abdul 
Fattah praised the nationalist sentiments of the Egyptian workers 
in the service of the British and assured them to provide new 
31* Minister of Interior Fuad Sirajud Din's Press Statement 
reported in The Times^ 27 October 1951. 
32. Al-Misrit Al^Ahram^ 20 October 1951. Al Bfokattam described 
the British as 'Pirates' who had 'lost their heads'. Al» 
Misri demanded that Egypt should join the Soviet bloc to 
help to realize her national demands, and Al-Ahram declared 
that a list of "British Crimes" in the Canal Zone was being 
compiled "for broadcasting to the world". Nahas Pasha 
said to a big crowd that "the enemy had lost their heads in 
a wave of madness and fear which had led them to commit 
aggressive acts." 
33. Al-Ahram. 24 October 1961. 
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jobs and grant maintenance during the period of their struggle 
against foreign domination of their country. (34) 
Besponding to the call of the nation and inspired by 
their own national feelings nearly all of the 80,000 native 
civilian workers serving the British in the Canzl Zone withdrew 
from their jobs. \35) This massive withdrawal of the civilian 
employees iranediately caused the British great inconvenience 
and virtually paralized the working of the Suez Canal. Labourers 
brought in as substitute from Cyprus, Malta and Bast Africa (36) 
could not cope with the huge vorkroT the Company and the 
British garrison. 
British G.H.Q. at Fayid announced on 23 October 
that all transportation of oil from Suez by road, 
rail and water had been suspended v/ith immediate 
effect, and that all rail traffic to and from the 
Canal Zone had likewise been stopped until farther 
notice. A military spokesman explained that 
measures had been taken because of the refusal of 
the Egyptian Port workers at Adobeya and Suez to 
return .to work. (37) 
The Ministry of Communications also issued orders to all 
Egyptian railtte^  staff lent to the British military authorities 
in the Zone to withdraw their services immediately. (38) 
34. Al-Misri. 21 and 31 October 1951; The Times. 31 October 
1951. 
36. Mohammad JSeguib, Egypt* s Destiny (London, 1955), p« 94; 
also Rasheed El Barawy, Egypt Between Two Revolutions 
(Cairo, 1952), pp. 173-4. 
36. Survey of International Affairs 1951 (HIIA, 1951), 
pp. 883-4. 
37. !Ehe Times. 24 October 1951. 
38. Al^Ahram* 19 October 1951. 
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The next move in this regard was the boycott of British 
goods and dismissal of all British officials and teachers in 
the service of the Egyptian Government. (39) A bonfire of 
British books was blazed in Cairo*s main square. 
The Egyptian State Council approved a general mobilization 
Bill providing, in case of war or threat of war, for the 
conscription of all Egyptians between 18 and 50; setting up a 
High Council of War (comprising the Ministers of War, the 
Interior, Commerce, Communications and National Economy, and 
the Chief of Staff) under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. 
The Government asked the citizens to learn to use fire-
arms and appealed to the rich to provide arms to the poor. 
Previously they had allov^ ed the people to carry arms on their 
person * for self-defence'. (40) 
The Egyptian Government also encouraged the formation 
of "liberation battalions" by providing them training facilities. 
On 20 December 1951 a parade was held at Fuad I Iftiiversity in 
Cairo of 60 undergraduates amed with sten guns, to mark their 
"passing out" as guerrillas for the Canal. (41) 
39* Al-Misriy 29 October 1961. Among the dismissed British 
subjects there were nearly 200 teachers, 33 doctors, 
24 specialists in Public works and Communications and 
some military and air advisors. See, Survey of Interna-
tional Affairs 1951. p. 286. 
40. The Timesy 31 October and 14 December 1961. 
41* A1 Misriy 21 December 1951. 
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At the same time the Ministry of Interior restored the 
property and funds of the extremist Muslim Brotherhood Organiza-
tion and allowed them to hold their meetings and resume their 
publications. (42) 
lifting the ban from the Brotherhood was a clear indica-
tion that the Government was now determined to solicit the 
support of all factions of the society to resist the British 
"aggression". This is how Nahas Pasha described the British 
military actions since 16 October. (43) In an Official Note 
to Britain, the Egyptian Government placed full responsibility 
for the clashes on 17-18 Ifovember on the 'irresponsible' and 
'arrogant* British soldiers. The Note described the clashes 
as 2 
Criminal acts of aggression which surpass in 
horror and savagery all those previous committed 
by the British occupation forces against the 
peaceful population and police officials in the 
Canal Zone. (44) 
It was in this atmosphere of suspicion, fear and hatred 
that the ghastly incident of 26 January 1962 took place in 
Ismailia. Though it is undeniable that certain subversive and 
Al-Misri. 16 December 1961. The Brotherhood had been 
banned in December 1948 by the Government of Ibrahim Abdul 
Hadi Pasha for its subversive activities which included 
the murder of Premier Nokrashi Pasha. The ban had been 
lifted on this organization in April 1961 but stringent 
restrictions on 'its activities had been in force. Now the 
Government removed all restrictions to gain their support 
in their struggle against the British. See Annual Register 
1948, p. 299; 1961, p* 288. 
43. Al'Ahram^ 14 December 1961 • 
Al-MLsri. 21 November 1961. British reply to the Egyptian 
Note in The Times^  25 November 1961. 
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seditious elements had infiltrated into the ^Liberation Squads' 
and they were trying to exploit the Anglo-Egyptian crisis for 
their own ends, Egypt's attitude, actions and reactions against 
British provocations, was motived and predominently guided by 
nationalistic objectives and enthusiasm. It was in their country 
that a foreign army was staying against their wishes; was 
interfering in their national affairs and was flouting the local 
authority. It was within Egypt that the British armed forces 
had established their own 'Kingdom' inside the Canal Zone to 
which eyen the Egyptian officials and army personnel had no 
free excess. 
If Egypt in those days was in revolt, it was for their 
national freedom. They had tolerated their subjugation under 
the British for so long, they were now trying to get rid of it. 
They had tried to achieve it by passivity, having failed they 
were now determined to assert their legitimate national claims 
by force. There was nothing wrong or bad or unprecedented 
about it. The UN Charter guaranteed every nation full freedom 
and equality of sovereign status. And, this was precisely what 
the Egyptians were striving to achieve while the British condem-
ned them for demanding freedom from their colonialism. 
Speaking in Cairo Nahas Pasha publicly denounced the 
Four-power Middle East defence plan as "worse than colonialism", 
accused the UN of furthering the ambitions of "greedy great 
Powers at the expense of smaller nations"; he declared; 
We thought Britain would return to her senses, 
especially when Labour came to power, but we had 
only promises. The Wafd did its best to negotiate 
with the British, who always put forward some 
pretext for 'common defence* which is colonization 
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in disguise. ••• The British troops had attacked 
and robbed people, surrounded towns, chased 
killed women and children, and captured police-
men. (45) 
It was a struggle between the forces of nationalism 
and imperialism in its unconventional cloak* Egypt's struggle 
should therefore be seen from a nationalistic point of view. 
Their blowing up the rail tracks, bridges and British military-
depots j throwing acid and hand granades from roof-tops and 
balconies on the British armed patrols, their occasional 
rioting and killing of British soldiers in encounters and of 
some isolated individuals and cutting wires of communications 
and channels of supplies were natural psychological reactions 
of a long suppressed and humiliated people. In many parts of 
Asia and Africa the nationalist forces had found that the 
imperialists understood only the language of force. 
The Egyptians had hoped that Britain would "eventually 
realize the consequences of her attitude .•• and would submit 
to the logic of rights and justice. (46) Instead the British 
preferred to use force and suppressive measures. They bull-
dozed and raised to the ground the village of «Kafr Abduh* 
which was a strong-point of the 'freedom fighters' arguing that 
it was a 'military necessity*. (47) 
46. Al-Misrif 14 November 1951. 
46. Speech from the Throne, dated 16 November 1951. See 
Al-MisriL. 16 November 1951; also The Egyptian Gazette 
of the same date. 
Al-Ahr^f The Egyptian Gazette^ 8, 9 and 10 December 1961. 
See also The Manchester Guardi^^ 10 December 1951. 
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Thls act of 'atrocity* sparked off the Egyptian 
resentment to the highest pitch. Ibrahim Faracj Pasha, acting 
Foreign Minister, described the incident as »symbolizlmg the 
unspeakable atrocities acts of brutal force perpetrated by 
British occupation forces in the fatherland. (48) Salah Eddin 
Pasha wrote to the Secretary-General of United Nations Trggve 
lie, protesting against the demolition of 75 houses at Kafr 
Abduh wMch, he declared, had been carried out "heedless of 
political, legal or human rights of inhabitants", and which he.s 
described as "an extremely serious and flagrant violation of 
the purposes and principles of the U.N." (49) 
The Egyptian Cabinet held an emergency meeting and 
unanimously resolved to recall their Ambassador from London 
"as a protest against aggression by the British forces in the 
Canal Zone." (60) 
Nahas pasha declared in a broadcast to the nation that 
Egypt would not stand idle in the face of British aggression 
and,that British "tyranny" would have "far-reaching 
consequences". (51) 
48. Ibrahim Paraq Pasha* s letter to the British Ambassador, 
dated 13 December 1961. See The Times. 16 December 1951. 
also Al-Misri^ 9 December 1961; The Egyptian Gazetteer 
13 and 14 December 1951. 
49. The Times^ 12 December 1951; The New York Times, 12 December 
1961. 
60» Al-Ahram, 14 December 1961. Also The Mideast Mirror, 
16 December 1951; The Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. 3, 
1952, p. 49; The Times^  13 December 1951. 
61. Al-Misri. 12 December 1951. 
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The 'Supreme Guide* of the Moslem Brotherhood, Hodeiby 
Bey issued a statement calling on his followers to intensify 
the campaign against the British. (62) 
By the close of the year hatred of Great Britain was 
apparent everywhere in Egypt. The National Liberation Army 
mainly consisting of enthusiastic students and other youngmen, 
organised resistance movements and fought pitched battles with 
the British regulars. Demonstrations and strikes became daily 
scenes in all ma^or towns of the country. The situation seemed 
to her practically getting out of control. Nevertheless, Great 
Britain still seemed adamant on maintaining its position despite 
20,000,000 people of Egypt determined to put them out. (53) 
On returning from London on 31 December 1962 after 
consultation with the Government, General Robertson made a 
statement which further embittered the already existing tension 
and made the Egyptians more steadfast in their basic demand of 
evacuation of their country and the Sudan under the Egyptian 
Crown. The statement, given below, was not merely a restatement 
of British policy but also threatened to silence the Egyptians 
by force if they continued their"present struggle; 
As the Foreign Secretary has made plain on n^y 
occasions HM Government are determined to press 
forward with the Four-Power proposals. ... Until 
such an arrangecent is made HM Government will 
uphold our position in the Canal Zone and maintain 
the freedom of International waterways of the Canal, 
not for any reason of selfish interest but as our 
contribution to the defence of the free world. 
52. A^-^isri? 17 December 1961. 
53* The Egyptian Gazette. 3 January 1952. 
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H© warned; 
It would be a great mistake fop any one to imagine 
that pressure and terrorism with their inevitable 
consequences, will in any way affect our resolve. 
If necessary we shall go on month after month, for 
many months, if need be shall meet force with force. 
• ••We have sufficient force at our disposal and we 
have the support of other countries. Hb one should 
be misled into thinking that we shall be turned 
from our policy by the passage of time or murderous 
episode. (64) 
Prime Minister Nahas Pasha replied in matching tone of 
determination and finality. He in f^ct expressed the feelings 
of the entire Egyptian people when he replied General 
Robertson's statement by saying: 
¥e are not worried by such threats and we are 
ready to use force in reply to force. We are 
determined to attain our aims and to realize 
our national claims. (65) 
Thus encouraged by the firm backing of Churchill* s Govern-
ment, General Erskine became bolder and ordered complete 
evacuation of all civilian population of the village Kafr Abduh 
and also the entire locality overlooking the Sweet Water Canal 
from which British convoys had been reportedly embushed. This 
caused great hardship and misery to 'hundreds of Egyptian 
families' - all this "to arouse security to his forces." (56) 
r 
The Egyptian Government strongly protested against the 
British operations which Sira^uddin Pasha later described to a 
Press Conference as "out of all proportion to the alleged 
64. The Egyptian Gazette. 1 January 1962; The Times. 1 January 
1952. 
Al-Ahrainy 1 January 1962. 
66. The Egyptian Gagette^ 7 January and 24 January 1952. See 
Survey of International Affairs 1951y p. 287. 
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provocation: the British had thrown women and children 
"destitute and half clothed" into the streets and taken them 
to prison caii5)s, had desecrated a mosque and a cemetry, had 
"loosed savage dogs on unarmed people" and had killed wounded, 
or flogged large numbers of the Egyptians. He added that as 
events had passed beyond the stage where mere protests were 
adequate^ 'forcible resistance would be the only alternative. (57) 
Against this official threat, the British Commander in 
Ismailia wished to clear the city of all armed Egyptian personnel 
including the police and gendarmerie posted there. In fact he 
planned a straight-forward occupation of the city. He, there-
fore, first moved his troops into the town and trained guns on 
police headquarters and then handed in an ultimatum to the 
Egyptian sub-Governor demanding that the police should surr^ider 
without arms, evacuate the government buildings and compound 
and depart from the city. But surrender in this manner would 
% 
have been a shame. The men surrounded by British tanks and 
troops were policemen by profession but they were Egyptians too. 
There was hardly any chance of their resisting the 
British show of tremendous force with bare rifles for any length 
of time but they did possess sufficient courage and spirit of 
sacrifice to face the situation boldly. The Minister of Interior iait 
encouraged them by telephonic message *to resist to thej^ bullet* • 
So they turned down the ultimatum and fought the onslaught of 
the British armoured cars until 50 of them were dead and 100 
67. The Egyptian Gazette^ 24 January 1952; The Times« 
23 and 24 January 1962. 
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wounded and the building shattered to pieces by borabapdment 
from heavy guns of the British tanks. (58) 
B. CAIRO PUT ON KLAMES 
The news of the tragedy caused an spontaneous and 
unprecedented outbreak of violsnQe in Cairo. (59) The entire 
population was insensed at the British action. The young 
enthusiasts of Al Azhar and the Cairo University, the infuriated 
Buluq en Nizam and the extremists organised mass-demonstrations 
and demanded »arms to fight fbr the Canal', and 'reprisals for 
the fate of their comrades at Ismailiya. (60) The orthodox 
'Ikhwans* and the Communists, though diametrically opposed to 
each other in their ideological context, joined hands for a 
common purpose. (61) 
The nationalist campaign against the British took serious 
turn in the afternoon of the 'Black Saturday* - the 26th of 
January 1952 when a section of the excited demonstrators resorted 
to violence and started destructive activities. The British 
owned or patronised clubs, shops, Casinos, bars and cinemas were 
68. The Egyptian Gazette^ 27 January 1962; Al-Misri. 27 January 
1952. See also Survey of International Affairs 1951. p. 288; 
Mohammad Jeguib, op.cit., p. 100; Laconture, op.cit., p. 106. 
John Connell, op.cit., p. 33; also The Times. 26 January 
1952. 
59. See, "Exchange of Notes Between Great Britain and Egypt", 
Document Section in Middle Eastern Affairs^ vol. Ill, March 
1952, pp. 80-82. 
60. Al-Misrif Al"Ah"mm. 27 January 1952. 
61. S.A. Morrison, Middle East Tensions (New York, 1954), 
GhapterjVII; also Walter Z. Lacquer^ Nationalism an^ d 
Communism. 
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ablazed and gutted, including the world-fiamous Shephards 
Hotel. It was almost a state of anarchy wherein looting, 
rioting, killing and chaos became the order of the remaining 
hours of the ^terrible day*. By the time the Egyptian troops 
entered the city to bring the situation under control, over 
750 establishments had been burnt or destroyed, at least thirty 
people lost their lives in which 11 were British and other 
foreign nationals, and several hundred others were injured. (62) 
These acts of violence and sabotage by individuals and 
small groups were not merely an outburst of * emotional national-
ism' but the culmination of^rgarly sevent^years^ of unequal 
and uncherished_relaWon^!^p_betw^^ ^ryain_aM Eg^t. 
A number of Western scholars, historians and journalists (63) 
have, however, tried to define this expression of Egypt's hate 
and anger over the entire British conduct - past and present, as 
only an indication of the conanon man's dissatisfaction with the 
working of the local administration and its inability to 
successfully deal with the problems of high prices and shortage 
62. For a fuller account the events of 26 January which is 
now nicknamed as 'Black Saturday' and for an analysis of 
the factors causing delay in bringing in the army to control 
situation, see Lacouture, op.cit.. Chapter XIIj also St. 
John, op.cit.. Chapter VIIj Survey 1951, pp. 288-90. Also, 
"Crisis in Egypt and Persia", World Today. September 1952, 
The Time,^ , 26 January 1962. 
63. H.Wood Jarvis, Pharaoh to Faruk (London, 1956), Chapter 33. 
p# J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of E^ypt-tLondon^ 1969), 
Chapter 16; Richard Hilton* The Thirteenth Power (Xondon, 
1958), Chapter 12; Tom Little, Modem Egypt (London, 1967), 
Chapter 7J Jean and Simmone Xaconture, Egypt^in Transition 
(London, 1958), Chapter 12. 
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of essential articles of domestic needs such as oil, sugar 
and bread; that the Wafd leaders had deliberately and purposely 
fanned up the trouble to divert the attention of the masses 
from the corruption and unsatisfactory handling of administra-
tion; that the King was again looking for an opportunity to 
break his alliance with the Wafdists and dismiss their govern-
ment which the latter could avoid or at least get postponed for 
some time by fomenting a crisis against the British; that the 
King, in his turn, was intending to use the breakdown of order 
as a pretext to oust the Government and, for this purpose, he 
delayed sending troops into the streets of Cairo to restore 
order. 
While these were the facts of Egypt*s domestic politics, 
they were not the dominant factore responsible for the crisis 
in her relations with Britain towards the end of January. To 
the Egyptians, settlement of outstanding questions of their 
relations with Great Britain was more important than such petty 
issues of local marketing process and control of prices. Egypt 
was afire with the desire for full freedom and restoration of 
national dignity. During the past several years, the success 
and survival of Governments had depended more on its ability 
or failure to fulfil the promise of realising national objectives. 
The Wafd in 1961-52 was so strong and popular that its survival 
could not have been affected by temporary shortage of some 
consumer goods or allegations of unfair practices in the 
administration. 
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Such charges had been brought earlier also against the 
Wafd Government by its dissident member, Markra Ebied, but 
despite that the Wafd had been returned to power by overwhelming 
majority in the last elections- Its success at the polls was 
not because of its promise of social reforms and economic 
improvements, but mainly because of its pledge to secure 
complete withdrawal of alien army and influence from their 
country* 
To suggest that the 1951-52 revolt of the people against 
Britain and the West was merely the result of their disappoint-
ment with the King and the Government to give a clean adminis-
tration, is to belittle or underestimate their nationalist 
fervour. Certain irresponsible and unpardonable acts on the 
part of certain irresponsible characters who always join in 
such a campaign, nevertheless, do not change its nationalist 
character of motivation* 
What happened in Cairo on 26 January, though morally bad, 
was not a pre-planned revenge* The targets were not earmarked 
in advance* The whole thing was an spontaneous expression of 
accumulated resentment of the people. The sufferings and 
victimisation of their fellow-countrymen in the Suez Canal area 
at the hands of the British troops were the immediate and grave 
provocation that led to violent manifestation of their 
disapproval and protest. The Wafd's responsibility was that it 
had not fully anticipated the nature and extent of British 
reactions to its decision of abrogation of the 1936 Treaty and, 
therefore, made no provision for the protection and care of the 
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Inhabitants of the Suez Canal Zone. Many who fled from their 
homes after the British forces had turned the whole area into 
a virtual theatre of war, described how they were subjected to 
innumerable atrocities committed by depperate British troops, 
many innocent people killed, their homes pillaged, their places 
of worship desecrated which aroused the listeners of Cairo to 
cries of revenge. (64) 
F* DISMISSAL OF MHAS PASHA. AMD THE EHfioP 
MOMBCHY IM EggT 
The burning of Cairo and the alleged failure of the 
Government to prevent »acts of genuine nationalist sentiments' 
being turned into acts of terrorism, gave King Faruk the 
desired chance to dismiss Nahas Pasha's Goverranent on 27 January 
and call on Ali Maher, reputed 'strong raan* of Egyptian politics, 
to form a new GoveriKnent. (65) 
Ali Maher* s first important task was to restore order 
in public life and arrange for security for all and thus to 
prevent British troops from moving into Cairo to protect the 
life and property of British and other foreign nationals in the 
64 • See, Baurse Egyptienne^ 24 January 1962, quoted in Survey 
1951, p* 289.Also The Times« 24 January 1962. See also 
Ifiistafa Ala, Egypt Between Revolutions (Cairo), Chapter IV; 
also Al-Misri. 10 February 1962. 
65. 1^-Ahram"y 28 January 1952; The Times. 28 January 1952. 
Ali Maher had been Prime Minister of .Egypt in 1936 and 
1939-40. He had had Faruk's confidence through many 
vicissitudes since the beginning of his reign in 1936. 
For details see. The Middle East in the War, op.cit., 
pp. 33-40, 199-212. 
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town. He tried to win the support and sympathy of the nation 
by assuring that he would strive "to achieve the evacuation of 
British troops and the unity of the Nile Valley - the two 
national ohjectives which all previous governments had at 
heart*" (66) At the same time he expressed his readiness to 
reop^ discussion with the four powers on the question of 
Middle East defence. (67) Answering Press reporters on 30 
January and again on 4 February, he said: 
We are ready to consider any understanding Mr* 
Eden might propose. ... It is my wish that a 
healthy atmosphere for a better understanding 
should prevail between Egypt and Britain and 
Powers of the Free World. The Middle East 
Command and the inter-Arab Security Pact will be 
matters for discussion with the Egyptian National 
Front (which consisted of the Saadists, the 
Liberal constitutionalists and the Wafdists)* 
Both these questions will, naturally, be in the 
framework of the UN Charter. (68) 
He also agreed to try and punish all those found guilty 
of neglecting their duty to prevent violence or participated 
in it, and promised compensation to those who suffered during 
the recent 'rioting'. He also ordered the withdrawal of all 
•National liberation Squads' and other volunteers from the 
66". Ali Maher's statement of policy made before the Chamber •Of Deputies on 28 January 1952. See Al«4/[i8ri. The 
Egyptian Gazette^ both of 29 January 1952. 
67. Mideast Mirror^ 2 February 1952, p. 2. 
68. Al-Ahrain^  6 February 1962; The Times^ 6 February 1952; 
also, Survey of International Affairs 1952 (RIIA, 1955), 
pp« 203-44 Mideast Mirrort 9 February 1952;.Middle East 
Journaly vol. Ill, February and March 1952, pp. 63, 97. 
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Canal Zone and to resume regular transport services and 
other facilities to the British troops. 
It was a good start and there were hopes that the two 
Governments would renew conversations and would arrive at some 
acceptable solution of their conflicting issues. Great Britain 
had not failed to appreciate the gesture of the Egyptian 
Government. The British Commanding Officer had withdrawn 
restrictions on civilian movement in the zone and released many 
Egyptians taken into custody since October last. (69) 
The reappointment of Amer Pasha to his former position 
as Ambassador in I^ ondon, from where he had been recalled by the 
Wafdists in December last was quite an indication that he 
seriously meant business- (70) He received the British Ambassador 
in a very cordial and friendly manner when the latter called on 
him. Both discussed the possibility of opening formal negotia-
tions for a settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. Both 
agreed to begin with a 'clean slate». The British diplomat was 
understood to have been advised by London to assure in advance 
that every Egyptian suggestion would receive »most careful 
consideration* by His Majesty's Government. (71) 
69• The Timesy 6 February 1952; Al-Misriy 5 and 6 February 
1962; Mideast Mirror^ 9 February 1952. 
70. Middle Eastern Affairs- 1953, p. 97; Mideast Mirror. 
23 February 1952. pp. 1-3: Mustafa Ala, op.cit., p. 112; 
El-Barawy, op.cit., p. 180; Tom Little, op.cit., p. 110. 
71. Mideast Mirror^ 1 March 1952, p. 2. 
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On the Egyptian side, there was a marked change in their 
basic approach to all the outstanding issues involving relations 
with Great Britain. Maher's Government showed its readiness 
to consider the question of evacuation, and the Sudan's unity 
with Egypt in the context of regional strategy and security. 
The preceding Egyptian Government had not been prepared to 
consider regional defence until its demands had been fully 
accepted. 
The statement made by the influential legal adviser 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr. Wahid Raafat Bey was of 
great importance in this regard. He frankly stated that the 
Egyptian question no longer concerned Egypt and Britain alone. 
He was obviously advocating that regional security Fact should 
replace bilateral arrangement, i.e., the 1936 Treaty. He 
referred to the proposal of the Iraqi Premier, Nuri Pasha, that 
the Arab league Security Pact should be opened to permit the 
association of other Powers. 
He believed that a defence pact for the Middle East 
based on the following principles could be acceptable to the 
Government and the people of Egypt: 
1. The British forces should evacuate the Canal Zone 
within a period not more than 12 months from the 
day the pact was signed. 
2m The military base which is now occupied by the 
British should be handed over to the Egyptian forces. 
3. The Egyptian authorities would be responsible for 
maintaining the base in readiness for use immediately 
there is foreign aggression. 
4. The help of foreign experts, regardless of their 
nationality, could be sought for the maintenance of 
the base. 
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5. A regional defence Pact between the Arab States 
on one side and America, Britain, France and Turkey 
on the other, should be concluded. 
6. These Western powers should supply the Arab forces • 
with all war material and equipment. 
7* A defence council to coordinate military plans 
should be formed. 
8. Troops of a foreign allied country should not occupy 
the land of another country except in time of war 
and should evacuate immediately the war is ended. 
9. Aid given by the Arab States in war-time should be 
restricted to the Middle East region alone. (72) 
r 
This statement seemed to have narrowed the field of 
dispute because it confirmed that there existed a certain degree 
of unity of intentions on both sides. 
But Maher's disagreement with the King on the question 
of dissolution of the Parliament, led to the postponement of 
negotiations with Great Britain, as he had resigned from 
Premiership on 1 March. (73) 
His successor, Ahmed Kfeguib El Hilali, a former Minister 
of Education in 1937 and again in 194fi, who had broken with the 
Wafd party after 1960*s election, agreed with the King to 
dissolve the Parliament, exile Sirajuddin and place entire 
responsibility of the events of 26th January and those preceding 
thet day on the Wafdists. (74) He put many persons on trial 
V2. ^-Ahramy 28 February 1962; also Mideast Mirror. 1 March 
1962, pp. 2-3. 
73. l^-Ahraia.' 2 March 1962: Anwar El Sadat, op.cit., p. 106} 
also Survey 1962, p. 204. 
74. Al-Ahram, 2, 3 and 8 March 1962; The Egyptian Gazette^ 
26 March 1952. See also Report of the Prosecutor-General 
of investigations of the 'Black Saturday* which held the 
Ccontd. on next page) 
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and sent many to including Ahmed Husain, founder leader 
of the Arab Socialist Party. 
These measures were bound to alienate all political 
parties from the Goverment. Ali Maher had wished to avoid 
this situation by declining to take such unwelcome measures at 
a time when *the prospect of reaching agreement with Great 
Britain were much nearer than at any time in the past'* It was 
mainly for this purpose that he had created a 'United National 
Front' and asked for the unanimous support of both the Houses 
of the Chamber. He had thus tried to prevent 'disunity' by 
retaining the Parliament. Hiough he denounced the negligence 
of those generally responsible for the situation, he took no 
action against them, and did not agree to break the Wafd. 
Hilali lacked Maher's political grasp and created rift in the 
national unity. This weakened his position in dealing with the 
British successfully, despite the fact that he shared and 
pursued the policy of his predecessor* 
Thus, the exploratory discussions on Egypt's political 
relations with Great Britain between Premier Hilali and 
Ambassador Stevenson began in a confused domestic atmosphere. 
After the abrogation of the Parliament, new elections were to be 
held within two months of the dissolution. And, in the elections, 
the Wafd* s victory was a foregone conclusion. The Palace and 
prominent figures in Egypt's social and political circles were 
74. (contd. from back page) 
Wafd Government responsible for failing to anticipate and 
to take precautions against those incidents. See, Mideast 
Mirror. 15 March 1952, pp. 1-6; El Sadat, op.cit., p. 106. 
-.207-
also not appreciate <S>j|J Hllali's programme of eradication of 
corruption from public life. (76) Hilali's Government was, 
therefore, a weak Government of uncertain tenure with no support 
from the Palace or the parties. The masses too were not 
particularly impressed by his promises of a clean and stable 
administration because of his severe punitive actions against 
popular leaders for their participation in the recent 'national 
agitation*• (76) The British Ambassador was aware of the 
weaknesses of Hilali's Goverranent and, therefore, wouldn't go 
to the extent of making real and conclusive deal with him. 
Nevertheless the two Governments tried to prepare a 
ground for further talks under more ^ uspicious circumstances in 
future. During several meetings held in Cairo and London 
between March and June 1962, both sides adopted an attitude of 
accommodation and adjustment with each other's objectives and 
commitments to their respective peoples. (77) For a while it 
75. Anwar El Sadat writes in his book Revolt on the Nile that 
Karim Tabet, Paruk's press officer, and Elias And^s, of 
the Palace clique, could think of no better plan to aslc ' 
the United States Ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, to help 
them overthrow Hilali. This move was characteristic of the 
political morality of the last days of the old regime, 
when it was considered quite natural to invite the interven-
tion of a foreign power in Egyptian affairs. This story was 
told to Galal Hammasy, my colleague of the newspaper Al-
Gomhourya^ by the distinguished diplomat himself at a fare-
well dinner on his return to the United States." p. 107. 
76. Al-Ahram> 19 May 1952; Mustafa Ala, op.cit., p. 112. 
Also Robert 0. Collins, Egypt and the Sudan (New Jersey, 
1967), p. 130; also The UniUd States Inltforld Affairs 
1952.(New York, 1963), p. 237. 
77. See Mideast Mirror. 22 March to 30 June 1962. See also 
Egyptian Gazette and Al-Misyj, (Cairo) and The Times (London), 
of the same period for editorial comments and articles frowr 
political reviewers; also see Survey 1962^ pp. 205-8. 
-.208-
seemed that Xondon was willing to consider the evacuation 
of the Canal Zone on the ground that Hilali Pasha was under-, 
stood to have accepted in principle the idea of; 
1. Joint planning of defence measures which would 
become operative in the event of an international 
emergency threatening the security of Egyptj 
2» Anglo-Egyptian cooperation in air defence; and 
the emplo^ent of British technicians in the Canal 
Zone. (78) 
Similarly on the question of the Sudan it was indicated 
from the British side that Britain had no objection to the 
Egyptian Crown having sovereignty over the Sudan and Egypt 
"as long as the Sudanese agree." Sir Stevenson gave the 
impression that what HM Government refused to do was to make a 
unilateral statement committing herself to a recognition of that 
sovereignty. It, therefore, seemed probable that if the two 
sides agreed on a practical method of ascertaining the Sudanese 
opinion, the controversy would be resolved to the satisfaction 
of all. 
The Egyptian Government, however, could not modify its 
demand of recognition of the King's title to the Sudan now with 
the proviso that the Sudanese should have the right to determine 
their relations with Egypt eventually. 
Their talks, however, could not continue further because 
of new political and legal complications having been created by 
the developments in the Sudan. The Sudan administration 
78. The Times. 28 March 1952; Al-Ahrain. 10 May 1952. 
Also US in World Affairs 1952^ p. 237. 
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presented to the legislative Assembly, on 2 April, a draft 
statute of self-government based on the work of the constitu-
tional commission which had been set up in March 1951. This 
draft statute had provided for immediate elections of a legisla-
ture and the formation of an all-Sudanese Government, but 
reserved substantial discretionary powers to the British 
Governor-General during the period of transition until the 
Sudanese people exercised their right freely to determine their 
future relationship with Egypt and Great Britain. (79) 
The new constitution was subject to the approval of both 
Egypt and Great Britain, the co-doraini, after its acceptance by 
the Assembly in Khartoum. But from the Egyptian point of view 
the co-domini status for both Egypt and Britain had been done 
away with by the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty and the 1899 
Condominium Agreements in October last. The Government and the 
entire people in Egypt were committed to uphold their constitu-
tional position. They could not lawfully assume responsibilities 
in that capacity and consider the value or otherwise of a 
constitution which had been formulated under an administration 
whose de jure rights they considered to have vanished under 
their own acts of abrogation. 
The Government of Egypt was seriously annoyed at the turn 
of events and straightaway refused to recognize the validity and 
propriety of the Governor-General's action. (80) The Al^Ahram 
79. Text in Documents on International Affairs 1952 (R I I a ) , 
p. 290; also Ciad. 8767, Appendix 2, pp. 12-45. 
80. Al-Misrif 4 April 1952. 
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warned that "the next few days, nay, the next few hours" 
would prove decisive in Anglo-Egyptian relations. (81) The 
Egyptians generally believed that the announcement by the 
Governor-General of the proposed new constitution at such a 
time was a direct affront to the Egyptian Government and showed 
that the Sudan Government's British chief saw no reason to 
obey the British Government or the latter was itself party to 
this intransigence. Most columnists in the dailies of Cairo 
and the pro-Egyptian Khartoum Press felt that the London Foreign 
Office had its hand in timing the presentation of the draft 
law before the Khartoum Assembly. (82) They felt that Britain 
was intent on carrying out its policy of separating the southern 
region from the north of the Kile Valley® They argued that 
there was not much point in proceeding with talks on the Sudan 
when the Sudan administration was proceeding with its own anti-
Egyptian policy as was evident from its latest actions. 
It would be of some interest to mention here that the 
American Ambassador in Cairo, Jefferson Caffery, whose main 
interest was to see that both Egypt and Great Britain reconcile 
their differences in the overriding interest of the defence of 
the free world, seriously urged British recognition of Egyptian 
sovereignty over the Sudan which would be merely nominal until 
the Sudanese people had exercised their right of self-deterraina-
tion. But the Foreign Office accepted the view of the Sudan's 
81. Al-Ahram, 30 April 1952. 
82, Mideast Mirror. April, May and June 1962. 
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Governor-General that the niceties of 'nominal sovereignty* 
were too subtle for a politically immature people, and that 
the question of the King of Egypt's title during the interim 
period should be made the object of 'immediate consultation 
with the Sudanese*'. (83).j 
Weguib el Hilali had sincerely hoped and tried to 
consolidate his position by coming to terms with Great Britain, 
but as the latter was not prepared to modify her stand on the 
question of the Sudan, he failed in M s objective and resigned 
on 28 June. Domestic pressures, including Palace-intrigues 
against him, (84)were no less important factors impelling his 
unceremonious exit from politics. (86) 
After Neguib el Hilali's resignation the question of 
Egypt's relations with Great Britain and other matters of 
external nature were pushed into abeyance until a new revolution-
ary Junta of younger army officers came at the helm of affairs 
in late July 1952. Meanwhile, problems and intrigues of 
national politics domimted the scene. The King and the 
political leaders remained preoccupied with asserting their 
positions against each other. The King was exasperated to learnyW^ 
his 'true-self has been expose to the people and that his 
83. Mew York Times. 21 May 1952; Survey of International Affairs 
1952 (RIIA, 1963J, p. 206. Also Cmd. 8767, «ee-aieo 
See also Mideast Mirrbr^ 9 February 1952, p. 4. 
84. Tom little, op.cit., p. Ill; El-Sadat, op.cit., p. 107; 
also msheed El Barawy, op.cit., pp. 180-2# 
ill-Ahram. 29 June 1952; The Egyptian Gazette of the 
same date. 
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subjects hate him for his sinfUl life and irresponsible 
conduct of public affairs. (86) The new officers made him 
SMi'cate from the throne and exiled him from the country to 
which he really never belonged. 
With his sailing away from the shores of Alexandria 
on board 'Al Mahroussa* on 26 July the past of Egypt, dominated 
by self-centred monarchs and corrupt politicians, was drowned 
into the sea. Egypt was reborn ti&t day to begin its new 
life. (87) 
86. For full description of King Faruk*s shameful private life 
and highly irresponsible, cormipt and dishonest conduct 
of the affairs of the state in which nobody's life, wealth 
and honour was safe, see Rasheed el Barawy, op.cit., 
Chapters 12 and 13; Lacouture, op.cit., Part II, Chapter Ij 
Tom Little, op.cit., p. Ill; also Survey 1962, p. 211j 
liMstafa Ala, op.cit., pp« 116-22* 
87. Al-Ahram^ The Egyptian Gazette^ 27 July 1952. See also 
The Times, 27 February 1962; also Mohammed Mbustafa Ala, 
Egypttag Between Two Revolutions (Cairo, 1952), p. 122. 

Chapter VI 
THE REVOLUTION AND THE PROSPECTS OF PEACEFUL 
SETTLEMENT OF ISSUES WITH BRITAIN -
THE SUDAN 
A. EGYPT'S NEW LEADERS'SATTITUDE 
TOWARDS GREAT BRITAIN 
By the middle of July 1952 the question of Egypt's 
relations with Great Britain had remained totally unresolved. 
The failure of Great Britain and Egypt to negotiate a new 
treaty after the Great War, and the former's attitude of 
postponing the issue by insisting on latter* s joining in a 
common defence alliance, had created a deadlock in their search 
for a new basis of their relationship. But this stalemate 
could by no means help the new Egyptian Government devote its 
attention to the probl€;ms of local politics and socio-economic 
reforms. 
The 'burning of Cairo* had unequivocally demonstrated 
the Egyptians' unwillingness to further tolerate the presence 
of 'alien armed forces' in their country. Britain's stubborn 
and obdurate action against a handful of Egyptian auxiliary 
police in Ismailia, and the other so-called 'precautionary 
measures' which included traffic restrictions and night curfews, 
personal searches, expulsion of families and even demolition of 
houses in the Canal Zone, had also brought home to the Egyptians 
the unpleasant fact that the presence of British forces was not 
only a limitation on their sovereignty but aalso national 
honour. 
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The revolutionary regime of the Free Officers (1) was 
fully convinced of the necessity of removing all such limita-
tions and interference in their domestic affairs. They paid 
immediate attention to the problem of Egypt* s relations with 
Great Britain* They had realized that the social revolution 
could not begin unless Egypt was completely free from local 
corruption and political interferences from the British garrison 
in the Suez Canal Zone. As Nasser wrote; 
Every nation undergoes two revolutions: the first, 
political, in which it recovers its rights to self-
government from an imposed despot, or an occupying 
army; the second, social in which the classes of 
society struggle against each other until an 
equilibrium is established and justice is secured 
for all citizens. (2) 
1. The Free 0fficerg_Organization had come into existence 
long "Bel'STF^ the coup d*6tat of July 1952. Many of the 
leaders of the movement were late-1930s graduates of the 
Military College. Many had classmates. In their official 
posts they enjoyed opportunities to meet together and 
discuss Egyptian affairs. 
Very early in their careers they expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the old order. The 1942 crisis and the humiliation 
of the Army in 1948 Palestine campaign quickened their 
discontent, but it was not until 1949 that a formal organiiza-
tion came into existence. Although they believed that the 
old order must be supplanted, at this time they did not see 
themselves as the instrument of change. The Free Officers 
Organization was set up, in part to protect the younger and 
more radical men in the army against the intrigues of the 
King. In part, it was also established to debate and 
circulate the ideas of the young officers more widely 
throughout the army. It had both a civilian and a military 
wing for popularising its ideas, although the civilian wing 
soon fell into disuse. Only the extraordinary breakdown in 
olitical and economic order in 1951 and 1952 convinced the 
ree~Officers that the army~mui? play'^predominant role 
in the~^litics or iSgypt^  ~ ~ f 
For a detailed account of the Free Officers Movement 
see Xacollture, op.cit., Part 2, Chapter I; Robert St. John, 
op.cit., Chapters 5-®; Robert 0. Collins, op.cit., Chapter 5; 
Ccontd. on next page) 
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In the first phase of the revolution, the Free Officers 
had. succeeded without violence in getting rid of the detested 
and despised monarch and scores of corrupt persons and 
politicians. Faruk had been permanently sent into exile (3) 
1« Ccontd« from back page) 
Joachim Joestin, Nasser^ The Rise to power (London, I960), 
Chapter 6. 
2. Gamal Abdul Nasser, The Philosophy of the Bevolution 
(Cairo, 1954), p. 26. 
3. On 26th of July 1962 the Junta presented the following 
ultimatum to King Paruk which demanded him to abdicate in 
favour of his infant son Fuad II and leave the country 
before simset the same day; "whereas the total anarchy in 
which the country has of recent months been thrown, and 
which has spread to all domains, is a result of your bad 
administration, your violations of the Constitution, and 
your disregard of the will of the people to a point where 
no citizen could feel secure in his life, dignity and 
property. 
'^ Whereas your persistence in this course has compromised 
the name of Egypt among the nations, and treacherous and 
corrupt persons have, under your protection, continued to 
amass shameful fortunes and to squander public funds while 
the people remained a prey to hunger and poverty. 
'whereas these facts have been brought to light by the 
war in Palestine, the traffic in defective arms and ammuni-
tion to which it gave rise, and the judgments pronoianced 
by the Courts on those responsible revealed your interven-
tion - intervention which distorted truth, shook confidence 
in justice,, encouraged traitors in their crimes, enriched 
some and corrupted others. 
" Therefore the Army, representing the Power of the 
People, has authorized me to demand that Youf Majesty 
abdicate the Throne in favour of the Heir Apparent, His 
Highness Prince Ahmed Fuad on this day, Saturday, July 26th, 
1952, and that you leave the country before 6 P.M. on this 
same day. 
'The Army holds Your Majesty responsible for any 
consequences which may result from your refusal to conform 
to the will of the people. 
Sd* Mahamed Neguib 
Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces. See El Sadat, op.cit., pp. 126-26 
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and all others who were involved in malpracticies were tried 
and planished by special tribunals. (4) All political parties 
had been suppressed (5) and the existing Constitution had been 
abrogated to pave the way for the drafting of the new one. (6) 
But the process was far from being complete as long as the 
'alien arsed forces' were present iiisid© th© country. 
They sincerely wished to weed out corruption, bribery, 
favouritism and abuse of authority from the Government and 
politics of their country which, in their opinion, were holding 
back the wheels of progress and social uplift. They wished to 
eradicate these evils and to see their country become a truly 
modern nation in the real sense of the world. But this was 
not possible without solving the problem of adjustment of their 
relations with Britain. They had no love for the British but 
they also realized that some business-like adjustment was 
necessary. 
In their pre-revolution circulars which v/ere secretly 
distributed among the army personnel they had totally disapproved 
of any compromise or concessions being made to the British or 
any other foreign power. In one of their circulars issued when 
the first Weguib el Hilali Government was formed and emphasis 
was shifted from foreign to domestic issues, the P.O. said: 
Aj-"Ahram« 8 September 1962. 
5. The Egyptian Ga2sette, 1 August 1952, 2 October 1962. 
6. John Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1900-56 (I-ondDn, 
1956), p. 389. 
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There have lately been several conspiracies by 
Anglo-American Imperialism for the purpose of 
tindermining the nationalist movement and divert-
ing the people from armed struggle against 
imperialism in the Canal Zone to domestic questions. 
After the Wafd Government had cut off negotiations 
and taken the drastic step of abrogating the treaty 
and after having rejected the imperialistic 4-State 
Middle East Defence pact, imperialism plotted and 
provoked the January 26 events. 
The Aly Maher Cabinet took the reins of 
Goverrunent and decided to resume negotiations with 
the British. 
Imperialism and Egyptian traitors hoped that 
Aly Maher would make a complete surrender by accept-
ing the 4-State Middle East Defence Pact, dissolving 
parliament, ordering the internment of thousands of 
patriots and using Martial law as means for the 
prevention of the people. 
They have, however, been greatly disappointed 
as Aly Maher has not acquiesced in their demands. 
It was therefore.deemed necessary that a so-
called "purification" movement should take place 
before facing imperialism. This was taken by Ahmed 
Neguib el Hilali who openly declared that the 
principal task of his Government was the .elimination 
of corruption, forgetting that imperialism was the 
main cause of such corruption and that it would not 
be possible to stamp it out unless the country got 
rid of imperialism. 
Among the objectives of the Free Officers is 
the launching of a campaign against corruption in 
all its aspects ••• but we should not coinbat such 
evils unless we have been completely freed from 
imperialism. Any other step should be tantamount 
to unpardonable treachery to the fatherland. (7) 
In another important 'circular* the inner circle of 
the Free Officers urged all the Officers in the Egyptian army 
to struggle for the enancipation of their country from the 
yoke of imperialism as they alone possessed the means and the 
ability to fight for their coxintry*s freedom and national 
Rasheed El Barawy, The Military Coup in Egypt (Cairo, 1962), 
pp. 199-200. 
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honour. The * circular' dated 22 March made the following 
general appeal * To All Officers' : 
Your own freedom is entirely dependent upon the 
freedom of the people. You should therefore,carry 
on the struggle for freedom everywhere. 
You should remember that the traitors, who are 
in command of the Army are also in league with 
imperialism. 
It is, therefore, your duty to turn on the 
enemies of the Fatherland and force them to respect 
our liberty, our dignity and our patriotism which 
they have violated in order that they might serve 
their own personal ends. 
'Down with imperialisml 
'Down with any alliance with imperialisml 
'Down with Joint Defence and with any collective 
security pact under imperialisml 
'Down with Martial Lawl (8) 
Another 'circular' issued on 'the emniversary of the 
bombardment of Alexandria by British imperialists' (9) against 
the nationalist uprising of Col. Ahmed Orabi in 1882, reiterated 
that a determined, united struggle by the army and the people 
was the only way to secure their freedom and basic human 
rights. The 'circular' cautioned the then Prime Minister, 
Hussein Sirry that 
The Egyptian people and the Free Officers have 
already declared they will never agree to any 
further negotiations, to any alliance or defence 
pact with imperialistic blocs but that they demand 
8. Ibid., p. 201. 
9. For a vivid account of the riots in Alexandria on 
11 June 1882 given by Col. Ahmed Orabi's associate in 
the revolt Ahmed Bey Rlfaat, see W.S. Blunt, Secret History 
of the English Occupation of Egypt (London, 1895), 
Appendix II. 
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liberty, full independence, oomplete neutrality 
and armed struggle for the liberation of the 
Fatherland. (10) 
These «circulars' and slogans clearly indicated that the 
principal aim of the revolution was that Egypt should occupy 
her rightful and natural position among the civilized and free 
countries of the world. Such an aim, they thought, could not 
be attained without unconditional evacuation. But after 
assuming the reins of authority, these young spirited officers, 
however, soon realized that total renunciation by violent 
methods and insistence on the acceptance of their own terms 
and conditions for reaching a settlement would not practically 
help them realize their objectives. A helpful change in their 
attitude and moderation in their approach on all issues 
involving Great Britain was necessary. Without such moderation 
the realization of the objectives of their revolution would 
have been delayed as the social revolution was so much dependent 
on the settlement of vital issues between Egypt and Great 
Britain. 
CAUTION AGAINST BRITISH IMTERVENTIOK 
The leaders of the revolution had not ignored or under-
estimated the chances of British intervention if the latter 
misunderstood their intentions. (11) In their very first 
pronouncement they wisely assured all British and other foreign 
10. Rasheed El Barawy, op.cit., p. 204. 
11. Tom Little, Modem Egypt (London, 1967), p. 151. 
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natlonals "that the Army considers^it self entirely responsible 
for the^^^ction of their persons and prop^ty." (12) They 
also sent an official Note to the British Embassy at the 
earliest moment informing that "what had just happened in Egypt 
was a purely internal affair"* The Note also contained a 
warning that "any attempt at intervention would be considered 
as interference in the country* s domestia affairs and would 
have serious consequences*" C13) 
The Baiitary Attache at the British Embassy C14) gave 
an assurance that 'Her Majesty's Government had no intention of •np— "" ^ ^ ' ^ ' 
interfering with the Internal affairs of Egypt*. (Ifi) 
After the end of the Great War, Britain's position 
was not what it was at the time of the rebellion of Colonel 
Ahmed Orabi towards the end of the 19th century. She was now 
much too weak and exhausted to assert itself against the surge 
of assertive nationalism throughout Asia and a considerable part 
of Africa. With the advent of the United Nations Organization, 
the attainment of independence by India, Pakistan, Burma and 
Ceylon, the emergence of USA and the USSR as the super powers 
and the ensuing cold war, imperialistic fronts had begun totter-
ing everywhere, and smaller nations were rapidly acquiring 
12. Text of the Proclamation broadcast to the nation on the 
morning of 23 July 1952, in El Saadat, op.cit., p. 119. 
13. Rasheed El Bamwy, op.cit., pp. 32-3; also Gregory Blakland, 
Ob.1ective Egypt (london, 1966;, pp. 176-77. 
14. Ambassador Ralph Stevenson was then on leave. 
15. Anthony Eden, Pull Circle - Memoirs (London, 1959), p.240. 
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political awareness of their national rights and status* 
The pre-war international balance of power had undergone a 
drastic change, and the new strategy of the post-war era was 
compelling every 'big nation' with interests and stakes abroad 
to win friendship and sympathy of maximum number of nations 
and cultivate closer, dependable associations through mutual 
cooperation in the fields of economic growth and defence 
arrangements. 
In the present case there was apparently no cause or 
pretext on the basis of which Britain could justify their 
intervention. The revolutionary regime of the Free Officers 
l^d not only assured the safety of life and interests of all 
foreignersi but had not allowed any xintoward incident to take 
place. The transfer of power liad been swift and without any 
violence or bloodshed. The King and the 'corrupt regime* had 
surrendered without any resistance and the masses had generally 
welcomed the change. (16) The Free Officers - the engineers 
16. Mideast Mlrroy of 2 August 1952 reported that all politi-
cal parties in Egypt expressed their support for the Army 
move and subsequent events. They all welcomed the abdica-
tion of King Faruk. 
Mustafa el-Nahas who returned to Egyptnfrom Europe 
on 28 ffiuly, expressed his pleasure and satisfaction over 
the great task performed by the Egyptian Army. 
Ibrahim Abdel Hadi, leader of the Saadist Party stated 
that »no true patriot could help declaring his fullest 
support fbr a movement aiming at the real purification of 
public life'. 
Hassan el-Hodeibi, Supreme Guide of the Moslem Brother-
hood said that he 'welcomed such great and unparalleled 
events which marked a new milestone in the country's 
progress - thanks to the steps taken by Army leaders'. 
Ccontd. on next page) 
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the coup d*etat had not alloi/ed even demonstrations of rejoic-
ing and felicitations lest they might lead to disturbances. 
Even from the logical point of view, Britain would not 
have been Justified to let her forces stationed in the Canal 
Zone interfere because according to the 193|S Treaty upon the 
application of which Britain still insisted but which Egypt had 
abrogated, it was stipulated that the British forces did not 
have the character of an army Qf occupation_and, therefore, they 
had no right to interfere in matters which did not concern 
them or threatened them with any danger. 
The revolutionary regime had also assumed that there 
were no 'personal motives* behind their action. Their only 
motive was to clean the administration and democratise political 
institutions. Great Britain was a democracy and hetd fought two 
major wars to preserve democracy and make the world safe for 
its expansion and development. It was obvious, therefore, 
that any move on Britain's part to interfere in Egypt's internal 
affairs was not only bound to meet strongest resistance by the 
Army and the peojjle but also the charge of Opposing the promise 
and prospects of Egypt's becoming a democracy. The United 
Nations^could have condemned Britain for violating its Charter 
guaranteeing against such interference. (17) Besides, the 
hitherto uncommitted nations would have developed serious 
^version to the West and would have lost all confidence and 
hope in the newly created international body to preserve peace 
17. UN Charter, Article 
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and political freedom of big and small nations. This could 
have compromised the position of the West and undermined its 
role and efforts to contain Commliatisio*^ , and the prevalent 
cold-war atmosphere woulda't have remained that cold. 
In short, Britain*s intervention in Egypt at this time 
would have been completely inconsistent with the spirit of 
the times and could tmve led to grave consequences. 
On the other hand, an attitude of restraint, in fact, 
the acceptance of the new order was not to be without definite 
returns. The new r^ime was not committed on any issue 
pending settlement with Briton- The King, whose interests 
and honour were always a limitation and a drawback in dealing 
with the British on the question of the Sudan, was no more on 
the scene. It could, therefore, fairly be expected that the 
young Egyptian Officers who were thinking more in terras of 
solving the immediate problems of their country and not 
calculating their actions in terms of future careers for them-
selves. It was, therefore, an opportune moment for putting the 
relations between the two countries on a better and more 
reasonable footing. As Sir Anthony Eden observed, "the Free 
Officers' Organization of which General Neguib was a 'put up' 
leader, was a better bet than either King or Wafd. He must be 
given his chance to clean the Egyptian stable." (18) 
The Free Officers, led and inspired by Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, a sober calculating and reasonable young man in his 
18. Anthony Eden, op.cit., p. 242. 
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early thirties, gave some serious thoi;ights to the problem 
of their country's relations with Great Britain. The previous 
Governments had not been able to give the country a sound 
economic system. Egypt's foreign exchange earnings and 
reserves were at the lowest. Stock-piles of cotton purchased 
by the last Wafd Government for the purpose of selling out at 
higher price to foreign buyers incurred huge losses as the 
world prices for cotton had gone down. (19) 
For the implementation of their programme of economic 
reforms, to boost-up foreign trade, to raise agricultural output 
and to start modem industries, to reduce poverty and unemploy-
ment, the regime desparately needed finances for investment. 
Local resources being inadequate, they were compelled to look 
for resources outside the country. Capital from iUnerican 
sources was not acceptable because of political strings being 
attached to them. Private investors both in America and Europe 
were reluctant because of instability and 'antics of the 
previous Governments'. (20) 
They realized that their movement would lose all its 
appeal and motivation if it failed to deliver something sound 
and worthwhile in terms of economic betterment and improvement 
in public services. Abolition of tiles of Pashas and Beys, (21) 
19. Al-Ahram, 19 August 1962. See also Mideast Mirror* 
23 August 1952, pp. 3-5. 
20» John Marlowe, op.cit., p# 391. 
21* Mideast Mirror, 2 August 1952. 
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even arrests and punishments given to the * corrupt' persons 
of the previous administration did not and really eeuid net 
bring a social change. Nettl^r redistribution of the big 
estates, (22) although a progressive step, was not likely to 
make any substantial contribution towards raising the naterial 
standards without modernization of agriculture and expansion 
of the irrigation system, and without providing necessary tools 
and fertilizers. 
Procurement of foreign aid and technical cooperation 
without unacceptable political conditions, was their urgent 
necessity. Consolidation of the revolution, therefore, demanded 
of them an early solution of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute= Though 
it Was apparent from their repeated pronouncements and official 
statements that they would not recede from 'Egypt's well-
publicized' demands vis-a-vis Great Britain, at all events as 
regards evacuation of the Canal Zone', were nevertheless 
prepared to behave in an objective, realistic manner by resorting 
to methods of negotiations. 
22. Xhe Agrarian Reform liaw limited land holdings to 200 
feddans, plus another 100 if the owner had children. The 
surplus was expropriated against compensation and redistri-
buted to small holders (usually the sitting tenants) 
against purchase by instalments. The price for expropria-
tion, and the price of purchase was based on the current 
land tax valuation. A little later, the large estates 
belonging to the members of the Royal Family were expro-
priated without compensation and similarly redistributed. 
By this means about half a million feddans of cultivated 
land was translated into small holdings. 
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Britain's Ambassador Sir Balph Stevenson who had now 
returned to Cairo, made the following statement welcoming the 
change in Egypt's political order and its programme to improve 
the image of their country. He said; 
There is by no means any evidence that the new 
Egyptian Government will modify Egyptian deinands 
but there have been indications from the Army of 
a more realistic approach to its own needs and 
relationship with the West. 
This has given rise to the hope that a more 
practical approach to Egyptian and Middle East 
defence, permitting evacuation of British troops, 
will be possible. (23) 
The new regime's moderation and realism in approaching 
the Anglo-Egyptian problems, however, was not the only factor 
influencing Great Britain's attitude towards them. 
The entry of Turkey into the NATO C24) had givoa the 
British considerable relief as the system of Western military 
alliances had been thus extended right into the Middle East. 
They could expect the new ally to influence and indirectly 
pressurise Egypt and her neighbouring countries to follow her 
example. 
Secondly, Britain had not yet fully recovered from the 
war-time financial exhaustion. Though the 'Recovery of Europe' 
programme and other forms of American aid had greatly helped 
her improve her position, she was finding it hard to maintain 
all of her forces in the Middle East in peace time. Thus 
financial considerations were impelling HM Government to think 
about reducing their forces in this part of the world. 
23. Mideast Mirror. 16 August 1952, p. 7. 
24. Department of State Bulletin, 10 March 1962, pp. 367-68. 
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Thirdly, the character of the proposed defence system 
for the Middle East had been changed. The Middle East defence 
organization was to be "a planning organizationand a 
(26) 
»Middle East Command* as originally conceived. -To quote 
Anthony Eden: 
These considerations, and particularly the first 
two (cited above), have made it necessary to review 
in detail our whole strategy in the Middle East. 
This review is now proceeding, and it may well 
emerge that a base-in^Egyptt although desirable, J.s 
no longer absolutely essential to our interestjs. 
Hitherto the basis of our policy towards Egypt has 
been the advice which we have received that it is 
essential to maintain in peacetime the Egypt base 
if the Middle East is to be successfully defended 
in war. If this policy is to be modified - and I 
must emphasise it has not yet been modified - we may 
find it easier to come to terms with Egypt. (26) 
As a practical expression of their new policy. His 
Majesty's Government announced its decision to transfer the 
joint headquarters in the Middle East to Cyprus. (27) Earlier 
in October, the British Government had agreed to make an advance 
of £6,000,000 to Egypt "as a demonstration of its goodwill 
towards the new regime." (28) 
At the sati» time the British military authorities 
announced that their military posts at the El-Ferdan bridge 
were being withdrawn and were being replaced by Egyptian army 
units. 
25. Anthony Eden, op.cit., p. 244. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Mideast Mirror^ 11 October 1952, pp. 1-2j 
Al-Ahraro.f 10 October 1952. 
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The strategic importance of the bridge to the Egyptian 
forces was evident by the fact that it provided the only 
direct access to the Sinai Peninsula, and handing it back to 
them was certainly an earnest of British confidence in the 
revolutionary Qovemment of Egypt. (29) 
The Egyptian Government reciprocated these gestures of 
goodwill and willingness to reach an understanding with Great 
Britain at the earliest moment. Restrictions on visas and 
resident permits for aliens were relaxed and conditions for 
foreign investment in Egypt were considerably liberalized. (30) 
They also decided to give aid to those of British 
nationals who suffered injury and to the relatives of those who 
lost their lives in the Cairo riots of last January. (31) 
C. EGYPT'S NEW LEADERS SPLIT ISSUES -
HOLD NEGOTIATIONS WITH BRITAIN ON THE 
QUESTION OF THE SUDAN ALONE 
In this atmosphere of grov/ing confidence and mutual 
trust of each other's good intentions, the Governments of Egypt 
and the United Kingdom made a serious bid to settle their 
outstanding disputes. But, unlike the past, they decided to 
split the issues and consider one issue at a time. 
29. Ibid. 
30* Al-Ahram and The Egyptian Gazette^ 5 August 1962. 
31* H.C. Deb.. 6 November 1952, vol. 607, cols. 379-80; 
also Mideast Mirro.ry 8 November 1952, p. 4. 
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The most urgent was the problem of the Sudan. It was 
at the same time most important also. It was on this issue 
that all previous attempts at settlement had floundered. The 
question of the evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone was no less 
important. Nevertheless, the 1936 Treaty on the basis of which 
the British troops were stationed in this area was, by its own 
terms, heading towards expiration in 1956, and the United 
N^ti^s was least likely to endorse its furt her ex ten sign 
against the will of t ^ Egyptians. Moreover any settlement 
regarding evacuation of the Canal Zone, when finally reached, 
was to take several months to be completed. Besides, the 
British had already on several occasions indicated their agree-
ment, in principle, to the demand of evacuation but it could 
not be acted upon primarily because it was linked with the 
question of the Sudan. 
The question of settlement of the Sudan problem had 
become more urgent because the «statutory period* of six months 
during which the condominium Governments were to study the 
draft statute of 2 April, was to expire on 8 November. The 
Sudanese Parliament would have then approved the draft statute 
and would have practically severed the Sudan from Egypt without 
the latter's trying to prevent this situation from taking 
place. 
Britain's position on the question was quite clear as 
she had already favoured the Sudan Government's proposals for 
self-government, (32) subject to certain reserved powers in the 
32. Anthony Eden, op.cit., p. 242. See also. The United States 
in World Affairs 1952 (New York, 1953), p. 239. 
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hands of the Governor-General and complete independence at 
the end of the three year period-
The denunciation of the 1899 Condominium by the Wafd 
Government in October last had created a politico-legal anomaly 
for Egypt. After the decree of abrogation of the 1936 Treaty 
and the Sudan Agreements had been affirmed by the ex-King on 
18 October, Egypt's status of the Condomini had ended. Egypt, 
thereafter, was not entitled to recognize or deal with the 
Sudan administration or its Governor General as their ^  .jure 
rights had vanifeihed. Nevertheless, the Governor General and 
his administration in the Sudan remained intact because Great 
Britain had refused to recognize the validity of Egypt's 
unilateral abrogation. 
Under the circumstances, it appeared that Egypt was 
effectively excluded from any decisive share in shaping the 
future destiny of the Sudan, and this would have obviously 
meant complete suppression of Egypt's aspiration in regard to 
the Sudan. (33) For the revolutionary Junta headed by Mohamed 
34. Egypt desired fbr a permanent union with the Sudan not 
merely because of historical connections, religious, 
linguistic and ethnic affinities, and mutual economic 
interests. Nor her desire was based upon the fact that 
unity of Egypt and the Sudan was an established political 
reality before the British appeared in the Upper Nile 
Valley. In fact, the most important consideration has 
always been that Egy5iiLJMajst_pQ.ssess J^e strongest guarantee 
water supply is not interfered wittiV 
The British were not trusted to give such guarantees. 
British authorities had themselves given the best expression 
to Egyptian anxiety in this matter. A distinguished British 
Officer was quoted in the House of Commons on 28 March 1895, 
as saying: "If I were the Mehdi, I would make Egypt pay 
Ccontd. on next page) 
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Neguib, son of a half-Sudanese mother and himself bom and 
brought-up at Khartoum, Egypt's present position vis-a-vls the 
British in relation to the Sudan was most unenviable and also 
challenging. 
Neguib had realized that only by participation could 
Egypt acquire any influence in the land of his birth. *The 
Sudan was dear to htm; and he had the wisdom to treat it as a 
separate issue"• (3€) The elimination of the King and the 
A 
suppression of the ¥afd gave him the freedom and the courage 
to renounce claim to the Kingdom of the Sudan. He understood 
the people and the problems of the Sudan better than any of his 
predecessors, and he was fully convinced that 
the ultimate future of Egypt's relations with 
the Sudan depends more upon the attitude of the 
Sudanese than the British. (35) 
For this reason he was less interested in the theoretical 
assertion of unity than the creation of conditions which would 
make effective cooperation possible. (36) 
33. (contd. from back page) 
for every quarter of water which rims from the Nile." 
A great British engineer, Sir Collin Scott carried the 
point further; "As for diverting the Nile in the Sudan and 
depriving Egypt of its water what the Mehdi could not do, 
a civilized people could do. ^t J^ very evident that the 
ciyilizedjossessor of the Upp'eFllile'Valley holds Egypt 
in his grasp ... and if poor little Egypt had the bad luck 
to be at war with the people in the upper waters, they 
might flood Egypt or cut off the water supply at their 
pleasure." Quoted from Leonard Wolf, Empire and Commerce 
in Africa (london, 1919), p. 156. 
34. P.M. Holt, A Modem History of the Sudan (London, 1961), 
p. 159. 
35. Mideast Mirror. 25 October 1952, pp. 2-4. 
36. Ibid. 
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Prooeeding with this policy, the revolutionary government 
of Egypt began conversations with Sudanese political leaders of 
the 'Independence Group* and accepted the proposition of 
I 
immediate self-government for the Sudan to be followed in due 
course by self-determination* (37) Thus what had appeared half-
hearted tactical moves in the twilight of the monarchy became a 
vigorous policy under the Junta. Its adoption of the principle 
of self-determination ft>r the Sudanese actually placed the 
initiative in their hands. 
EGYPT'S BID TO FIRST BEFBIEMD 
yHE SUDAMESE 
Neguib's obvious strategy was to first (Concentrate on 
getting the British out of the Sudan by leaving the question of 
future status in relation to Egypt open for the time being. 
He now talked about 'independence and freedom of the Nile Valley' 
and not, as his predecessors had done, of unity. 
In his bid to befriend the people of the Sudan and to do 
away with any misgivings about Egypt's intention, he appointed a 
Sudanese as Governor of the Aswan Province of Upper Egypt, and 
another to the prestige position of deputy-rector of the Al-Azhar 
University. He also invited Sir Syed Abdul Rehman al-Lfehdl, 
son of the Mahdl and leader of the Umma party to Cairo for talks 
37. Neither of these steps was, however, completely new in 
November 1951, before the coup d'etat, the Egyptian delega-
tion to the UN had declared itself not to be opposed to 
the principle of Sudanese self-determination, while represen-
tatives of the Umma Party had been invited by the Egyptian 
Prime Minister, Negulb. el Hilali, to Cairo in June 1962. 
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of mutual interest. (38) 
Consultations with the Bfehdi's delegation proved most 
helpful in the realization of the 'grand strategy'. He 
virtually staged a 'diplomatic coup' when he signed an agreement 
with the Patron of the 'Umma' on 29 October the most striking 
feature of which was the Egyptian recognition of the Sudan's 
right to choose independence of any connection with Egypt. 
Such a decision was however to be preceded by immediate home-
rule to enable the Sudanese to acquire experience of statecraft 
and to pave the way 'to free and untrammelled self-
determination' . (39) 
In order to realize these objectives, the Egyptian 
Government pjtoposed to amend the Sudan Draft Constitution by 
creating a 'Higher Constitutional Authority' consisting of the 
present Governor-General of the Sudan, one Egyptian, one Briton, 
two Sudanese and one Indian or Pakistani. The Governor General 
of the Sudan was required to seek the advice of this body in 
the exercise of his functions in accordance with the proposed 
amendments. Furthermore^ the decisions of the committee were 
to be carried out^ notwithstanding the conflicting view of the 
Governor General on the same issue. 
The effect of this historic agreement was to give Egypt 
greater influence in Sudanese affairs than what she has had 
38. Mideast Mirror. 18 and 26 October 1952. 
39. Pull text of the Agreement in Mideast Mirror. 1 November 
1962, pp. 2-4. See also The Times, 30 October 1952. 
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since 1924, when, after the assassination of the Sirdar of 
the Sudan, Sir lee Stack, the Egyptian administrator and troops 
were sent out of the Sudan. Precisely the implementation of 
the agreement was to mean: 
!• Egypt regained full rights as a condominium 
power which she had herself lost by the abrogation 
of the 1936 Treaty on 8 October 1961. 
2. She would have equal position with Britain on a 
commission with mandatory powers over the 
Governor-General. 
3. She almost certainly put a time limit to Britain's 
legal status in the Sudan as the elections were 
to be held by 31 December. 
Some Egyptians indeed might have criticised {which they 
could not do openly because of the press censorship having 
been reimposed recently) that General Neguib had dropped the 
prior claim to complete unity with the Sudan; but this claim 
was theoretical and, despite the insistence of former Egypti^ 
Governmentsjbtoi^^ it had never existed as a 
political fact. In fact, insistence on it as a prior condition 
of Sudan settlement had tended to increase the political 
separation of the Sudan from Egypt. Neguib's agreement with 
the Umma leaders enabled Egypt to reestablish her legal rights 
in exchange for a theoretical unity. 
The pro-Egypt Unionist leaders also accepted the said 
agreement because it was not merely a practical step taken 
towards the end of the British domination in their country, it 
was a sound evidence of 'brotherly feelings' for the Sudanese. 
It was also hoped that during the transition period of three 
years they would be more free to campaign for unity with Egypt. 
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There is, however, a view that the Unionists as represented 
by the Ashigga Party were, in any case, never so strongly pro-
Egyptians as at one time seemed to be the case* 'Most of their 
members were more concerned with preventing the leader of the 
Umma, Syed Sir Abdul Rehman el Mehdi Pasha, a posthuBwus son 
of Mahdi, from making a bid for the Crown of an independent 
Sudan*. They were not thinking in terms of permanently and 
completely identifying or merging themselves with the Egyptians. 
In the course of time they were to chalk-out an independent 
national existence for themselves. (40) The immediate effect 
of the * agreement' nevertheless was satisfactory and was 
generally welcomed in the Sudan; 
Groups which mistrusted self-government and self-
determination when these were advocated by Britain, 
were more favourably disposed when Egypt espoused 
these aims, and the British administration in the 
Sudan found its own weapons turned against it. (41) 
E. EGYPT'S MDTE TO BHETAIN 
SETTLEBffiMT OF THE SUDAN - EXCLUSIVE ISSUE 
On the basis of the agreement reached between the 
Sudanese political leaders and the Egyptian Government, the 
latter handed on 2 November, a 'Note' to the British Ambassador 
in Cairo, (42) Sir Ralph Stevenson. Some of the significant 
points of the 'note' were as follows: 
40. R.C. Monat, Middle East in Perspective (Xondon, 1958), 
p. 242. See also P.M. Holt, op.cit., p« 160. 
41. P.M. Holt, op.cit., pp. 169-60. 
42. Text of the Egyptian Note in Egypt No.2 (1953), Cmd. 8767. 
See also Mideast Mirror Supplement^ 8 November 1952, 
pp. 1-3. 
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Cl) The Egyptian Government firmly believes in the 
' right of the Sudanese to self-determination and 
the effective exercise thereof at the proper time 
and with the necessary safeguards. 
(2) To attain the abovementioned object there should 
begin forthwith a transitional period envisaging 
two objectives, 
a) to secure full self-government for the 
Sudanese, 
b) to provide the requisite free and neutral 
atmosphere for the Sudanese to exercise self-
determination. 
(3) The transitional period being a preparation for the 
effective termination of the dual administration 
shall be considered as a liquidation of that 
administration. 
(4) The Egyptian Government declares that the sovereignty 
of the Sudan shall be kept reserved for the Sudanese, 
during this transitional period, until self-
determination is achieved. 
These points were substantially in accord with the agree-
ments signed with the Sudanese political parties, and were based 
on the provisions of the Self-Government Ordinance. Following 
new points were also embodied in the text of the 'Note*; 
(1) The Governor-General should, during the three 
years transition period, be advised by a Five-man 
Commission consisting of one Egyptian, one British, 
two Sudanese, one Indian or Pajcistani. 
(2) Sudanization of all Government services should be 
completed by the end of the three year period. 
(3) The Governor-General's powers of veto should only 
be effective if supported by both co-domini, instead 
of only one of the co-domini, as provided in the 
Ordinance. 
(4) The Governor-General's special powers over the 
Southern Sudan as provided in the Ordinance, should 
be abolished during the transition period. 
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(5) In the absence of the CSovernor-General, the 
elder of the two Sudanese on the Couimission, 
should act in his place. (43) 
(6) At the end of the transition period, the Sudan 
Government should draw up a draft law for the 
election of the Constituent Assembly to be 
approved by the Parliament® 
(7) British and Egyptian Military Forces should 
withdraw from the Sudan at least one year before 
the elections of the Constituent Assembly assuring 
freedom and impartiality of the election). 
(8) The decision on the future of the Sudan should 
be made: 
a) either by the Constituent Assembly choosing 
to link up the Sudan with Egypt in any form; 
b) or by the Assembly choosing a Sudan completely 
independent of the UK, Egypt or any other 
country. 
F- BlgTAirS RESPOHSE - NEGOTIATIONS ON 
THE SUDAN BEGIN 
The contents of the Egyptian »Note' were such that 
HM Government was morally obliged to accept them as a basis for 
formal negotiation with the Government of Egypt on the question 
of the settlement of the Sudan question. Sudan's right of self-
determination was the cornerstone of British policy, for Britain 
had always argued that it was not within the powers of Britain 
to recognise, over the head of the Sudanese, Egyptian sovereignty 
over the Sudan. (44) Now Egypt had formally announced to 
43. In the Agreement of October 29, 1952, the successor of 
the Governor-General, was to be nomin^ -ted by Britain and 
appointed by Egypt, should that post become vacant during 
the transition period. 
44. For statements of the British leaders since the Anglo-
Egyptian negotiations began on the subject of revision of 
the 1936 Treaty in 1946, see, H.G. Debates, 5th Series, 
vol. 421, col. 218j vol. 432, cols. 619-20; vol. 493, 
cols. 1176-78, and vol. 495, col. 824. 
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espouse the same cause ajid was asking Britain to take practical 
measures tovrards the realization of-this objective without 
delay. Britain could not possibly have backed out of its pledges 
to the Sudanese and commitments to its own people* (45) More-
over, the revolutionary government of Egypt had shown remarkable 
courage and statesmanship in drafting their »Note*. They had 
excluded the mention of any other issue in the *note*, which 
was a clear indication they were prepared to negotiate a settle-
ment of the Sudan question ' separately from, and preliminary 
to, negotiations, on evacuation from the Canal Zone'. 
The Egyptian 'Note' obviously marked a great advance 
and there was every reason to think that a solution of the 
Sudan aspect of the Anglo-Egyptian question would pave the way 
for talks on the Canal Zone issue and regional defence. 
Anthony Eden, then Foreign Secretary, told the House of 
Commons that on the basis of the Egyptian note of 2 November, 
"showing a readiness to accept the principles of self-government 
and self-determination in the Sudan ... 
... it ought to be possible for this country, the 
Sudan and Egypt to reach an agreement which will be 
of enduring value, and, if we can do that, we can 
at least hope for the wider agreement which is in 
the minds of many Hon. Members in this House. (46) 
The British Foreign Secretary also noted the improvement 
which had taken place in Anglo-Egyptian relations under the new 
Government and paid tribute to the "courageous efforts of 
45. Tom Litt,e op.cit., p. 153. 
H.C. Deb.. 6 November 1962, vol. 507, col. 380. 
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General Neguib and his friends (the Free Officers) to cut 
through the tangle of mladministration at home and interna-
tional disputes, which was the legacy of previous Egyptian 
Governments." (47) 
In this congenial atmosphere of reciprocity simultaneously 
prevailing in London, Cairo and Khartoum, the British Ambassador, 
Sir Stevenson held several rounds of negotiations with the 
highest persons in command in Egypt - General Neguib and his 
Advisors. (48) 
The most arduous debate was about the proposed Governor-
General's Commission. Although there was full agreement on the 
formation of this Commission, the real point of difference of 
opinion was the extent to which it would be given mandatory 
powers. The British side considered it impracticable and 
inadvisable to transfer the Governor-General's'special responsi-
\ 
bility* for the 'non-Moslem' and 'primitive' south. They also 
considered it unworkable that the Governor-General should not 
be left with his special powers to handle an emergency arising 
from a collapse of public order or government. 
On the other hand, the Egyptian Government and the 
National Unity Party of the Sudan (49) considered the mandatory 
47. Ibid. 
48. First round of their formal talks began on 20 November. 
The two delegations met again on 24, 26 November and 
9, 22 December 1952. 
49. The Sudan's various pro-Unity Pairties, namely, Ashiqqa. the 
Sudan Congress, the Graduates' Conference, the Nationalist 
Front, the Unity of the Nile Valley Party, the Liberal 
Constitutional Party, met in Cairo with General JiJeguib and 
consequently agreed to amalgamate themselves into a single 
•National Unionist Party' with Ismail El Azhari as its 
President. 
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powers of the Governor General's Commission as security which 
they required against British administrative influence during 
the transitional period and were quite reluctant to see any 
modification of these powers. 
Another important point on which their views differed 
was related to the conditions under which the elections could 
be held» Sir Stevenson declared that HM Government 'would 
like the elections to be held forthwith (probably to deny Egypt 
and the UKP the time to educate and influence the Sudanese to 
vote in their favour) and leave other points at issue to be 
decided by the new Sudanese Parliament. <50) 
Speaking in the House of Commons on SnDecember, Anthony 
Eden answering a question as to when elections in the Sudan 
were likely to be held, said: 
Personally, I should have liked the elections to 
have taken place before some of the other complicated 
matters were settled, but we have not been able to 
agree on that, and that may have the effect of delay-
ing the elections. (61) 
The Egyptian Government refused this propisal and 
considered it important to reach an agreement on all matters 
in the said Note as a whole and as quickly as possible in order 
to decide the whole problem. General Neguib said: "We insist 
on every letter in the Sudan agreement being accepted^ we can 
accept nothing else." (52) 
50. Cmd. 8767, p. 9. 
51* H.C. Deb.. 8 December 1952, vol. 509, cols. 15-16. 
52. Mideast Mirror. 22 November 1952, p. 1. See also 
Add El Fattah I.S. Baddour, Sudanese-Egyptian Relations 
(Hague, 1960), pp. 160-1. 
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General Neguib was reported to have told the correspon-
dent of az-Zaman; 
I should like the whole world to know that the 
Egyptian Government will not abandon and will not 
change any provisions in the Egyptian-Sudanese 
Convention to which Egyptian and Sudanese political 
parties have rallied unanimously and which political 
and religious chiefs of the Sudan have blessed. I 
have explained to the British and American Ambassa-
dors that the convention concluded between the 
Government of Egypt and the Sudanese parties is the 
minimum which they can accept as a solution of the 
Sudanese problem, and that the duty of the UK is to 
accept that convention as it stands, without rejecting 
or without modifying any of its clauses. (53) 
Egypt's position was further strengthened by successfully 
concluding an agreement on 10 January 1953 with the four 
principal Sudanese parties, (54) which, having heard from the 
Egyptian Minister for the Sudanese Affairs, Major Salim an 
account of the principal points of difference between the 
British and Egyptian Governments, (55) adopted a number of 
*final» and «irrevocable* resolutions and declared that they 
would all boycott the forthcoming elections. 
The Sudanese Parties signatories to this document 
have agreed that the aforesaid points shall consti-
tute the basis for the Sudanese self-government 
statute. Failing this, these parties have unani-
mously agreed to boycott the elections held under 
any other statute. 
53. Quoted by The Times. 22 December 1952. 
54. The Umma Party, the Socialist Republican Party, The 
National Unionist party and the National Party. 
55. Mideast Mirror^ 27 December 1952, p. 1. 
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The Parties have also agreed to meet to arrange 
and carry out measures for boycotting elections 
in such eventuality. (56) 
The Khartoum Parties' agreement obviously weakened 
Great Britain's negotiating position. A further setback was 
caused by the publication in Egypt of a "top secret" letter 
from Sir James Robertson, the Civil Secretary of the Sudan 
Government, addressed to the Sudanese leaders and Sudan 
Government officials. 
The letter was essentially a defence of the British and 
the Sudan Government's position and particularly emphasised 
that Britain had not delayed agreement on the Sudan. It also 
emphasised the differences in the various texts of the agree-
ments Egypt had earlier signed with the political parties in 
the Sudan and her Note of 2 November to Britain. The British 
argument was that many of the points of difference were matters 
which should have been left to the Sudan Parliament to decide 
and the future of the Sudan as a whole was better assured by 
safeguards for the South which would allay fears or dissatisfac-
tion there. (57) 
66. The Khartoum Agreement clearly emphasised that the Self-
Govemment Ordinance should be amended in accordance with 
the terms of the October 29 Agreement signed between the 
Egyptian Government and the various Sudanese Parties. 
Text of the Khartoum Resolutions of 10 January 1953, in 
Cmd. 8767, pp. 51-53; The Timesy 13 January 1953; Al-Ahram. 
11, 12 January 1953; Mideast Mirror Supplement, 17 January 
1953. 
57. Text of Sir James Robertson's 'top secret' letter in The 
Mideast Mirror Supplement% 17 January 1953, pp. 1-5. 
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Thus, when the negotiations were resumed on 12 January, 
the Egyptians were more confident and insistent on the full 
acceptance by the other side of its 9th November *Ifote' as the 
basis for settlement of the Sudan problem* They firmly rejected 
Britain's 'draft agreement' because it contained special 
provisions concerning the southern provinces of the Sudan. (68) 
Thereafter several meetings were held (59) between the Government 
of Egypt and the British Ambassador, but assisted by high-
powered advisors (60) imtil they were finally able to reach an 
agreement on the 12th February 1963* 
THE SUDAN AGREEMENT 
The historic agreement recogniaed the right of the 
Sudanese to self-determination, and, to enable them to exercise 
that right in a free and neutral atmosphere, it provided for 
early free and secret xselatiefte- to a Sudanese Parliament and 
for a transitional period of self-government to continue for a 
maximum of years during which the sovereignty of the country 
should be kept in reserve until the self-determination had 
been achieved. 
58. 8767, pp. 53-55. The Times, 15 January 1953. 
59. 12, 17, 28 January 1953 and 8 and 12 February 1953. 
60. The Egyptian Government was represented by Maj. Gen. 
Mohammed Neguib, then Prime Minister, Dr. M. Fauzi, Foreign 
Minister, Wing Comd. Hussein Zulfiqar Sabry, Major Salah 
Salim, Dr. Hamed Sultan and 2eyn El Husny. The British 
Gfovemraent was represented by the British Ambassador, Sir 
Ralph Stevenson, Mr. M.G. Crosswell and Mr. R.B. Barroughs. 
Mideast Mirror, 31 January 1953, p. 2. 
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Some of the most important points in the Agreement were: 
1. Elections for a Sudanese Parliament to be held, 
as soon as possible and supervised by ^  inter-
national commission* 
2. Powers of the (British) Governor-General to remain 
as provided for in the Self-government Ordinance, 
but the Governor-General to be supervised and 
controlled by a five-member international Commission 
formally appointed by the Egyptian Government. 
3. Formation of a Sudanization Committee with the 
object of 'Sudanizing' the administrative services 
during the three-year period. 
4. Provision for the election of a Constituent Assembly 
within three years to make arrangements for self-
determination. 
5. Withdrawal of British and Egyptian troops from 
the Sudan before the election of the Constituent 
Assembly. (61) 
The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan, put an ^ d 
to one of the long-standing disputes between the two countries. 
The problem of the Sudan had for several decades been the 
'stumbling block' responsible for the impediments of all previous 
efforts concerning Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. With the 
amicable settlement of this problem it was rightly expected 
that a new era of Anglo-Egyptian understanding would soon be 
heralded in. It was hailed as a prelude to immediate and 
'propitious tackling' of Anglo-Egyptian differences over the 
Canal Zone. 
In a statement before the House of Commons, Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden said; 
61. Pull Text of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan 
in Appendix No. 
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I am glad to be able to report that Her Majesty's 
Ambassador at Cairo has now signed an agreement 
between Her Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom and the Egyptian Government concerning the 
introduction of self-government for the Sudanese, 
to be followed by self-determination ••• the 
recognition of the right of the Sudanese to order 
their own future developments, constitute a 
reasonable settlement of this question which has 
for long bedevilled our relations with Egypt and 
contributed so much uncertainty to the future of 
Sudan itself* I hope indeed that the outcome of 
these negotiations may prove to be a happy augury 
for the future well-being of the Sudanese. I hope 
too that it may have its beneficial influence on 
Anglo-Egyptian relations. (68) 
Similarly, General Mohamed Neguib expressed the hope that 
the Sudan agreement would help expedite the settlement of the 
remaining differences between Britain and Egypt. In a broadcast 
to the nation the same night, he said: 
With the help of God an agreement has today been 
reached between the Egyptian and British Governments 
for liquidating the administration of the Sudan 
Condominium and for setting up self-government in 
preparation for the exercise by the Sudanese of the 
right of self-determination in an atmosphere of 
complete freedom. ••• This agreement opens a new 
era in the relations between the Egyptiana and their 
Sudanese brothers. ... It also opens a new era in 
the relations between Egypt and Great Britain, an 
era destined to re-create trust between them and to 
have a good effect on the outstanding questions 
between the two countries. (63) 
This agreement, however, could not have been possible if 
the 'revolutionary regime' of Egypt had not been bold enough to 
break with the approach and methods of the previous Egyptian 
H.C.- Deb., 12 February 1953, vol. 511, cols. 602-6. 
63. Al-Ahram, 13 February 1963. See also Documents on 
International Affairs 1953 (HIIA, 1956), pp. 327-28. 
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Governments who invariably combined the two issues and 
insisted on the Unity of the Mile Valley under the Egyptian 
Crown. (64) Indeed the Free Officers* Government made a ma^or 
compromise by accepting self-government for the Sudanese and 
their right to decide their future national status. 
This bold attitude greatly facilitated the British to 
concede the Egyptian view point on other related matters. 
According to Charles Cremeans, Egypt* s willingness to con^ jromise 
"pursuaded British officials and the American diplomats that 
they were f^ced with a new kind of regime with which the West 
might be able to do business." (6fi) 
Another factor which greatly helped both sides in reaching 
the final agreement on the future of the Sudan, was the "friendly 
pressure" of the United States on both Governments. (66) General 
Neguib acknowledged and thanked the American iUnbassador Jefforson 
Caffery for his 'helpful and encouraging attitude' during their 
recent negotiations with Great Britain. (67) 
64. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain* s Moment in the Middle East 
(London, 1963), p. 176. 
65. Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and the Mo rid (New York, 
1963), p. 139. 
66. J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Hear and Middle East, vol,II 
(Princeton, 1966), p. 335* See also The Unit^ States ir^  
World Affairs 1953 (New York, 1955), p. 294. 
67. Mideast Mirror^ 14 February 1953, p. 4; 
Al-Ahram. 13 February 1963. 
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The American Ambassador at Cairo welcomed the conclusion 
of the Sudan agreement and said: 
The signing of an agreement on the Sudan by Egypt 
and the United Kingdom, two nations whose friendship 
is cherished by the United States, is a happv 
occasion and a good omen for the future. (68, 
Two days later, the new Secretary of State, John Poster 
Dulles, sent a congratulatory note to the British Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden, which clearly brings out that Dulles 
was hoping that the settlement of the Sudan would remove one 
big obstacle to better relations with the West and would induce 
Egypt to ^oin in a military association with the West. 
Achievement of the Sudan accord by the British 
and Egyptian Government is indeed gratifying to 
the United States. ... This amiable accord may 
well be the first step towards the establishment 
of more fruitful associations in an area of 
critical importance to the security of the free 
world. (69) 
The British and the iUnerican views on the question of 
Middle East defence and requirements were identical. This was 
proved beyond doubt by Dulles* concern about the threat of 
Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. In the first address 
to the American nation he stated: 
In the Middle East we find that the Communists are 
trying to inspire the Arabs with a fanatical hatred 
of the British and ourselves. That area contains 
the greatest known oil reserves that there are in 
the world, and the Soviet interest is shown by the 
fact that Stalin, when he was negotiating with 
68. Al-Ahram. 13 February 1953; 
Mideast Mirror^ 14 February 1953, p. 5. 
69. Department of State Bulletin^ 23 February 1953, pp. 306-6• 
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Hitler in 1940, said that the area must be looked 
upon as the center of Soviet aspirations. If all 
of that passed into the hands of our potential 
enemies, that would make a tremendous shift in the 
balance of economic power. And furthermore this 
area also has control of the Suez Canal and that is 
the portion of the world ••• which has long been 
guarded and called the life-line, which made it 
possible for Europe to be in conanunication with 
Asia. There are difficulties at the present time 
between the question of the defence and control 
of the Suez Canal. (70) 
70. Ibid., 9 February 1953, pp. 213-14. 
One is hard put to discover what Communist 
<inspiration' he had in mind, since he never did explain. 
It is possible he referred to Communist agitation nainly 
for home-consumption. Nevertheless, the frequent reference 
by American political to Arab nationalist demands as 
Communist agitation was not only puzzling, but extremely 
resented to by the Arabs. 

Chapter VII 
THE REVOLUTION AND THE PROSPECT OP PEACEFUL 
SETTLEMENT OF THE SUEZ ZONE 
ISSUES ¥ITH BRITAIN 
A- EGYPT ANXIOUS TO OPEN TALKS ON THE SUEZ 
CANAL, .QUEgTION IBMEpiATELY. BRITAIM NOT 
SO ANXXOyg 
The conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on 
Sudan was expected by Britain and the United States to partially 
solve the difficulties referred to by Dulles in his above noted 
address. Nevertheless, relations between Egypt and Great Britain 
remained tense after that. The Egyptians, now more than ever, 
were becoming impatient with what seemed to them British delaying 
tactics in regard to the question of British evacuation of the 
Suez Canal Zone, (l) In fact the same day the Sudan accord 
was reached» General Neguib stated in a Press Conference that 
he hoped the accord would 'pave the way for immediate talks on 
the British withdrawal from the Canal Zone'• (2) Three days 
later, Dr. Mohammad Fawzi, Egypt's Foreign Minister, reported 
that his Government had officially informed the British Ambassador 
at Cairo, that Egypt was ready for talks on British evacua-
tion. (3) As there was no immediate and satisfactory response 
1* Elizabeth Monroe, op.cit., p. 175. See also 
The Timesy 5 March 1953. 
2. Mideast Mirror^ 14 February 1953, p. 4; 
New York Times^ 13 February 1953• 
3* Al-Ahram^ 15 February 1953; The Daily Telegraphy 
16 February 1953. 
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from the British Government, the Free Offioers resorted to 
threats of guerrilla action against the Briti^ forces in 
Egypt. (4) 
The Egyptian Government made it quite plain from the 
very start of their informal consultations with the British 
Ambassador, and also made public statements, that they would 
require 'unconditional British agreement to withdrawal al1 
troops from the Canal Zone within a stated period, expressed 
4. The New York Times of 27 February was in fact referring to 
a statement made by Col« Masser to a Correspondent of the 
New York Herald Tribune in the mid-November 1952. The 
Statement as reproduced by Al»Akhbar on 29 December 1962 
was as followsI 
"We are quite prepared to be reasonable. The British 
have promised us during the past 70 years to evacuate the 
Canal Zone but are still there. Egypt will no longer 
tolerate procrastination and dilatory methods." 
"If the Government of the new regime has reason to 
believe, after its sincere efforts, that Egypt's liberation 
from the British occupation is not in sight, I assure you 
that the military leaders will fl?elinquish their official 
position to lead the people in a struggle against the 
British. T h ^ war_but 
it wilj. rather ha3ge_jfche-Sharacter or_strong resTstance 
movement in which guerrilla methods wiIl~"Se adopt 
grenades~w3rrJL-Dje_ tnr"own~in^i5e""dark^jBritIi^^ be 
agsassinaj;ed i n ^ e streets ai^thesfr^g will bej^der-
taken by ^ high 
Price foF^the^oecgpaJXon^^^^ fMideasfTUrror, 
3 January 19637T^5)7' 
On 3 January, Ridwan, the Minister of State, repeated 
the threat uttered by Col. Nasser, cited above, and on the 
next day Major Abdul Hakim Ameer asserted the Government's 
primary aim of driving the British out of Egypt and the 
Sudan. General Neguib also told a large group of students 
that the revolution had been staged in order to expel 
imperialists. Major Salim threatened the British of drastic 
action, including sabotage and boycotting even if Great 
Britain were involved in a great war'. CThe Times. 6 February 
1963; for references see Survey 1953f pp. 162-S3). 
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in months rather than in years," (5) as a prelude to discuss-
ions about a possible new agreement for mutual defence. (6) 
Unless unconditional withdrawal of the British troops was an 
accomplished fact, they were not willing to discuss anything 
with Great Britain or any other nation® Great Britain, on the 
other hand, was pressing to make an agreement on the troops and 
installations in the Canal Zone a part of wider agreement on 
the defence of the Middle East, in other words, "to make 
British withdrawal conditional upon a new treaty of 
alliance." (7) 
In its •note* of 27 February 1963 the British Government, 
stating its terms for negotiations on the future of the Canal 
Zone, insisted on Egyptian agreement to the return of British 
forces in case of war, and that British or NATO technicians 
should remain behind to oversea military installations there. 
The Boyal Air Force was to be allowed also to share with the 
Egyptian Air Force eight bases in the Canal Zone. It was also 
suggested that if Egypt accepted these terms, substantial 
American and British economic aid would follow. (8) 
f 
The difference between the parties was really one 
of confidence. Neither trusted the other sufficiently 
to desert the entrenched positions in which they had 
dug themselves. Egypt maintained the right of a 
6. iyl-Ahram. 10 and 11 March 1963; 
Mideast Mirror^ 14 March 1963, p. 2. 
6* John Marlowe, op.cit., p. 398; The Timesy 19 mrch 1963. 
7« Survey 1963. p. 164. 
8* New York Times. 27 February 1953. 
-252-! 
sovereign state to choose whether or not to have 
foreign troops on its territory; Great Britain took 
its stand on possession, on the 1936 Treaty, and 
on the necessities of the cold war. (9) 
With these rival aspirations being incompatible, there 
was little likelihood of a rapproachment between the two 
Governments, at least in the foreseeable future. Another 
source of friction between the Egyptians and Great Britain were 
the elections in the Sudan. Both sides charged each other 
with bad faith. The Egyptians accused the British of coercing, 
briby^ ing and intimidating Sudanese officials, who were favour-
able to unity with Egypt. (10) The British denied these 
charges, and counter-charged the Government of the BCC with 
interference in the Sudan elections. (11) 
r 
Britain hoped that the Sudan would eventually Join the 
British Commonwealth. In his statonent issued in Khartoum on 
25 March 1953, Selwyn Lloyd, British Minister of State, had 
stated that membership of the British Commonv/ealth «was not 
inconsistent with independence'; *that an independent Sudan 
might suggest any relationship it cared for'. (12) 
These reported statements spontaneously created a stir 
in Egyptian official circles and hardened their attitude on 
the Canal Zone issue. General Neguib who was then touring the 
upper Egypt, strongly reacted by telling pressmen; 
9* John Marlowe, op.cit., p* 398. 
10. Mideast Mirror^ 14 March 1953, p. 1. 
H.C. Deb.. 6th Series, vol. 620, cols. 102-4. 
12. Mideast Mirror. 28 March 1963, p. 1# 
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We want uncondltionaland total evacuation* 
Tfiere~wn:i either~M^vacuation oirannlliimtion* 
WTwiTl~live free or die honesT; Th6 wbrld 
knows our view point. (13) 
Another Egyptian leader, ^ ing Commander Abdel latif 
Boghdadij a member of the BCC and a close confident of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, made the following forthright statement on the 
Canal Zone issue on 31 March: 
We ask all Egyptians, everywhere, to be prepared 
to strike when the time comes bgc§aisa--yau-§Jie 
able to ,st,rike the tyrant and oppressor• You 
dealTa splendid blow in the past, you will strike 
again if necessary, without hesitation* ••• 
Nothing will dissuade us until we see the last of 
the forces of evacuation* 
Egypt would not resort to negotiations whatever 
the cilFcuisAan^. E'^imtion must'~come~firsi~~ahd 
it should be unconditional. We shall accept no 
co^ iarEIons^  Once evacuation has been realized we 
shall negotiate with whom we like for the interest 
of our country alone* 
The day of struggle is coming, there is no 
doubt about that* Be prepared for it* Prepare 
yourself and your children how to fight before you 
teach them how to read and write. Freedom has a 
price and we shall pay that price however dear it 
might be. (14) 
In a similar tone, Gamal Abdel Nasser declared that the 
continuation of occupation was incompatible with the revolution^ 
"Since we took over responsibility, we have been struggling to 
destroy the foundations of imperialism: 
In the south, the struggle has ended with the 
recognition of the Sudan's right to self-determi-
nation* Here in the north we will not boast as 
others dld~^f 'negotiations** We will only say 
13* Ibid*, p. 5. . 
14* The Egyptian Gazette^ 1 April 1963; also )\}idaast Mirrort 
4 April 1963, pp* 6-7. 
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'Getout of ourcoimtry« Only the sons of the 
"We shall not bargain over our rights"; 
"We will accept nothing but full freedom". (16) 
In an interview with an American Correspondent, General 
Neguib explained about British attempts to get the Sudan to 
3oin the British Commonwealtha and accused Great Britain of 
a long series of broken promises over the Canal Zone; and a 
few days later he condemned the British attitude as illogical 
in the face of Egypt* s known determination to insist on 
unconditional evacuation* (16) 
Despite these 'bellicose* declarations by some Egyptians 
in positions of responsibility, the official attitude towards 
the Canal 2one problem was that Egypt intended to reach a settle-
ment by negotiations. Their insistence on "unconditional 
evacuation" as the basis of discussions with Britain was merely 
intended to express tl^ir total opposition to commit Egypt to 
Middle^East defence as part of an agreement on evacuation. 
In Britain, however, the tone and substance of the state-
ments increasingly built up the opinion that it would be useless 
and perhaps dangerous to enter into negotiations with the 
Egyptians in their present mood. (17) 
15. Ibid. 
16. The Timest 9 April 1953, quoted in Survey 1953^ p. 165. 
17* H.C. Deb.. 5th Series, vol. 512, cols. 2064-65; H.L> Deb.^ 
6th Series, vol. 181, p. 351. Members of both Houses of 
the British Parliament expressed their disquiet by pressing 
the Government not to conclude any agreement without 
parliamentary sanction. Such headlines as "Hopes of success 
(contd. on next page) 
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On his way back from the Sudan, Selwyn Lloyd called 
on General Neguib in Cairo and referred to the damaging effect 
of these recent speeches* (18) It is, however, surprising 
that the British leaders and diplomats should have failed to 
realise that much of the contents of these *bellicose* state-
ments of the Egyptian leaders were meant for local consumption. 
At the diplomatic level there had been indications that Egypt 
desired to secure the maintenance of the Canal Zone base and 
was willing to discuss the retention of technicians to ensure 
V 
it. (18) Obviously the hardening and confusion of opinion 
in Britain could be attributed to their inability or unwilling-
ness to reconcile those diplomatic hints with the public 
utterances of the Egyptians that there could be no negotiations 
before evacuation. 
Churchill's Gov^emment_being weak in the House of — • • -
Commons as a result of conflicting opinions on the Canal issue 
within its own ranks, was not eager to initiate negotiations. 
"The Churchill Government", wrote Elizabeth Monroe, "also 
dallied because it needed time in which to bring round its own 
right-wing supporters to the need fbr a new policy. The Suez 
Canal had long held a special place in British esteem; Anthony 
Eden had once called it "the Swing door of the British Empire", 
17* (contd. from back page) 
in Cairo Fade" and "Deadlock Over Suez" appeared in the 
British newspapers. The Daily Telegraph wrote: "There was 
not the slightest chance to have defence talks.leading to 
anything." yhe Daily Telegraphy 
18. Gamal Abdel Nasser's Statement of Policy, The Egyptian 
Gazette, Al-^ raffl^  11, 12 April
-256-! 
and to the Conservatives who were soon christened the Suez 
Group - it was as sacred as British soil. Members of the 
group called for much party cosseting, for a body of Conserva-
tive opinion, of unknown size, was against following the 
precedent set by Labour Government in India, Burma and Palestine 
and at Abadan, and scuttling "from the Canal Zone". (19) 
Thus with the rising tide of criticism and adverse 
comments in Britain upon the statements of the Egyptian leaders, 
it became apparent that talks on the Suez Canal issue would 
be delayed from the British side. This was confirmed by the 
announcement that Field Hfershal Sir William Slim would proceed 
to Australia to take up his new assignment. (20) Earlier in 
February his departure was postponed "in order to advise the 
British Government in the course of talks on the Canal 
Zone." (21) 
The military Junta of Egypt, on the other hand, was 
much too anxious to begin the conversation with the British. 
Ifc-ving compromised on the question of self-determination fbr the 
Sudan, they had hbped to achieve something spectacular and 
spontaneous on the question of complete evacuation of the Suez 
Canal Zone. 
19. Elizabeth Monroe, op.cit., pp. 176-76; also New York 
Timesy 16 December 1953; see also Mideast Mirror. 21 February 28 March 1953. 
20* Manchester Guardlai^ ^ 20 March 1964; Mideast Mirror. 28 March 
1954, p. 4. 
21. The Timesf 24 February 1953. 
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At this point, Nasser broke more than two months of 
"glowering inactivity" by a bold but conciliatory statement 
of policy of the revolutionary Government and urged the British 
Government to begin negotiations for a ^ust solution* In an 
interview given to the correspondent of the Observer on 
11 April 1953, (22) he said that by^ "just solution we mean 
the evacuation of British forces from the Canal 2o^" and no 
discussion on Middle E^t defence. He expressed Egyptian lack 
of trust, which he ascribed to the delays in beginning 
discussions to the British attempts to link the question of 
the Canal Zone with question of regional defence* He also 
sought to excuse the more flambuoyant statements of the 
Egyptian leaders by pleading the necessity "to prepare the 
Egyptian people for the consequences" of British intransigence. 
He then explained that; 
A revolutionary regime inevitably makes enemies 
at home among the corrupt and privileged group 
whose power it attacks. Then there are communists 
who seek to disrupt everything constructive. 
These elements seek to discredit us in any way 
they can. In the circumstances we cannot hold out 
our hands like beggars to Britain when what we are 
demanding is what every Egyptian believes to be 
his right. (23) 
In the manner of a realist, Nasser frankly adjaitted that 
Sgypt 'could not maintain such an immense base* unaided and 
that, since the base had been a British base, "British 
22. Observer, 12 April 1963; AlnA-hramy 12 April 1963; 
New York Times, 13 April 1953. 
23. Ibid. 
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\ 
technicians would be needed." (24) Further inciting Great 
Britain to compromise, he gave a clever turn to the problem 
of 'regional defence*. He stated that since the Arab States 
were all weak and very anxious to strengthen their defences, 
they could not find better friends than the West to help them 
do that. (25) 
Nasser, however, refused to yield on the future use of 
the base by the West since any commitment of this would be 
•premature' in his view, 'before getting satisfactory solution 
of her problems with Great Britain'. He also did not fail to 
remind the British leaders that in the last war "Egypt contri-
buted more than she was compelled to do under the treaty," (26) 
and wamedJ 
If there is no settlement, you cannot count on 
such cooperation again. All we are saying is 
that_if Brifcain-does not intend to^reach a just 
settlement, you cannot count_^ us"~lnlpea^  
war^ wll^T find us~¥rtT:er enemies. 
We can try to be friends. But you cannot expect 
us to hold out our hands like beggars for what 
we know to be our national rights. (27) 
This statement was quite significant in so far as it 
recognized the need 'to maintain an efficient base', and 
indicated that in refusing to negotiate on the Middle East 
defence, the Egyptian leaders did not want a strategic vacuum 
in the area. It clearly implied a desire for contact with the 
VIest, since the "friends" who could help were undoubtedly to 
be found among the Western Powers. His criticism of the 
24. Ibid. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Ibid. 
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»disruptive intentions' of the Communists so obviously hinted 
at that. Moreover, in the presence of the orthodox Muslim 
Brothers* no Egyptian Government, however strong and progressive, 
could have thought of identifying itself in any manner with 
the conanunist world* 
Gamal Nasser had thus in effect made it clear that 
there was a negotiable position. 
The significance of the statement was noted by the 
British Press in a series of editorial comments, all of which 
recognized that it had taken the matter a halpful step forward. 
The Daily Telefiraph which had taken a strong line against Egypt 
on the Canal 2one question, (28) modified its attitude to some 
extent and advocated a reciprocal gesture from Her Majesty's 
Government. (29) 
At this point, therefore, London had to choose 
between * inactivity' and negotiation upon a 
restricted basis, tacitly trusting that in the 
latter case the conclusion of an agreement on the 
Canal Zone would be followed by discussions and 
agreement on regional defence. (30) 
London finalj^chojge to negotiate. Churchill immedia-
tely called General Sir Brian Robertson, C-inC of the Middle 
East, back to London for consultations, and three days later 
announced that they would soon begin discussions on the Canal 
Zone question. (31) 
28* The Daily, Telegraph, 27 March 1963. 
29. Ibid., 12 April 1953. 
30. Survey 1953. p. 166} The Times^ 12 April 1953» 
!Che' Times. 16 April 1953. 
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The announcement was broadcast simultaneously by the 
Cairo radio, however, emphasising that the negotiations were 
expected to deal with the technical problems involved in the 
evacuation of the British and the subsequent maintenance of 
the Suez Canal Zone. (32) 
The announcement also put an end to weeks of uncertainty, 
during which the atmosphere had shown menacing signs of 
deterioration. This period had included tentative approaches 
by both sides to find a basis for discussions and an attempt 
on the part of Britain and the United States, to persuade the 
Egyptian <Sovernment to engage in tripartite discussions in 
which the question of evacuation was to be dealt with as a part 
of the wider problem of Middle East defence. (33) TheEg^rp^ans 
had jj.romptljr rejectejl_any_„Qffioial US role in the Suez 
talks. (34) 
B. FIRST ROUND OF TALKS BBGAH AND ENDED TOO SOOlif. 
BRITAIN DECLINED UMCONDITIOHAL WITHDRAWAL 
On April 27, General Mohamed Neguib and his Foreign 
Minister Dr. Mahmud Fawzi of Egypt sat down with Ambassador 
Ralph Stevenson and General Sir Brian Robertson of Great Britain 
32. AlrAhram, 16 April 1953; Mideast Mirror. 18 April 1963, 
p.l* 
33. New York Tiraest 15 March 1953. 
34. Ibid., 17 and 19 March 1963. The US Ambassador, Caffery, 
made a press statement on the 18th saying that the US 
did not wish any official role in the talks unless she 
was asked by both sides. United States in World Affairs 
1953 (New York, 1965), p. 295. 
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to try to »hammer out" a definitive agreement. They tried 
to find a common ground, but as their basic contentions differed 
widely, their talks proved abortive. After their sixth meeting 
concluded on 6 May, their brief communique made no mention of 
the date for the next meeting. It meant that the first 
approach t-owards a settlement had failed. 
The Egyptian negotiators wanted a clear statement 
of the British intention to withdraw before 
proceeding to discuss in Committees matters which 
they regarded as comparatively minor points: for 
Egypt the political decision to withdraw was para" 
mount and all else ranked as consequential military 
details. But for Britain these other matters of 
essence of the agreement and the British negotiators 
refused to give a pledge to withdraw without first 
discussing the security of the Canal Zone* i.e., 
the number and terms of service of the retained 
British technicians and the availability of the 
base in the event of war or threatening war. 
With regard to the technicians there were 
two competing views, the one that they would be 
seconded to the Egyptian army for service under 
its orders and the other that they would be 
responsible for the maintenance of British property 
under orders from London. (35) 
EGYPT* S REACTIONS -
Egypt had entered into negotiations with the hope that 
Britain would foiroally recognize the principle of "total and 
unconditional evacuation". They had spoken about this fact 
over and again as the only basis for negotiations. Lastly, 
on the very eve of the negotiations Col. Nasser had repeated 
that Egypt*s objective was »complete independence* and at the 
same time she was ready to cooperate with her "friends". But 
the existence of British troops in Egypt was the main 
35. Survey 1953^  p. 166; Tom Little, op.cit., p. 155. 
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hinderance to friendly relations between the countries. (36) 
Even in his 11 April statement which is credited to have 
induced the British to come to the negotiating table, had not 
concealed this fact. Now Britain*s attempt to "construct a 
technical agreement through a series of conaaittees which would 
work from ground up* was, therefore, quite naturally disappoint-
ing and irritating. Nasser explained; 
We refused to enter into any details without 
agreement on the basic issue, because there is 
no need to draw ourselves in committees and 
details only to find ourselves in the end with-
out a clear and agreed objective. (37) 
C* CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE; MAIN CAU^ 
OF BBE^POWN 
The breakdown of negotiations before they had really 
got into motion was not so much the result of difference on 
the question of control of the technicians who should maintain 
the base in operational condition after the withdrawal of the 
Combatant troops, but reflected a deep crisis of confidence. 
"The British", in the words of John Connell, Wanted to trust 
- "j 
the Egyptians but could not; the Egyptians were obsessed with 
the sacred significance of the battle against imperialism." (38) 
The British wanted to.believe that the Egyptians, and 
their 'Arab allies, could' one day be persuaded to realize that 
the cbmrnon enemy was Communism and that practical arrangements 
must be made to hold it at bay. The Egyptians, on the contrary. 
36. Mideast Mirror^ 2 Bllay 1953. 
37. Ibid., 9 May 1953. 
38. John Connell, op.cit., p. 43. 
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believed that the real enemies were Western imperialism and 
Zionism* 
The danger of Soviet penetration in the oil-rich Middle 
East was indeed a real one but even as later as 1953-54 it 
was comparatively remote and in suspense, while the presence of 
unwanted British forces and the menace of Zionist expansionism 
were facts of life* Therefore, the two points of view, so 
utterly divergent from each other, could hardly be reconciled, 
without either side willing to giving up its insistence* Pop 
Sgypt, all that she insisted upon was a matter of rights; for 
Britain, her stand was a matter of precautions* Rights certainly 
have a priority over precautions against * assumed* dangers* 
General Neguib»s reaction over the failure of the 
talks was more vehement and forthright. He said; 
We have washed our hands of the talks by which 
the British desire to draw us into a vicious 
circle where would never end, as happened before* 
But we have never agreed to deviate from the 
policy which we have laid down for ourselves* We 
entered the talks knowing full well that we wanted 
and determined to say what we wanted briefly and 
clearly* And we demanded it with determination 
so that the other side may know that we tolerate 
no bargaining* 
I don't know how such a simple and ^ ust demand 
could be subject to dispute, delay or division* I 
do not know that prompt acceptance of this demand 
will be an important factor to stabilization and 
peace* It is impossible to go back and waste the 
blood and suffering the people expended to make 
the country theirs - theirs to own, defend and 
plan for. (39) 
39* Al-Ahram. 10 May 1953j Mideast Mirror^ 16 May 1953, p. 1. 
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The Egyptian leader concluded his remarks by adding 
that Egypt did not want a "cheap independence" for which she 
had not paid. "Soaie of the price we have already paid and 
we are fully prepared to pay in full* Independence cannot be 
granted on paper but only achieved by payment with blood." (40) 
The crisis in Egypt's relations with Britain arising 
from the deadlock in the talks on the Suez Canal became more 
serious and alarming when Sir Churchill foiand it necessary to 
retort at General Neguib by telling the House of Commons that 
"if Egypt used force jj3_the Caoal Zone, British troops would 
use force in self-defence." (41) His * retort* was unfortunate 
as it created the impression that he still regarded Egypt 
virtually a British colony and that the very thought of 
evacuation hurt him. The Egyptians remembered what he had 
said in one of his war-time speeches, "I have not become Prime 
Ministe_r Iji order top reside over the liquidation of the 
British Empire." (42) 
But the pattern and forces of international politics 
had undergone several significant chances since the end of the 
last war. With the advent of the United Nations and the 
emergence of assertive nationalism in the hitherto subjugated 
communities, and the new technological achievenents, the British 
40. Ibid. 
H.C." Disb.^  5th Series, vol. 515, cols. 886-89; 
also Documents (RIIA) for 1953, p. 342. 
42. Quoted in John Marlox^ e, Amb Nationalism and British 
Imperialism (Ijondon, 1961), p. 74. 
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Empire had already started receding to its own narrow 
confines. He was now the Prime Minister of a country that 
had not yet fully recovered from the strains and exhaustions 
of the last war and was closely dependent on iimerican economic 
and military cooperation, while the new Republican Government 
of the United States, headed by G®ieral Eisenhower, was 'keen* 
to restore good relations with the Arab world. (43) Churchill 
could not have ignored these facts. Moreover, the Egyptian 
Governmrait had decided to maintain peace and security through-
out the country. They had completely ruled out sabotage and 
had warned their people against it. In a broadcast on 20 May, 
Neguib told the people to restrain until the Government decided 
to begin a national struggle; "of course, the Government will 
fix the time for the battle." But he also warned that "we 
are not going to be reckless." are very anxious not to 
repeat the mistakes of those who preceded us. The disaster of 
Palestine will not be repeated, nor the tragedy of the Canal 
which took place after the abrogation of the Treaty in 
1951 •" (44) Therefbre,_-ttiere_v^ or 
necessity to use force against the Egypy^ns. The atmosphere in 
the cities of Egypt remained calm and there was no overt sign 
of anti-British feeling. Even in the Canal Zone, the number of 
incidents reported were, if anything, slightly fewer than in 
normal times. Nevertheless, there was tension and several 
43. pepartment of State Bulletihy 23 March 1953, p. 431. 
Al-Ahramf The Egyptian Gazette^ 20 and 21 May 1953. 
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families left Cairo »against potential dangers'. (45) Gaaal 
Abdel Nasser described the existing state of Egypt's relations 
with Britain as *a war of nerves'» (46) 
Ihe possibility of resuming negotiations was further 
put off by the flare up of a new crisis over the disappearance 
of a British airman from the Ismailia area in the Canal Zone-
General resting, Commanding Officer of the British troops in 
Egypt, took an 'extremely serious view' of the incident and 
sent a strongly worded note to the Sub-Governor of Ismailia 
and demanded that the airmeai should be returned immediately. 
The note read: 
Lt. General Festing reserves the right to take 
such action as he considers necessary if the 
aireraft-man A.V. Rigden, is not returned to the 
British authorities •«. by 09.00 hours on Monday, 
July 13, measures will be put into force which 
will cause serious disruption and inconvenience 
to the Egyptian community in the area of 
Ismailia. (47) 
The disappearance of an 'airman' was not so serious an 
incident as to Justify the action of General Festing. 23ie 
language and the actions proposed in his letter could not be 
described but an 'ultimatum'. Egypt's reaction was naturally 
of vehement denunciation. Major Salem denied that the Egyptian 
authorities had any knowledge of Rigden's disappearance and 
45. The Daily Telegraph. 21 May 1963; The Times.^  21 May 1953. 
46. Al-Ahrain. 24 May 1963. Also New York Times« 14 May and 
15 July 1963. 
47. The Times. 13 July 1953; Mideast Mirror^ 18 July 1953; 
Al»Ahram^ 12 July 1953. 
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denounced the note as a «new aggression on Egyptian sovereignty 
and independence'• (48) 
Despite such grave provocation, the Egyptian Government 
was determined to prevent any untoward incident to happen inside 
Egypt. Maintenance of law and order was their primary aim 
ii^ en they declared a state of emergency and posted heavy armed 
guards at the foreign legations and public buildings, and put 
additional police JEbrce in and around the city. They were not 
r 
prepared to allow panic and lawlessness to weaken their position 
and authc^ty. The revolutionary regime thus had made a 
favourable impression in official and non-official circles in 
liondon and Wa^ington of its intentions of peacefully negotiating 
differences instead of stirring mob violence as its predecessors 
had done. 
After the Rigden crisis passed off with the withdrawal 
of British forces back to their barracks in the Zone. (49) 
Selwyn lloyd expressed that HM Government was willing to resume 
discussions on the Canal Zone, if Eg:^t so wished. (60) 
48. Al'-Ahminf 12 July 1963. 
49. AS warned in General Festing's * ultimatum*, on the failure 
of Egyptian authorities to return A.V. Rigden by 9 o'clock 
on the 13th of July, the British forces in the Canal Zone 
had erected half-a-dozen check-posts, sent out patrol cars 
and began a search of all road and rail passengers and 
vehicles into and out of the Ismailia region. Barage 
traffic on the Sweet water Canal was also subjected to 
restrictions and search. These restrictions and check-
posts were withdrawn as the situation improved in Ismailia 
after the 16th July. 
60. H.C. Deb.y 6th Series, vol. 617, cols. 2060-1. 
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D- THE UNITED STATES MEDIATES 
It seems most probable that behind this new initiative 
there was American pressure, (51) to come to terms with Egypt = 
Secretary Dulles seemed to have personally observed the gravity 
of the Anglo-Egyptian relations during his visit to Cairo and 
other capitals of the region in May* (52) 
It was after this trip, that the US administration 
decided to help bring about a solution of the Anglo-Egyptian 
iu^asse, though by process of »behind-the-scene diplomacy*. It 
was hoped in Washington that if the Suez dispute were solved 
satisfactorily, the last and major stumbling block in the way 
of creating a M-ddle East defence system would have been 
cleared. The British Government also seened to have taken into 
account the fact that *a peace-time station' could not be 
maintained continually under * a state of seige*• Moreover, the 
1936 Treaty was due for revision in_1956 - so near at l^d -
and the British would then be illegal occupants, liable to 
unconditional evacuation. Anthony Eden admitted in his memoirs 
that an agreement with Egypt at that stage was desirable in 
the interest of the Itaited Kingdom. (63) 
61. New York TiineSy 14 May 1953. 
62. Anthony Eden, Full Circle - Memoirs (liondon, I960), p*260. 
53. Sir Anthony Ed«i has described the various influences that 
forced Britain to reach a settlement with Egypt in this 
manner: "Many influences were at work on Anglo-Egyptian 
relations that summer, the most powerful was self-interest. 
Time and modern needs were bringing changes. The Suez 
Canal remained of supreme importance, the base was yearly 
less so. The tangled mass of workshops and railways in an 
(contd. on next page) 
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The Egyptian Ciovernment, though willing and eager to 
open negotiations, was however reluctant to take the initiative 
/ 
on account of the recent incidents in Ismailia. (54) London 
understood the situation and therefore decided to take the 
initiative by sending back Sir Brian Robertson, joint leader of 
the British delegation to the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations to 
Cairo on 19 July. On his arrival the General made the follow-
ing important and encouraging statement mentioning about 
Egypt*s right to full sovereignty: 
Much has happened in the world and in Egypt 
during the time I have been away, (56) but 
nothing has happened to detract from my convic-
tion that an amicable agreement between Britain 
and Egypt to resolve outstanding questions, 
eminently to the advantage of both countries; 
an agreement taking full account of Egyptian 
sovereignty* 
This statement was important as it indicated a shift 
in the British view and thereby helped restore confidence needed 
for the resumption of contacts. The Egyptian side responded 
favourably. Two days after the arrival of Sir Robertson, the 
Revolution Command Council issued a statement which indicated 
53. (contd. from back page) 
area the sisse of Wales'was cumbersome and dependent upon 
Egyptian labour. It did not seem likely that in this 
nuclear age we should ever need a base on the past scale* 
Sftnller bases, redeployment and dispersal would serve our 
purpose better. The Minister of Defence, Lord Alexander, 
favoured agreement, so did the Secretary of State for War, 
Anthony Head, and most military opinion. A treaty seemed 
to them a method of resolving an outdated commitment. 
Service in the Canal Zone was also a poor recruiting 
agent." Anthony Eden, op.cit., p» 860. 
54. Observery 19 July 1963; Mideast Mirror. 25 July 1963. 
55. General Sir BriaA Robertson had left for London after the 
first formal contact with the Government of Egypt became 
deadlocked on 6 May 1953* 
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that Egypt was prepared to discuss practical matters »which 
the British negotiators had wanted to discuss in April and 
May last* • (66) It obviously meant the narrowing of gaps which 
hsLd separated the two sides in May. (57) Cairo* s leading and 
reliable Al-Ahram quoted CSeneral Neguib saying "If the British * 
came forward to us with a request for resumption of the talks 
on the basis of immediate and unconditional evacuation we 
shall be prepared to do business with them.j8 (58) The use of 
the word 'business' implying absence of rigidity was indeed 
encouraging• 
First informal contact between the tvjo sides however 
Gould not be established before 30th of the month when the 
hospitality of the Cairo Embassy of Pakistan enabled them to 
meet at a Dinner. (59) 
/ 
The party was a means to overcome the first hurdle to 
any resumed negotiations. The two sides in a brief joint-
communique expressed the hope that their first informal contact 
at the Dinner Party would lead them to further explore the 
possibilities of an agreement. (60) 
56. Al-Ahram^ 22 July 1953; The Daily Telegraphy 22 July 1963« 
57. Mideast Mirror. 26 July 1953. 
58. Al-Ahramy 30 July 1953. 
59. The Pakistan Ctmrge d'Affaires, Syed Husain Tayeb, who 
was also the Chairman of the Sudan Governor-General's 
Commission in Khartoum, had invited Sir Robertson and 
Robert Etokey along with all the members of the Egyptian 
delegation to the May talks, at a dinner at his residence 
for the purpose of providing a 'neutral' ground for the 
two sides to meet informally. Al-Ahram^ 31 July 1963. 
60. Al-Ahr^y 31 July 1963. 
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Thereafter; the two sides met several times, and 
seriously tried, though still infomally, to explore the 
possibilities of an agreement between their two Governments 
on the question of the Suez Canal issue. In all fifteen 
meetings were held, the last taking place on 21 October. 
During'the first few meetings held before Sir Eobertson went 
to london for consultations with Sir Winston Churchill, both 
sides talked with restraint and cordiality and there seemed 
good prospects of reaching some understanding. So far they 
had been discussing, rather 'bargaining', to use Peter 
Calvocoressi's expression, about the number, control and 
duration of employment of British technicians and the availa-
bility of the base in future. (61) 
61. The 6th 'informal' meeting between Britain and Egyptian negotiators on the Suez Canal base issue was held and agreed on. 
1# An Egyptian Officer would be "Commander of the 
base". ~ 
2. A British, deputy, receiving orders from London, 
would be "technicaljBupervisor". 
3. About 4|OOP British technicians would be_retalned» 
uu&til Egyptians could be trained to take over the 
skilled Jobs. 
4. The^jitish garrison would be evacuat^ ed.within 
ISl^ntHs after~the slgoli^ of~tEe"^reement. 
Issues to'"W~s^rir"se^fleari.ncluded"~S\^^ 
of the base for the return of British or Allied 
armies in the event, or threat, of war. 
^ddle East Journal^ vol. 8, No.l, 1964, p.73; 
see also The Observer^ 27 September 1953* 
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After his retum from London, General Bobertson, 
insisted that 'the British soldier-technicians' must have 
some form of emblem, even if only a badge on their overalls 
and a flag at their headquarters, as token of their loyalties 
and reminder that they were still subject to military discip-
line. Secondly, the British also asked for the right of re-
entry to the base in the event of an attack not only upon a 
member of the Arab league but also upon Turkey or Persia. Kie 
British negotiators made another 'funny' suggestion, i.e., if 
Egypt was not prepared to retain the 'technicians' for a 
longer period (they had suggested 7 years against Egypt's 
suggestion for 3 years), Great Britain would give way provided 
Egypt agreed to their 'right of re-entry in the event of a 
threat of war instead of merely in the event of an 
attack'• (62) (Italics mine). 
The Egyptian leaders felt the change of attitude in 
the British negotiators and warned their people and the world 
at large against "too much optimism" about the outcome of the 
'present informal discussions'. (63) A sharp conflict of 
opinion had now arisen on the question of 'uniform' for the 
technicians. The British were so much insistent on the 
technicians wearing the army uniform and carrying weapons that 
they were reported to have 'offered to give way over Turkey 
62, The Observer, 27 September 1953; The Daily Telegraphy 
28 September 1963; also Mideast Mirrgry 17 October 1953, 
pp. 2-4 and 24 October 1953, p. 7. (Siphasis mine). 
63. Mideast Mirror. 10 October 1953, p. 2; The Times^ 
4 October 1953 • 
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in return for Egyptian concession over the uniforms'. (64) 
The Egyptians could not agree to this because the very sight 
of continuing presence of British military personnel was totally 
averse to their national pride, and meant only a partial 
fulfilment of their basic demand of 'Complete evacuation', a 
continuing conflict of dual authority in the same area. 
The Junta would have indeed found it awfully 
difficult to defend themselves against the 
criticism of right-wing extremists, especially 
the Muslim Brotherhood, and to convince the 
people that they had indeed terminated the 
occupation, if British unifoi^s were still to 
be seen in tfie"CanaI Zone"!. C65!l 
In the words of Tom Little, "it was a small point 
con5)ared with the number of technicians, the duration of the 
argument and the conditions governing reactivation of the base, 
but it showed how little the British understood the mind of 
Egypt"f (66) And finally, the two sides issued an agreed 
communique that 'it had not been possible to reach agree-
ment' . (67) (Italics mine) 
64. Survey of International Affairs 1953> p. 172; see also 
panchester Guardian^ 23 September 1953. 
65. Coral Bell>s^ ,Survey of International Affairs. 195a ( R I I A , 
1957), p. 19^ ;; 
66. Tom little, op.cit., pp. 155-56. See also 
The Observer. 1 November 1953. 
67. Mideast Mirror^ 24 October 1953; The Times^ 22 October 1953; 
AlrAhrajs, 22 October 1953. 
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E. MEGOTIATIOMS SLOlffiD DOUH: 
SPLIT IN THE RGC 
Although the joint communique had not closed the 
negotiations, the Government of Egypt could not devote enough 
time and attention to the discussions which somehow 'languished' 
for some more weeks. Elections in the Sudan and the widening 
of tussle for 'power' between General Neguib and Nasser and 
the consequent split in the Council of Revolution, (68) delayed 
the process of reaching a negotiated settlement with Great 
Britain. 
68. At the time of July 1952,coup the. military„3unta_haji_had 
no idea of "sitting up a^permanent military dictatorship 
i H ^ ^ P * simply aimed at removing 'the old gang' 
in the hope and expectation that this removal would 
liberate the forces of reform which, they assumed, were 
being stifled by the corruptions of the 'old gang'. Itoh^ed 
Neguib had been _selected by the yo\ms ol'ficers as a ' 
respected^_se.aiorof^^ of 
the coup. BuFirt~wasnaot~Tong before Abdel Nasser and the 
more radical and more perceptive members of the junta 
realised that reform was not merely a matter of purging 
corruption. Slowly,j 
they came to realise 1 
revolution. M t Mohamed 
power in'his hands and who, mor^ver, had won great popula-
rity in Egypt in his role as a father figure, and consider-
able respect abroad by his role in the Sudan negotiations 
with Britain, appears to have held to the original idea of 
the coup and to have continued thinking in terms of a 
fairly rapid reversion to constitutional life. He came to 
regard Abdel Nasser and the more radical members of the 
RCC as young hotheads and was no longer willing to accept 
his role as a figurehead. He began to claim the right to 
veto the decisionsof tlg_RCCT By the end of the year, 
tHerewasHino^ re of~l§ss~op^disagreement between Neguib 
on the one hand and Abdel Nas^ ser and the majority of the 
ROC on the other. 
The_ first 'showdown' came on 24LFebruary 1954 when 
it wa^^nnov^ed by the ^  that Neguib had been relieved 
oTthe^pO-^tiLAf~PTesident, Prime Minister, and_gMijpman of 
the BCC and that Abdel Nasserhad replaced him as Prime 
MfflV^^nd Chairman, leaving the Presidency vacant• 
(contd. on next page) 
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HASSER WINS AGAIMST NEGUIB AMD RESUMES 
MEG0TIATI0M5 IMMEDIATELY WITH MORE 
COICmATORY ATTITUDE 
After Nasser emerged victorious from the 'Neguib crisis' 
negotiations with the British Ambassador, Sir Ralph Stevenson 
(69) were resumed without delay. (70) Both sides started afresh 
with a note of hope and a promise of better understanding and 
accommodation of each other's contentions and claims* On the 
68 • (contd. from back page) 
This announcement, which attributed Neguib's removal to 
his attempts to monopolise power, was__gj?ee$jBd with^wide-
Within a few daj^ JJegi^ b w ^ invitedjby _the_RDC jto ^ t u m 
to Presidency "Bfe accepj;id„and,._almgst immediately, 
announced"^tes &r„eiectLiQns_and.^nyocation^of a 
const it ue^ Assembly, abolished martial law and the Press 
clHsorship, indlrei'nstated himself in the Premiership and 
in the Chairmanship of the ICC. Neguib had, to all appear-
ance, won the day. The RCC announced the intention to 
dissolve itself, to grant full political rights, to hold 
free elections, and to allow an elected National Assembly 
to choose a President. All political internees (except for 
Communists) were released. 
B.ut_-bjghind the scene Abdel Nasser^ organising his 
relationship with the Army, with the police, and with the 
workers' syndicates, was p^epa^ngjfco strike back. This 
was the_jdecisiye moment for the Egypt'ian Revolution* On 
March the K C rescinded all the liberal decisions they 
a few days before"^  A^Jb^^gh^" later,_Abde 1 
Nasser onc'e'ffiore repIaceg~Neguib as'Prime Minister and 
Chairman of the leaving Neguib, _fo.j!^ _the_bijne bein^, 
wr£5~t^President Abdel Nasser accomplished this without 
opposition either from his colleagues in the ROC (except 
for one, who resigned) or from the Army, and without overt 
opposition from public opinion. From henceforward he was 
the real master of the country. 
(See The United States in World Affairs 1954 (New York, 
1956), pp. 339-40; John Marlowe, op.cit., pp. 406-7; 
Lacontures, op.cit., part III, Chapter 3.) 
69. Sir Ralph Stevenson returned to Cairo after a long leave 
in January 1954. ftee AlrAhram, 1 January 1954. 
70. The United States in \jorld Affairs 1954^ p. 339. 
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Egyptian side Nasser appeared more ready to make concessions 
on points on which he had stood firm in the autumn of the 
previous year. He agreed to allow the British rre-sntry in the 
event of an attack not only on an Arab country but also on 
Turkeys (71) On the British side, after prolonged debates and 
uproarious scenes in the Parliament, staged by a section of the 
right-wing conservatives which was against evacuation from the 
Canal Zone, (72) the Government was asked to decide that 
civilians instead of soldiers should man the base installations, 
bearing no mark of their nationality. 
One of the most important factors which seemed to have 
directly influenced the Conservative Government was the persis-
tent fidvi^ of the military lea<^rs and strategists that the 
base could not be held in a_hostile enyironm^ ent» (73) Sir 
Winston Churchill himself was fully convinced, after he had had 
discussions on this issue with President Eisenhower in Washington, 
»^hat to keep a large concentration of men and material in the 
71. The Times, 22 July 1954; Mideast Mirror. 31 July 1954. 
The conditions for an agreement on Suez were among the 
points of difference between General Neguib and Col. Nasser. 
Just before the first dismissal of General Neguib, Gamal 
Nasser is understood to have informed the American and 
Australian envoys in Cairo that Egypt was prepared to 
concede the point on Turkey. See New York Times^ 21 March 
1954; also The Timesy 17 March 1954. 
72. H.C. peb.. 5th Series, vol. 524, cols. 827-9, 2450-71; 
vol. 530, cols. 1356-8, 511-21, 554-61, 522-^. 
73. Anthony Eden, op.cit., p. 260; also "Developments of the 
Quarter", The Mddle East Journal, 1954, p. 446. 
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Canal Zone was a doubtful expedient in an age of atomic 
warfare." (74) It demonstrated that the British Prime Minister 
identified himself with his Foreign Secretary's policy of trying 
to achieve an agreement with Egypt. (75) 
G. aSADS OF AGREEIffiMT SIGMED 
This was in feict the turning point in the discussion 
about the Suez Canal base then going on in Cairo. Further 
impetus was added by the arrival in Cairo of Antony Head, the 
British War Secretary, with *wide powers' to come to terms 
quickly. (76) His choice was quite an indication that the 
Cabinet in England had finally accepted the advice of the 
Committee of the Chiefs of Staff who believed that the Suez base 
74. The United States" in World Affairs, 1954 (Council of 
Foreign Relations, New York, 1956), pp. 339-40. Sir 
Winston Churchill made considerable use of this argument 
in answering his domestic critics. On 13 July, two days 
after the Cairo talks began, the storm broke out in 
Westminster. The Army Sub-Committee of the Conservative 
Party's Defence Committee held a 90-minute meeting, which 
was addressed by Anthony Head, Secretary of State for War, 
Butler, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Sir Winston 
Churchill. Anthony Head talked about the strategic 
necessity of redeployment of forces in Cyprus, Libya, Iraq 
and Jordan in view of the radius of devastation a hydrogen 
bomb would produce if dropped on the Suez Canal. Butler 
then spoke about the financial burden involved in running 
the base - some £150 million a year, being unbearable in 
the circumstances. After the socalled 'Suez rebels', led 
by Captain Waterhouse voiced the opinion that British 
prestige in the Middle East would be irreparably damaged 
by complete withdrawal from the Suez Canal, the Prime 
Minister remarked: "You cannot maintain prestige with 
f^ITyV' 
76. See Anthony Eden, op.cit., p. 260. 
76. Ibid.; Mideast' Mirror^ 31 July 1954; Al-Ahram. The 
Egyptian Gazette^  24 and 25 July 1954; The Times. July 
1964. 
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was no longer tenable, under the 'changed circumstances'. (77) 
Matters were discussed and decided upon with astonishing speed. 
On the night of 27 July, the two Governments initialed the 
'Heads of Agreement', (78) embodying the principles and the 
main details of the terms under which the Briti^ troops were 
to be withdrawn from Egypt and the Canal Zone military base 
maintained a state of preparedness. 
The official communique expressed the conviction of the 
two Governments that the agreement 'by removing sources of 
friction and mistrust will help to bring about growing improve-
ment in the relations between their two countries'• It further 
declared that the signatories had 'no aggressive purpose iri 
reaching the agreement but that the agreements contemplated will 
contribute to the maintenance of peace and security, which is the 
objective of both their governments." (79) (Italics mine) 
The Heads of the Agreement provided; 
a) for the_ evacuation of all British forces from 
Egypt within t^nty months of the signature_of 
the Agreement; 
77. This was later confirmed by Antony Head himself in his 
speech in the House of Commons on 29 July 1964. He said: 
" ... the 'heads of agreement' which had been initialed . 
in Cairo, and the correctness or otherwise of the Govern-
ment's policy towards Egypt depended to a large extent on 
strategic considerations and, in particular, on a strategic 
review carried out by the Chiefs of Staff and agreed to 
by the Cabinet in the light of present conditions." See, 
H.C. Deb.^ vol. 631, cols. 724-31. 
78. Al-Ahram. The Egyptian Gazette. 28 July 1964; The Times, 
The Hew York Tlmesy 28 July 1954; Mideast Mirro.r^  31 July 
1954, p* 3. 
79. Ibid. (Emphasis mine) 
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b) for British bases in the Canal Zone to be main-
tained by the British civilian contractors for a 
period of seven years; 
c) for British forces to reoccupy the Canal Zonein 
the eVenTof an attack by any outside power on 
E^ygt, or any other country which¥i^~apa^ to 
the Arab collective Security Pact of 1950, or on 
Turkey. (80) 
Details of the procedure and various technicalities 
regarding maintenance of the base in the most efficient working 
order, including facilities and protections to be provided to 
the British Civil Contractors and labour were worked out in the 
same spirit of cooperation and compromise. After about two 
months of patient and painstaking discussion, the two Govern-
ments finally signed the most important document regarding the 
evacuation of the Suez Canal base on the 19th day of October 
1954. (81) From the British side the signatories included 
Anthony Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. (82) 
H. TERMS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGREHffiMT (83) 
The main provisions of the »epoch-making* agreement 
were precisely the same as set out in the * Heads of Agreement* 
in July last. Ratifications were exchanged at-Cairo after 
nearly six weeks. (84) 
80. Text of the Agreement in Appendix No. 
81- Al-Ahram. The Egyptian Gazette^ 20 October 1954. 
82. The TimeSf 27 September 1954. 
83. The Egyptians would not have it called a «Treaty' 
because of the distasteful association the word had for 
them. 
84. Al-Ahram^ 7 December 1954; The Times^  7 December 1954. 
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It consisted of 13 articles, two annexes, including 
appendices, 17 exchange of notes elaborating the provisions of 
the main agreement. This curious structure of the agreement 
apparently was necessitated by the number and complexity of 
the technical problems to be disposed of in detail. Thus the 
essential provisions were set and organization of the base 
elaborated in the annexes and various legal, financial and other 
useful arranganents were dealt with through exchange of notes. 
Article 11 of the main agreement provided that the annexes 
and appendices to the agreement were an integral part thereof; 
each of notes consisted a subsidiary agreement• 
Article 2 declared the termination of the 1936 Treaty, 
without specifying the times of termination. This formula was 
devised to avoid raising the issue of Egypt's unilateral 
abrogation on 15 October 1951 which was not recognized by 
Great Britain. 
Article 1 of the main agreement provided for the 
withdrawal of British forces from the Egyptian 
territory in gradual stages, in accordance with the 
schedule set forth in Part (a) of the Annex. 
This withdrawal was to be completed entirely within 
twenty months of the date of signing the agreement 
(19 October 1954). (86) 
Other provisions of Annex, I contain detailed 
provisions for the progressive transfer of responsi-
bility for security and maintenance of installations 
from British to Egyptian control. (86) 
86. At the time of the ratification of the agreement on 
6 December 1954, it was found that the withdrawal was 
actually proceeding ahead of schedule. See Christian 
Science Monitory 29 December 1954. 
86. For example a «hand-over document* of each installation 
was to be prepared by the British forces in such details 
(contd. on next page) 
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Article 3 of the 'agreement* provided that certain 
parts of the Canal base were to be kept in efficient 
vforking order and capable of immediate use in case the 
need for reactivation of the base arose. 
In Annex. II and appendices, thereto, it was 
provided that Great Britain would maintain and operate 
certain installations for the duration of the agree-
ment, vfhereas Egypt was required to »maintain in good 
order' other specified installations. 
Section 5 of Part A provided that upon the with-
drawal of British forces from the base, the Egyptian 
Government would assume responsibility for the 
security of all base installations and equipment. 
Section 6 provided that the UK Government would 
maintain and operate the installations listed in 
Section (2) A and the British equipment therein by 
concluding contracts with one or more British or 
Egyptian commercial firms called thereafter as 
Contractors. 
These Contractors according to Section 8 were 
given the right to employ British technicians up to 
a total of 1.200 but not exceeding for those recruited 
outside Egypt a total of 800, as well as Egyptian 
technicians and such local labour engaged in Egypt 
as might be required. 
Subject to certain specified exemptions, companies 
and partnerships acting as contractors, as well as their 
personnel, were to subject to Egyptian law with respect 
to their activities in Egypt. 
Section 6 provided that the British Government was 
authorized to attach temporary personnel to H-M.'s 
Embassy in Cairo for the purpose of inspection of the 
installations referred to in Part I. The maximum number 
of such personnel was to be agreed upon between the 
two governments. 
Article 4 of the 'agreement? dealt with reactiva-
tion of the base. It stated that in the event of an 
armed attack by an "outside power" or any country which 
at the date of signature of the present agreement 
86. (contd. from back page) 
as may be agreed upon between the respective headquarters 
and to be handed over to the Egyptian authorities in advance 
of the transfer to enable the latter to assess the security 
and maintenance problems and to make appropriate arrangements 
to deal with them. (Annex. I, Part B, Section B). 
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(19 October 1964) was a member of the Arab Collective 
Security Pact or on Turkey, Egypt agreed to afford to 
the UK such facilities as might be necessary to place 
the base on a 'war footing' and operate it 
effectively' • 
These facilities included the use of Egyptian 
ports which were to be found 'indispensable' for 
carrying out the above mentioned purposes. 
Article 6 provided for consultation between Egypt 
and HM Government in the event of the threat of such 
attack. The agreed minute attached to the agreement 
sought to define the expression "outside" as used in 
Articles 4 and 6, as any country other than those 
referred in Article 4. Thus the agreement was not to 
become operative in the event of an attack by a member 
of the Arab Collective Security Pact upon another 
member or Turkey or an attack by Israel or any of 
these Powers. 
Article 5 provided that in the event the base was 
reactivated in accordance with Article 4, the British 
occupying forces "shall withdraw immediately upon the 
cessation of hostilities". The agreed minute expressed 
the understanding that Article 5 meant that such with-
drawal would commence as soon as hostilities ceased 
or be completed without delay. 
Article 8 explained that two Governments recognized 
that the Suez Canal was an integral part of Egypt and 
was waterway "economically and commercially and 
strategically of international importance", in which 
the freedom of navigation was to be maintained as 
guaranteed by 1888 Convention. 
Article 10 affirmed that the right of membership 
and privileges guaranteed by the Charter of the United 
Nations and the obligations arising thereto, were to 
remain absolutely unaffected by signing the agreement. 
It amounted to recognition and a promise of Great 
Britain to uphold the sanctity of equal sovereign 
status of Egypt. 
EGYPT'S RESPONSE AMD REACTIONS 
TO THE AGREEMENT 
The 1954 'Zuez Canal Base Agreement' was hailed both by 
the Egyptian and the British Government as a satisfactory 
compromise. The signing of the agreement was an occasion of 
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great rejoicing for the people of Egypt, because, at last 
long, 72 years of British occupation had come to an end. (87) 
It was the fulfilment of their greatest national aspiration -
completeness of political freedom. They had conceded on the 
question of Unity of the Sudan and Egypt primarily with the 
very object of reaching a settlement on the question of evacua-
tion of the Canal Zone. Nasser, whose realism, straight-
forwardness and - as a matter of fact - approach was mainly 
responsible for the conclusion of the agreement, asked his 
people to see the agreement as the point of culmination of the 
nationalist struggle launched by Orabi and Saad Zaghlul, both 
pioneers of Egypt's freedom movement. In his nation-wide 
broadcast the same night Nasser spoke with enthusiasm. He said; 
This is a turning point in the history of Egypt. 
With this agreement a new era of friendly relations 
based on mutual trust, confidence and cooperation 
opens between Egypt and Britain and the Western 
countries. It is the biggest single achievement 
in Egypt's national aspirations to date. I must 
pay a high tribute to the British side for their 
part in reaching the agreement. I w^t to mention 
in particular General Sir Brian Robertson for his 
friendly attitude towards Egypt. Now we want to 
get rid of hatred in our hearts and start building 
up our relations with Britain on a solid basis of 
mutual trust and confidence which 1ms been lacking 
in our relations for the past several decades. (88) 
In an interview with the Arab News Agency Col. Nasser 
further elaborated that the agreement signed with Britain met 
all the major requirements of Egyptian sovereignty. "A 
87. New York Times, 28 July 1954; also The Egyptian Gazette^ 
28 July 1954. 
88. Radio Cairo Broadcast, 19 October 1954. Reporting and 
Coverage in ^ IrAhram, 20 October 1954. 
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succession of politicians of the old regime," he commented, 
"made much of their nationalism only succeed in making a bad 
situation worse." (89) He was thus trying to explain and 
emphasise that the Suez agreement could be concluded because 
the revolutionary regime, under his leadership, approached the 
problems of its relations with Britain in a somewhat more 
realistic manner and by being reasonable, i.e. by taking a 
balanced view of their own interests and those of others. In 
this context, reasonableness meant intelligent pursuit of one's 
own national interest avoiding a clash with the interests of 
another people. He defended his action by explaining: 
Egypt has now secured the evacuation of British 
troops. This is the basic principle. She always 
struggled for, and, in achieving it, Egypt has 
made no concessions against this principle. The 
lengthy negotiations were intended to oasure that 
evacuation could be achieved without prejudicing 
either Egypt's inalienable rights or the mutual 
desire of Egypt and Britain to ensure the security 
of the Middle East. (90) 
The agreement freed Egypt from the bondage of the 1936 
Treaty and consequently strengthened the position of the 
Bevolutionary Command Council vis-a-vis the inside opponents of 
the regime. With the signing of this 'most important document' 
Egypt's right to conduct its affairs, domestic as well as 
foreign, was restored. 
89* See Mideast Mirror^ 31 July 1954, pp. 6-8; 
also Al-Ahram^ 28 and 29 July 19^. 
90. Mideast Mirror^ 23 October 1964, p. 7. 
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In his little book, The Philosophy of the Revolution^ 
Nasser referred to the general decline of the British and 
French political influence in the Middle East and the need of 
a dynamic personality to integrate the local forces and 
channellise its vast, mostly untapped economic and man-power 
resources for prosperity and political discipline. Egypt, being 
comparatively more advanced, more educated and more populous 
than the rest of the region, was called upon to play that 
historic character. In his words: 
We cannot look at the map of the world ... without 
realising Egypt*s position on the map and her role 
by the logic of that position. Can we fail to see 
that there is an Arab Zone surrounding us? ••• 
Can we possibly ignore the fact there is African 
Continent which we have been made part of by fate? 
.«• Can we ignore the fact that there is an 
Islamic with which we are united by bond of religious 
principle reinforced by historical realities? ..• 
It always strikes me that in this area in which we 
live is a role running around aimlessly looking for 
a hero to give it being. ... The role is not one 
of leadership or domination. It is rather a role 
of interaction with and response to all the factors 
mentioned above, which involves making use of the 
tremendous talent strength in the regions surround-
ing us to create a great power in this area which 
will then rise up to a level of dignity and under-
take a positive part in building the future of 
mankind. (91) 
To play this »role« it was necessary that Egypt must 
have the freedom to make her decisions, end sudi freedom they 
could not have so long as Britain insisted on the continuing 
validity of the 1936 Treaty and so long as the 80,000-men 
strong British force stay within 'easy« striking distance of 
her capital. 
91. Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Bevolution 
(Cairo, 1954), p. 30. 
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It was, therefore, an important and urgent task for 
the Free Officers to get rid of the intimidating presence of 
the British forces as soon as possible, even if it meant a 
little bit of bending down to, a little adjustment with, 
Britain on matters of lesser importance as compared to an 
agreement on princ3j)les. Nasser's acceptance of Turkey being 
included in the list of countries, an attack on which would 
justify Britain* s re-entry into the base, was primarily 
motivated to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement on the 
question of evacuation as such. Nasser would not have conceded 
on this point without weighing the pros and cons. He was not 
unaware that the cold war was, until then, centred in Europe 
and the Par East, and the Soviet interest in the Middle East 
was not yet of the nature of positive assertion, or at least 
was not found to be able to interfere in their affairs. i92) 
Moreover in Egypt, according to his calculations, the people 
'would not care much about Turkey - all that they would be 
overhwlmed with, would be the fact that at long last, the 
British were clearing out. The popular acclaim to the agreement 
and their 'wild rejoicing' in the streets of Cairo and 
92. Soviet Union's somewhat mysterious lack of interest in 
Arabic speaking part of the Middle East in the post-war 
years was understood to be due to late Joseph Stalin's 
fear or caution that an aggressive policy in this region 
<would attract American intervention; he preferred that 
America should be kept away, even if at the cost of 
tolerating the British presence*. See Guy Wint and Peter 
Clavocoressi. Middle East Crisis (Penguin Books, 1957). 
See also, Walter Z. Xaquer. "The Appeal of Communism in 
the Middle East", The Middle East Journal. IX (Winter, 
1955), pp. 20-25. 
-287-! 
Alexandria, proved that he understood the mind of his 
countrymen. (93) Moreover, the inclusion of Turkey was to be 
readily welcomed by the Arab League. Iraq, an Arab League 
member, was already tied to Turkey through the Sadabad Pact. 
Egypt»s Minister of National Guidance, Saleh Salim 
defended the agreement by saying that an aggression against 
Turkey would result in world war, in which event Egypt would 
be greatly benefited by having Britain's support. (94) The 
Al-Ahram commented in its editorial: 
Twenty million Egyptians today lift up their heads, 
proudly aware that their national dignity is now 
fully restored. Never in the history of the world 
has a whole nation been indebted to a handful of 
men, as v/e are today to the leaders of our Revolution. 
93. Huge crowds assembled in Sharia Karr el Aini and the 
streets surrounding the parliament building, wildly 
cheered Col Nasser and his colleagues as they drove away 
after the ceremony. 
Cairo itself was bright with coloured lights. Public 
buildings, houses and shops on main streets and squares 
were brightly illuminated. 
(Egyptian Gazette* 20 October 
1964) 
Large crowds of people, mostly students and workers 
toured streets of Cairo, Alexandria and other big cities, 
carrying banners and dancing to the acconqpaniment of 
trumpets and flutes. 
They shouted various slogans, including "Long Live 
Nasser - Hero of evacuation", "Long Live Independent Egypt" 
and "Long Live the RCC". 
As a further sign of rejoicing military bands played 
nationalist songs in public parks and squares, A torch 
procession paraded in the main streets of Alexandria. 
Individuals shook hands hugged and embraced each other 
with a hearty * Mabaruk*• 
(The Egyptian Gagette^ 21 October 1954) 
94. New' York Times^ 31 July 1954. 
-288-! 
With faith in CSod, confidence in the people 
and in themselves, determination and will-power 
the leaders of the Revolution achieved their 
greatest objective and freed their country from 
foreign occupation. 
We are now free and our next generation will 
be born free. (95) 
The English daily, The Egyptian Gazette, acclaimed 
the accord as a great landmark in the history of Egypt. 
Editorially it said; 
Few acts in modern political history can equal 
in importance and successful conclusion of the 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. ... It will stand out 
in the annals of this country as the corner-
stone of the new Egypt. 
It has confirmed the wisdom of the policy of 
the Egyptian negotiators, who were determined that 
the evacuation of the British troops should be 
settled before any other ma^or problem was tackled. 
This Treaty, for the first time in many centuries, 
gives Egypt full sovereignty and independence. 
The agreement establishes between Egypt and 
Great Britain a relationship in accordance with the 
ideas and standards of the 20th century. ... A 
new basis has been laid for growing cooperation and 
goodwill which can only be to the advantage of both 
parties. (96) 
The Al-Akhbar asserted: 
The Anglo-Egyptian agreement marked the end of a 
long period of national struggle which began when 
foreign troops first occupied this country. 
It is hoped that now the UK, the US and the 
Western denrocracies will place greater confidence 
in this countryj and cooperate with Egypt for the 
sake of world peace and international welfare. ••• 
Egypt, now having restored her national rights, 
is in a better position to collaborate with them 
to safeguard peace. (97) 
Al-Ahramy 19 and 20 October 1964. 
The Egyptian Gazette^ 20 October 1964. 
Al-Akhbar^ 20 October 1954. 
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Akher Seta wrote a very suggestive editorial 
pointing out that now Egypt would have a chance to lead other 
Arab brothers to evolve a 'realistic Arab policy towards world 
problems*. Hie editor, Mohamed Hassamin Heikal (now editor 
of the Al-Ahram)^ wrote: 
must all realize that the Agreement is only a 
step forward towards the realization of our aspira-
tions. ••• The battle has not ended ••• only a 
barrier has been removed in our fight against 
social evils. 
We must appreciate that the Evacuation Agreement 
has added to the responsibilities of both the Govern-
ment and the people. ... We must now mobilize our 
all powers and resources in order to speed up the 
execution of our productive plans. 
Greater attention is needed to reorganize the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, now that the restrictions 
imposed by the 1936 Treaty have been removed. There 
is urgent need to draw up a new foreign policy based 
on safeguarding our interests before any other 
considerations. 
A conference of Arab Prime Ministers should be 
held in Cairo to explain to them the broad lines of 
Egypt* s foreign policy and urge them to draw up a 
realistic Arab policy towards world problems. (98) 
The editor of the Al-Gumhouria wrote: 
On July 26, 1952, when Faruk was exiled the 
evacuation of foreign troops from both Egypt and 
the Sudan became possible, because the imperialists 
lost their agents and supporters who were swept 
out of power by the advent of the Revolution. 
We must now spare no effort to build a great 
future for both Egypt and the Sudan. (99) 
96. 4kher S^. 20 October 1954. 
99. Al-Guiahuriay 20 October 1954. 
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It was nevertheless important that the leaders no less 
than the Egyptian press did not forget to mention that Egypt 
and Britain would be again friends, and they all hoped for a 
better and cooperative understanding between the two countries. 
The Al-Ahram< s editorial was typically representative of the 
common Egyptian feeling towards Great Britain - their staunchest 
enemy until yesterday; 
Wciile we are celebrating today, the evacuation of 
British troops from Egypt, we must also celebrate 
the birth of genuine friendship between Egypt and 
the United Kingdom. 
By regaining the friendship of Egypt, the United 
Kingdom has also regained the friendship of the Arab 
world. The United Kingdom is now in a position to 
develop her trade and economic relations with Egypt 
wMch deteriorated appreciably following the abroga-
tion of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. (100) 
The way in which Egypt looked at the great event was most 
aptly described by Nasser himself in almost every talk, speech 
and interview he granted after signing the documents on the 
19th of October; 
The' ugly page of Anglo-Egyptian relations has been 
turned and another page is being written. British 
prestige and position in the Middle East has been 
strengthened. There is now no reason why Britain 
and Egypt should not work constructively 
together. (101) 
lOO* /^ l-Ahram^  21 October 1954. 
British experts to Egypt before the abrogation, 
totalled £40 million; this figure decreased in the last 
two years to less than £20 million. 
101. The Egyptian Gazette^ 20 and 21 October 1954; 
Mdeast Mirrory 23 October 1954, p. 7. 
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J. GREAT BRITAIN'S RESPONSE AMD BEACTIONS TO 
THE SUEZ CAML EVACUATION AGREEMENT 
In Great Britain, Her Majesty* s Government stoutly 
defended (102) its decision to withdraw from the Canal base 
by arguing that the Suez agreement with Egypt was not an end 
in itself, but a necessary step towards creating a basis for 
collective security in the Middle East. (103) Nutting who 
initiated the agreement told the House of Commons that: 
This Agreement serves the interests of both 
Governments; and that it is the intention of 
Egyptian Government as of Her Majesty's Govern-
ment to make it work laarmoniously. It marks a 
new and hopeful beginning to the process of re-
building confidence between our two countries. 
I have been at pains to emphasise in all my 
discussions with the Egyptian Prime Minister and 
his colleagues is a two-sided matter. It is my 
hope that this confidence will now gradually 
develop, if that happens, then I believe we 
shall have taken a step which will serve the 
cause of stability and peace throughout the 
Middle East. (104) 
The British Government had more than one reason to feel 
satisfied about the Canal Zone Agreement. Firstly, there was 
the obviously compelling factor of inadvisability of maintaining 
a huge base at a tremendous cost of over £50 million a year, 
the utility of which was now regarded to have been considerably 
102. See H.C. Deb.y vol. 531, cols. 724-822; 1607-13. 
103. In the United States it was hoped that one consequence 
of the agreement would be the gaining of a new recruit 
for what John Poster Dulles in his contratulatory message 
to Colonel Abdel Nasser tactfully referred to as "great 
stability and defensive strength in the area." United 
States in World Affairs 1954^  p. 341. 
H.C. Deb., vol. 631, col. 1610. 
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diminished as a result of new concepts of defence-strategy 
and equipment. (106) 
iSecondly, they seemed now fully convinced that the 
base, however important it might still be considered by the 
friends of Waterhouse, the leader of the right-wingers, could 
not be fi'uitfully maintained in the face of dissent and 
protest of the people of the area* 
Thirdly, Her Majesty's Government was not a loser if 
the terms of the agreement were studied carefully. The agree-
ment in fact had preserved Britain's every 'essential require-
ment'. According to Nutting's own statement, ®the most 
important point' of the agreement was that it gave them a legal 
right to maintain a base in Egypt. They were to have there, 
for the duration of the Agreement, a reserve of war-like stores 
and also full facilities for the running of the workshop which 
they badly needed for the maintenance and repair of their 
military equipment in the area. 
Furthermore, the contractors who were to look after 
these facilities and were to maintain the base in 'efficient' 
working order, were to be British nationals. (106) Nevertheless, 
they were granted certain immunities, including custom extemptions 
for most of the equipment and material they imported for the 
105. Britain's Minister of War Antony Head explained that 
with Turkey in the NATO, and with the 'northern tire 
arrangements involving l^ irkey and Pakistan, the old 
reliance on the Suez base is replaced by a new concept 
of area defense. New York Times^  30 July 1964. 
106. Section 6 of Annex. II. 
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carrylng out of their responsibilities. (107) More than 
half of the labour to be employed by them could be English-
men. (108) 
These were admittedly * considerable financial and 
political concessions for a sovereign Government to make'• (109) 
Pourthlyj the withdrawal was to be completed over a 
period of twenty months, (110) and if any untoward incident, 
such as one defined in Article 4 of the Agreement, happened 
during that period, there would still be a sufficient number 
of British soldiers in the base to face the situation. There-
after, provision was made for their re-entry into the 
base. (Ill) 
Fifthly, certain more important installations like the 
one at Tel-el-Kebir were to be maintained by British contractors 
and technicians. While certain installations which were to be 
handed over to the Egyptians were assured by the latter to be 
maintained efficiently at their own cost. BSoreover, at two 
air stations the servicing British technicians were placed 
under the control of the Boyal Air Force. Overflying, landing 
and servicing facilities for the RAF were also provided in the 
main Agreement. 
107• Section 8 of Annex. II. 
108. Ibid. 
109. Anthony Nutting* s statement in the House of Commons. See H.C. Deb.« vol. 531, 25 October 1954, col. 1608. 
110. Article 1. See also Part A of the Annex. I. 
111. Articles 3 and 4. 
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Sixthly, Egypt had agreed to waive all its financial 
claims arising out of the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty in 
October which amounted to a considerable sum. (112) 
Above all, their failure to include Iran in the 
reactivation provision was significantly compensated for by 
Egypt's agreement to a commitment that the parties would engage 
in "mutual consultation" in the event that any state covered 
by the Agreement came under a "threat of an armed attack". (113) 
Apparently it was the view of the British Government that an 
attack on Iran would constitute a threat towards Iraq ^ nd thus 
the consultation provision could be invoked. 
Anthony Nutting was, therefore, right when he said in 
the House of Commons that "the agreement gives us all we require 
... while at the same time we have eliminated the main source 
of friction between ourselves and the Arab world." (114) 
(Italics mine) 
lifhat more Britain could have at any rate hoped to gain 
from an agreement on the base which was going to be abandoned 
in any case in 1956. In that event Britain would have had no 
rights of re-entry or numerous other facilities which she had 
been able to secure under this agreement. Though the Egyptians 
were to have the base, it was to remain available for the 
general defence of the area. 
112. Nutting's statement. H.C. Deb.,, vol. 531, col. 532; 
vol. 632, col. 222. 
113. Article 4. 
ll'^ * H.C. Deb.^ vol. 632, col. 222. 
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As a matter of fact, Britain's agreement to transfer 
her control of tiie base to the Egyptians demonstrated the 
possibility of hanoonizing local and Western interests in a 
manner that would facilitate continued cooperation for common 
ends. In brief, it readjusted an outmoded relationship in a 
manner that brought substantial satisfaction to both sides -
though Egypt*s gain was almost entirely psychological. 
Perhaps the most appreciative and perceptive coimaent on 
this historic agreement between Egypt and Great Britain was 
offered by their brief 3oint-communique itself, which they 
issued after signing the 'great document': 
Ihe Prime Minister of the Bepublic of Egypt and 
his delegation and Mr. Kutting, Minister of State 
at the Foreign Office, the British Ambassador and 
Jfejor-General Benson, have signed today in Cairo 
an agreement in the Suez Canal base area designed 
to establish Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new basis 
of cooperation. 
The delegations have laboured intensively to 
achieve a clear, comprehensive agreement which 
constitutes a constructive measure in the cause 
of peace. 
They now express, on behalf of their GoveriMnents, 
their sincere desire to work closely and actively 
together in fulfilling the agreement, and so to 
promote a new spirit and friendship between their 
peoples. (115) 
K. EG:I!PT BECOMES A FREE MATION 
Nbw that the Republic of Egypt had achieved relatively 
complete freedom of choice and actions at the international 
plain, Nasser and his associates gave preference to build up 
US' Al-^hram. 20 October 1954; Mdeast Mirror^ 23 October 1954. 
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Egypt*s image as the leading nation in the area by improving 
her national economy and armed strength, rather than get lost 
into the intricacies of the cold-war. It is true that Egypt 
is too strategically located ever to escape the mesh of power-
politics. And for that reason alone, Egypt's problem had not 
been so much the Question of whether or not to be involved, 
but, in feet, with whom and for what purpose? Before the 
signing of the Agreement in October, they did not have the 
option even about the party to associate or to be more appro-
priate, to tie down themselves with. Now at least, the new 
leaders of Egypt had, for the first time after many centuries, 
the freedom to make their own decisions and exercise 
preferences. 
The task of making the choice was however easy as it 
was limited to the Western bloc or the Communists. The revolu-
tionary regime could not align itself with either without losing 
popularity and even power, depending on the extent of popular 
reaction to their decision. 
For the fulfilment of the 'social revolution' meant 
eradication of poverty by means of increasing production and 
employment to the Jobless. This depended on improved means of 
irrigation, technical education and rapid industrialization. 
The necessary capital, know-how, and equipment could come only 
from the Western sources. And, these Western sources were 
quite willing to oblige Egypt but on condition of closer military 
cooperation. (116) Egypt had had too long and too bitter an 
116. President Eisenhower had written to General Nasser as 
(contd. on next page) 
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association with the West to welcome it once again, though 
in a different form, under different .names. They knew that 
they were already being criticised by the extremists, notably 
the 'Brothers' for they had conceded the British the right of 
re-entering into the base. They saw the 'agreen^nt' with so 
much of disfavour that one of their members tried to sabotage 
it by aiming at Nasser's life. (117) Moreover, ever since they 
had dislodged the old politicians from power, they had been 
reminding the people of the loss of Palestine and the humilia-
tions they suffered in their first encounter with Israel, thus 
inculcating a sense of revenge against her and all others 
whom they held responsible for her creation in their midst and 
were now known to be her patrons and protectors. These were 
incidentally the same people who were in a position to help 
the Egyptians in the realization of their various plans and 
projects, including the construction of the Aswan Hi^ Dam. 
No Egyptian would have appreciated tying of their country with 
those same powers whose stand on Israel problem differed so 
markedly from their own. 
Any identification with the other quarter, without 
having built up necessary environment and mental preparedness 
116. (contd. from back page) 
long as 15 July 1953 that the US was ready to provide 
Egypt with economic and military assistance once a Suez 
agreement was reached. Again on 2 October it was announ-
ced that lafashington was now ready to begin implementing 
these pledges. Great Britain had already lifted its ban 
on the sale of arms to Egypt which had been imposed in 
1951 following the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty by the 
Wafd Goverment. See, United States in World Affairs 
1954. pp. 341-42. 
117. Al'Ahram, 27 October 1954; The Egyptian Gazette. 27 and 
28 October 1954. 
-298-! 
to face facts realistically,' 'wduM have been more dangerous-
Going to Moscow for help at that stage would have been too 
drastic a step for any Government with a predominently religious 
cotnmunity as its body of citizens. Moreover, the Soviet Union 
was still not actively interested to enter into the Arab areas 
and thus bring the cold war so near to her own door step. 
Their main interest was in keeping the area neutral as far as 
possible. Moreover, the Revolutionary Command Council was not 
unaware that they were being severely criticised in the Soviet 
press for concluding the Canal Zone Agreement. The Izvestia 
had bitterly reproached the Egyptian leaders for having 
"jumped on the American bandwagon for their shortsightedness 
and weakness". (118) 
The Budapest Badio had been openly accusing these 
leaders of independent Egypt of high treason and calling upon 
the Egyptians to revolt against them. (119) Radio Moscow had 
criticized the Suez Agreement as "the first step towards the 
inclusion of Egypt in the Western bloc." (120) The Free 
Officers, who now constituted the main body of the Government 
were resentful of the Soviet propaganda supporting the anti-
Government elements « the Brotherhood against the Junta, Heguib 
against Nasser, the Wafd against the liberation Rally. (121) 
118. Izvestia. 8 August 1954 in Walter Z. Laquer, The Soviet 
Union and the Middle East (I.ondon, 1959), p. 196. 
119. Ibid. 
120. Radio Moscow, 16 November 1954, in W.Z. Laquer, op.cit., 
p. 197. 
121. Ibid. 
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Thus it was apparently most difficult for the Egyptians 
aad to identify tliemselves with either of the two super powers. 
Nevertheless, the very fact of geography that made it impossible 
in the past to avoid entanglement with a Great Power, now 
suggested remaining aloof or non-aligned. A course of determined 
neutrality was most suitable for Egypt under the circumstances 
of Great-Power rivalries and contest for supremacy. 
Egypt was afraid of Communism and had taken serious 
repressive Erasures against local communists, but fear of 
communism was not the only or even the most important issue in 
Egyptian politics. Egypt has no common frontiers with the 
Soviet Union, as has Turkey, nor, to quote Albert Hburani's 
words, "has her her history conditioned her to think of her 
greatest danger as coming from that direction." (122) Therefore, 
they viewed the problem of East-V/est relations and the 
necessities of area defence in a radically different light from 
the British and the Americans. 
The overtures and the pledges made by the British and 
the American leaders, referred to above, therefore fell short 
of evoking a favourable response. Egypt, if correctly interpre-
ted, was quite eager and willing to receive Western aid in arms 
and money, (123) but disinclined to undertake the pledges 
required by the Mutual Security legislation or to take any other 
action that could seem to commit them to the Western cause. 
122. Albert Hourani, "Anglo-Egyptian Agreement", The Middle 
East Journal (Siammer, 1956), p. 253. 
123. See, Mew York Times, 31 July 1954. 
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Egypt*s views on the question of defence cooperation 
were set forth clearly by Nasser himself when he said: 
After the Suez settlement there is nothing standing 
in the way of our good relations with the West, but 
this harmony, hammering for pacts will only keep 
alive the old suspicions in the minds of the people, 
and the Communists know well how to exploit these 
suspicions. (124) 
This statement of the "most important man of Egypt* 
suggested to the Western Powers to keep patience and meanwhile 
build up confidence in the people of the area. A * Background 
Paper* published by the Council of Revolution further affirmed 
the Premier's views on the subject: 
It is only by a period of complete independence 
during which mutual trust is built up between 
Egypt and the Western powers that Egypt will be 
able to look without suspicion on any closer ties 
between this country and other powers. Cooperation 
based on trust and friendship, even though it is 
not specified by any written agreement, is better 
than a treaty that is regarded suspiciously by 
average Egyptian. (125) 
This was a true expression of the Arab situation the 
merits of which were, however, not properly assessed by the 
policymakers in London and Washington. They could not see 
the point that in shying away from the notion of formal defence 
arrangements with the West, the Egyptian leaders were 'ananinm-
ted* by a number of practical and ideological considerations. 
124. Al-Ahram. 20 August 1954. See also, The New York Times^ 
20 August 1954. See also, The United States in World 
Affairs 1954 (New York, 1956), p. 342. 
125. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Where I Stand and Why? (Press release 
of the Embassy of the UaR in Washington, 1959), p.4. 
See also The Times^  3 September 1954. 
-301-! 
They were not immune to the suspicion that »the Western 
Powers in pressing for defence cooperation were trying to 
secure a foothold in the country for their o\m purposes' • 
Moreover, the danger of an outside aggression did not 
seem to them so very great. If, in their view, there wag a 
threat„to^ tl^r secujjj^it was_no^J'rom the USSR but from 
Isr^l. It was now the central issue to which the two Great 
Powers - Great Britain and the United States - did not pay the 
attention it deserved. All future ups and downs in their 
relations with Egypt and other Arab countries were immediately 
and directly related to this central issue of Egyptian and 
Arab politics vis-'a-vis the Great powers. 

Chapter VIH 
SUMMARY £ND GONGLUSIOHS 
Egypt's struggle for freedom from foreign domination 
and interference can be traced back to the rise of tohammad 
Ali - *the founder of modern Egypt' - whose last descendant, 
King Faruk was sent into exile by a handful of nationalist 
military officers in July 1952. The manner and the circumstan-
ces in which Mohammad Ali was acclaimed by the people of Egypt 
as their political leader and guide (l) could be regarded the 
first expression of their national, consciousness. 
Among his successors who exploited the country's wealth 
and resources for their personal benefit and who staked Egypt's 
independence and national integrity by inviting British and 
French advisors and investors, Tawfik Fasha was politically 
the most infirm and incompetent. It was during his reign that 
the first organized nationalist agitation, led by Colonel Orabi, 
was forcibly suppressed and the country was occupied by the 
British in 1882. From that time to the day of signing the 
Suez Canal evacuation Agreement in 1954, the relations between 
Egypt and Great Britain were governed by the fact of Britain's 
superior military force and.Egypt's constant, at times violent, 
struggle to get rid of the alien domination and the concomitant 
foreign interference in Egypt's life and politics. 
On the eve of the First World War, Egypt's status was 
altered from 'occupation' to a 'Protectorate'. This change in 
1» See, M. Rifaat Bey, The Awakening of Modern Egypt 
(Iiondon, 1946), pp. 16-27• 
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Egypt's status vls-a-vls Britain's predominant position was 
merely a matter of formality. It did not bring any relaxation 
in the latter's policy of interference in Egypt's domestic 
affairs and suppression of emerging nationalist political 
forces. 
After the conclusion of 'Peace' between the Axis and 
the Allies, the Egyptians demanded their total emancipation. 
But all that their nationalist struggle and sacrifices during 
the war, achieved was a declaration of partial independence in 
February 1922. Britain^anilaterally decided to give Egypt a 
national government with a parliamentary set up, but, in fact, 
shorn of full sovereignty. Matters of foreign policy, defence, 
the problems and privileges of alien minorities and the manage-
ment of the Sudan affairs remained the exclusive concern of the 
British Government. These in fact were the very limitations 
which demonstrated the incompleteness and the mockery of the 
Egyptian independence. Being thus incapaciated to express her 
personality in external matters, Egypt's status in the comity 
of nations remained indeterminable. Nevertheless, the Egyptians 
accepted it as the first step towards the attainment of 
complete independence. 
In 1936, the world was again at the threshold of a serious 
crisis. With Hitler's-rise to power in Germany, the Axis 
challenged afresh the political hegemony of the victors of the 
First World War beyond their own geo-cultural limits. With a 
rapid rise in the tempers on both sides, the danger of a ma^or 
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conflagration was becoming more certain and in any such large-
scale battling! the possession of Egypt was to be seriously 
contested. Her geographic position as a bridge-head linking 
Europe with Asia and Africa was to be an invaluable strategic 
advantage in determining the outcome of the clash. Britaih 
would have been unwise to forego this advantage by letting Egypt 
sftip out of her control. Egypt, on the other hand, couldn't 
have been able to overthrow this control as long as the large 
contingents of British armed forces were physically stationed 
inside Egypt. It would have been, therefore, impossible for 
her to officially look or ask for the Axis* assistance without 
making Egypt itself a battlefield and thus causing incalculable 
destruction and misery to scores of her own people. Moreover 
if the Axis had intervened, and had succeeded against the 
British, Egypt would have only passed from one occupation to 
oHji. 
another without gaining her objective. If, on the hand, such 
an intervention was denied or defeated, the Egyptians would 
have been subjected to serious British revenge. The safer 
alternative was, therefore, to agree for the time being to a 
closer alignment with Great Britain. 
The conclusion of the 1936 Treaty between Egypt and 
Great Britain was thus accepted by the former under the pressure 
of circumstances. 
After the end of the war in 1945, Egypt proposed to the 
British Government that the 1936 Treaty be revised as the 
circumstances under which it was concluded had been substantially 
changed. 
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True, that the Treaty was well received by the 
Egyptians in 1936, and Prime Minister Mahas Pasha was widely 
credited for being its chief architect, nevertheless, it was 
clear from the beginning that the arrangement was not to be 
regarded as a final and satisfactory settlement of accounts 
with His Majesty's Government of the four points reserved in 
the Unilateral Declaration of 1922, only one - the protection 
of foreigners and minorities - had be«i conceded by the British, 
but the other three - imperial communications, the Sudan and 
the defence of Egypt were still left to be their sole concern* 
Egypt's acceptance of the Treaty, in fact, reflected the 
relative pressure - strength of Great Britain which she then 
effectively exercised in her treatment of Egypt. Once this 
pressure-capacity was modified in favour of Egypt, the effective-
ness of the Treaty was to be determined by the willingness of 
the Egyptians to abide by it rather than by the narrow-legalistic 
concept of 'Paeta Sunt Servanda'• 
In 1946-47 the pre-war balance of pov;er was fundamentally 
changed. Militarily and financially exhausted Britain was no 
longer capable of wielding unquestioned authority over the 
dependent territories. India had been freed and bifurcated into 
two independent nation-states - India and Pakistan. The US and 
the USSR had emerged from the war as the strongest Powers both 
striving to outbid the other in wisdom and influence. The 
United Nations Organization had been established to try to 
prevent all future wars by encouraging settlement of issues 
between nations by pacific means. (2) Its Charter had explicitly 
2. See Charter of the United Nations (Articles 2/3 and 33) 
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recognized the principle of * freedom for all', (3) and the 
equality of their sovereign status. (4) political domination 
or interference in any form against the wishes of the people 
concerned was prohibited* (6) 
Such post-war developments naturally encouraged the 
nationalists of Egypt to demand for a revision of the 1936 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty to redefine their mutual relations as 
equal nations* The people of Egypt considered nothing as urgent 
and important as the question of realizing their complete 
political freedom. The fate of Governments and political 
leaders was determined by their ability to deal with the British 
successfully. Every other matter, including reforms in 
administration and economic system was treated secondary. (6) 
Prom the Egyptian point of view, no achievement in any field 
could be compared to their national right of full independence. 
The stipulations of the 1936 Treaty were a serious limitation 
on the full and free expression of her sovereign will and 
actions. The presence of hostile foreign troops on her soil 
was wounding to her national dignity. 
In December 1945 the Egyptian Government made its first 
formal demand for a revision of the 1936 Treaty, frankly 
stating that the military situation which the Treaty had been 
3. Ibid. Art. 1/3' 
4. Ibid. Art. 2/1. 
6- Ibid. Art. 3/4* 
6. Egyptian Information Bureau, Modem Egypt - A Quarter 
Century of Progress (Cairo, 1952), p. 14. 
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deslgned to meet had ended with the war and, therefore, 
continuing their relations with Britain on the basis of a 
treaty which had become obsolete was unrealistic and insulting 
for the Egyptians. It reminded them of their uneven status 
vis-a-vis the other signatory, i.e. Great Britain. 
The Labour Government in London was not aversee to the 
necessity of revising the pre-war bilateral arrangements in view 
of the post-war develojanents in the world political climate 
and her own inability to effectively suppress the growing 
strength of the Egyptian nationalism. Prime Minister Attlee 
was quite inclined to look for a new basis of his country's 
relations with Egypt. He was convinced that Britain's vital 
interests in Egypt could be better preserved in a congenial 
and cooperative atmosphere rather than in a state of continuing 
animosity. 
He seemed quite serious about reaching a settlement with 
Egypt as he immediately started to translate his words into bold 
actions. On 7 May he made a formal announcement that his 
Government had accepted the principle of complete withdrawal of 
British forces from Egypt in peace-time provided a satisfactory 
agreement was reached on the question of treaty revision as a 
whole. (7) 
AS a practical gesture of his really desiring a peaceful 
settlement, he ordered the withdrawal of British troops from 
The Time^ ,, 8 May 1946. Al-Ahram and The Egyptian Gazette^ 
8 and 9 May 1946. 
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Cairo and Alexandria and to hand over the Cairo Citadel to 
Egyptian troops early in July 1946. (8) Such determined efforts 
indicated that Britain* s Labour Government was prepared to 
reconcile the aspirations of Egyptian nationalism with Britain's 
vital strategic and economic requirements. Consequently, the 
political atuK)sphere in Egypt becane more propitious than at any 
time before, for an agreement. The Egyptians who were already 
quite anxious for reaching an accord with London, willingly and 
without delay started negotiations with the leaders of His 
Majesty's Government. And for a time, it seemed rather certain 
that the two countries would successfully arrive at a new 
agreement to safeguard their mutual interests, but for a sudden 
change in the attitude of the British Government. 
On returning home from London where he had initialed a 
draft-treaty with the British Foreign Secretary, the Egyptian 
Prime Minister and leader of his delegation, Ismail Sidki Pasha 
informed his people that Britain had agreed on the settlement 
of the Sudan question '•within the framework of unity of Egypt 
and the Sudan under the Crown of Egypt." It was merely on the 
basis of this understanding that Sidki Pasha had agreed to the 
British suggestion, rather insistence, to split the problem of 
evacuation of British troops from the question of the Sudan. 
By the terms of the draft-treaty the British Government had 
agreed to complete evacuation of Egypt by the end of 1949; while 
Al-Ahr^my 5 July 1946$ The Manchester Guardian^ 6 July 
1946. 
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the question of the Sudan was to be settled in separate 
negotiations on the basis of unity of the Nile Valley. 
The chances of a peaceful and mutually satisfactory 
settlement of the whole of the Anglo-Egyptian controversy were 
better under Ismail Sidki Pasha than at any time before or- after 
he retired from public life, until Egypt underwent a revolutton-
ary change in the middle of 1962. He was firm in his views 
and was quite willing to enter into an alliance in place of the 
outdated 1936 Treaty. He also enjoyed the confidence and 
support of the King, and thus, he was strong enough to sail 
through the storm of opposition criticism successfully and 
obtain the ratification of the draft-instrument. The King too 
would have had no hesitation in approving it. 
But his position was seriously embarrassed and weakened 
by the public statement of the after-thoughts in Britain's 
policy. Alrtlee categorically refuted the Egyptian Prime 
Minister's interpretation and assertion of his understanding of 
the meanings of Sidki-Bevin draft-agreement. He claimed that 
»no change in the existing status and administration of the 
Sudan is contemplated and no impairment of the right of the 
Sudanese ultimately to decide their own future*. (9) 
The change in the minds of the Xabour leaders seemed to 
have been due to the fact of stringent criticism of their policy 
from the Conservative Opposition in the House of Commons. (10) 
9. H.C. Deb.y vol. 428, cols. 295-6. 
10. See H.C. Deb.. 5th Series, vol. 422, cols. 781-2. 
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Attlee's statements and actions were hotly criticised as a 
tactHcal erroT to begin negotiations with a concession. Some 
who belonged to the group of die-hard colonialists thought it 
principally unwise to evacuate Egypt and quit the Sudan at all* 
A weak Labour Government, already over-strained by and preoccu-
pied with the post-war domestic problems and a serious financial 
crisis, must have found it difficult to by-pass or ignore the 
compulsions and pressures of Britain's domestic politics. 
If Great Britain had be^i able to abide by its own 
earlier declarations of intentions, the Sidki-Bevin 'draft-
agreement' would have provided a reasonable guide-line for 
concluding a broad-based arrangement of mutual interest and 
advantage. The Egyptians would not have objected to the final 
agreement as it would have nearly fulfilled their primary 
nationalist objectives. Surely, they wouldn't have been unwise 
aU to let this opportunity slip and to suffer the anguish irritants 
f 
of an unsettled and xinenviable state of relations with Great 
Britain. 
Ismail Sidki's resignation from his country's Prime 
Ministership was more an expression of protest against London's 
backing out of its pledges to regard the Sudan an integral part 
of Egypt. He had accepted the principle of an alliance with 
Great Britain which would provide for the use of his country as 
a war-time military base, but he wished the return of the British 
forces to Egypt to be made conditional on the actual declaration 
of war in the Mediterranean or Middle East area. Britain, on 
the other hand, now insisted to have Egypt available as a base 
-Sil-
as soon as war appeared imminent anywhere in the world* Thii§, 
obviottsly meant the the continuation of the British Forces in 
Egypt as there was no definite and agreeable criterion to 
determine whether or not war was imminent. Moreover, with the 
grovfing uneasiness in the East-^ 'est relations, there always 
existed a potential <fenger in every comer of the world as the 
contest for power and influence between the two rival blocs was 
not confined to any given area. 
Similarly, on the question of the Sudan, the Egyptians 
were awfully disappointed to note that the British were trying to 
make the Sudan a separate political entity. They were convinced 
that the British were using the modern sophisticated expressions 
like •self-determination' for the Sudanese, as a cloak for 
Egyptians exclusion from, and for the continued imperialist 
occupation of, the Sudan. To say that as long as the Sudanese 
were able to decide their future political status, simply meant 
postponing the issue indefinitely. The British were to determine 
when and whether the Sudanese have acquired sufficient political 
wisdom and experience to decide their destiny. If during the 
past several decades of her almost exclusive control of the Sudan, 
the rate of literacy could not be higher than three per cent, CH) I 
it was not difficult to imagine how long the Sudanese would 
take to come of age. 
11. British Ambassador Sir Ralph Stevenson's statanent 
during his conversations with the Egyptian Foreign 
Minister. See flecord of Conversations^ op.cit., p. 73.* 
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Whe-tever might have been the compulsions and considera-
tions of national and international political intrigues and 
complexities, the responsibility for the failure to arrive at a 
peaceful settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian controversy would rest 
more on Great Britain. The negotiations in 1946-47 failed 
mainly on account of the latter* s unhelpful insistence on her 
own conditions* 
In the autumn of 1947, the new coalition Goveriwient of 
Egypt, headed by Fahmy En Nokrashi Pasha, appealed to the United 
Nations Security Council against the 1936 Treaty. But "his own 
and to his country's dismay, he discovered that the interests 
of smaller nations could not be successfully defended, if a 
combination of the Great Powers thought of their contentions 
somewhat diffjerentjy. The Egyptian Premier most strongly pleaded 
its case and used every argument that could appeal to the sense 
of justice of his 'distinguished audience', but as the British 
and the iSjnerican Governments were more anxious to preserve and 
safeguard British position and presence in the ai»ea apparently 
to contain communism, the consideration of - the Egyptian complaint 
and claims was put off indefinitely-
Further negotiations between Egypt and England remained 
suspended until the Wafd party returned to power in 1950. In the 
intervening period, the Egyptian scene was dominated mainly by 
problems of internal politics and rivalries between the Palace 
and the political parties, most prominent of them, the Wafd. For 
a while the major target of Egypt's nationalist resentment seemed 
to be not Britain but Faruk and his henchmen in the army and 
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among the civilians. A short sentence in K&sser's Philosop)hy 
of the Revolution^ recalling what a dying soldier-friend told 
to Kemal El Din Hussain at the time of their campaign against 
Israel: "Xisten Kemal, Egypt is the field of our supreme war 
effort", was the motivating force of the July 1962 Revolution. 
It is, therefore, understandable that while the Arab-Israel 
conflict did not directly cause the collapse of the so-called 
•Constitutional machinery* in Egypt, it contributed substantially 
to the chain of events v^ich led to the dramatic take-over of 
authority by the nationalist military leaders. 
In January 1960, the V/afdists returned to power with 
overwhelming majority in the Parliament. Their victory at the 
polls was however a clear manifestation of the people's desire 
to curtail the authority of the King and their determination to 
alter Egypt's relations with Great Britain on the basis of 
complete evacuation and unity of the Nile Valley. The Wafdists 
had identified themselves with this approach since 1941 when 
Nahas Pasha first addressed a note to the British Government 
asking for revision of the 1936 Treaty. They were chiefly 
responsible for the growth and expansion of nationalist opinion, 
and so they knew well that a resolute effort to resolve the 
•great controversy' with Britain was the most important issue 
that would determine their popularity and tenure of office. 
In June 1950 Nahas Pasha resumed negotiations with the 
British representatives. But the talks faltered and Egypt 
threatened to unilaterally abrogate the 1936 Treaty which, from 
the Egyptian point of view, had ceased to be a suitable basis 
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for Anglo-Egyptian relations. Throughout their lengthy 
discussions, dispersed over a year, they maintained their 
position on the demand of complete and unconditional evacuation 
both from Egypt and the Sudan. Britain, on the other hand, 
followed a policy of postponing the entire issue of their 
relations with Egypt. They took the plea of being too much 
preoccupied with other important international issues, presunably 
the Korean War and the crisis in Iran on the question of 
nationalization of oil. She insisted on the acceptance by Egypt 
of certain pre-conditions for revising their existing mode of 
relations. 
Despite urgency, the Egyptians, hov?ever, showed patience 
and maintained peace in the streets despite occasional provocative 
statements by the British side. A number of explanatory 'Notes* 
and * Aide-Memo ires* were exchanged between the two nGovernments, 
but in effect leading to nothing practically realizable. Great 
Britain* s insistence on viewing the whole problem of relations 
between Cairo and Xondon not within its 'narrow confines' but as 
a part of the larger question of regional security. Britain^ in 
fact, left no room for a con^romise by pressing Egypt to agree 
in advance to Join a Western-sponsored defence arrangement. For 
them (Britain and her allies) the danger of aggression from the 
Communist countries was not too far and unreal and, therefore, 
adequate military preparedness was an immediate necessity in 
order to deter such aggression. The British also declined to 
commit on the future of the Sudan without the Sudanese having the 
right to decide it by themselves. 
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There was obviously a wide gap between the political 
approach of Egypt and the military considerations of the British 
negotiators. Egypt was aspiring and struggling to restore her 
national dignity by removing all external restrictions on her 
sovereignty, while Britain was insistent on preserving her pre-war 
status and interests on the plea of new military necessity. It 
was, therefore, not a coincidence that the leader of the British 
delegation in the first formal talks opened in Cairo in June 
1950, was a high-ranking military officer, Field Marshal William 
Slim. 
The Egyptians understood that the British were seeking 
to perpetuate their military occupation under a new name and in 
a new form. They were, therefore, fully ;Justified in rejecting 
the new British proposal for a joint-armed forces of UK, USA, 
Prance and Turkey to be maintained in Egypt in peace-time. In 
fact, the presence of foreign army in pseace-time, could not mean 
anything else but a sort of occupation and a restriction on 
Egypt's freedom of actions at home and at the international 
level. 
If, on the other hand, Britain had agreed to the 
unconditional withdrawal of her forces from Egypt, it would have 
given the Egyptians a great psychological relief and consequently, 
a tactical advantage to the British to later ask for a closer 
cooperation both in peace and in war. With the British soldiers 
stationed within the country, the Egyptians could never believe 
that the proposed new alliance was, in any way, different from 
the one they had denounced recently. Nahas Pasha himself 
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eii5)hasised this psychological point ^ en he told the British 
negotiator that once the British had withdrawn from Egypt, his 
Government would be most willing "to work together hand-in-hand 
and with our hearts and souls." (12) The British, however, 
missed the point. They fiailed to realize the invaluable advantage 
of support and sympathy of a willing people as against the 
limited technical advantage which they hoped to obtain from the 
presence of 'limited foreign troops' in strategic areas, despite 
the natives* disapproval and active opposition. 
Great Britain's unresponsive and unhelpful attitude 
towards the needs and aspirations of the Egyptians was bound to 
harden their attitude on their basic national demands. They 
insisted that the question of evacuation and the unity of the 
Nile Valley were absolutely linked together and could not be 
dealt with separately. Moreover, the prospects of a Conservative 
vivtory in the forthcoming General elections in the UK, (13) 
were seriously apprehended to make things more difficult. They 
could not expect from a Conservative Government to concede to 
their demands. 
Thus, in view of a greater likelihood of the impasse in 
the existing situation becoming more difficult with the change of 
Government in London, Cairo could not have continued the talks 
12. Nahas Pasha's statement during his conversation with 
Marshal Slim, dated 5 June I960. See Record of Conversa-
tions. op.cit., p. 11. 
13. The General Elections in the United Kingdom were held on 
25 October 1951 which returned the Conservatives to power 
finder Churchill's Prime Ministership. 
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indefinitely. Besides, public opinion throughout Egypt was 
getting more and more impatient. The Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Communists, despite being ideologically poles apart, had made 
a coEttnon cause against the corrupt monarchy and the continuing 
menace of British occupation- Both were in the forefront 
representing the inchoat fury of the masses,, with the existing 
state of things. The various students' organizations and workers' 
committees, consisting mainly of young enthusiasts, could not 
be persuaded any more to accept the policy of wait and watch. 
Thus the Wafd had been emboldened by the firmness of 
national unity and support of the Government for the realization 
of the national objectives. Early in October 1851, when it 
became apparent that the negotiations with the British were not 
likely to achieve results or appease popular excitement, Nahas 
pasha felt himself strong enough and justified, to free Egypt 
from the bondage of the obnoxious 1936 Treaty by unilaterally 
abrogating it. The Egyptian Parliament approved the motion by a 
unanimous and enthusiastic vote. The^  parliament also conteap-
tuously turned down the latest British invitation to join the 
proposed Middle-East Defence Organization. The fact that the 
newest British proposals, being essentially the repetition of 
earlier ones, were handed to the Egyptian Goverrunent five days 
after the latter had publicly denounced the 1936 Treaty and the 
1899 Condominium Agreement, and refused to have any dealing 
with the British until their forces were withdrawn from both 
parts of the Nile Valley, were exhausperating, as they betrayed 
Britain's want of understanding and appreciation of Egypt's 
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nationalist fervour. 
After the passage of the Government motion of abrogation 
of the Treaty, there fbllowed several weeks of sporadic violence 
and sabotage in the Canal Zone, accompanied by mass withdrawal 
of Egyptian labour from the huge British military bases. Britain's 
so-called precautionary measures - imposing curfews and blocading 
of important strategic points connecting the Canal Zone with 
the city of Ismailia and the supply routes to the Egyptian army 
in the Sinai desert, and, above all, the landing of several 
battalions of British Paratroopers from Cyprus and the closing-in 
of the British war-vessels to the shores of Egypt merely added 
fuel to the fire. Furthermore, the British Commander's orders 
to disann the civilians and auxiliary police, and searching of 
private houses and mosques, was the gravest provocation. 
General Erskine's ultimatum demanding the surrender of 
auxiliary force, confined to their barracks in Ismailia, was 
without any impelling cause or reason. These handful and ill-
armed Egyptian police®^ had done nothing to justify the British 
action. The British had no legal authority to take such measures. 
After 1936, Egypt was not, legally speaking, an occupied territory 
and, therefore, there was no basis on which Britain's resort to 
force could be justified. Moreover, the Egyptian police-men 
were the sons of the soil and were not devoid of nationalist 
sentiments. Why then would they hage complied with the orders of 
an alien and incompetent authority to lay down their arms of 
self-defence. Surrender in this manner would have been a shame 
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for them. Surely, they didn't have sufficient armed strength 
to take up the challenge, but they did have sufficient moral 
courage and spirit of sacrifice to face the situation boldly. 
So, they turned down the ultimatum and fought the onslaught of 
the British armoured-cars until 50 of them were dead and 100 
wounded. 
This ghastly incident at Ismailia was bound to agitate 
the minds of the Egyptians. In a country that had been long 
struggling for her emancipation from the yoke of British 
imperialism, such impertinent manifestations <St force were 
inevitably to arouse the nationalist temper to revengeftil 
subversive activities. Morally, resort to violence could be, 
generally speaking, wrong and unappreciable. But under the 
circumstances of the present case, resort to violence was the 
natural weapon of the weaker of the two sides. In a frustrating 
situation existing in Egypt's relations with Great Britain, it 
was difficult to control the annoyance and anger of the youthful 
element charged with nationalist zeal. Therefore, what happened 
in Cairo on the 26th of January 1952, was a direct reaction of 
the most provocative and atrocious killing of their fellow-
countrymen in Ismailia by the British army. 
The agitation that started out to protest against the 
British was later joined by some irresponsible elements who 
turned the mob-frenzy into mob-violence against the British and 
other-foreign establishments, and also of those wealthy Egyptians 
who were known to be the friends and followers of the British 
and their ways of life. Many shops of fashion-material, 
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restaurants, cinemas, clubs and hotels, including the world-
famous 'Shepherds' were set on fire. 
The Wafd Government, which had not been dilatory in 
inflaming anti-British sentiments, however, was no longer capable 
of bringing the situation under control. The civil administra-
tion and the police, being equally resentful of the previous 
day's incidents at Ismailia, could not be expected to forcibly 
suppress the populitr. agitation. In the beginning they 
deliberately restrained but later on when the processionists 
became sufficiently worked-up and violent, they were not able 
to control the worsening of the situation. Finally, the army 
was called in to take charge of the situation, but by then 
considerable damage had been done to life and property of 
foreigners and some wealthy Egyptians too. This state of chaos 
and lawlessness, gave the King the chance he had been looking for 
for some time, to dismiss the Wafd Government. The very next 
day of the 'Black-Saturday', Nahas Pasha's Ministry was relieved 
of office. 
It would not be relevant in the context of this study, 
to analyse and determine the responsibility of the events of the 
26th of January. What is, however, important is that it was the 
culmination of the pent-up nationalist emotions, di sap point ii^ nts 
and resentments against Great Britain's prolong obstinacy and 
totally unhelpful insistence on seeing Egypt's problems from the 
view-point of cold-war requirements and exigencies. In fact, 
the British never impressed the Egyptians of appreciating their 
national sentiments. They never seriously wished to make a 
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compromise with Egypt, instead, they only wished to farther 
consolidate their existing position without regard to Egypt's 
disapproval and objection to the same. 
After the dismissal of Nahas Pasha*s Government, the 
King, whose shameful private life and utterly dishonest manage-
ment of public affairs had been exposed to the people, now 
started beliaving in the most autocratic and whimsical manner. 
In five months that preceded the spectacular take-over of the 
Egyptian affairs by the Free Officers in July 1952, five 
Governments were installed into power under Egypt'^ most distin-
guished personalities, but they all failed to put up with the 
sorry state of things. 
In such circumstances of government instability and 
widespread unrest due to severe shortage of essential consumer 
goods and rising of price-level of every article of domestic 
use, the question of Egypt* s relations with Great Britain was 
temporarily pushed into abeyance. Meanwhile, however, a secret 
organization of young army officers, most of whom had suffered 
the agony of mismanagement of the Palestine campaign, were 
preparing to eliminate Faruk and his corrupt favourites 
considered responsible for the decadence and humiliation of 
Egypt. 
In July 1952 their preparations and plans of action 
were still premature for staging the epoch-making drama of the 
revolution, but Faruk* s own hasty and lanwise actions forced them 
to advance the date of the great event. Faruk knew that there 
was a certain group of junior-rank officers who were opposing 
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his authority and influence in the amy* 
In order to suppress them, he appointed his own relative 
Colonel Sherin as Minister of War while his Prime Minister 
favoured General Mohajnad Jffeguib* s name to appease the army* But 
the King seemed to have underrated the intelligence and 
confidence of the cool-headed shrewed tactician who was leading 
the Free Officers when he thought of breaking their organization 
by suddenly pounding over their heads and dispersing them to 
distant places. But before Faruk and his trusted 'senior 
officers' had had a chance to implement their plans, the army 
of the revolution silently captured them and put an end to 
their influence and authority for ever. 
The initial reaction of the people of Egypt was of 
surprise but not of fear or shock. They were ultiiaately happy 
to see that the corrupt and unjust oligarchy of the Pashas was 
at last long toppled down. 
Great Britain's reaction to these developments in Egypt's 
domestic affairs, was determir^d primarily by the wise and 
timely assurances, given by leaders of the revolution, to protect 
the life and property of all foreign residents in Egypt. In 
their earliest broadcasts to the nation, they repeated this 
assurance to disallow the British to make a move on that 
pretext. 
Despite this assurance and strict vigilance to prevent 
rioting or sabotage against the British, if the British had 
tried to repeat the history of 1942 and interfere in Egypt's 
internal matters, the consequences would have been only la 
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disastrous. Not only the people of Egypt and their army 
would have offered strongest resistance, but the entire world 
conanunity would have unreservedly condemned them. The Western 
cati^ ) would have been weakened to prevent the expansion of 
Soviet influence in the whole of Asia and Africa, and very 
probably, the cold-war wouldn't have recsained that cold. More-
over, the confidence of the smaller nations in the ability of 
the United Nations to prevent the 'Big Powers' from interfering 
in other's local affairs, would have been completely shattered. 
Britain's attitude of restraint and in fact the 
acceptance of the new revolutionary order helped a lot in 
resolving her disputes with Egypt in a peaceful manner. Thus 
far, the King's interests and honour had limited the scope and 
chances of reaching a settlement with Great Britain. After 
Faruk's removal from the scene and finally after the Institution 
of Monarchy was replaced by a Republican form of Government in 
June 1953, the prospects of reaching an agreement on all out-
standing issues between Egypt and England became more definite 
than ever before. 
The new leaders were not committed on any particular 
form or conditions of such an agreement. They could afford to 
start with a clean slate. They could be realistic and precise 
in their approach and dealing with the British as they were not 
aspiring to make politics their new career. They were essentially 
military men, not a political party and had no political 
manifesto of their own. Their objective was confined to freeing 
the country from corruption and to get the British out of Egypt 
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and the Sudan. But they did not wish to do all that by 
themselves. Their original plan was to leave the power in the 
hands of civilian authorities as soon as the administration 
was cleaned of corrupt persons and practices and the existing 
political parties were able to reform* themselves. The parties, 
however, did not agree to do so as it reflected upon their 
integrity, capability and performance. 
The leaders of the revolution, thereupon decided that 
the traditional political pattern was not capable of realizing 
the 'social objectives' of their revolution. They believed that 
Egypt desperately needed to reform its political iaatitutions 
and reorganize the fabric of socio-economic activity; that the 
pace of the desired change had to be faster if Egypt was 
intended to catch up with the other rapidly developing nations 
of the world. 
In fact, in a country like Egypt where the rate of 
literacy was not higher than 10 per cent, and where the average 
wage of the worker was as meagre as thirty cents a day; (14) 
where opportunities for instruction in modern subjects of science 
and technology i^ ere still negligible, where a relatively small 
number of wealthy landowners controlled immense quantities of 
land and formed an economic oligarchy with enormous political 
influence; (15) where the masses had been living for long under 
14. Egyptian Information Bureau, Modern Egypt - a quarter 
century of Progress (Cairo, 1952), p« 4* 
15. Out of a total number of 2.75 million proprietors, 70 per 
cent had less than half an acre each, while 2,115 had over 
200 acres each. At the top of the pyramid of ownership 
(contd. on next page) 
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alien political subjugation in which their political education 
and training in public affairs was carefully avoided lest they 
became conscious and demanding of their political rights, it 
would have been quite futile to create a fascade of Parliamentary 
democracy. If the elections were held under the existing 
circumstances, the same intriguing class of self-centred rich 
Pashas would have returned to power and utilized their position 
and authority for their personal glorification and the prosperity 
of their own class. And, no Government of the old type would 
have given Egypt, what she now badly needed - reforms in every 
walk of life. 
The return of old parties to povrer would have only meant 
the continuation of all the old ills of the Egyptian society, 
while as a matter of fact, it was the high-time for Egypt to 
undertake a complete overhauling of her entire set up. She 
needed to conserve every bit of her energy for her rapid 
regeneration and revitalization. Only a government under the 
Free Officers could be expected to make a break-through in her 
domestic reformation, and also boldly remove the stalemate in 
her relations with Great Britain without which Egypt could never 
really feel herself to be free from the age-old yoke of British 
imperialism. 
IS. (contd. from back page) 
some 200 proprietors owned an average of 2,600 acres each, 
but some of them owned as many as 20,000 acres. The King 
and members of his family owned about 2/3 of the area that 
was expropriated under the land Beforms plan of the military 
Government. See Nauris Harard, Government and Politics of 
the Middle East (N.J., 1962), p. 71. 
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For dealing with the British, as past experience 
suggested, Egypt needed a strong, stable Government which 
enjoyed popularity and commanded unchallenged authority. The 
Council of the Revolution, therefore, had good reasons to decide 
that it could not work through existing political parties and 
personalities, and to assume all power directly for a transi-
tional period of three years• 
During this period, the revolutionary Government, mainly 
because of its realism, foresight and straightforwardness, scored 
two spectacular and long-awaited diplomatic victories in its 
relations with the Government of the United Kingdom. These 
spirited youngmen seemed to have fully realized that no Egyptian 
Government, however authoritarian, could ultimately survive, if 
it was not able to meet the country* s desire to be free and 
unoccupied. No plans of socio-economic reforms and no scheme 
of political development could evoke popular enthusiasm and 
cooperation unless Egypt truly became master of its ownself. 
The abdication of the 'bad King', the abolition of the 
titles of »Beys» and 'Pashas', the expropriation of landed estates 
exceeding a limit of two hundred feddans, and finally, the 
termination of the institution of monarchy in June 1963, were 
undoubtedly impressive measures for the purpose of Egypt's 
sociological transformation, but her political liberation was 
still to be achieved. 
It was obvious that so long as the question of the Suez 
Canal base and the Sudan remained unsolved, the people of Egypt 
could not regard the change of order anything better than the 
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pregious ones. Popular feeling against the presence of the 
British troops was so strongly resentful and frustrating that 
Egypt*s new leaders decided to open negotiations with the British 
Government without further delay. But they did so with a marked 
difference. Having successfully eliminated the King and the 
parties from the scene of Egyptian politics; they had virtually 
no fear of violence of mobs or the machinations of political 
rivals, they were able to tackle the question of relations with 
Great Britain with some boldness. They sho^ /ed some realism by 
agreeing to split the two outstanding issues and to consider . 
them separately, each independent of the other. The result was 
that within a few weeks an agreement had been reached over the 
Sudan in February 1953. 
The terms of the agreement over the future of the Sudan 
clearly showed that the new Egyptian elite was convinced that 
despite many cultural affinities with the people of the Sudan, 
there were, nevertheless, vital disparities between them and 
that the latter had a claim to be recognized as a separate 
national entity. They held that to deny the Sudanese the right 
of •self-government' and »self-determination', while insisting 
upon the same in their own case, betrayed contradiction and 
inconsistency in Egypt's political approach. They were intelli-
gent enough to visualise the consequences of deliberately ignor-
ing the rising tide of nationalist upsurge in the Sudan. They 
knew that even the pro-Sgypt Unionists were not really thinking 
in terms of a perpetual and total amalgamation of their 
country with Egypt. 
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They were mainly interested in ousting the British, 
and, to achieve that end, they needed closer cooperation and 
guidance of their Egyptian brothers. Once the British were out, 
the Sudanese were to break with Egypt as well and emege as a 
fully sovereign state - master of its owaself* The Ashigga, 
which represented the unionist trend was, in fact, more seriously 
interested in denying the Mehdis the possibility of making the 
Sadan their kingdom under the British patronage. 
With this understanding of the Sudan situation, the 
military Junta of Egypt did not think it advisable to insist 
that the Sudan was a part of Egypt and must be treated as such. 
In their view, the hitherto followed policy of inextricably 
associating the question of evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone 
with the statusnof the Sudan only meant indirectly extending 
the lease of Britain's continued occupation of their own country. 
Therefore, by recognizing the right of the Sudanese to determine 
their own future, the members of the military regime exhibited 
more immediate concern to their own country's liberation. 
The famous 'Khartum Agreement* between Egypt and the 
two main political groups, the 'Ashigga' and the 'Umma', which 
provided for immediate elections, a transition period of three 
years, speedy Sudanization of all services, and a referendum to 
be held at the end of the transitional period to decide whether 
the Sudanese should be independent or united with Egypt, was a 
remarkable diplomatic victory of Egypt over the British. By 
agreeing to the principle of self-determination for the Sudan, 
the Egyptians, virtually left ho room for the British to postpone 
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the issue any further. The Egyptians had cleverly trumped 
the British ace, and thus made it inevitable for the latter to 
accept the new accelerated prograMae of self-determination for 
the Sudan. 
The events in the Sudan politics that followed the 
signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, proved that the young 
leaders of the Egyptian revolution had rightly understood the 
nature and the dimensions of the nationalistic fervour of the 
Sudanese. The first national Government of the Sudan headed by 
Ismail Azhari, leader of the Ashigga, apenly resented Egypt's 
attenQ)t to influence the Sudanese choice in favour of closer 
alignment with Egypt. 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was the real leader, guide and 
mentor of the Revolutionary Command Council, wisely reconciled 
with the situation in the Sudan without bitterness or resentment. 
Endowed with qualities of admirable statesmanship and political 
foresight, he immediately realized that the prospect of an 
independent and friendly Sudan was far better than the prospect 
of a subservient and hostile one. In December 1955, when the 
Sudanese Parliament unanimously declared that the Sudan was 'to 
become fully independent sovereign state', he was the first to 
accord full recognition to her new status. (16) 
The signing of the agreement on the Sudan question was 
almost inanediately followed by undertaking negotiations on the 
question of the Suez Canal Zone evacuation. But these negotiations 
16. Al-Ahram, 2 January 1956; The Times, 2 January 1956. 
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took comparatively longer time and involved some serious 
debate on the terms and conditions of the agreement between 
the two Governiaents. 
On the Egyptian side, a contest for power between General 
Mohammed Neguib and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasserj both represent-
ing divergent views on domestic matters, preoccupied the 
energies and the attention of the Government and the people so 
much that the negotiations with Britain over the Canal Zone 
had to be put off until the controversy ended with complete 
victory for Nassr. 
Heguib's defeat was, in fact, the victory of the revolu-
tionary forces with which Hasser was identified» Neguib had 
played no part in liberating Egypt from the tentacles of corrupt 
monarchy and selfish politicians. He was merely a titular head 
whom the young engineers of the coup had chosen to be their 
nominal leader in order to convince the Egyptians and the world 
at large that their action was not a youthful adventure. In this 
assigned role, Keguib earned stockpiles of mass-popularity and 
prestige. He was widely acclaimed as the deliverer, but only 
few knew that the real authority behind him was the Revolutionary 
Council. After the Sudan Agreement, however, Neguib unwisely, 
decided to make himself the master of the situation. He 
developed secret contacts with the opponents of the revolution, 
particularly the Moslem Brotherhood whifcch promised him to support 
him in his bid for power. He, therefore, insisted on rapid 
reversion to constitutional life and civilian control of the 
Government. 
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Nasser and his more radical and more perceptive 
colleagues in the ROC, on the other hand, felt that if the 
military Junta prematurely relinquished the reins of Government, 
Egypt would sink back again into corruption and chaos. The 
old pattern of intrigues and rivalries between individual 
leaders and parties around them, would not only have adversely 
affected Egypt's socio-economic transformation, but also 
disabled her to get rid of Britain's domination. The Council of 
the Revolution obviously, could not have allowed that to happen, 
and so it decided to push the real leader of the revolution, 
Nasser, in the forefront by appointing him the Prime Minister 
of the country with full authority both to look into domestic 
issues and to deal with the British. 
Thus armed with added strength and enlarged authority, 
Nasser, immediately resumed negotiations with the British 
representatives in Cairo, over the question of the Canal Zone, 
and after several weeks of hard bargaining, initialed an agree-
ment which happily provided for immediate British evacuation 
from Egypt. 
A closer examination of the main provisions of the 
historic agreement would clearly show that Egypt was not the 
looser in any sense, in any way. As his country's chief 
negotiator in this case, Nasser had undertaken certain well-
calculated risks when he conceded to the inclusion of Turkey in 
the list of countries an attack on which would justify Britain's 
re-entry into the base, he was certainly not unaware that the 
cold war still far away in Europe and the Par East, and that the 
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Soviet Union was not yet strong enough to forcibly assert 
her position and interests in the Arabic-speaking area* More-
over, the people of Egypt, according to his calculations, 
'would not care much about Turkey - all that they would be over-
whelmed with would be the fact that at last long, the British 
were clearing out'• The popular acclamation to the agreement, 
and their 'wild rejoicing' into streets of Cairo and Alexandria, 
proved that he understood the minds of his countrymen well* 
Above all since an aggression against Turkey - a partner in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, would have meant a world 
war, in which event Egypt was to be greatly benefited by having 
Britain's support. 
The most immediate and the most profound effect of the 
signing of this historic agreement was that the twenty million 
Egyptians felt, for the first time in many centuries, that they 
were now a really independent and sovereign nation* It was an 
end in itself as well as the starting point for the realization 
of Egypt's other aspirations. The presence of the invisible 
British troops in their country for the last seventy-two years, 
was a barrier, the removal of which was sure to enable them fight 
against social evils. 
For Great Britain also the peaceful conclusion of the 
evaciiation treaty was not a bad bargain. Their experience of the 
past several decades of dealing with the Egyptians was not a happy 
one. The latter had persistently refused to accept anything 
at the cost of their independence and national dignity. After the 
World War II their nationalism had become more vigorous and 
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assertive. No amount of force used against them would have 
discouraged them in their endeavour to achieve their full 
freedom. If not in 1954, the Egyptians would have, any way, 
completely abandoned the 1936 Treaty when it would have automa-
tically expired in 1966. In that event Britain would have had 
no rights of reentry and reactivisation of the base for the 
purpose of the defence of the area. Under the present agreement, 
Britain, as a matter of fact, preserved nearly all of her 
•essential requirements'. (17) In brief, she had more than one 
f" 
reasons to feel satisfied about the said Canal Zone Agreement. 
She had freed herself from the liability of maintaining a costly 
base without however, surrendering the right to use it when 
necessity arose. 
By agreeing to evacuate the Suez canal Zone, Great Britain 
in fact acknowledged that a military base, however important a 
link in the British communications, could not be effectively and 
fruitfully maintained in the face of total dissent and violent 
protest of the people of the area. 
The Suez Canal Evacuation Agreement, r?itified by the 
Parliaments of Egypt and England in October 1964, was one of the 
most important landmarks that turned the «ugly page* of the 
history of Egypt's relations with Great Britain. As it finally 
ended Britain's military occupation of their country, there was 
now no grievance or bad feeling in the heart of the Egyptians 
against the British. Both, Egypt and Great Britain expected that 
17• See pepartment of State Bulletlny 10 November 1954, p. 734. 
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henoeforth their two countries would be able to work 
constructively together. 
The two people could have really become great friends 
and cooperate with each other in the realization of their common 
objectives of peace and prosperity, if Great Britain had not 
unwisely tried to prevent Egypt from influencing and guiding 
similar movements for freedom and national honour in other Arab 
countries of the area, Britain's sponsorship of the infamous 
Baghdad Pact was so obviously motivated to challenge and 
counter-balance Egypt* s expanding prominence and popularity 
throughout the Arab world» 
Britain's denial of arms to Egypt for her self-defence 
against Israel's mounting war-like overtures and then the 
launching of the Anglo-French military aggression against her, 
in collaboration with her enemy, Israel, in 1966, were primarily 
motivated to snub Egypt and to disable her completely to strive 
and to participate in the awakening of the Arab world. 
Great Britain's unfriendly and uncooperative attitude 
towards Egypt, however, betrayed their want of proper understand-
ing not only of Egypt's national aspirations but also their 
inability to realize that only Egypt, by virtue of her greater 
political experience and better socio-economic and Intellectual 
standards, and her larger and better organized armed forces, 
was capable of leadership of the Arab world* Also being centrally 
located between the Arabic-speaking part of Asia and Africa, 
Egypt was naturally destined to play the role of the 'Big 
Brother' • 
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In October 1964 Great Britain recognized the strength 
of Egyptian nationalism, and their own inability to suppress 
it any further, when they signed the agreement to quit the 
Suez Canal Zone, but they ignored that the new republican 
Government of Egypt represented the modem political trends 
which were bound to appeal and inspire every other Arab state 
desiring to come of age by denouncing imperialism and its evils. 
In his 'Philosophy of the Revolution', Nasser had 
articulated the so-called Thesis of the 'Three Circles' -
Arab, African and Islamic - in which Egypt had a major role to 
play. <18) Great Britain's inability or unwillingness to 
properly assess the value and the implications of the contents 
of this small book in the context of historical facts of their 
long but unhappy experience, led to disappoint the glowing hopes 
of Anglo-Egyptian cooperation to which Anthony Head, Secretary 
of State for War, had hinted at in October 1964. (19) 
By sponsoring the Baghdad Pact in 1955, Great Britain 
aroused suspicions in Egypt which, aggravated by the perennial 
Egyptian and Arab dispute with Israel, and the Western role in 
the Palestine question, forced them to call up the very Soviet 
A 
"devil", that the Western alliance was seeking to deter. Prom 
thett on Egypt led the forces of opposition in the Arab world to 
the Western defence schemes and became one of the major 
18. Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution 
<Cairo, 1964), p. 30. 
r 19. See, H.C. Deb., vol. 631, col. 1610. See also, The New 
York Times. 30 July 1954. 
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proponents in Asia and Africa of the policy of neutralism 
in the cold war. Needless to say such Egyptian action was 
very pleasing to the Soviet Union who eventually ' leaped over' 
the MEDO alliance to enter the Arab political scene in the 
form of economic and military aid from 1955 and on. (20) 
20. See, Middle East Forum> vol. XLV, 1969, p# 56, 
Appendix I 
DHAFT ANGIX3-EGyPTIAN TREAIT AND ACGOMPAKYIWG 
PROTOCOLS 
25 October 1946 
Art. 1* The Treaty of Alliance signed in London on 26th 
August, 1936, together with the Agreed Minute, notes and the 
Convention of 26th August, 1936, concerning inununities and 
privileges which accompanied the said Treaty, shall cease to 
have effect upon the entry into force of the present Treaty. 
Art. 2. The High Contracting Parties agree that in the 
event of Egypt becoming the object of armed aggression or in the 
event of the United Kingdom becoming involved in war as the 
result of armed aggression against countries adjacent to Egypt, 
they shall take, in close co-operation and as a result of 
consultation, such action as may be recognised as necessary until 
the Security Council has taken the necessary measures for the 
re-establishment of peace. 
Art. 3. In order to ensure the mutual co-operation and 
assistance of the High Contracting Parties, and in order to permit 
of the effective co-ordination of the measures to be taken for 
their mutual defence, the High Contracting Parties agree to 
establish a joint Board of Defence composed of the competent 
military authorities of the two Governments, assisted by such 
other representatives as the two Governments shall appoint. 
The Board is an advisory body whose functions are to 
study, with a view to proposing to the two Governments the measures 
1. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers. 1947. Egypt Wo. 2, 
Cmd. 7179. 
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to be taken, problems concerning the mutual defence of the 
High Contracting Parties by land, sea and air, including questions 
of material and personnel connected therewith and, in particular, 
the technical requirements of their co-operation and the steps 
to be taken to enable the armed forces of the High Contracting 
Parties to be in a position effectively to resist aggression-
The Board shall meet as often as may be necessary in order 
to carry out these functions. If need arises, the Board shall 
also examine, on the invitation of, and on the information 
supplied by, the two Governments, the military repercussions of 
the international situation, and, in particular, of all events 
which may threaten the security of the Middle East, and shall make 
in this respect suitable recommendations to the two Governments, 
who, in the case of events threatening the security of any one 
of the neighbouring countries of Egypt, will consult together in 
order to take in agreement such measures as may be recognised 
as necessary. 
Art. 4. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to 
conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition 
directed against one of them. 
Art. 5. Nothing in the present Treaty can in any way 
prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve, or may devolve, 
upon one or other of the High Contracting Parties under the 
Charter of the United,Nations. 
Art. 6. The High Contracting Parties agree that any 
difference on the subject of the application or interpretation 
-339-! 
of the provisions of the present Treaty, which they are unable 
to settle by direct negotiation, shall be determined in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, 
having due regard to the declarations made by both High Contract-
ing Parties under Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the 
International Court. 
Art. 7. The present Treaty is subject to ratification. 
Batifications shall be exchanged in Cairo as soon as possible. 
The Treaty shall come into force on the date of the exchange of 
ratifications. The present Treaty shall remain in force for a 
period of twenty years from the date of its coming into force 
and thereafter it shall remain force until the expiry of one 
year after a notice of termination has been given by one High 
Contracting Party to the other through the diplomatic channel. 
DRAFT SUDAN PK3T0C0X 
The policy v/hich the High Contracting Parties undertake 
to follow in the Sudan within the framework of the unity between 
the Sudan and Egypt under the common Crown of Egypt will have 
for its essential objectives to assure the well-being of the 
Sudanese, the development of their interests and their active 
preparation for self-government and consequently the exercise of 
the right to choose the future status of the Sudan. Until the 
High Contracting Parties can in full common agreement realise 
this latter objective after consultation with the Sudanese,' the 
Agreement of 1899 will continue and Article 11 of the Treaty of 
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1936, together with its Annex and paragraphs 14 to 16 of the 
Agreed Minute annexed to the same Treaty, will remain in force 
notwithstanding the first Article of the present Treaty. 
DRAFT EVACUATION PROTOCOL 
The High Contracting Parties agree that the complete 
evacuation of Egyptian territory (Egypt) by the British Forces 
^all be completed by 1st September, 1949. 
The towns of Cairo and Alexandria and the Delta shall be 
evacuated by 31st March, 1947. The evacuation of the remainder 
of the country shall proceed continuously during the period 
ending at the date specified in the first paragraph above. 
The provisions of the Convention of 26th August, 1936, 
concerning immunities and privileges will continue provisionally 
to be applied to the British Forces during the period of their 
withdrawal from Egypt. Such amendment of the agreement as may 
be necessary in view of the fact that British troops will after 
31st March, 1947, be withdrawan from the Delta and the two cities 
shall be settled by a subsequent agreement between the two 
Governments to be negotiated before this date. 
Appendix II 
DRAFT DEGREE-I^WS ^ ^^  
A draft decree-law abrogating the 1936 Treaty and Its 
Annexesy and the Condominium Agreements of January 19 and 
July lOy 1899y regarding the administration of The Sudan. 
We Farouk I King of Egypt. 
Upon what has been submitted to us by the Council of 
Mini sters. 
Vie order the following 
The folloi^ ring draft law is to be submitted in Our name 
to Parliament 
Article I. - Xaw No.SOj 1936, ratifying the Treaty of 
Friendship and Alliance between Egypt and Great Britain and which 
was signed in London on August 26, 1936, shall be rescinded. 
Thus, the provisions of this Treaty and the agreement attached 
thereto concerning exemptions and privileges enjoyed by the 
British Forces stationed in the Kingdom of Egypt, as well as the 
provisions of the Condominium Agreements of January 19 and July 
10, 1899, regarding the administration of The Sudan shall cease 
to be operative. 
Article II. - Law No.13 and Law No.24, 1941, relative 
to exemptions and privileges referred to in the preceding Article 
are abrogated. 
1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Egypt). Becords of Conversations^ 
Motes and Papers Exchanged between the Royal Egyptian 
Government and the United Kingdom Government Cl^ i^ rch 1950 -
November 1951) (Cairo^  19511, pp. 171-175. 
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Article III. - Our Ministers are hereby charged with 
the execution of this law, each in so far as he is concerned 
and with taking the necessary measures in this respect. 
It will become operative as from the date of its publica-
tion in the "Journal Officiel". 
Issued at Montazah Palace on Al-Moharram 6, 1371 (October 
7, 1951). 
FAROUK 
II 
A draft decree-law inviting Parliament to amend the 
Constitution to decide the constitutional position of The Sudan 
and to define the title of the King. 
We Farouk I King of Egypt. 
After taking cognisance of Royal Decree No.42, 1923, 
setting up a constitutional regime for the Egyptian state and of 
Articles 156 and 157 of the Constitution; and upon what has been 
submitted to us by the Council of Ministers. 
¥e order the follox^ ing:-
Article I. - Parliament is invited to consider amending 
Articles 159 and 160 of the Constitution to decide the constitu-
tional position of The Sudan and to define the title of the King. 
Article II. - The President of our Council of Mnisters 
is hereby charged with the execution of this decree. 
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III 
A draft decree-law providing that the King shall be 
titled King of Egypt and The Sudan. 
We Parouk I King of Egypt. 
After taking cognisance of Boyal Decree No.42, 1923, setting 
up a constitutional regime for the Egyptian Statej of Articles 
156 and 157 of the Constitution; of the decree issued on October 7, 
1951, proposing the amendment of some provisions of the 
Constitution; and of the two decisions of Parliament approving 
the necessity of such amendment and the subject matter thereof. 
Me order the following 
The following draft law is to be submitted in Our name 
to Parliament 
Article I. - Article 159 of the Constitution shall be 
cancelled and the following substituted:-
The provisions of this Constitution shall apply to all the 
Egyptian Kingdom. Although Egypt and The Sudan are one nation, 
the regime of rule in The Sudan shall be defined by a special 
law. 
Article II. - Article 160 of the Constitution shall be 
cancelled and the following substitutedi-
"The King shall be titled King of Egypt and the Sudan." 
Article III. - The President of the Council of Ministers 
and the Minister of Justice are hereby charged with the esecution 
of this law which will become operative as from the date of its 
publication in the "Journal Officiel". 
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IV 
A draft decree-law providing that The Sudan shall have 
a special Constitution to be drawn UP by a Constituent Assembly 
representing the inhabitants of The Sudan* 
We Farouk I, King of Egypt and The Sudan. 
After taking cognisance of Law No. , 1951, abrogating 
the Treaty of August 26, 1936, and its annexes and also abrogating 
the Condominium Agreements of January 19 and July 10, 1899, 
concerning the administration of The Sudan and also after taking 
cognisance of Article 159 of Boyal Order No.42, 1923, setting up 
a constitutional regime for the State of Egypt, amended by Law 
No. , 1951. 
And upon what has been submitted to us by the Council of 
Ministers. 
We order the following 
The following draft law is to be submitted in Our name to 
Parliament 
Article I. - The Sudan shall have a special Constitution to 
be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly representing the inhabitants 
of The Sudan and shall be enforced as soon as sanctioned and 
promulgated by the King. The Constituent Assembly will also draw 
up an electoral law to become operative in The Sudan after its 
ratification and promulgation. 
Article II. - The rules and proceduresix)f the Constituent 
J^ ssembly shall be defined in a decree. 
Article III. - The Constitution referred to in Article I 
shall contain the following fundamental rules 
a) The establishment of democratic and representative rule 
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in the country, whether the representative body consists of one . 
t 
Chamber or two. One of the two Chambers at least shall be 
/ 
entirely elective. 
The King's prerogative to dissolve the representative body 
or the elected Chamber only, if the representative body is composed 
of two Chambers, a new general election shall be held within a 
short interval of time to ensure the continuance of parliamentary 
control over the executive authority. 
b) The separation of the legislative, executive and 
Judicial authorities. 
c) The establishment of a Council of Ministers composed of 
Sudanese. The King ruling through his Ministers and having the 
right to appoint and dismiss his Ministers. The Ministers being 
jointly responsible to Parliament or to the elected Chamber, at 
least for the general policy of the Cabinet and each for his 
Ministry. 
d) The participation of the representative body with the 
King in practising the legislative authority including the 
introduction of legislation. Issuing of laws to be subject to 
approval by Parliament and sanction by the King. 
The prior approval by the representative body of the levying 
of new taxes, their modification or abolition, floating of loans 
and the annual budget. 
e) The guarantee of the independence of the judiciary 
authorities at all levels. 
f) The guarantee within the limits of the law of the rights 
of individuals, public and personal liberties, liberty of belief, 
freedom of opinion, liberty of the Press, liberty of meetings and 
of association. 
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Article IV. - As an exception to the provisions of the 
preceding Articles, Foreign Affairs and matters of Defence, the 
Army and Currency, shall be exercised by the King throughout 
the country within the limits of Royal Order No.42, 1923, 
establishing a constitutional government in the State of 
Egypt. 
Article V. - The President of our Council of Mnisters 
is hereby charged with the execution of this law. 
Appendix III 
AGREEMENT ON SELF-GOVERM/IENT AND SELP-BETERMIM-
TION FOR THE SUEAN: BRITAIN AND EGYPT 
12 February 1963 Cl) 
Art. I. In order to enable the Sudanese people to 
exercise Self-Determination in a free and neutral atmosphere, 
a transitional period providing full self-government for the 
Sudanese shall begin on the day specified in Article 9 below 
Art. 2. The transitional period, being a preparation for 
the effective termination of the dual Administration, shall be 
considered as a liquidation of that Administration. During the 
transitional period the sovereignty of the Sudan shall be kept 
in reserve for the.Sudanese until Self-Determination is achieved. 
Art. 3. The Governor-General shall, during the 
transitional period, be the supreme constitutional authority 
within the Sudan. He shall exercise his powers as set out in 
the Self-Government Statute with the aid of a five-member 
Commission, to be called the Governor-General* e Commission, whose 
powers are laid doiim in the terms of reference in Annex I to 
the present Agreement. 
Art. 4. This Commission shall consist of two Sudanese 
proposed by the two contracting Governments in agreement, one 
Egyptian citizen, one citizen of the United Kingdom and one 
Pakistani citizen, each to be proposed by his respective Govern-
ment. The appointment of the two Sudanese members shall be 
1. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers. 1963, Treaty Series 
No. 47, Cmd. 8004. 
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subject to the subsequent approval of the Sudanese Parliament 
when it is elected, and the Parliament shall be entitled to 
nominate alternative candidates in case of disapproval. The 
Commission hereby set up will be formally appointed by Egyptian 
Government decree. 
Art. 5. The two contracting Governments agree that, it 
being a fundamental principle of their common policy to maintain 
the unity of the Sudan as a single territory, the special powers 
which are vested in the Governor-General by Article 100 of the 
Self-Govemment Statute shall not be exercised in any manner 
which is in conflict with that policy. 
Art. 6. The Governor-General shall remain directly 
responsible to the two contracting Governments as regards; 
<a) external affairs; 
Cb) any change requested by the Sudanese Parliament under 
Article 101 (1) of the Statute for Self-Government as regards any 
part of the Statute; 
(c) any resolution passed by the Commission which he regards 
as inconsistent with his responsibilities. In this case he will 
inform the two contracting Governments, each of which must give 
an answer within one month of the date of formal notice. The 
Commission's resolutions shall stand unless the two Governments 
agree to the contrary. 
Art. 7. There shall be constituted a Mixed Electoral 
Coionission of seven members. These shall be three Sudanese 
appointed by the Governor-General with the approval of his 
Commission, one Egyptian citissen, one citizen of the United 
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Kingdom, one citizen of the United States of America, and one 
Indian citizen* The non-Sudanese members shall be nominated by 
their respective Governments. The Indian member shall be Chairman 
of the Commission. The Commission shall be appointed by the 
Governor^General on the instructions of the two contracting 
Governments. The terms of reference of this Commission are 
contained in Annex II to this Agreement. 
Art. 8. To provide the free and neutral atmosphere 
requisite for Self-Determination there shall be established a 
Sudanisation Committee consisting of: 
(a) an Egyptian citizen and a citizen of the United Kingdom 
to be nominated by their respective Governments and subsequently 
appointed by the Governor-General, together with three Sudanese 
members to be selected from a list of five names submitted to him 
by the Prime Minister of the Sudan. The selection and appointment 
of these Sudanese members shall have the prior approval of the 
Governor-General*s Commission; 
(b) one or more members of the Sudan Public Service 
Commission who will act in a purely advisory capacity without the 
right to vote; 
(c) the function and terms of reference of this Committee 
are contained in Annex III to this Agreement. 
Art. 9. The transitional period shall begin on the day 
designated as "the appointed day" in Article 2 of the Self-
Government Statute. Subject to the completion of the Sudanisation 
as outlined in Annex III to this Agreement, the two contracting 
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Governments undertake to bring the transitional period to an 
end as soon as possible. In any case this period shall not 
exceed three years. It shall be brought to an end in the 
following manner. The Sudanese Parliament shall pass a resolution 
expressing their desire that arrangements for Self-Determination 
shall be put in motion and the Governor-General shall notify 
the two contracting Governments of this resolution. 
Art. 10. When the two contracting Governments have been 
fbrmally notified of this resolution, the Sudanese Government, 
then existing, shall draw up a draft law for the election of the 
Constituent Assembly which it shall submit to Parliament for 
approval. The Governor-General shall give his consent to the law 
with the agreement of his Commission. Detailed preparations Ibp 
the process of Self-Determination, including safeguards assuring 
the impartiality of the elections and any other arrangements 
designed to secure a free and neutral atmosphere, shall be subject 
to international supervision. The two contracting Governments 
will accept the recommendations of any international body which 
may be set up to this end. 
Art. 11. Egyptian and British military forces diall 
withdraw from the Sudan immediately upon the Sudanese Parliament 
adopting a resolution expressing its desire that arrangements 
for Self-Determination be put in motion. The two contracting 
Governments undertake to complete the withdrawal of their forces 
from the Sudan within a period not exceeding three months. 
Art. 12. The Constituent 'Assembly shall have two duties 
to discharge. The first will be to decide the future of the 
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Sudan as one integral whole* The second will be to draw up 
a constitution for the Sudan compatible with the decision which 
shall have been taken in this respect, as well as an electoral 
law for a pennanent* Sudanese Parliament. The future of the Sudan 
shall be decided eitherJ 
(a) by the Constituent Assembly choosing to link the Sudan 
with Egypt in any form, or 
(b) by the Constituait Assembly choosing complete 
independence* 
Art. 13. The two contracting Governments undertake to 
respect the decision of the Constituent Assembly concerning the 
future status of the Sudan and each Government will take all the 
measures which may be necessary to give effect to its decision. 
Art. 14. The two contracting Governments agree that the 
draft Self-Government Statute shall be amended in accordance with 
Annex IV to this Agreement. 
Art. 15. This Agreement and its attachments shall come 
into force upon signature. 
Appendix IV 
AGREEMENT BEO^EEN THE GOVERNMENT OP THE UNITED 
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND 
AND THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING 
THE SUE2 CANAL BASE 
Cairo, October 19, 1964 
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and the Government of the Republic of Egypt, 
Desiring to establish Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new 
basis of mutual understanding and firm friendship. 
Have agreed as follows 
Article 1 
Her Majesty's Forces shall be completely withdrawn from 
Egyptian territory in accordance with the Schedule set forth in 
Part A of Annex I within a period of twenty months from the date 
of signature of the present Agreement. 
Article 2 
The Government of the United Kingdom declare that the 
Treaty of Alliance signed in London on the 26th of August,' 1936, 
with the Agreed Minute, Exchanged Notes, Convention concerning the 
immunities and privileges enjoyed by the British Forces in Egypt 
and all other subsidiary agreements, is terminated* 
Article 3 
Parts of the present Suez Canal Base, which are listed in 
Appendix A to Annex II, shall be kept in efficient working order 
and capable of immediate use in accordance with the provisions of 
!• Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers^ 1954^  Egypt Wo. 2 
Cmd. 9298. 
-363-! 
Article 4 of the present Agreement. To this end they shall be 
organised in accordance with the provisions of Annex II* 
Article 4 
In the event of an armed attack by an outside Power on any 
country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement 
is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League 
States, signed in Cairo on the 13th of April, 1950, or on Turkey, 
Egypt shall afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may 
be necessary in order to place the Base on a war footing and to 
operate it effectively. These facilities shall include the use 
of Egyptian ports within the limits of what is strictly 
indispensable for the above-mentioned purposes. 
Article 5 
In the event of the return of British Forces to the Suez 
Canal Base area in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, 
these forces shall withdraw immediately upon the cessation of the 
hostilities referred to in that Article. 
« 
Article 6 
In the event of a threat of an armed attack by an outside 
power on any country which at the date of signature of the present 
Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab 
League States or on Turkey, there shall be inmediate consultation 
between Egypt and the United Kingdom. 
Article 7 
The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall afford over-
flying, landing and servicing facilities for notified flights of 
aircraft under Royal Air Force control. For the clearance of any 
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flights of such aircraft, the Government of the Republic of 
Egypt shall accord treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to the aircraft of any other foreign country with the 
exception of States parties to the Treaty of Joint Defence between 
Arab Xeague States. The landing and servicing facilities 
mentioned above shall be afforded at Egyptian Airfields in the 
Suez Canal Base area* 
Article 8 
The two Contracting Governments recognise that the Suez 
Iferitime Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway 
economically, commercially and strategically of international 
importance, and express the determination to uphold the Convention 
guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal signed at 
Constantinople on the 29th of October, 1888. 
Article 9 
(a) The itoited Kingdom is accorded the right to move any 
British equipment into or out of the Base at its discretion. 
(b) There shall be no increase above the level of supplies 
as agreed upon in Part C of Annex II without the consent of the 
Government of the Republic of Egypt. 
Article 10 
The present Agreement does not affect and shall not be 
interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of 
the parties under the Charter of the United Nations. 
Article 11 
The Annexes and Appendices to the present Agreement shall 
be considered as an integral part of it. 
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Article 12 
Ca) The present Agreement shall remain in force for the 
period of seven years from the date of its signature. 
(b) During the last twelve months of that period the two 
ir 
Contracting Governments shall consult together to decide on such 
arrangements as may be necessary upon the termination of the 
Agreement. 
(c) Unless both the Contracting Governments agree upon any 
extension of the Agreement it shall terminate seven years after 
the date of signature and the Government of the United Kingdom 
shall take away or dispose of their property then remaining in 
the Base* 
Article 13 
The present Agreement shall have effect as though it had 
come into force on the date of signature. Instruments of ratifi-
cation shall be exchanged in Cairo as soon as possible. 
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised 
thereto, have signed the present Agreement and have affixed 
thereto their seals. 
Done at Cairo, this nineteenth day of October, 1964, in 
duplicate, in the English and Arabic languages, both texts being 
equally authentic. 
ANTHDNT NUTTING 
RALPH SKRIKE STEVENSON 
E-H. BENSON 
CL.S.) GAMAL ABDEL NASSER 
(L.S.^  ABDEL HAKIM AMER 
(lis.) SALAH SALEM 
(L.S. MAHMOUD FAltfZI 
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Awraix I 
Withdrawal of Her Ma.1e5ty's Forces 
(With Reference to Article I of the present Agreement) 
Part A 
1. In accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of the 
present Agreement, the following percentages of Her Majesty's 
Forces in Egypt on the 27th of July, 1854, shall have been with-
drawn between that date and the dates indicated in the schedule 
below:-
Percentage of Date Her Majesty's Forces 
Date of Signature of the Agreement plus 
4 months. ••• ••• 22^ 
Date of Signature of the Agreement plus 
8 months. ••• 35^ 
Date of Signature of the Agreement plus 
12 months. ••• ••• 
Date of Signature of the Agreement plus 
16 months. ••• 
Date of Signature of the Agreement plus 
20 months. ... ... 100^ 
2* In connection with the above-mentioned withdrawal, the 
Government of the Republic of Egypt shall afford all necessary 
facilities for the movement of men and material. 
Part B 
Procedure for Standing Machinery^ Staff Contacts 
and Issue of Instructions to the Appropriate 
Egyptian and British Authorities to Facili-
tate Withdrawal 
1. For the period of withdrawal mentioned in Article 1 of 
the present Agreement, the British and the Egyptian Authorities 
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wiii each designate appropriate Headquarters in the Canal Area 
which will be responsible for the progressive transfer of 
responsibility for security or maintenance of installations from 
British to Egyptian control. 
2« - (a) The British Headquqrters for this purpose will be 
the Headquarters British Troops in Egypt and the Headquqrters 
No,206 Group, Itoyal Air Force. 
(b) The Egyptian Headquqrters for this purpose will be 
the Headquarters Eastern Command. 
3. The Headquarters mentioned in paragraph 2 «ill be the 
link between the British and the Egyptian Authorities on all 
details in connection with the transfer of responsibilities for 
the security and maintenance of installations from British to 
Egyptian control. The Headquarters will establish direct staff 
contacts as appropriate to carry out the task on the lines set 
out in this Annex. Through the medium of their respective Movements 
Staffs, they will arrange for all the facilities to be provided 
by the Egyptian Authorities for the British Forces under para-
graph 2 of Part A of this Annex. 
4. During the period of withdrawal, the Headquarters 
Eastern Command will gradually assume increasing responsibility 
for the control of the Canal Area as the commitments of the British 
Headquqrters diminish. 
6. The British Headquarters will draw up an outline 
progranine of withdrawal from the various installations for which 
they are at present responsible. This programme will be discussed 
between the British and the Egyptian Headquqrters so that the 
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Sgyptian Authorities may make plans accordingly for the 
progressive assumption of their responsibilities. The Egyptian 
Headquarters may propose in discussion minor modifications of 
dates, timing or areas concerned. 
6* It is desirable that the transfer of responsibilities 
from the British to the Egyptian Authorities should be carried out 
by complete zones. But in cases where this is not possible, it is 
agreed, in the interests of ensuring a clear division of 
responsibility, that installations and areas handed over will be 
of such a size as will avoid the mixing of British and Egyptian 
Forces and producing circumstances where responsibilities cannot 
be clearly defined. 
7. Except as provided for in paragraph 8, the responsibility 
for the security and maintenance of an installation will not be 
transferred when;-
(a) the installation is still operated by British Forces; 
' or 
(b) the installation forms part of a larger installation 
still operated by British Forces. 
8. When an installation is handed over to the Egyptian 
Authorities for security or maintenance the withdrawal of British 
Forces from such installation will be complete and likewise the 
assun5)tion of responsibility for the security or the maintenance 
of the installation by the Egyptian Authorities will be complete. 
Nevertheless, the Egyptian Authorities agree that they will, on 
request by the British Headquqrters, assume responsibility for the 
security of a particular installation while a limited number of 
British technical troops are still engaged within the installation. 
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Such a request shall not be made unless the number of British 
guard troops available is inadequate to ensure security. 
9. When an installation is to be handed over to the 
Egyptian Authorities for security or maintenance, the Egyptian 
Headquarters will be notified as far in advance as possible and 
a date for the handing over will be agreed between the British 
and the Egyptian Headquarters. 
10» A hand-over document of each installation will be 
prepared by the British Forces in such detail as may be agreed 
between the British and the Egyptian Headquarters, and will be 
handed over to the Egyptian Authorities in advance of the transfer, 
so as to enable the Egyptian Authorities to assess the security 
and maintenance problems and to make appropriate arrangements to 
deal with them. 
11. When any installation is handed over to the Egyptian 
Authorities for security or maintenance, all defence posts, 
emplacements, barbed wire fences, communications, perimeter 
lighting where applicable, and fire fighting equipment on an 
appropriate scale, connected with the protection of the installa-
tion will be handed over by th© British to the Egyptian Authorities. 
In addition all available information including data as to the 
pattern, number and location of mines will be handed over. In 
order to ensure a smooth and efficient transfer of responsibilities, 
the British Headquarters will provide all possible assistance and 
give advice, where required, particularly as regards mines. 
12. When an installation, not listed in Appendix A to 
Annex II, is to be evacuated by British Forces, the Egyptian 
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Headquarters will be notified as far in advance as possible. 
13. During the period of withdrawal, British and Egyptian 
Forces will have unhampered use of the railways and main roads 
through each other*s areas of responsibility. When large-scale 
movements are contemplated, previous notification will be given 
and the necessary traffic control arrangements made® 
14. During the period of withdrawal, training areas will 
be agreed between the British and the Egyptian Headquarters. 
15. In order to avoid interference between radio stations 
operated by the British Forces and the Egyptian Forces in the 
Canal Area during the period of withdrawal, the use of non-
internationally registered radio frequencies in the Canal Area 
subject to co-ordination between the British and the Egyptian 
Headquarters. 
Part C 
Engagement and Security Scre^ng of Workers 
The following provisions shall apply with respect to the 
engagement by the British Forces in the Suez Canal Area of 
technicians and personnel and other local labour (hereinafter 
referred to as "workers") and the security screening of those 
workers:-
1. Employment offices at Port Said, Ismailia, Suez and 
Zagazig will register workers for employment by British Forces. 
2. The British Forces Labour Engagement Units will be 
placed to conform with the location of the Employment Offices 
mentioned in paragraph 1 and there will be full co-operation 
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between these Units and Offices, and between the Central Labour 
Authorities of the British Forces and the Central Office of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs at Ismailia. 
3. The British Forces Labour Engagement Units will give 
full details of occupational requirements when notifying vacancies 
to the Employment Officess 
4. Applicants registered at the En^loyment Offices will 
be screened by Officers of the Egyptian Ministey of the Interior. 
6. If, however, the Security Officer of the British 
Forces considers that an applicant is undesirable, this fact will 
be notified to the Employment Office concerned. The reasons 
will also be notified whenever possible. 
6f No vjorker will be engaged by the British Forces unless 
he has been registered at and submitted by an Employment Office 
after screening by the Officers of the Egyptian Ministry of the 
Interior. 
7. The British Forces will trade-test applicants in 
skilled occupations as may be necessary and in accordance with 
present practice. If sb applicant is not accepted, the Employment 
Office will be notified and brief reasons will be given. 
8. Workers ec^ jloyed by the British Forces, who become 
redundant as withdrawal proceeds, will not be discharged until 
they have been considered for transfer to other units of the 
British Forces which may need additional workers in similar 
occupations. Notifications of such transfers will be sent to the 
Employment Offices concerned. Vftien notice of termination of 
services is given to a worker, notification will be sent to the 
appropriate Employment Office. 
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9* As and when the services of workers are terminated 
by the British Forces, such workers will, in accordance with 
the Civilian Employees Hegulations of the British Armed Forces 
in the Suez Canal Zone, be paid the leaving indemnities due to 
them and be given their appropriate notice or alternatively 
wages in lieu of such notice. 
I0« The provisions of paragraphs 1 to.8 above apply to 
all workers, other than those of British nationality en5)loyed 
by the British Forces. 
ANNEX II 
Organisation of the Base 
Part A 
1. For the purposes of the present Agreement, the 
following definitions shall apply:-
(a) "The Base" shall mean the installations listed 
in Appendix "A" to this Annex, including both land 
and buildings, but excluding the equipment therein. 
(b) "British equipment" shall mean all movable property, 
including such property fixed to permanent founda-
tions, oTTOed by the Government of the United Kingdom. 
(c) "British technicians" shall mean the civilian 
, - personnel of British nationality employed in Egypt 
by the commercial firms in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 8 of this part of this Annex. 
(d) "Aircraft under Royal Air Force Control" shall mean 
. . aircraft of Her Majesty's Forces and British civilian 
aircraft under charter to them. 
2. (a) The Government of the United Kingdom shall have the 
right to maintain, and to operate for current requirements, th© 
installations numbered as serials 1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 16, 30 
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34 inclusive and 36 in the list at Appendix "A" to this Annex. 
(b) Should the Government of the United Kingdom decide 
at any time no longer to maintain any of these installations, 
they will discuss its disposal with the Government of the Republic 
of Egypt. 
<c) The approval of the Government of the Republic of 
Egypt shall be obtained for any new construction in any of the 
installations mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of tMs paragraph. 
3. The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall maintain 
in good order each of the installations numbered as serials 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17 to 29 inclusive and 37 in the list 
at Appendix "A" to this Annex from the date on which the installa-
tion is handed over to the Government of the Republic of Egypt 
by the Government of the United Kingdom. 
4. Within a period of twenty months from the date of 
signature of the present Agreement, the Government of the United 
Kingdom shall transfer to the Government of the Republic of Egypt 
ownership and possession of the installations and equipment listed 
in Appendix "B" 
5. Following the withdrawal of Her Majesty's Forces, the 
Government of the Republic of Egypt as the sovereign government 
shall assume responsibility for the security of the installations 
and of all equipment contained therein, or in transit to or from 
the Base, in accordance with the provisions of part "E" of this 
Annex. 
6. For the purpose of maintaining and operating the 
installations referred to in paragraph 2(a) above and the British 
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equipment therein, tfi© Government of the United Kingdom shall 
conclude contracts with one or more British or Egyptian commercial 
firms (hereinafter referred to as contractors) 
7. - (a) The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall give 
full support to the contractors who shall be afforded such 
facilities as may be required to enable them to carry out their 
tasks* 
(b) The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall designate 
an authority with whom the contractors can co-operate in carrying 
out those tasks. This authority will be the General Officer 
Commanding Eastern Command, or any person delegated to act on 
his behalf. 
(c) A Board of filanagement shall be appointed by the 
contractors and established in the Base to co-ordinate the 
contractors' activities. 
8- (a) The contractors shall have the right to employ 
British technicians up to a total of 1,200 but not exceeding for 
those recruited outside Egypt a total of 800; as well as such 
Egyptian technicians and personnel, and such local labour engaged 
in Egypt as they may require.* 
(b) The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall give 
facilities for the entry into and exit from Egypt of British 
technicians and their families. 
(*) British civilian technicians will be located at Abu Sueir 
Airfield and Fanara Flying Boat Station to assist in the servicing 
of aircraft under Royal Air Force control and in the take-off, 
flying and landing procedures in connection with the landing and 
servicing facilities mentioned in Article 7 of the presait Agreonent. 
So far as can be foreseen the number of such technicians located at 
Abu Sueir Airfield and Fanara Flying Boat Station will be 23. 
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9. The Government of the United Kingdom shall be afforded 
facilities for the inspection of the installations referred to 
in paragraph 2 (a) of this Part of this Annex, and the work 
being carried out therein. For this purpose, personnel, not 
exceeding eight in number, shall be attached to Her Majesty's 
Embassy in Cairo. In addition, personnel, not exceeding five in 
number, may be attached temporarily to Her Majesty's Embassy in 
Cairo-
Part B 
Contractors and their Employees 
1. Egyptian law shall apply to the activities in Egypt of 
companies and partnerships acting as contractors for the purposes 
of the present Agreement and to their personnel. 
2. Nevertheless, any such company or partnership having 
its head office and the office of its principal activity outside 
Egypt, and having no other activities in Egypt at the date of 
signature of the present Agreement, shall, with respect to its 
activities pursuant to the present Agreement, enjoy the following 
exemptions:-
(a) Such company or partnership shall not be required 
to effect any registration under the provisions of 
the Egyptian Commercial Register Law No. 219 of 1953 
or be required to comply with the provisions of 
Articles 91, 92 and 93 of the Egyptian Companies law 
No. 26 of 1954. 
(b) Such company or partnership shall not be required to 
pay Egyptian tax on profits including the tax on the 
presumed distribution of dividends under Article 11 
of Law No. 14 of 1939. 
(c) With respect to British technicians recruited outside 
Egypt for the purposes of the present Agreement, any 
such company or partnership, as well as those technicians^ 
shall be exempt from the follov^ ing Egyptian laws:-
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(i) Individual Contract of Service Laws No. 317 of 
1952 and No, 165 of 1953; 
(ii) Law concerning Compulsory Insurance in respect of 
Workmen's Compensation No. 86 of 1942, Workmen's 
Compensation Law No. 89 of 1950 and Xaw on Con^ jensa-
tion for Industrial Diseases No. 117 of 1950, or 
any other Law which may require industrial insurance 
or compensation for industrial diseases; and 
(iii) Xaw relating to Workers' Syndicates No. 319 of 
- 1952. 
3. References to laws in the preceding paragraph include 
any enactment replacing or amending these laws. 
4. The Government of the Eepublic of Egypt express their 
willingness to consider sympathetically the grant of exemption 
from any law that may impede the performance by the contractors 
and their personnel of their tasks pursuant to the purposes of 
the present Agreement. 
5. - Ca) With reference to paragraph 2, no activity shall 
be regarded as being outside the purposes of the present Agreement 
if it is done for the Government of the Republic of Egypt all 
their request. 
(b) Subject to the consent of and on conditions agreed 
with the Government of the Republic of Egypt, a company or 
I^rtnership referred to in paragraph 2 may, with respect to its 
activities pursuant to the present Agreement, continue to enjoy 
the exemptions referred to in paragraph 2 to 4, notwithstanding 
any new activities in Egypt outside the purposes of the present 
Agreement. 
6. Any company incorporated under the laws in force in 
the United Kingdom solely to act as a contractor for the purposes 
of the present Agreement and having its head office outside Egypt 
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shall be treated in the same way and enjoy the same exemptions 
as companies and partnerships referred to in paragraph 2 notwith-
standing that the office of the principal activity of such first-
mentioned company may be in Egypt. 
7. - (a) In accordance with paragraph 2 (c) of Part A of 
this Annex, contractors may, subject to agreement v/ith th® 
Government of the Republic of Egypt, build houses in so far as 
the requirements of their personnel are not covered by existing 
accommodation* 
Cb) Contractors may also hire bourses subject to such 
conditions as may be agreed between them and the lessors. 
8. - (a) Companies and partnerships incorporated or formed 
under the laws in force in the United Kingdom and engaged in 
activities pursuant to the present Agreement and British 
technicians employed by such companies and partnerships shall, 
with respect to those activities, be accorded in Egypt treatment 
no less favourable than that accorded to the nationals, including 
companies and partnerships, of emy other foreign country. 
Cb) The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph 
shall not be construed as conferring any right or privilege which 
is or may be accorded only to Arab League States. 
9. Companies and partnerships engaged in activities 
pursuant to the present Agreement end their British workers, 
employees and personnel shall, with respect to those activities, 
be accorded treatment no less favourable than that afforded 
generally to Egyptian nationals, including companies and partner-
ships. The provisions of this paragraph shall not confer any 
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special privilege which is granted to Egyptian nationals in 
special circumstances. 
10. Any service rendered or supply furnished from 
installations listed in Appendix "A" to this Annex or at Egyptian 
airfields in the Suez Canal Base area by contractors to Egyptian 
authorities or by Egyptian authorities to contractors will be 
at cost price, i.e. at a price con5>osed of the cost of the 
materials consumed, the labour used and a due allowance for 
actual overhead expenses in providing the service or supply. 
Part C 
(With reference to Article 9 of the present 
Agreement) 
1. The supplies held in the Base will consist of the 
categories listed in Appendix "C" to this Annex. After the end 
of the period of withdrawal, the level of supplies in each 
category shall not exceed the figure quoted in the schedule. 
Except with the consent of the Egyptian authorities, supplies in 
one category shall not be replaced by supplies of another 
category. 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1 above the contractors 
will, after the period of withdrawal, give the Egyptian Designated 
Authority information regarding the disposition, composition and 
amount of the supplies held in the installations. 
3. The procedure to be followed with respect to the 
insert and export of British equipment being moved into or out 
of the Base is set forth in Appendix "D" to this Annex. 
4. The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall accord 
-369-! 
all necessary facilities for the storage and turnover of 
petroleum products to the contractor who maintains and operates 
the installation's numbered as serials 30 to 34 inclusive in 
Appendix "A" to this Annex as well as the storage capacity-
leased to him by the Government of the Republic Efeypt numbered 
as serial 35 in that Appendix. Petroleum products thus held on 
behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom shall be in 
accordance with paragraph 1 above. 
Part D 
Imports and Exports 
1. British technicians recruited outside Egypt may, on 
first arrival, import into Egypt free of customs duty their 
personal effects and household goods. Members of one household 
may, on first arrival, in5)ort into Egypt free of customs duty 
personal effects and household goods belonging to other members 
of the same household. 
2. - (a) Provided that the supplies held in the Base do 
. 1 
not exceed the level for which provision is made in paragraph 1 
of Part C of this Annex, the contractors may import into Egypt 
and use for the purposes of the present Agreement, without 
licence, let or hindrance and free of any customs duty or any 
other dues or taxes. British equipment consigned by the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom which is either Ci) within the 
categories of supplies referred to in that paragraph, or Cii) to 
replace equipment within any installation. 
(b) Nevertheless, this exemption from customs duty, other 
dues and taxes shall not extend to:-
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(i) any petrol, oil or lubricants used by the 
^ - contractors; 
(ii) any motor vehicles (other than tank transporters 
and their towing vehicles) used by the contractors 
outside the installations, or 
(iii) any office furniture or office supplies i^orted 
and used by the contractors. 
3* No property inqaorted into Egypt inraccordance with 
the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be sold in Egypt 
unless Egyptian customs duty and all other dues are paid at the 
appropriate rate. 
4. The Egyptian authorities shall permit, without 
licence, let or hindrance and without fee or other charge, the 
export by contractors of any British equipment now in the Base, 
imported into Egypt or manufactured in Egypt for the purposes of 
the present Agreement, and the export by British technicians 
recruited outside Egypt of any property imported into Egypt by 
them. 
Part E 
(With reference to paragraph 5 of Fart A 
of this Annex) 
Security 
1. The installations shall receive from the Government of 
the Republic of Egypt as the sovereign Government the necessary 
measures for their security. Accordingly, the measures taken by 
Republic of Egypt 
the Government of the^Eepublic for the security of the installa-
tions handed over to the contractors shall not be less effective 
than those taken Sor the security of coD^arable Egyptian 
installations. 
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2. The measures to be taken by the Government of the 
Republic of Egypt for the security of installations handed over 
to the contractors shall include the upkeep of perimeter wires, 
perimeter lighting and defence posts and the provision of defence 
fto4?es',.ncoaDjBi|nications and other necessary measures. Material for 
the replacement or uiaintenance of such perimeter wires, perimeter 
lighting and defence posts shall be provided by the Grovernment 
of the United Kingdom. 
3. Without prejudice to the general principles mentioned 
above, the contractors shall 
(a) take all reasonable measures necessary to prevent 
theft, sabotage and fire inside the perimeter of 
the installations, including the posting of internal 
security civilian guards; and 
(b) in particular ensure that, as far as facilities 
permit, stores are kept under lock and key, and 
and only the minimum in open stacks; and 
(c) without prejudice to the provisions of sub-para-
graphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, comply with 
Egyptian general security regulations issued by 
the Egyptian Designated Authority and applicable 
to comparable Egyptian installations so far as they 
relate to the matters mentioned in those sub-
paragraphs; in this connection the Egyptian 
authorities shall have the right to carry out 
inspections to ascertain that these regulations 
are complied with; and 
(d) co-operate fully with the Egyptian authorities in 
the maintenance of the security of the installations. 
4. The appropriate Egyptian authorities and the contractors 
shall jointly establish and enforce a pass system to cover the 
entry into and the exit from the installations of persons, vehicles, 
equipment and stores with a view to reducing the risk of loss 
or sabotage. 
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6. The Egyptian authorities, being responsible for the 
genei«.l security of equipment and stores during movement, shall 
be given 48 hours notice when it is intended to move equipment 
or stores to or from installations except in cases where the 
Egyptian authorities agree to a shorter period of notice. 
Similar notification should be giv^ to the Egyptian authorities 
in the case of stores awaiting movement at docks or railway 
sidings. 
Part F 
Engagement of Workers by Contractors and 
their Security Screeing 
The following provisions shall apply with respect to the 
engagement by contractors of technicians and personnel and other 
local labour (hereinafter referred to as "Workers") and the 
security screeing of such workers:-
!• The Ministry of Social Affairs Employment Offices will 
provide full facilities to the contractors for the engagement 
of their workers. 
2. The location of the installations will determine the 
Employment Offices with which contractors will co-operate. 
3. The contractors will give full details of occupational 
requirements when notifying vacancies to the Employment Offices. 
4. Workers engaged by contractors who have been previously 
employed by Her Majesty's Forces and have been screened by 
Officers of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior will not be 
screened again, but all other workers previously employed by 
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Her Majesty's Forces will be so screened before engagement 
by the contractors. 
6. No worker, who has not previously been employed by 
Her Majesty's Forces or by a contractor, will be engaged by a 
contractor or be otherwise employed within an installation unless 
he has been registered at and submitted by an Employment Office 
after screening by Officers of the Egyptian Ministry of the 
Interior. 
6. A worker who has already been trade-tested by Her 
Majesty's Forces or by another contractor may be engaged by a 
contractor in a similar occupation without further test. In the 
case, however, of a new applicant who is submitted to a contractor 
and is rejected after trade-testing, the Employment Office will 
be notified and brief reasons will be given. 
7* The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 6 above apply to all 
workers, other than those of British nationality (who will be 
included in the agreed number of British technicians employed by 
the contractors). 
X X X X X X 
Appendix B 
(With reference to Paragraph 4 of part A of 
Annex. II) 
The following are the installations to be transferredJ-
(a) All the airfields in the Suez Canal Base area 
occupied by Her Majesty's Forces. These are situated at:-
E1 Firdan. 
Ismailia, excluding the area of HQ MEAF stated in ucijkxxa,, area UJ. MCtAr Serial 37 of Appendix A to Annex II. 
-374-! 
Abu Sueir 
Deversoir (excluding that part built on land which 
forms part of the concession of the Suez Maritime 
Canal Company). 
Fayid. 
Kasffereet 
Panara (Flying Boat Station). 
Kabrit 
Shandur, and 
Shallufa. 
(b) Navy House, Port Said. 
(d) Adabiya Port, including heavy cranes. 
(d) Royal Naval Boom Depot, Adabijfty. 
(e) The Delta Station. 
(f) Moascar** 
(g) Serials 2,3,4,5,6,11,12,13,15,17-29 inclusive and 
37 in the list of Installations in Appendix A to 
Annex II* 
Appendix C 
(With reference to Paragraph 1 of Part C of this 
Annex) 
Level of Supplies 
Category Level 
1. Ammunition^ including all natures of 
ammunition, mines and explosives. 50000 (tons) 
2. Stores, including bridging equipment, 
engineer and ordnance stores. 300,000 (tons) 
(*) Ownership and possession of Moascar Area shall be transferred 
under the terms of paragraph 4 of Part A of Annex II to the present 
Agreement with the exception of the possession of the area 
referred to under Serial 36 of Appendix A to Part A of Annex II 
(and shown and outlined on the site plan attached thereto) which 
shall be reserved rent free for the accommodation of British 
technicians during the period of the present Agreement. 
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3. Unartaoured Vehicles* ••• 
4» Engineer Equipments, including engineer 
plant and earth-moving equipments* 
Railway locomotives 
Railway Wagons 
Craft. 
Air and Ground Fuels 
Petrol and Water Containers 
7* Equipment under Repair -
Heavy and Light Armoured Vehicles 
Wheeled Vehicles 
Afitillery Equipments 
Eqgineer Plant and Equipments 
Other Stores 
2,000 (number) 
500 (pieces) 
30 (number) 
100 (number) 
3 (number) 
80,000 (tons) 
1,300,000 (jerricans) 
70 (number 
400 (number^  
50 (number^  
50 (number, 
1,500 (tons) 
Appendix D 
(With reference to paragraph 3 of part C of 
this Annex) 
Procedure for Clearance of British Equipment 
through Egyptian Ports 
The following procedure shall apply with respect to the 
in^ort and export of British equipment being moved into or out 
of the Base:-
1* Movement of British equipment into or out of the Base 
shall take place in accordance with a Freight Movement Instruction 
issued to a contractoraa by the British authorities* A copy of 
the Freight Movement Instruction shall be given to the Egyptian 
authorities, in the case of British equipment moved out of the 
Base, before shipment takes place, and in the case of inward 
shipment before the arrival of the British equipm^it in Egypt. 
The Freight Movement Instruction shall contain details of the 
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consignment, including the Freight Shipment Order number bj^  
which each item is identified. The Freight Shipment Order humher 
shall be marked upon the items shipped. 
2. British equipment to be moved into or out of the Base 
shall, with respect to its transit between the Egyptian port and 
the installation concerned, be covered by a Convoy Note (in 
the case of road or inland water transport) or by a Railway 
l^ arrant, as the case may be. Copies of these documents, which 
shall bear the Freight Shipmentx Order number of each item, 
shall be given to the Egyptian Designated Authority. 
3. In the case of outward shipment, Preign Bequisitions 
shall be submitted by the contractors to a designated Freight 
Agent at the port of shipment. These requisitions shall contain 
the exact measurement of each item, and shall refer in each case 
to the Freight Shipment Order number. Copies of Freight 
Requisitions shall be given to the port authorities at the port 
of shipment. 
4. Copies of Bills of Lading and of Ships' Manifests 
shall be available to the Egyptian port and customs authorities 
in the normal manner. 
5. The designated Freight Agent shall, on behalf of the 
contractors, supply to the Egyptian port and customs authorities 
such information, docmaents and forms as are required to comply 
with the normal working procedure of these authorities. 
6. Inspection by Egyptian authorities of British equipment 
moved into or out of the Base shall be in accordance with the 
following procedure;-
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(a) In the case of imports, inspection shall normally 
take place at the port of entry into Egypt, and, in 
the case of exports, in the installation in which 
the British equipment to be moved is held. 
(b) Inspection shall be carried out without unnecessary 
delay. 
(c) After inspection clearance shall be given to the 
British equipment either by affixing a mark upon it 
or by the issue of a document-
ed) If articles arrive in tropical packing, the packages 
shall not be opened at the port of entry and shall 
be sealed by the Egyptian authorities. 
Such articles shall be held on charge by the 
contractors in the installations. These articles 
shall not be unpacked unless in the presence of the 
Egyptian authorities, 
(e) Packages containing such articles and bearing unbroken 
seals shall be cleared for re-export without being 
opened. 
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A B S T R A C T 
Egypt's long and arduous struggle to emancipate herself 
from the yoke of British ioperiallsm can be divided in four 
stages. The first phase of her nationalism began with the 
popular uprising of Colonel Ahmed ^rabi against t^e interference 
of foreign powers in Egypt's domestic matters. ihjtL British 
forceibly suppressed his nationalist cau^aign and occi:^ )ied Egypt 
in 1882. 
The First World War and the subsequent pix>withes of the 
then vrorld leadership assuring self determination and freedom 
for all non-self governing* dominions added ia^etus to their 
upsurge and consequently, con^elled Great Britain to grant par-
tial autonomy to Egypt to manage her municipal affairs in Feb. 
ruary 1922, Matters relating to foreign policy, defence, the 
minorities and the Sudan were still the sole concern of His 
Majesty's 
Government. Ihe Egyptians, though bitter about the 
reserved points, nevertheless, accepted it as a step towards the 
attainment of full independence* 
32ie Second Phase of Egypt's relations with Britain began 
with the conclusion of the 1936 Treaty between them. Nahas 
Pasha the then Prime Minister of the Wafdist Government, accep-
ted and signed the instrument under great pressure of mounting 
international tension,' With the intensifying bitterness and 
growing hostility between the Allied on the one hand and the Axis 
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Powers on the other, the danger of a major conflagration had, 
by then, isdcome almost certain, and, it was a foregone conclu* 
sion that in such an eventuality, Egypt was not destined to 
remain aloof or unaffected* Being a British-occupied territory, 
she had already become the natural target of the iUis assualt. 
For the same reason she was also denied the freedom to choose 
sides. 
Die third important phase of Egypt's nationalist struggle 
began with the end of the World War II. In the new scheme of 
things, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the 
strongest and, therefore, the most dominant Powers. Economic 
prosperity and military strength of Great Britain had been largely 
reduced by the stresses and strains of the war. Bie emergence 
of nationalist caiapaigns throughout Asia and Jlfrica, inspired 
by the ideals and objectives of the United Nations, further com-
pelled the British to redefine their relations with the people 
hitherto under her dominance or subjugation. 
!Die advent of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom held 
out a hope and a promise to leave Egypt to the sole charge of 
the Egyptians, Prime Minister Attlee boldly recognized their 
claim and the need to revise the 1936 treaty, as the circumstan-
ces under which it had been concluded had substantially changed 
lo^ 
Egyp^ reciprocated the British gestures of goodwill by adopting 
moderate and accommodating attitude towards Britain's vital 
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interests in their country, Eie two countries had nearly 
reached an agreement to replace the treaty by a new Pact of 
friendship and cocoperation - the Sidk^-Bevin Agreement, but 
far the question of the Sudan. Due to pressures of domestic 
politics, Attlee's government backed-out of its pledges regard-
ing the unity of the Nile valley under the Egyptian Crown, 
Bae fate of Egypt's appeal to the Security Council against 
Britain»s occupation of another member's territory without the 
kcv 
latter's consent, however, confirmed feedrr suspicion that the 
United Nations, would never act against the interests of a major 
Power, 
A return to direct negotiations, held between June 1950 
and October 1961, accomplished little, except that a plathora 
of notes and conversations changed hands but yielded nothing 
essential. Their basic contentions remained irreconciled, Egypt 
was now more anxious and determined to have her rights, >^ile 
Britain continued to press her to join a Western-sponsored mili-
tary arrangement as a pre-condition for a settlement \diich meant 
their continued presence in a new form. 
Having thlts tried negotiations, international appeal 
and the hope of a new balance of power, the Egyptians took the 
courageous step to denounce the 1936 Treaty. After all, how 
long could a suffering people have patience to continue prolonged 
-4-! 
abortive negotiations, iitoreover, chances of a Conservative 
victory at the polls in the U.K., were also an ia^ jortant con-
sideration in taking m such an action. Ihe ^ nservatives could 
not be expected to concede to the Egyptian dej&ands. 
But the denunciation of the treaty did not end Egypt 
frustrations or its problems in relation to the West. It is 
one thing to do away with a piece of paper and quite another to 
unseat a military occupation. Proclaiming Farifc **King of Egypt 
and the Sudan* did not really unite the Nile Valley. Britain's 
reaction was bitter and resentful, she considered Egypt's action 
illegal and hence ineffective and inconsequential as regard«& 
her position under the said Treaty. At Ismailia, Great Britain 
used force and killed many Egyptian police«man as a preventive 
measure.* 23ie incident led to the sack of Cairo on January 26, 
19S2. 
!I!his chaotic and futile situation paved the way for the 
new "purification** regime of July 23, 19S2. me old party lea-
ders and palace-clique had failed to deal with the national 
crisis iBotUng was left but to dismiss them and make a fresh 
* 
start. The process began with the forced abdication of the 
king on July 26, 1962. 
Ihe reitolutionary regime soon discovered that the stabi-
lity and popularity of the new order as well as the implemen-
tation of their programme of reform and development were dependent 
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or an early settlement of their outstanding issues with the 
British* The question of the Suez Canal evacuation and the 
Sudan were therefore, taken immediately by the new elite. 
After considerable debate and hard bargaining, the 
Revolutionary Council however, succeeded in resolving their 
disputes with Great Britain. Ihey showed remarktble straight, 
forwardness, and foresight based on realism and guided by their 
determination to secure a peaceful settlement. On the question 
of the Sudan, they recognised the principle of self-determina-
tion and finally conceded to the sudanese the right to their 
own independent national existence. 
An agreement on the evacuation of Suez Canal took longer 
and more tenuous course of negotiations. The delay was mainly 
caused by a split in the council of the Revolution on the ques-
tion of its leadership and direction. Nasser*s victory was 
seen in Great Britain as a gurantee against political instabi-
lity and disorder. It also represented a more sober, though 
determined, approach towards the Anglo-Egyptian controversy. 
He displayed great diplomatic astuteness by conceflting to the 
British insistence on the reactivlzation of the base in the 
event of an attack on the Arab states or Turkey. And thus,at 
longlast, the two countries reached an agreement on the evacua-
tion of the British troops from the Suez Canal zone on July 
27, 1964. 
-6-! 
Hie agreement put an end to the 72 years of Britain's 
occi^ jation of Egypt. The Egyptians cleberated the conclusion 
of the agreement as the most glorious event in their history* 
On this day they became a truly independent nation, capable of 
shaping i(!k0eovn destiny, without any limitation on her sovereign 
status. 
After the two most iB5)ortant issues of controversy with 
Great Britain were thus amicably settled, Egypt was quite will-
ing to inculcate better understanding, rather cordial relations 
with the West, Nasser and his colleagues of the revolutionary 
council, ruling with widespread popular support but without the 
JT 
haji?)ering pressure of parties and Parliaments, were sincerely 
determined to transform their country into a really modern and 
prosperous nation. Ihey expected the Western countries to help 
them in the realization of this objective. Denied ttiis assis-
tance, they naturally felt inclined towards the other quarter. 
Great Britain's sponsorship of the Baghdad Pact was considered 
in Egypt an attempt to keep the Arabs weak and divided. From 
then onwards, Egypt led the forces of opposition in the Arab 
world to the western defence schemes and military alliances and 
became one of the major chao^ions of the policy of neutralism 
and non-alignment both in Asia and Africa. 
In brief, the history of Egypt's relations with Great 
Britain is a record of a constant conflict between the former's 
demand for unconditional independence and the latter's concern 
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for its 'historic» position. To the Egyptians nothing was more 
ic^ortant and urgent then the attainment of conq;)lete freedom. To 
realise this objective they willingly sacrificed, rather post-
poned. their country*s socio-dconondc reform and regeneration. 
With the passage of time their nationalist struggle became incre-
asingly vigorous and assertive as was occasionally manifested 
into acts of sabotage and violence. Ihe continued presence of 
foreign troops inside Egypt, against the will of her people was 
a constant irritation and a reminder of the incoii5>leteness of 
their soveriengty, and a reflection on their national dignity, 
Unfortunately the western scholars,by and large, have tried to 
complicate the story inorder to divert attention from its siaqpl© 
justice. They have purposely attributed Egypt's unrest to her 
poor economic conditions, and to a low standard of living, while 
Egypt's contention was that her people hate Britain's occupation 
and could^rest until it was ended. This has been the primary 
Tmte of every Government in Egypt. Ihe position of parties and 
the popularity of their leaders was determined by their ability 
to deal with the British effectively. Their tenure of govern-
ments also depended mostly on their achievements at the popular 
front. Every new government was finally caught between the dile-
mma of actual British possession and the pressure of taie country 
for evacuation. Egypt's national development has suffered because 
the main teii5)o of her political life has centered roaM her stru^ 
ggle with the British. It was evident that until the burning 
issue of her relations with Britain was not satisfactorily solved, 
1/ 
Egypt could not hope to have a really stable government so as put 
internati®ft«i problems of the country in tt® proper perspective. 
